The Impact of EU Criminal Law on the Greek Criminal Justice System by Karanikolas, Spyridon
  
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
 
QUEEN MARY 
 
Ph.D. thesis: 
 ‗The Impact of EU Criminal Law on the Greek Criminal Justice System‘ 
 
 
 
 
By SPYRIDON KARANIKOLAS 
Supervised by Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas 
London, 2011 
 
ii 
 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
 
QUEEN MARY 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis: 
 
 ‗The Impact of EU Criminal Law on the Greek Criminal Justice System‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
of 
Queen Mary College 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
By SPYRIDON KARANIKOLAS 
Supervised by Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas 
London, 2011 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Ph.D. thesis is dedicated to my family, 
                                                                            and especially to my mother Christina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Abstract 
European Criminal Law has been one of the most rapid, remarkable, but at the 
same time controversial developments in the European Union having a significant 
impact on domestic criminal justice systems. Judicial and police cooperation                     
in criminal matters soon became a fully-fledged policy of the European Union 
affecting the national sovereignty of Member States, the relationship between 
individuals and the States as well as the protection of fundamental rights. 
My thesis examines the development of EU criminal law towards the creation of 
a European ‗Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‘ (via mutual recognition and the 
harmonization of substantive criminal law) and its impact on the Greek criminal 
justice system. In assessing the overall above mentioned question, I examine how EU 
criminal law has developed; what have been the main political and legal challenges 
for the implementation in Greece; to what extent, and how, the Greek Legislator has 
implemented EU law in the field of mutual recognition and harmonization, and, last, 
but not least, what has been the judges‘, practitioners‘ and academics‘ reaction to this 
development.  
The thesis has two parts: one on mutual recognition and one on the harmonization 
of substantive criminal law. Chapter one explores the main issues regarding the scope, 
extent, and nature of the principle of mutual recognition at EU level. Chapter two 
explores the main issues related to the impact as well as the practical operation of the 
principle of mutual recognition in the Greek Jurisdiction. Chapter three, then, turns its 
interest on harmonization of substantive criminal laws from the EU point of view. 
Finally, Chapter four focuses on the impact of the implementation of the EU 
harmonization system on the Greek Jurisdiction with regard to the same areas of 
substantive criminal laws, as discussed in chapter three. 
These chapters are then followed by a conclusion aiming to synthesize and 
highlight the main issues that have arisen during the analysis of this thesis and answer 
the main question: ‗What has been the impact of EU Criminal Law on the Greek 
Criminal Justice System?‘ 
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Introduction 
European Criminal Law has been one of the most rapid, remarkable, but at the 
same time controversial developments in the European Union. Judicial and police 
cooperation in criminal matters soon became a fully-fledged policy of the European 
Union affecting the national sovereignty of Member States, the relationship between 
individuals and the States as well as the protection of fundamental rights.                      
The last few years, in particular, we have witnessed a major growth of legislative and 
judicial initiatives in this field with the European Court of Justice
1
 playing a very 
significant role in a number of cases in this emerging presence of European Union in 
the sensitive, and often contested, field of criminal law.  
My starting point is that EU criminal law has been developing rapidly and its 
adoption has had a significant impact on domestic criminal justice systems.             
My thesis will examine the development
2
 of EU criminal law towards the creation of 
a ‗European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‘ (via mutual recognition and the 
harmonization of substantive criminal law) and its impact of EU criminal law 
produced under these methods using Greece, in particular, as a case study.                   
Greece has been chosen on the basis that it is a constitutional democracy with a civil 
system of law where the implementation of EU law could conflict with its domestic   
–even constitutional- law. Also, Greece could represent a number of similar legal 
systems where same conclusions by the thesis could be drawn and possibly apply.   
In assessing the overall above mentioned question, I will examine how EU 
criminal law has developed; what have been the main political and legal challenges 
for the implementation in Greece; to what extent, and how, has the Greek Legislator 
implemented EU law in the field of mutual recognition and harmonization, and, last, 
but not least, what has been the judges‘, practitioners‘ and academics‘ reaction to this 
development. In order to address these questions, my methodology will be to use as 
main sources the relevant legislation, the case law and secondary literature. Also, I 
will use some information taken through interviews
3
 with judges, policy makers and 
practitioners, having though exclusively a supporting role in my thesis.  
                                                             
1 Officially now called ‗Court of Justice of the European Union‘.  
2 This thesis takes into account the developments at EU and Greek level up to the 31/12/2010.  
3 All the interviews used in this thesis have been carried out with a digital voice recorder, with a 
specific questionnaire and after having taken the approval of the Queen‘s Mary Ethics Committee as 
well as the consent of the interviewees. Also, the confidentiality of the research data has been fully 
ensured.  
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The thesis has two parts: one on mutual recognition and one on the harmonization 
of substantive criminal law. These have been chosen on the basis that they constitute 
the most representative examples of EU integration in a very much contested field of 
law, reflecting the debate on the preservation of national sovereignty and on 
strengthening EU co-operation in criminal matters. I will, thus, examine the 
development of both of these forms of integration through specific legal instruments 
from the EU perspective and then the impact of EU criminal law on the Greek 
criminal justice system. 
In this framework, the purpose of the first chapter is to explore the main issues 
regarding the scope, extent, and nature of the principle of mutual recognition at EU 
level. In particular, the analysis will begin by looking at the relation of the principle of 
mutual recognition in the context of the judicial cooperation in criminal matters.          
The analysis will, then, focus on the first measure implementing the principle of 
mutual recognition, namely the European Arrest Warrant. The EAW has been chosen 
on the basis that is the first concrete and most emblematic measure implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition and that it has raised serious reactions during its 
operation. Issues like the definition and the scope of the European Arrest Warrant,      
the removal of the double criminality principle, the grounds for the mandatory and the 
optional non-execution of an European Arrest Warrant, the competent authorities and 
the time limits, the surrender procedure, the rights of the requested person, the role of 
consent, human rights concerns as well as the rule of speciality, are of particular 
interest in this chapter. It will also examine whether the European Arrest Warrant can 
constitute evidence of the existence of mutual trust between Member States.                       
At the end of the chapter issues raised during the implementation of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW, with particular focus on the various constitutional challenges 
by the various national Courts, will be analyzed.  
The purpose of the second chapter is to explore the main issues related to                
the impact as well as the practical operation of the principle of mutual recognition in          
the Greek Jurisdiction, drawing upon interviews with judges, policy makers and 
practitioners. In particular, the chapter will begin by looking at the ‗big picture‘ of the 
principle of mutual recognition in the Greek legal order. It will then examine the 
negotiations of the Greek Government in Brussels towards the adoption of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. The analysis will then focus on 
the controversial parliamentary debate on the implementation of the Framework 
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Decision and the criticism expressed such as that: (a) the Bill was ‗express‘;                   
(b) the surrender of Greek citizens is unconstitutional; (c) the abolition of double 
criminality is also unconstitutional; and (d) the protection of human rights is 
insufficient. It will then go to examine the implementation of the Council Framework 
Decision in Greece and its systematic article by article analysis, as well as its 
interpretation by the national Courts accompanied by the views of the Greek 
academics and the views of the Greek practitioners.  
 Chapter three will then focus on harmonization. Whereas the term 
‗harmonization‘ is a commonly used term regarding many areas of the Community 
policies, in the criminal law system the terms, as it has been argued, ‗harmonization‘ 
and ‗approximation‘ are in effect synonymous, even if the differences between these 
concepts are unclear
4. Also, whereas ‗harmonization‘ and ‗approximation‘ are 
different concepts from ‗uniformity‘, harmonization can be seen as a method ensuring 
‗harmony‘ in the Community/Union criminal law system5. It is in this light that the 
term ‗harmonization‘ will be used in this thesis. In this context, the chapter will begin 
with an overview of the evolution of harmonization throughout the periods:               
(a) before the Treaty of Maastricht; (b) from the Maastricht Treaty to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam; (c) from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Tampere European Council, the 
Hague Programme and the Stockholm Programme. Then, it will examine the 
competence of the EC to adopt criminal law with particular interest in the cases that 
have been dealt by the European Court of Justice regarding competence issues 
between the first and the third pillars. It will then look at the very significant changes 
that have emerged due to the Treaty of Lisbon. The analysis will be completed by 
examining the area of the substantive EU criminal law which has been harmonized, 
and in particular, three areas of law will be used as examples: (a) the fight against 
terrorism; (b) the fight against organized crime; and (c) the fight against money 
laundering. These areas have been chosen on the basis that they are very serious 
offences with prominent threats on security, they have largely a transnational element 
and national relevance and they constitute the most representative cases of the 
substantive EU criminal law which have significant importance and effect on the 
domestic national law and for which the obstacle of double criminality has been 
                                                             
4 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗EU Criminal Law‘, Oxford and Portland, 2009, p.59. 
5 Ibid. 
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overcome. Like the first chapter, this chapter will focus its interest only to the EU 
point of view.  
In the last chapter (four), the focus is on the impact of the implementation of the 
EU harmonization system on the Greek Jurisdiction with regard to the same areas of 
substantive criminal laws, as discussed in chapter three. These three areas of 
criminality have been chosen on the basis that they are serious, have transnational and 
national relevance, and they have also had a very high security priority in the past two 
decades, not only in the European Community, but the Greek legal order too.                  
In particular, the chapter will begin by looking at the fight against terrorism.  In this 
section the analysis will start from the ‗big picture‘ of the Greek Legislation in 
combating terrorism and then will focus on the Greek Implementing Law (Statute 
3251/2004) and its article by article analysis. Then, it will go to examine the academic 
point of view and the relevant raised arguments (such as vagueness and lack of 
certainty in the definitions; violations of the principle of proportionality; 
criminalization of beliefs; inconsistencies with the Criminal Code system and the 
Constitution) and then some final remarks will follow. The chapter will, secondly, 
examine the fight against organized crime in the Greek Jurisdiction. The analysis will 
start by examining the ‗big picture‘ of the Greek Legislation in the fight against 
organized crime and will mainly focus on the main instrument, namely, the provisions 
of Statute 2928/2001. It will then focus on the academic point of view and the raised 
objections (such as definitional issues; the principles of proportionality and equality; 
threats to constitutional rights and freedoms and the rule of law; the rights of the 
defendant; introduction of expediency concerns; inconsistencies within the criminal 
law system). It will then examine the relevant case law by focusing in two main areas: 
(a) the characteristics of a criminal organisation and (b) the differentiation between 
criminal organisation and criminal group. Then, some final remarks will follow. The 
chapter will, finally, examine the fight against money laundering in the Greek 
Jurisdiction. The analysis will start by looking at the ‗big picture‘ in the Greek 
legislation in combating money laundering. It will, then focus, on the main 
instrument, namely, Statute 3691/2008. The academic point of view on money 
laundering will be then presented by focusing on issues as the legal right that is 
protected by the provisions, the connection between money laundering and organised 
crime, the failings of the regulatory techniques of the Statutes and their compliance 
with the Greek Constitution and the doctrines of the criminal law system which have 
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been much debated and commented upon. Finally, the focus will move on to five 
main issues of the Greek case law: (a) Which actions constitute money laundering 
activities; (b) What the relation between money laundering and the predicate offences 
is; (c) What the relation between money laundering and organised crime is; (d) The 
punishment of the perpetrator of the predicate offence for the crime of money 
laundering; and (e) The constitutionality of procedural provisions. This chapter will 
be accompanied with some final remarks. 
 
These chapters are then followed by a conclusion aiming to synthesize and 
highlight the main issues that have arisen during the analysis of this thesis and trying 
to answer its main question, namely: ‗What has been the impact of EU Criminal Law 
on the Greek Criminal Justice System?‘ 
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Chapter 
1 
‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in an Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ 
       
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Frustrated by the slow and often ineffective judicial cooperation, especially in the 
field of criminal matters, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 opened the window and 
introduced the aim of transforming the European Union into an ‗Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice‘. The principle of mutual recognition, applicable to both civil 
and criminal judgments, is seen as a new mechanism, binding judiciary and process 
across the EU in order to achieve this aim.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the main issues regarding the scope, 
extent, and nature of the principle of mutual recognition. In particular, it will be 
starting the analysis by looking at the principle of mutual recognition in the context of 
the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The analysis will then focus on the first 
measure implementing the principle of mutual recognition, namely the European 
Arrest Warrant and the serious concerns that it raised. It will then examine whether 
the European Arrest Warrant can constitute evidence of the existence of mutual trust 
between Member States. It will, finally, focus on issues raised during the 
implementation of the Framework Decision on the EAW.  
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II. The Principle of Mutual Recognition 
 
  
In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the ambitious aim to maintain and to 
further develop the European Union as an ‗Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‘6. 
Shortly afterwards, in 1998, the European Council in Cardiff called upon the EU 
Council to ‗identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each 
others Courts
7‘, in this way giving a new dynamic to the cooperation between the 
Member States in civil and criminal matters. In the first Action Plan on the creation of 
a European Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, the Council was asked to ‗initiate 
a process with a view to facilitating mutual recognition of decisions and enforcement 
of judgments in criminal matters‘8.  
In 1999 at the special European Council on Justice and Home Affairs matters held 
at Tampere, the principle of mutual recognition was endorsed which - according to 
their view - should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and 
criminal matters within the European Union. At the same time, the deadline of 
December 2000 was set for the adoption of a Programme of measures to implement 
the (so-called by the European Commission) ‗ambitious goal‘9 of the principle of 
mutual recognition
10
.  
However, one should note that the principle of mutual recognition is not an 
unfamiliar or new concept of EU Law. It is well known that its origins stem from the 
famous case Cassis de Dijon
11
, but also from across the freedoms of the Single 
                                                             
6 See the Preamble and article 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. OJ C- 340 of 10 November 1997.            
Also, As the Commission has pointed out ‗the three notions of Freedom, Security, and Justice are 
closely interlinked‘. See ‗Communication from the Commission, Towards an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice‘, Brussels, 14/07/1998, COM 1998, 459 Final.  
7
 See Paragraph 39 of the Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 15-16 June 1998.  
8 See Paragraph 42 (f) of the ‗Action Plan of the Council, and the Commission on how to best 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of Freedom, Security, and Justice‘.                            
OJ C-19, 23/01/1999. 
9 See ‗Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters‘, 2001/C 12/02, page: 2. See also the ‗Hague Programme‘ where the principle of 
Mutual Recognition is placed in a central position. According to the Council mutual recognition should 
remain the main priority of the EU policy to improve judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. 
(par. 3.4.2) OJ C- 053, 03/03/2005. 
10 Following suggestions by the UK, at the special European Council on Justice and Home affairs 
matters at Tampere in 1999 it was held that: ‗[…] The European Council therefore endorses the 
principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial co-
operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle should apply both to 
judgments and to other decisions of judicial authorities‘. See para.33 and 35-37 of the ‗Tampere 
European Council Presidency Conclusions‘, 15 and 16 October 1999.   
11 See ‗Cassis de Dijon‘, Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649; [1979] CMLR 494. 
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Market and the application to external trade
12
. It has also been applied in the internal 
market and in the civil and commercial judgments
13
. Yet, the application of the 
principle in criminal law has, indisputably, significant differences compared to its 
application in the internal market or civil law. One could draw these differences 
mainly in that mutual recognition, in the context of internal market works within a 
framework which is absolutely connected with the recognition of national regulatory 
standards and controls and in the context of the civil law with the recognition of civil 
judicial decisions; whereas mutual recognition in the field of criminal law works 
within a framework which is more connected with the rights of the individuals and 
fundamental rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 For the notion of the principle of mutual recognition in the internal market see inter alia: Horng, ‗The 
Principle of Mutual Recognition – The European Union‘s Practice and Development‘, (1999), World 
Competition, Kluwer Law International, p. 135, Armstrong, K., ‗Mutual Recognition‘ in C. Barnard 
and J. Scott (eds.), ‗The Law of the Single Market European Market: Unpacking the Premises‘ (Hart, 
2002), ch. 9, N. Bernard, ‗Flexibility in the European Single Market‘ in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), 
‗The Law of the Single Market European Market: Unpacking the Premises‘, Hart, 2002 and Paul Craig 
& Grainne De Burca, ‗EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials‘, 2007, Oxford University Press, p.706-
714.  
13 See Jannet A. Pontier and Edwige Burg, ‗EU Principles on Jurisdiction and Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in civil and Commercial Matters‘, TMC Asser Press, 2004, p. 27-44, also 
Eva Storskrubb, ‗Civil Procedure and EU Law – A Policy Area Uncovered‘, Oxford University Press, 
2008, p. 277 and the Case C-7 /98 ‗Krombach‘ [2000] ECR I-1935. 
9 
 
III. Mutual recognition in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
 
 
The principle of mutual recognition in the context of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters is a recent development
14
. In 1998 the UK Government during its EU 
Presidency
15
 pressed hardest for mutual recognition in the field of criminal law 
suggesting that this approach is based on ‗tolerance of diversity on the basis of mutual 
confidence and trust in each others‘ legal systems, as opposed to insistence of 
uniformity for its own sake
16‘.  At the same time, namely the 3rd of December 1998, 
the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, presented an Action Plan
17
 on how 
to best implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Point 45 (f) of the so-called ‗Vienna‘ Action Plan provided that 
within two years of the Treaty‘s entry into force18 a process should ‗initiate with a 
view to facilitating  mutual recognition of decisions and enforcement of judgments in 
criminal matters‘.  
A few months later, in March 1999, the UK presented a discussion paper
19
 which 
formed the basis for the political agreement on mutual recognition. The UK was ready 
at that time to go a step further stating inter alia that:  
‗[…] however, experience has shown that approximation is time consuming and 
sometimes difficult to negotiate. Full harmonisation of all criminal offences is not a 
realistic prospect; moreover, differences in criminal procedures will continue to 
impede judicial co-operation. Member States will continue to have different systems 
of criminal law for the foreseeable future. Even if laws were fully aligned, lack of 
mutual recognition would still imply the need to check facts and satisfy legal 
conditions before co-operation could be provided. In order to remove unnecessary 
                                                             
14 For an overview of the development of the principle of mutual recognition see Peers Steve, ‗Mutual 
Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council got it wrong?‘, Common 
Market Law Review, (2004), 2004, p.p. 5-11. 
15 For a valuation of the UK Presidency in 1998 see Peter Ludlow, ‗The 1998 UK Presidency: A view 
from Brussels‘, Journal of Common Market Studies, (1998), Vol. 36, p.p.573-583. 
16 See ‗The mutual recognition of criminal judgments in the EU: will the free movement of prosecutions 
create barriers to genuine criminal justice?‘, 
Available at: www.statewatch.org/news/jun00/05mutual.htm. 
17 See ‗Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of Freedom, Security and Justice‘, Text adopted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council of 3 December 1998. OJ C19/1, 23/01/1999. 
18 Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
19 See ‗Mutual Recognition of judicial decisions and judgments in criminal matters‘, NOTE from the 
UK Delegation to the (then) K.4 Committee, Council doc. 7090/99, Brussels, 29 March 1999, 
especially par. 9. 
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procedural hurdles and formalities, work on approximation must be accompanied by 
progress towards mutual recognition. Mutual recognition can sometimes provide a 
shorter route to improving co-operation, without fully aligning legislation‘. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the principle of mutual recognition was 
first introduced in the European Council of Cardiff in 1998 where they were asked   
‗to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each other‘s 
Courts‘20 and concluded that it was ‗necessary to enhance the ability of national legal 
systems to work together‘. It was then developed as the cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation in the European Council of Tampere in 1999. The main logic behind the 
principle of mutual recognition was that judicial cooperation regarding criminal 
matters should be improved and also that criminals should not benefit from the 
abolition of borders in the EU
21
. For that reason, the Council and the Commission 
were asked to adopt, by December 2000, a programme of measures to implement the 
principle of mutual recognition. In July 2000, the European Commission presented       
a Communication
22
 on mutual recognition where inter alia it expressed the view that:  
‗This traditional system is not only slow, but also cumbersome, and sometimes it is 
quite uncertain what results a judge or prosecutor who makes a request will get.  
Thus, borrowing from concepts that have worked very well in the creation of the 
Single Market, the idea was born that judicial cooperation might also benefit from the 
concept of mutual recognition, which, simply stated, means that once a certain 
measure, such as a decision taken by a judge in exercising his or her official powers in 
one Member State, has been taken, that measure – in so far as it has extra-national 
implications - would automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have 
the same or at least similar effects there‘. 
This Communication resulted in the adoption, by the Council in 2001, of a 
Programme containing 24 measures – ranked by priority - to implement the principle 
of mutual recognition
23
. According to the introduction of this Programme, the 
principle of mutual recognition is very much dependent on a number of parameters 
which determine its effectiveness such as whether fulfilment of the double criminality 
requirement as a condition for recognition should be maintained or dropped; 
                                                             
20 See Cardiff European Council, 15 and 16 June 1998, Presidency Conclusions, par.38.  
21 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 118. 
22 See ‗Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters‘, p.2, COM (2000) 495 Final, 26/07/2000. 
23 See ‗Programme of Measures to implement the principle of Mutual Recognition of decisions in 
criminal Matters‘, OJ C 012, 15/01/2001. 
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mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of third parties, victims and suspects;            
the definition of minimum common standards necessary to facilitate application of the 
principle of mutual recognition; determination and extent of grounds for refusing 
recognition etc. 
Since then, a number of instruments have been adopted which are based on the 
principle of mutual recognition and which try to achieve and accommodate the goals 
of the mutual recognition programme. Undoubtedly, in the core of the ‗first round‘ of 
these instruments is the European Arrest Warrant, an instrument which, however, will 
be discussed in detail further on this chapter.  
Three more instruments have been adopted on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition and also belong to the first round of the adopted measures. The first one  
is the Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders
24
; the second 
one is the Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005               
on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property
25
; and     
the third one is the Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 
2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties
26
. 
The first two instruments deal with confiscation orders. In particular, the first one 
(F.D 783/2006) aims to facilitate co-operation between Member States as regards the 
mutual recognition and execution of orders to confiscate property. It achieves the 
measure no. 6 and 7 from the mutual recognition programme. The transposition date 
was the 24 November 2008. It provides for the direct execution of confiscation orders 
for the proceeds of crime by establishing simplified procedures for recognition among 
Member States and rules for dividing confiscated property between the Member State 
issuing the confiscation order and the one executing it. It has a very similar structure 
with that of the European Arrest Warrant. It aims to enable judicial decisions to be 
executed immediately, without any further formality, leading to a more automatic 
model of recognition. However, like the European Arrest Warrant, the confiscation 
order Framework Decision provides a very similar list of offences for which, if they 
give rise to a confiscation order and are punishable in the issuing State by a custodial 
sentence of a maximum of at least 3 years, execution of the confiscation order will 
                                                             
24 OJ L 328 of 24/11/2006. Final date for the implementation in the Member States is the 24th/11/2008. 
This F.D was partly amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299 of 26 February 2009. 
25 OJ L 68, 15/03/2005. 
26 OJ L 76 of 22/03/2005. This F.D was partly amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299 
of 26 February 2009. 
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take place without verification of the double criminality of the acts in the executing 
Member State. In addition, there are also a number of reasons for which the executing 
State may refuse to execute the order.  
The second instrument (F.D 212/2005) was adopted at the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council on 24 February 2005. The transposition deadline was 15 March 2007. 
The purpose of this Framework Decision is to facilitate co-operation between 
Member States concerning the recognition and execution of orders to confiscate the 
proceeds of crime. Under the mutual recognition principle, a Member State has to 
recognise and execute in its territory confiscation orders issued by judicial authorities 
of another Member State. In particular, this Framework Decision aims to ensure that 
all Member States have effective rules governing the confiscation of proceeds from 
crime, inter alia, in relation to the onus of proof regarding the source of assets held by 
a person convicted of an offence related to organised crime. 
The third instrument Framework Decision (214/2005) extends the principle of 
mutual recognition to financial penalties of €70 or greater so that financial penalties 
imposed in one Member State by the judicial and administrative authorities may be 
enforced in another Member State. It completes measure no. 18 of the programme of 
measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition. The deadline for 
implementation by Member States was 22 March 2007.  It also imposes a duty on the 
competent authorities of a Member State to recognise, without any further formality, 
decisions relating to financial penalties transmitted by another Member State. 
Nevertheless, like all the above mentioned instruments, grounds of refusal for non 
recognition and non execution are provided in this Framework Decision as well.  
Since then, we have seen over the last few years a ‗second round‘ of mutual 
recognition very important instruments being adopted. In particular, the Council on 
the 18 December 2008 adopted the Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data 
for use in proceedings in criminal matters. This Framework Decision completes 
measures 5 and 6 of the programme of measures to implement the mutual recognition 
principle which deal with the mutual recognition of orders to obtain evidence. The 
Framework Decision does not directly address the issue of mutual admissibility of 
evidence
27
. However, it intends to facilitate the admissibility of evidence obtained 
                                                             
27 See IJzerman A., ‗From the CATS portfolio: The European Evidence Warrant‘, (2005), European 
Evidence Warrant – Transnational Judicial Inquiries in the EU, J.A.E. Vervaele (ed.), Intersentia. 
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from the territory of another Member State leading to the ‗free movement of evidence 
across the EU
28
. Its structure is very similar to the European Arrest Warrant.                        
The negotiation of this Framework Decision was extremely lengthy and political 
agreement was hard to achieve
29
. However, one should note that currently 
negotiations between Member States are taking place in order to achieve consensus on 
the adoption of a Directive on European Investigation Order aiming to replace the 
European Evidence Warrant
30
.  
Furthermore, another instrument which is connected to the principle of mutual 
recognition and which achieves measure 22 of the mutual recognition programme
31
    
is the Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation 
decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative 
sanctions
32
. This instrument aims at facilitating the social rehabilitation of sentenced 
persons, improving the protection of victims and of the general public, and facilitating 
the application of suitable probation measures and alternative sanctions, in case of 
offenders who do not live in the State of conviction
33
.  
In addition, another recent instrument which achieves the goal of measure 14 of 
the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition, is the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters 
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the 
purpose of their enforcement in the European Union
34
. This new instrument applies 
mutual recognition to the transfer of sentenced persons to another Member State than 
the State of conviction. One of its main innovations is the extension, compared to the 
existing Council of Europe instruments, of the possibilities to impose the transfer 
without the consent of the person concerned
35
. This Framework Decision will also 
                                                             
28 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 126. 
29 For instance, the Netherlands pushed for a partial application of the territoriality principle, to allow it 
to refuse to comply with an EEW relating to offences committed wholly or partly in its territory. 
30 See ‗Initiative for a Directive regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters‘, 
COPEN 115, 29 April 2010.  
31 In the programme of measures of 29 November 2000, the Council pronounced itself in favour of 
cooperation in the area of suspended sentences and parole. See measure no. 22. 
32 This F.D was partly amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299 of 26 February 2009. 
33 See art. 1 of the F.D. 
34 OJ L 327/27 of 05/12/2008. This F.D was partly amended by the Council Framework Decision 
2009/299 of 26 February 2009. 
35 See art. 6 of the F.D.  
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apply to some cases referred to in the European Arrest Warrant Framework 
Decision
36
. 
Moreover, the Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008            
on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the 
course of new criminal proceedings is one more instrument based on the principle of 
mutual recognition which achieves element no. 2 of the mutual recognition 
programme. As stated in article 1 of the Framework Decision its purpose is to 
determine the conditions under which, in the course of criminal proceedings in                 
a Member State against a person, previous convictions handed down against the same 
person for different facts in other Member States, are taken into account. 
The last, but not least, adopted measure is the Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 which enhances the procedural rights of persons 
and fosters the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered 
in the absence of the person concerned at the trial
37
. In summary, this Framework 
Decision modifies the existing Framework Decisions with regard to the ground for 
non recognition related to cases where the decision to be executed was rendered in the 
absence of the person concerned at the trial
38
 and establishes common rules for the 
recognition and/or execution of judicial decisions where the person concerned was not 
present
39
. 
In summary, all these measures can be seen as a significant step reflecting the 
2001 programme on mutual recognition. Also, all these measures intend to create a 
coherent system of mutual recognition covering all stages of the criminal justice 
process (both pre and post trial). However, as Valsamis Mitsilegas notes, this has led 
to the adoption of instruments which are both limited in scope and ambition and 
complex
40
 and may be seen as making judicial cooperation more complicated. Despite 
this, the most important instrument indisputably is the European Arrest Warrant.             
In the following section the operation of the European Arrest Warrant will be 
                                                             
36 See art. 25 of the F.D.  
37 See Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, thereby enhancing the 
procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial. 
38 In particular, the Framework Decisions 2002/584 JHA, 2005/214 JHA, 2006/783 JHA, 2008/909 
JHA and 2008/947 JHA.  
39 See article 1 of the F.D.  
40 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗The third wave of third pillar law. Which direction for EU criminal justice?‘, 
European Law Review, 2009, p.548. 
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discussed as it is the ‗first, and most symbolic41‘, to date, measure which has been 
fully implemented in all Member States and has been merely the first instrument -
from the full legislative mutual recognition programme- to implement this new core 
principle of criminal justice cooperation and to be seen as evidence of the existence 
(or non existence) of mutual trust between Member States.  
Although, for reasons of completeness, one should not ignore two very recent 
developments: First, the Treaty of Lisbon
42
, recently signed by the EU Member States 
on 13
th
 December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009, which clearly and 
formally provides that mutual recognition will be the core element of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters
43
. In that context, mutual recognition seems to be the 
‗winner‘44 compared with the harmonisation system45. As the President of ECJ             
Mr. Skouris stated from the Treaty of Lisbon it is evident that ‗mutual recognition is 
the foundation of the European Union‘ and that ‗the Union should be based on the 
principle of mutual recognition‘46.The Treaty of Lisbon, reinforces and consolidates 
progress in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice to date as well as underlines the 
principle of mutual recognition, allowing a Court in one EU country to recognise and 
enforce a criminal conviction from another. The Treaty also allows for minimum rules 
to be adopted in relation to the mutual admissibility of evidence, rights of individuals, 
and victims of crime in criminal proceedings, prevention and settlement of conflicts 
of jurisdiction, training of the judiciary and judicial staff
47
, leading to a hybrid 
European criminal justice system
48
. Second, the adoption by the Council of the so-
called Stockholm Programme, being the successor to the Hague Programme and 
                                                             
41 See Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, COM 
(2005) 63 Final Brussels, 23.02.2005, p.2, par.1. 
42 For an overview of the Treaty of Lisbon see The Law Society, ‗Guide to Lisbon Treaty – European 
Union insight‘, January 2008. See also Steve Peers, ‗EU Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon‘, 2008, 
European Law Review. 
available online at: http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/guide_to_treaty_of_lisbon.pdf 
43 Art.69 (A) Treaty of Lisbon.  
44 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p.156.  
45 See articles 64 (3) and 67 (1) TFEU. 
46 Interview with the President of the European Court of Justice Mr. Vasilios Skouris in 09/01/2010. 
47 See ECLAN study, ‗Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European 
Union‘, Final Report, 20/11/2008. The Institute for European Studies Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
together with the European Criminal Law Academic Network (ECLAN) were selected by the European 
Commission to carry out in 2008 a project on "analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the European Union". The final report is written by Gisèle Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and 
Laura Surano. Available online at: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/criminal/recognition/doc_criminal_recognition_en.htm 
48 See Ilias Bantekas, ‗The principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law‘, European Law 
Review, (2007), p.376. 
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setting out the new priorities for 2010-2014, where the principle of mutual recognition 
is fully promoted, whereas harmonization is used only to ‗facilitate mutual 
recognition‘49.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
49 See the ‗Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens‘, 
Brussels, 02/12/2009, 17024/09. 
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IV. The general overview of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
 
The Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of the 13 June of 2002 on the 
European Arrest Warrant (hereafter called EAW) and the surrender procedures 
between Member States
50
 is the first challenging step which significantly and 
successfully
51
 changes the institutional status of the extradition procedure between 
Member States
52
. In addition, it constitutes the first example of the attempted effort 
for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In fact, the purpose to be achieved                 
is determined in the preamble of the Framework Decision: […] ‗(5) The objective set 
for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice leads to abolishing 
extradition
53
 between Member States and replacing it by a system of surrender 
between judicial authorities. [….] Traditional cooperation relations which have 
prevailed up till now between Member States should be replaced by a system of free 
movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters, covering both pre-sentence and 
final decisions
54, within an area of freedom, security and justice‘.                                                                                                                                                               
In order for this purpose to be achieved, the traditional ways of cooperation 
between Member States are changing and, instead, a new system of rules emerge and 
a new mechanism materializes which is not included in the European Union Treaty:        
The European Arrest Warrant as being the first concrete measure in the field of 
criminal law implementing the principle of mutual recognition
55
.  
It is interesting to note that the European Arrest Warrant was supposed to be 
drafted after the Framework Decision on the execution of orders freezing property. 
However, the events of the 11 September 2001 not only caused a considerable 
increase in legislation at national and European level with the objective of assisting 
                                                             
50
 OJ L 190 18/07/2002, pp 1-18. Available from: www.europa.eu.int. 
51 See ECLAN study, id, 2008. 
52 The Framework Decision replaced the existing at the time texts. See ‗Proposal for a Framework 
Decision on the EAW and the surrender procedures‘, COM (2001) 522 Final/2 of 25/09/2001. 
53 See the recent judgement of the ECJ ‗Case C-296/08 PPU, Ignacio Pedro Santesteban Goicoechea‘, 
where the Court found that the purpose of making conventions in the field of extradition applicable 
after 1 January 2004 ‗can only be to improve the extradition system in circumstances in which the 
European arrest warrant system does not apply‘. 
54 It is notable that the ECLAN study suggests that that the majority of those interviewed found it is 
easier to apply the principle of mutual recognition to final decisions because those decisions are 
surrounded by greater safeguards and are taken by largely equivalent judicial authorities in all the MS, 
whereas the competent authorities for taking pre-trial decisions do not have the same characteristics 
everywhere. See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
55 For the birth of the EAW and a broad analysis of the Council Framework Decision see Niko Keijzer, 
‗The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision between Past and Future‘, in E. Guild (ed.), 
Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, 2006, Wolf Legal Publishes, p. 13-73. 
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the fight against terrorism
56
, but also created a ‗window of opportunity‘ for reaching a 
rapid agreement on the complex and controversial issue of the proposal for the 
EAW
57
 whose adoption was prioritised. The Commission submitted a proposal on the 
19
th
 of September in 2001, a few days after the terrorist attacks
58
. The negotiations
59
 
lasted only two months and six days leading to the adoption of, even till now,                
an extremely debated and criticized instrument whose main characteristics are the 
abolition of dual criminality for thirty-two categories of offences, the abolition of the 
political offence exception, the adoption of several mandatory and optional grounds 
for refusal to execute a warrant, the introduction of strict time limits, the introduction 
of a common form of the warrant
60
 and last, but not least, the ability to surrender 
nationals in other jurisdictions in a faster and simpler procedure than the former 
extradition procedure. 
 
1. Definition and scope of the European Arrest Warrant  
 
The EAW is defined as ‗a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view 
to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or 
detention order‘61. Regarding this definition, it must be said, that the meaning of the 
word ‗European‘ is more symbolic than realistic given that the judicial decision in 
question is issued not by a ‗European‘ legal body, but by a Member State‘s legal 
authority. Consequently, it is a national judicial decision, rather than a European one 
which must be, however, recognized and executed by the issuing State.  
                                                             
56
 See Bill Gilmore, ‗The Twin Towers and the Third Pillar: Some Security Agenda Developments‘, 
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2003/7, European University Institute Florence, available online.                  
See also Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, ‗After September 11th: the Fight Against Terrorism in National and 
European Law. Substantive and Procedural Rules: Some Examples‘, European Law Journal, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, March 2004, pp. 235–253. 
57 See Peers, CMLR, id. 2004, p. 12. 
58 COM (2001)522, OJ. 2001. For a critical discussion of the proposal, see Peers, ‗Statewatch analyses 
No. 3, Proposed Framework Decision on European arrest warrants‘. Available at: 
www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/ewarrant.pdf. 
59  For further discussion at negotiations see Nilsson, ‗Mutual Trust or Mutual Mistrust?, Mutual Trust 
in the European Criminal Area‘, Editions De L‘ Universite De Bruxelles, 2005, pp.29-33. See also M 
Plachta and W van Ballegooij, ‗The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and 
Surrender Procedures between Member States of the European Union‘, in Blextoon, Handbook on the 
European Arrest Warrant, TMC Asser Press, 2005, p.32-26.  
60 See art. 8 of the Framework Decision.  
61 Art. 1 (1) of the F.D. 
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One should note yet that contrary to the previously existing extradition treaties,            
it is no longer required that the original or authentic copy of the decision suitable for 
the issue and execution of an EAW be submitted. On the contrary, judicial 
cooperation under the framework of the EAW takes a new formalised essence as the 
EAW has the form of a Certificate
62
. What is then required is clearly depending on the 
nature of the offence. In other words if the offence is one of the 32 described offences 
in the EAW for which the double criminality principle is abolished, then the issuing 
authority needs only to tick the respective box in the EAW and to give information 
about the applicable provision, irrespectively of the special characteristics of the 
alleged offence as such are provided in the national law. However, this raises serious 
questions and doubts - as will be seen further below. Alternatively, if the offence is 
not in the list, then the issuing authority needs to provide a ‗full description‘ of the 
alleged committed offence(s). Nevertheless, this is a very broad approach which does 
not give clear answers to what is meant by the term full description and seems to raise 
serious questions with respect to the principle to speciality.   
 The issue of an EAW requires that pending against the requested person is                
a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or, 
where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of 
at least four months
63
. This indicates that a wide range of criminal behaviour can fall 
within the scope of the EAW. However, the important innovation of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW is the partial abolition of the double criminality principle with 
regard specific offences.  
 
2. The removal of the double criminality principle  
 
Article 2 par. 2 of the Framework Decision provides that the judicial authority of 
the executing State should not examine the so-called ‗double criminality‘ of the act. 
By that term is meant that no one should be extradited for conduct that would not be 
criminal in both the issuing the EAW State and the executing State
64
. The removal of 
the principle of double criminality
65
 in relation to the wide range of 32 types of 
                                                             
62 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 121.  
63 Art. 2 (1). 
64 See Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf, March (2004), p.208. 
65 See Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, par. 35. 
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offence was one of the most controversial debated elements of the EAW
66
, as this 
principle is very closely connected to the meaning of national sovereignty.                  
This occurs, because it permits States to refuse extradition for acts that they have not 
criminalized and yet has several implications for fundamental human rights as the 
criminalization of an act reflects the social, cultural, and ethical considerations of             
a society at a certain time. Human rights, on the contrary, are in many legal orders 
important instruments for continuous adaptation to changing social needs, fears and 
convictions
67
.The principle of double criminality, therefore, provides the individual 
with a standard of certainty of his legal rights and obligations which may be affected 
because of the different approaches of Member States with regard to the apprehension 
of substantive criminal law.  
    However, the EAW in article 2 provides for the abolition of double criminality           
in respect of 32 types of serious offences
68
 which are punishable in the issuing State 
by a maximum custodial sentence or a detention order for at least three years or 
more
69
. In essence this means that by the removal of the principle of double 
criminality, and the recognition of the foreign decision thereof, the judicial authority 
of the executing State recognizes the evaluation of the foreign Legislator with regard 
to the criminalization of a certain act or behavior.  
It is not a coincidence that the abolition of the principle of double criminality takes 
place in a number of offences - namely in the 32 types of offences provided in article 
2 of the EAW
70
. The Framework Decision does not provide for the legal definition        
of the offences in question, but rather it leaves upon Member States to implement the 
list contained in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision in light of the existing 
offences in their domestic criminal law
71
. This, yet, means that Member States have 
common political views and solidarity for combating the offences in question. Some 
                                                             
66 See for example the proposal of the Commission which initially suggested complete abolition of the 
principle of double criminality with some limited exceptions. ‗Explanatory memorandum to the 
Commission proposal for a framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant‘ COM (2001) 522 
final/2, note 4.5 (6). 
67 See Armin Von Bogdandy, ‗The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights 
and the core of the European Union‘, Common Market Law Review, (2000) Vol.37, p.p. 1307–1338. 
68 A list which cannot be considered as numerus clauses, but apertus because of the possibility to be 
extended or amended under the conditions required by Article 2.3. 
69 These include for example participation in a criminal organisation, terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, corruption, fraud, money laundering, 
etc. 
70 As Valsamis Mitsilegas notes the list includes offences which are ‗both very common and diverse, 
both national and transnational‘. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2006, CMLR,p. 1284. 
71 For the importance of labeling in Criminal Law see James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‗Fair 
Labeling in Criminal Law‘, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2008, p. 217-246. 
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of the offences in fact have been harmonized at EU level (characteristic examples are 
human trafficking, organized crime, and drug trafficking); whereas, some others (like 
murder or rape) are left to the existing definition at national level, bringing us to the 
main question of mutual trust. Yet, the removal of the principle of double criminality 
results in the exportation of national laws to all other Member States for the purpose 
of executing the EAW. The latter, consequently, means that Member States need to 
accept the criminal laws of the other Member States without having the essential 
knowledge and a clear picture about what those laws, in fact, might be
72
. This, 
nevertheless, seems at this stage unrealistic and difficult to work in practice
73
. 
In fact, the implementation of this provision has proved to be more complex than 
initially expected. The lack of precise definition of the crimes, together with legal 
translation difficulties, led some Member States to make a declaration in their 
implementing law in order to exclude specific offences as they were not punishable 
under their domestic law
74
. Greece, for example -as will be discussed further- omitted 
to implement specific categories of offences and Belgium expressly excluded abortion 
and euthanasia even though they could conceivably be caught by the category 
‗murder, grievous bodily injury`, in respect of which double criminality is abolished. 
Another question that arises is what happens with offences that are not included in 
the catalogue of the Framework Decision and/or for which there is a different legal, 
culture, historical or even philosophical approach across the EU Member States. 
Characteristic example is euthanasia
75
. It is notable that, in this catalogue, offences 
such as stealing and theft or sexual offences are not included.   Are these left in the 
general and indefinable term of mutual trust? And, if that is the case, are we talking 
about a general trust without conditions and prerequisites or about a trust which is 
                                                             
72 As Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf make the point that raises the prospect of a ‗two-tier‘ system of 
criminal justice depending on whether judicial authorities are required to give effect to domestic law in 
cases that there is not issued any arrest warrant, or the law of the issuing State, in cases that an arrest 
warrant is issued. See EAW, (2003), p. 40. 
73 See ‗Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the strengthening of mutual trust 
between Member States‘ where in paragraph 19 the Commission recognizes that with respect the EAW 
‗a series of difficulties have revealed which could to some extent be resolved if the Union were to adopt 
harmonisation legislature‘. COM (2005) 195 Final, 19/05/2005. See also Massimo Fichera, ‗The 
European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?‘ European Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, No.1, 2009, p. 80 who suggests ‗that the list should be reduced to a few core offences, 
i.e those for which common criteria for definition and punishment can be more easily found‘.  
74 See ‗Annex to the Report from the Commission on the European Arrest Warrant‘, COM (2006) 8 
Final, 24/01/2006.  
75 In Netherlands, for example, euthanasia since 2001 under certain conditions is a lawful act.  
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purely based on minimum common acceptable rules for which all Member States 
share common views?  
Article 2 par. 4 tries to give an answer by providing that: ‗for offences other than 
those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts 
for which the EAW has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the 
executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is 
described‘. Therefore, it seems that for offences not listed in Article 2(2) the 
executing State may still require dual criminality. It may also do so for the listed 
offences to the extent that they are not punishable in the issuing Member State by a 
deprivation of liberty for three years or more. The practice has shown that nearly all 
Member States require dual criminality for non-listed offences and most do so for 
listed offences not punishable by three years or more of deprivation of liberty
76
. 
However, the general approach in the text of the Framework Decision (namely [...] 
whatever the constituent elements or however it is described) is not satisfactory 
because, as will be shown further on, it seems to contradict the very basic general 
principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.  
 
3. Grounds for the mandatory non-execution of an European Arrest Warrant  
 
  In paragraph 2 of article 1 it is clearly defined that ‗Member States shall execute 
any EAW on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition‘. However, the judicial 
authority of the executing State, under the limited grounds provided in articles 3 and 4 
of the Framework Decision, has the right to refuse to execute the EAW. In particular, 
three mandatory and seven non-mandatory grounds for the non-recognition of the 
judicial decision are provided. These, notably, do not include the political, fiscal, or 
military character of the offence. 
With regard to the mandatory grounds for refusal, article 3 of the Framework 
Decision provides three reason of mandatory refusal of the execution of the EAW. 
Specifically, these reasons refer to the existence of amnesty in the executing State of 
the offence on which the arrest warrant is based
77
, the principle of ne bis in idem (res 
                                                             
76 See Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert, ‗Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: 
An Appraisal Of The EU‘s Main Criminal Law Measures Against Terrorism After ―11 September‖‘, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 41, 2004, p.913.   
77 See article 3 (1) of the F.D. The same ground for refusal was similarly expressed in article 9 of the 
Agreement of the 27th September 1996 concerning extradition between EU Member States.  
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judicata) in relation to a final judgment by a Member State
78
, and the lack of criminal 
responsibility due to age limit as provided in the executing State
79
. Thus, if the 
judicial authority of the executing Member State ascertains the presence of any of 
these reasons, it is obliged to issue a formal rejection denying the execution of the 
EAW, and, consequently, the surrender of the requested person.  
 
4. Grounds for the optional non-execution of an European Arrest Warrant  
 
Article 4 of the Framework Decision initially provided seven optional reasons for 
refusal of execution of the EAW. However, the Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA which amended the Framework Decision on the EAW, added one 
more ground for the optional non-execution of an EAW. All these reasons give the 
ability to the judicial authority of the executing State to refuse the execution of the 
EAW, and consequently, the surrender of the requested. In this case, the executing 
judicial authority exercises its discretionary power, which the Framework Decision 
itself provides for it.  
In particular, these reasons are: (a) if, in one of the cases referred to in art. 2 (4), 
the EAW is based on a criminal act which is, however, not covered by the principle of 
double criminality; (b) if the suspect is prosecuted in the executing Member State for 
the same act; (c) if the judicial authorities of the executing Member State have 
decided not to conduct or to halt criminal prosecution for the criminal act which is the 
object of the EAW as well as in the case where the accused has been tried finally for 
the same criminal act in a Member State; (d) where the criminal prosecution or 
punishment of the requested person is statute-barred according to the law of the 
                                                             
78
 See article 3 (2) of the F.D. The respect of the principle of ne bis in idem is imposed among Member 
States of the European Union, a principle that is similarly expressed in art. 54 of the Schengen Treaty. 
According to this principle, if the executing judicial authority ascertains that the requested person has 
been tried irrevocably for the same acts in any Member State, it should deny the execution of the EAW. 
See Maria Fletcher ‗Some developments to the ne bis in idem principle in the European Union: 
Criminal Proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok  and Klaus Brügge‘, The Modern Law Review, 
Vol.66, 2003, p.769-780. See also the very recent ECJ case of Gaetano Mantello, Case C-261/09, of 
16/11/2010, where the ECJ ruled that the concept of ‗same acts‘ in Article 3(2) of the Framework 
Decision constitutes an autonomous concept of European Union law. Also, whether a person has been 
‗finally‘ judged for the purposes of Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision is determined by the law of 
the Member State in which judgment was delivered. Thus, a decision which, under the law of the 
Member State which instituted criminal proceedings against a person, does not definitively bar further 
prosecution at national level in respect of certain acts cannot, in principle, constitute a procedural 
obstacle to the possible opening or continuation of criminal proceedings in respect of the same acts 
against that person in one of the Member States of the European Union.  
79 See article 3 (3) of the F.D.  
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executing Member State and the acts fall within the jurisdiction of that Member State 
under its own criminal law. 
Furthermore, the executing State may refuse to execute the EAW according to the 
ground (e) if the requested person has been finally judged by a third State in respect of 
the same acts; (f) if the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of 
execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, where the requested person is 
staying in, or is a national or a resident of the executing Member State and that State 
undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic 
law
80
; (g) the next optional ground for refusal centralizes its interest on the principle 
of territoriality. In particular, it refers to criminal acts which, according to the 
legislation of the executing Member State, are considered to have been committed 
wholly or partly in its territory - or in a place treated as such - or have been committed 
outside the territory of the issuing Member State and the legislation of the executing 
Member State does not permit the prosecution for the same criminal acts taking place 
in areas outside its territory
81
. However, according to the ECLAN study, this 
provision has been transposed, and is applied in practice, in an astonishing multitude 
of different ways
82
. In any event, this provision aims to alleviate concerns regarding 
the abolition of double criminality as if there is any sort of connection with the 
territory of the executing the EAW authority then the latter still can refuse to execute 
the EAW
83
.  
As noted above, the last optional ground for refusal (h) was inserted in the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant as article 4a with the Council 
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009. According to this new 
provision the executing judicial may also refuse to execute the European Arrest 
Warrant based on a decision rendered following a trial at which the requested person 
                                                             
80 See the recent Case C-66/08 Kozłowski of 18/02/08, where the ECJ stated that the terms ‗staying‘ 
and ‗resident‘, determining the scope of Article 4(6), must be defined uniformly, since they concern 
autonomous concepts of Union law. According to the Court, when evaluating whether the person 
requested is ‗staying‘ in the executing State, it is for the executing judicial authority ‗to make an 
overall assessment of various objective factors characterizing the situation of that person, which 
include, in particular, the length, nature and conditions of his presence and the family and economic 
connections which he has with the executing Member State‘.  See also the Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg 
where the Court found that the executing Member State cannot in addition to a condition as to the 
duration of residence in that State, subject the application of the ground for non-execution of a EAW to 
supplementary administrative requirements. 
81 As the ECLAN study suggests all mutual recognition instruments, whether formally adopted or only 
politically agreed, except the FD 577 of 22 July 2003 on the freezing of property or evidence, admit a 
territoriality clause as an optional ground for refusal. See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
82 See ECLAN study, id. 2008,  
83 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p.127. 
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did not appear in person (the so-called judgments in absentia). Yet, it is notable that 
before the amendment of the Framework Decision, in cases of judgments in absentia, 
surrender could be subject to the condition that the issuing judicial authority would 
give an assurance deemed adequate to guarantee the person who is the subject of the 
European arrest warrant that he or she would have an opportunity to apply for a retrial 
of the case in the issuing Member State and to be present at the judgment
84
. 
Nevertheless, under the new provision 4a, this is not any more the case, as judgments 
in absentia may become a ground for the non-execution of an EAW, which proves the 
significance that the EU Legislator attaches to the protection of fundamental rights, 
especially to the procedural rights of persons and the right to fair trial provided in 
article 6 of the ECHR
85
, and its determination to improve and facilitate the judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.  
Further, it is noteworthy that the ECJ in a recent judgement went a step forward by 
supporting that the execution of a European arrest warrant issued for the purposes of 
execution of a sentence imposed in absentia within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 
Framework Decision, may be subject to the condition that the person concerned, a 
national or resident of the executing Member State, should be returned to the 
executing State in order, as the case may be, to serve there the sentence passed against 
him, following a new trial organised in his presence in the issuing Member State
86
. 
This decision, yet, is of critical importance as the Court clarified that the EAW may 
be issued not for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, but also for the 
purposes of executing of a custodial sentence or a detention order.  
The Commission‘s report87 on the implementation of the EAW illustrates that 
several Member States have either added in their national laws grounds for                 
non–recognition that are not contained in the Framework Decision or they have 
converted optional grounds for refusal into mandatory ones. This suggests, not only 
that Member States wanted to preserve an increased safety valve to the introduced 
automated system of mutual recognition, but at the same time that lack of trust 
                                                             
84 See article 5 (1) of the Framework Decision before the amendment.  
85 See par. 1 of the Preamble of the Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA. 
86 See Case C-306/09 ‗I.B. v Conseil des ministres‘ of 21 October 2010.  
87 See the ‗Report from the Commission‘, id. COM (2005) 63 final, where the Commission 
characterises the introduction of grounds not provided in the Framework decision as ‗disturbing‘.  
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between them was the main reason for the introduction of additional grounds for 
refusal of recognition and execution of a request by the requested authorities
88
.    
However, this seems to be contrary to both the nature and the scope of the 
Framework Decisions in general. As it is known, Framework Decisions are binding as 
to the result to be achieved, leaving the choice of form and methods up to the national 
authorities
89
, and do not have a direct effect. To that extent, when Framework 
Decisions are implemented they have many similarities with the Directives of the first 
pillar
90
. In order to be able to evaluate, on an objective basis, whether a Framework 
Decision has been fully implemented by a Member State, some general criteria have 
been developed with respect to Directives which, according to the European 
Commission, should be applied mutatis mutandis to Framework Decisions
91
: 
‗[..1] The form and methods of implementation of the result to be achieved must be 
chosen in a manner which ensures that the Directive (and thus and the Framework 
Decision) functions effectively with account being taken of its aims‘. Yet, the 
European Court has made a very illustrative point in that respect. In the case 
Commission v. Italy 
92
the Court inter alia stated that:  
‗[…] the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require 
that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific 
legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive, be 
adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application 
of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner […]‘. 
In addition, it is interesting to note a recent Judgment of the House of Lords
93
 
where, with regard to the implementation of Framework Decisions was of the opinion 
that: ‗[…] In its choice of form and methods a national authority may not seek to 
frustrate or impede achievement of the purpose of the decision, for that would impede 
                                                             
88 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗Trust-Building Measures in the European Judicial Area in Criminal 
Matters: Issues of Competence, Legitimacy and Inter-institutional Balance‘ in S. Carrera and T. 
Balzacq, Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe‘s Future (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006), pp. 
280. 
89 Art. 34 (2) (b) TEU. 
90 For further discussion see Matthias J. Borgers, ‗Implementing Framework Decisions‘, Common 
Market Law Review, Vol. 44, 2007, p.1361. See also Art. 249 (3) TEC.  
91 See ‗Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament based on Article 10 
of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings‘. COM 
(2006) 187 Final, 02.05.2006. 
92 See Case C-363/85, Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 1733, par. 7. 
93 Judgments ‗Dabas (Appellant) v. High Court of Justice Madrid (Respondent)‘, House of Lords, 
Session 2006-07, [2007] UKHL 6, 28/02/07. 
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the general duty of cooperation binding on member states under article 10 of the EC 
Treaty‘. 
What is clear from the above mentioned two judgments is even if Member States, 
while implementing a Directive and similarly a Framework Decision into their 
domestic law, use different verbatim terminology from the one in the Directive or in 
the Framework Decision, this should not, in any event, mean that Member States can 
change the content of the Directive or the Framework Decision (i.e. by adding new 
grounds for refusal) as this leads to a breach of their obligation under article 10 TEC 
and 34 (2) (b) TEU respectively. This further suggests that Member States, while 
implementing the Framework Decisions into their national law, should not go beyond 
the very essence of the Framework Decisions (for example by creating new grounds 
for refusal) because, if this is done, Framework Decisions become binding not as to 
the result to be achieved (a result which has been primarily set up by the original 
Framework Decision of the Council), but to the result to be achieved as implemented 
by each Member State in a different way into their national law. This, however, is 
contrary to the spirit of the EU Legislator, who wanted to give Framework Decisions 
a binding effect in the context of the result to be achieved as is provided in the 
primary adopted Framework Decision and not in the implemented national legal 
instrument
94
.    
Furthermore, the conversion of some of the optional grounds of refusal into 
mandatory ones is contrary to the spirit and the purposes of the Framework Decision 
for one more reason: it eliminates the executing judicial authority from the possibility 
of exercising his discretionary power. As is noted above, the Framework Decision 
gives to the judicial authorities the ability to refuse its execution on the optional 
grounds of refusal. This discretionary power is directly provided to the national 
judicial authority of execution of the EAW and not to the national Legislator
95
. 
Accordingly, when the national Legislator converts the optional grounds for refusal 
into mandatory, this results in the limitation, if not deprivation, of the discretionary 
power of the judge which, however, is contrary to the Framework Decision.  
 
                                                             
94 See Commission Staff Working document, ‗Annex to the report from the Commission‘, where the 
Commission is of the opinion that the approach by some Member States to add more grounds for 
refusal of a arrest warrant goes beyond the Framework decision. SEC (2005) 267, Brussels, 
23.02.2005, p.5. 
95 See article 4 of the Framework Decision.  
28 
 
Having taken all these into account, one could rightly argue that if a Member State 
refuses to execute an EAW on grounds which are not permitted/provided under the 
originally adopted by the Council Framework Decision then other Member States 
might do likewise. Nevertheless, if such practice becomes widespread then the whole 
effort of mutual recognition could break down and its benefits would be lost, as 
mutual recognition will gradually depend on reciprocity
96
, a principle which, 
according to the European Commission, is contrary to the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision
97
 and the principle of mutual recognition thereof. In fact,                 
in response to the German Constitutional Court‘s ruling that annulled the EAW 
Framework Decision in 2005, the Spanish authorities, since then, rejected several 
EAW requests from Germany because under Spanish Constitutional law extradition is 
permitted only on the basis of reciprocity. However, as expected, this caused several 
reactions. Indicative is the statement of Andy Burnham, Member of the House of 
Commons and Parliamentary under Secretary of State, who while examined in the 
Sub-Committee E of the EU Committee of the House of Lords on 18
th
 January 2006, 
expressed his fear that such approach by Member States would be ‗a breakdown of 
the system (of mutual recognition) if it was tit-for-tat‘, meaning of course the rules of 
reciprocity
98
.  
 
5. Competent authorities and time limits  
Article 6 of the Framework Decision provides that the competent judicial 
authority for the issue and the execution of an EAW is determined by virtue of the law 
of the issuing and the executing, respectively, State. The EAW must contain the 
information set out in article 8 of the Framework Decision. Furthermore, the final 
decision on the execution must be taken within a period of 60 days – in some 
exceptions 90 days – from the arrest of the requested person99, whereas the surrender 
must take place within 10 days after the final decision on the execution of the 
                                                             
96 For an overview of the relation between the principle of reciprocity and the EAW, see Harmen van 
der Wilt, ‗The principle of Reciprocity‘, Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, R. Blekxtoon et 
all., TMC Asser Press, 2005, p.71. 
97 See Commission Staff Working document, id. 2005, p.12, where the Commission points out that, 
contrary to the Framework Decision, Czech Republic applies reciprocity towards other Member States 
in order to surrender its nationals. 
98 See House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‗30th Report of Session 2005–06, on European 
Arrest Warrant—Recent Developments, Report with Evidence‘, p.11.  
99 See article 17 of the F.D. 
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EAW
100
, introducing in such a way a simplified procedure marked by automatization 
and speed
101
. 
 
6. Surrender procedure – Rights of the requested person – Consent  
 
Another question that arises for consideration while analyzing the general 
overview of the EAW is whether or not the executing State, after the arrest of the 
requested person, has to surrender the person in question recognizing thus the judicial 
decision of the issuing State
102
. The answer to this question is not given directly by 
any of the articles of the Arrest Warrant separately, but by the context of the Arrest 
Warrant as a whole. Indeed, the execution of the EAW takes place in two stages:          
The first being the arrest of the requested person and the second the surrender of that 
person to the issuing State.  
    To clarify this according to the Framework Decision, towards the combination of 
article 1 paragraph 2 and articles 9, 10, 11, 12, and 17, it is clear that as soon as the 
judicial decision of the issuing State is transmitted to the executing judicial authority, 
the latter is obliged to arrest the person in question without any delay. At this stage 
the arrested person has the rights provided in article 11 (i.e. to be informed, legal 
counsel, and interpretation). Up to this phase, the judicial decision is enforceable 
without the executing State having any prima facie ground to refuse to arrest the 
requested person. However, at the second stage - namely at the detention and the 
surrender procedure of that person - the executing judicial authority has the right to 
take a decision on whether or not the requested person should remain in detention, in 
accordance with the law of the executing Member State
103
, yet also to decide whether 
the person is to be surrendered
104
.  
    At this point it must be mentioned that if the arrested person indicates that he or she 
consents to surrender, this consent leads to his or her surrender without the executing 
authority having any ground to decide otherwise from the will of the arrested person.                  
                                                             
100 See article 23 of the F.D. 
101 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, CMLR, id. 2006, p. 1284. 
102 At this point it is worth standing to mention the Explanatory Memorandum presented by the 
Commission for a Council Framework Decision on the EAW, where it is mentioned, inter alia, that: 
‗The system of the EAW can function only when there is perfect trust between the Member States as to 
the quality and reliability of their political and legal systems‘. See explanatory note to art 49 of the 
‗Proposal for a Council Framework decision on the EAW and the surrender procedures between the 
Member States, COM/2001/0522/final/2-CNS 2001/0215. Available from: www.europa.eu.int. 
103 Art. 12. 
104 Art. 15. 
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His or her consent may not, in principle, be revoked
105
; and it must be given 
voluntarily and in full knowledge of the consequences. However, if the person in 
question does not consent to his or her surrender, then he or she is entitled to be heard 
by the executing judicial authority
106
. The final decision about the surrender is taken 
within a short period of time following the arrest and after the consideration of some 
legal issues with regard to the rules that determine the surrender procedure of the 
requested person as referred to in articles 2 to 5 and 16. The executing judicial 
authority notifies the issuing judicial authority immediately of the decision on the 
action to be taken on the EAW
107
 and the requested person is surrendered within the 
time limits set out in article 23. Yet, any period of detention arising from execution of 
the European arrest warrant is deducted from the total period of deprivation of liberty 
imposed
108
. 
 
6.1 Human Rights Concerns
109
 
 
a. General overview 
 
    Mutual recognition, and the enforcement of judicial decisions in criminal matters 
thereof, is based on the presumption that the judicial proceedings in the issuing State 
have taken or will take place in accordance with due process and other human rights 
requirements. This is one of the main aspects founding the trust between the judicial 
                                                             
105 Art. 13 (4). 
106 Art. 14. 
107 Art. 22. 
108 Art. 26.  
109 For the purposes of this thesis the examination of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights is not of particular focus. However, for reasons of completeness of this thesis, as to the 
compatibility of surrender through a EAW with articles 5&7 of ECHR see, for example, Case ‗Ocalan 
v. Turkey‘, No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 March 2003, par. 85, where the Court was of the opinion 
that: ‗Convention does not prevent cooperation between States, within the framework of extradition 
treaties or in matters of deportation, for the purpose of bringing fugitive offenders to justice, provided 
that it does not interfere with any specific rights recognizes in the Convention‘. Also, as to the 
compatibility of surrender and extradition with article 3 of ECHR see, for example, four cases which 
could result to an infringement of this article, if the conditions referred into were not met: (a) case 
‗Peers v Greece‘ in 2001 (No. 28524) regarding the standards of keeping the arrested person in prison; 
(b) case ‗Price v UK‘ in 2001 (No. 33394) regarding the treatment of the arrested by the law-
enforcement officers; (c) case ‗Einhorn v France‘ in 2001 (No.71555) regarding the imposition of an 
irreducible life sentence; (d) case ‗B.B v France‘ in 1998 where the surrender of the requested person 
could lead to the deterioration of his physical health condition. However, regarding the relationship of 
the surrender with the article 6 of ECHR, see case ‗Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v Turkey‘ in 2003 
(No. 46827/99 and 46951/99), where the Court reiterated that decisions regarding the entry, stay and 
deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of an applicant's civil rights or obligations or of 
a criminal charge against him, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.  
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authorities of Member States. This trust is, thus, very much connected with the crucial 
question of whether the human rights protection in Member States is up to an 
adequate level
110
 and whether the essential aforementioned ‗common values‘ for the 
creation of mutual trust exist. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to take a look at Amnesty‘s 
International latest reports in 2006, where serious concerns are expressed about the 
situation of human rights in Europe
111
, or at the recent judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights to be persuaded that not only the values in question do not in 
fact exist, but that the vast majority of the current EU Member States have had 
adverse judgments relating to their criminal justice systems. In addition, in the case of 
Pupino
112
, the European Court of Justice expressly stated that third pillar measures 
had to be interpreted in light of human rights principles, including the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as in the very recent case of 
Advocaten voor de Wereld
113
, the ECJ confirmed that within the third pillar the human 
rights principles are also applicable when considering the validity of EU law and the 
national application of EU law. 
While the Union ‗is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States‘114, grave failings are observed in the respect of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Member States
115
. Nevertheless, these failings, 
even if raising serious questions with regard to very fundamental rights of the 
defendant, do not seem to affect the very basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition
116
. To that end, in the last few years the European Commission has 
expressed its strong interest to establish in a number of key areas, minimum 
procedural safeguards in criminal matters in an attempt to overcome the problems 
having arisen under the aforementioned failings. This, in essence, suggests that 
                                                             
110 See Guy Stessens, ‗The Principle of Mutual Confidence between Judicial Authorities in the Area of 
Freedom, Justice and Security‘, L‘espace penal europeen: enjeux et perspectives, Editions De L‘ 
Universite De Bruxelles, 2002, p.102.  
111 See Amnesty International, Report of 2006 about the state of Human Rights in Europe. Available 
from: http://www.amnesty.org 
112 Case C-105/03, ‗Pupino‘, [2005] ECR I-5285, 16/06/2005. For commentary see Maria Fletcher, 
‗Extending ‗indirect effect‘ to the third pillar: the significance of Pupino‘, European Law Review, 
2005, p. 862. 
113 Case C-303/05, ‗Advocaten voor de Wereld‘, judgment of 3 May 2007. The importance of this case 
will be discussed further on within this chapter. 
114 See TEU art.6 par.1. 
115 See Amnesty International, Report of 2006 about the state of Human Rights in Europe. 
116 See the annual reports on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2002, 2003 
and 2004 made by the Network of fundamental rights independent experts. Available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home. 
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Member States jumped at the opportunity to adopt a measure (namely the EAW), 
without having previously safeguarded its execution under the adequate respect of 
fundamental rights. Thus, later adopted instruments, such as the Framework Decision 
on judgments in absentia in 2009
117
 or the Resolution of the Council on the Roadmap 
for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings of 2009
118
, as well as the very recent Directive 2010/64 on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings
119
, reveal that the EU Member 
States under pressure and in a indirect confession regarding the inadequate level of 
protection of fundamental rights between Member States and in order to 
counterbalance this lack of sufficient protection, now ‗ex post‘ shifts its interest in the 
minimum standards on defense rights and in the enhancement of the protection of 
fundamental rights through the proposal of such measures.  
    With regard in particular to the operation of the EAW, Member States should meet 
the standards of human rights protection set out in the different international human 
rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
120
. 
The EAW, thus, cannot be successfully and efficiently operated in a climate of 
disregard of human rights
121
. It also seems that the possibility of checking whether 
fundamental rights have been respected is expressly envisaged in the implementing 
legislation of a number of Member States
122
. Human Rights concerns have been 
primarily focused on whether the rights of arrested person, in particular the right to a 
fair trial and the protection from torture, will not be breached in the issuing the EAW 
State.  
Nevertheless, even the arrest of the requested person itself according to the EAW 
raises the question of the legality of this very important intervention in the personal 
freedom of that person. As a first general comment, it should be mentioned that the 
procedural aim of the arrest and surrender of the requested person in the EU level is 
different from the one which justifies the arrest and detention of a person within the 
                                                             
117 See Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009. 
118 Resolution Council, 2009/C 295/01 of 30 November 2009.  
119 OJ L280/1 of 26/10/10.  
120 Member States are bound by different national and international instruments for the protection of 
Human Rights. However, in this thesis the EAW will be approached under the ECHR provisions, as on 
the one hand that is provided in art. 1 par. 3 in combination with art. 6 par. 2 of TEU and on the other 
as it is the most accessible regional instrument with legal force, and thus more likely to apply to cases 
related to the EAW.  
121 See Caroline Morgan, ‗The European Arrest Warrant and the Defendants‘ Rights: An Overview‘, 
Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant, R. Blekxtoon et all., TMC Asser Press, 2005, p.195. 
122 See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
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framework of a national criminal trial. The executing State carries out the EAW not 
for the satisfaction of its own criminal claim, but for the facilitation of the exercise of 
a foreign jurisdictional power according to the framework of the intergovernmental 
co-operation in criminal matters. However, this distinction does not - and in fact it 
should not - affect the legal position of the requested person as in any case the arrest 
and surrender of that person should be carried out under the provisions of the ECHR 
as it constitutes a serious intervention in the individual right of personal freedom as 
well as the application of the provided rights under the ECHR to surrender under the 
EAW is both logical and plainly necessary for the effective operation of mutual 
recognition
123
.   
Indeed, apart from a number of applications of the ne bis in idem principle (Arts. 
3(2), 4(2)-(3) and 4(5)), as well as provisions on trials by default (Art. 5(1)) and on 
life sentences (Art. 5(2)), the main provisions in EAW dealing with human rights are 
Article 1(3) and the 10th, 12th and 13th recitals of the preamble
124
. In particular, Art. 
1 par. 3 explicitly defines the obligation of respect of individual rights by providing 
that: ‗This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation 
to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 
6 of the Treaty on European Union‘125. In addition, in the preamble of the Framework 
Decision and in particular in par.12 and 13 there is a reference to respect the 
fundamental rights. However, it is notable that art. 3 and 4 of the EAW related to the 
grounds for non execution are ‗silent‘ on fundamental rights126.  
Nevertheless, the arising question is whether human rights constitute, in fact, a 
fourth, but not directly provided, ground for the mandatory non-execution of the 
European Arrest Warrant in the light of art. 1 par. 3 of the Council Framework 
Decision according to which fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles are 
explicitly respected. From the whole spirit of the Framework Decision it seems that 
the necessity for respect of fundamental rights is addressed to the judicial authorities 
of the Member State which issued the EAW as well as the judicial authority of the 
                                                             
123 See Paul Garlick, ‗The European Arrest Warrant and the ECHR‘, Handbook on the European Arrest 
Warrant, R. Blekxtoon et all., TMC Asser Press, 2005, p. 168. 
124 One should not, however, ignore that the exact effect of the preambular clauses is not clear.  
125 See Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union. 
126 As Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf comment ‗this absence gives rise to the suspicion that Member 
States have not given serious consideration to the possibility of grave human rights abuses occurring in 
other Member States that would give rise to an obligation to refuse surrender. See Susie Alegre and 
Marisa Leaf, ‗Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A step too far too soon? Case 
Study - The European Arrest Warrant‘, European Law Journal, Vol.10, March (2004), p.202. 
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executing State. The judicial authority, thus, is designated to check whether the EAW 
violates article 6 of the TEU. In this framework, one can argue that the judicial 
authority while examining human rights issues, it does so in the light of the legality 
itself of the European Arrest Warrant, and not of its execution. If, thus, a requested 
person claims that his surrender will probably result in a violation of his fundamental 
rights, then the judicial authority which ascertains that the EAW may violate 
fundamental rights, refuses its execution not because it infringes some ground for 
refusal, but rather because it has not been legally issued
127
.  
 
7. Rule of Speciality  
 
Article 27 of the Framework Decision, having as a title ‗Possible prosecution for 
other offences‘, provides for the cases concerning exceptions to the rule of speciality, 
a rule which is closely connected to sovereignty. As a general rule, a person 
surrendered may not be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of his or her 
liberty for an offence committed prior to his or her surrender other than that for which 
he or she was surrendered
128
, except in the case referred to in Article 27(1), under 
which consent for such surrender can be presumed to have been given, and in the 
cases provided for in Article 27(3).  
The Court of Justice, interpreting this provision, stated in its judgment concerning 
the recent case C-388/08
129
 that while a person surrendered under a European arrest 
warrant for the purpose of prosecution for a criminal offence may be prosecuted for 
that offence only, it is possible, under specific criteria, to make certain changes to the 
description of facts during the procedure and describe the offence more precisely 
without offending against the rule of speciality. The Court was also of the opinion that 
while it is always possible to prosecute a person for a different offence from the one 
specified in the arrest warrant with the consent of the Member State executing the 
warrant; such consent is not required for changes and amendments which do not result 
in a different characterization of the offence. 
                                                             
127 However, it has been argued that article 1 (3) of the Framework Decision as well as par. 12 of its 
Preamble compel a ground for refusal of the surrender of the requested person. See Nico Keijzer, ‗The 
European Arrest Warrant and Human Rights‘, in Current Issues in European Criminal Law and the 
Protection of EU Financial Interests, Austrian Association of European Criminal Law, 2006, p. 141. 
128 See art. 27 par. 2 of the F.D. 
129 See ‗Case C-388/08 PPU ‗Leymann and Pustovarov‘, 1 December 2008.  
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However, it is notable that the Court notes in its judgement that the exception 
applies as long as no measure restricting personal liberty is taken against the person 
for the ‗offence other‘ than that for which he has been surrendered. If, thus, that 
person is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for the ‗other offence‘, consent must 
be sought and obtained before the sentence is enforced. The Framework Decision 
does not, however, prevent the person surrendered from being subjected to a measure 
restricting personal liberty before consent is obtained, where that restriction is 
justified in law by other charges mentioned in the European Arrest Warrant. 
All the above mentioned analysis shows that the European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision under certain conditions indisputably leads to the so-called ‗free 
movement of criminal decisions‘ and, in particular, constitutes the first step for the 
mutual recognition of judgments aiming at the arrest and surrender of suspects within 
the European Union, ensuring that the process takes place exclusively between the 
judicial rather than the political authorities of the Member States and under the 
safeguard of fundamental human rights and the umbrella of mutual trust.  
Yet the latter justifies the main purpose of the EAW which is to ensure the inter-
State‘s cooperation in the field of criminal law for combating the international crime 
as they do have common interests in order the Union to become an ‗Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice‘. 
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V. The EAW as evidence of the existence (or non existence) of mutual trust 
between Member States 
 
As has already been discussed, the purpose of the EAW is to improve traditional 
judicial cooperation by limiting the grounds of refusal, bringing judicial authorities of 
Member States into a closer cooperation in order to achieve the effective enforcement 
of criminal decisions
130
, and introducing mutual trust of the different and diverse 
criminal legal systems.  
The semantic definition of the norm ‗mutual trust‘ is something vague and 
constitutes at least a very abstract concept. It has been linked, and has acquired 
particular relevance, with respect to the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions. The question that arises is if indeed there is mutual trust between Member 
States –especially after the last enlargement of the EU- or it is just a declamatory 
word used by the politicians in order to promote the cooperation between Member 
States in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but for which the 
judicial authorities of the Member States do not share the same point of view
131
.  
The concept of mutual trust is something very difficult to define. With respect to 
criminal matters, it appeared in the Programme of Measures to implement the 
principle of mutual recognition adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2000
132
, where 
the Ministers gave the core elements of the meaning of mutual trust, stating that the 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters 
‗presupposes that Member States have trust in each others‘ criminal justice systems‘. 
That trust is grounded - as they said - in particular, on the States‘ shared commitment 
to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are deemed to be common to the 
Member States and which constitute the basis upon which the principle of mutual 
recognition is founded. The same concept was also used in the recent Stockholm 
Programme where it was stressed that ensuring trust is ‗one of the main challenges for 
the future‘. 
                                                             
130 See article 31 par. 1 of the TEU. 
131 It is notable that the ECLAN study suggests that negotiations of the different instruments sometimes 
appear to take place more in a climate of suspicion than of mutual trust. See ECLAN study, id.2008. 
See also Massimo Fichera, id. 2009, p. 80, where he argues that ‗trust, although presumed to exist, has 
not yet acquired a normative status. It appears to be more like a declaration of intent‘.  
132See ‗Programme of Measures to implement the principle of Mutual Recognition of decisions in 
criminal Matters‘. OJ C 012, 15/01/2001. 
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However, it is clear that these broad terms cannot, in any event, justify the 
application of mutual trust in the field of judicial cooperation as even if Member 
States have common views with respect, for example, to the general idea of 
democracy, this is not enough for the judicial authorities to trust and ensure the 
prompt execution of a criminal judicial decision issued in a requesting State.  
Criminal law is strongly linked with the regulation of the relation between the 
individuals and the State on the one hand and on the other with the limitation of civil 
liberties and rights of the individuals (nationally and internationally guaranteed) in 
cases where the latter commit an unlawful act. As such, clear, predictable, and 
specific criminal law principles are essential in order to provide legal certainty in a 
society based on the rule of law
133
. 
Alternatively, the European Court of Justice in the joint cases of Hüseyin Gözütok 
and Klaus Brügge134, went further by proclaiming the principle of mutual trust in 
respect to the ne bis in idem principle
135
, but stating inter alia that:                                 
[...] there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their 
criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in 
the other Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national 
law were applied‘136.            
Neither is this approach by the European Court of Justice satisfactory.               
The reasoning of the Court might have been fundamental – as, with it, the Court 
confirmed the legally binding nature of the principle of mutual recognition based on 
the mutual trust, - but it is utopian, if not also dangerous, to expect from the judicial 
authorities of the Member States to have ‗blind‘ trust in the foreign judicial criminal 
systems of which, in fact, they have either no knowledge about or a very limited one. 
Besides, this is also apparent if one considers the number of grounds of refusal 
adopted by the Member States while implementing the Framework Decision where 
one could rightly argue that the more grounds for refusal the less one can presume 
that trust exists between Member States.
137
 
                                                             
133 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, CMLR, id. 2006, p.1280. 
134 See the joint cases ‗Hüseyin Gözütok (C-187/01) and Klaus Brügge‘ (C-385/01), 2003, ECR. In 
addition see Maria Fletcher, id. (2003), p.769-780. 
135 For a detailed analysis of the ne bis in idem principle see Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 142-153.  
136 For a detailed analysis of the judgement see Sasa Sever, ‗The ne bis in idem principle in the case 
law of the European Court of Justice‘, in Current Issues in European Criminal Law and the protection 
of EU Financial Interests, Austrian Association of European Criminal Law, 2006, p. 147.  
137 See Massimo Fichera, id. 2009, p. 81. 
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This last point is of greater consideration and importance given the last two 
enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively. One could argue
138
 that the 
new Members of the EU, in order to enter the EU, have to implement the Union 
acquis as a condition sine qua non for the joining the Union, with accession therefore 
being conditional
139
 in these terms. Implementation of the Union‘s acquis means 
practically that Member States have to comply with and fulfil the Copenhagen 
criteria
140
, namely the political, the economic, and the so-called acquis criterion, 
meaning, with respect to the mutual recognition issue in the judicial cooperation 
context, that the ‗new‘ Member States have a judicial system which is ready to be 
recognized and accepted by the ‗old‘ Member States‘ judicial authorities.               
However, that seems not to be the case. It is rather undoubted that the ‗old‘ Member 
States showed some degree of mistrust in the new Member States.  
Characteristic is the example of the acquisition by the new Member States of 
Schengen membership. Accession to the European Union did not mean automatic 
Schengen membership for the new Member States. On the contrary, the existing 
Schengen members required to agree unanimously on the readiness of candidate 
countries to be members
141
. It is not a coincidence that the old Member States wanted 
to create an extra safeguard valve to avoid any potential shortcomings or imminent 
risks in the transposition and implementation of the instruments related to mutual 
recognition in the area of criminal law under the Title VI of the TEU.                         
In particular, according to the Act of Accession, the Commission upon motivated 
request of a Member State or on its own initiative and after consulting Member States 
could take appropriate measures which could include the form of even temporary 
suspension of the application of relevant provisions on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters
142
. Even if this clause could be invoked within 3 years of the 
accession and even if in fact it was never invoked that does not change the reality 
                                                             
138 See Emmanuel Pitto, ‗Mutual Trust and Enlargement‘, Mutual Trust in the European Criminal 
Area, Editions De L‘ Universite De Bruxelles, 2005, p. 47. 
139 On conditionality and enlargement, see K.E. Smith, ‗The Evolution and Application of EU 
Membership Conditionality‘ in M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (OUP, 
Oxford, 2003), pp. 105–140. 
140 Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set 
out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. 
However, relevant criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and 
strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. 
141 For an analytical review of the relation between trust and enlargement see Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗The 
External Dimension of EU Action in Criminal Matters‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 12, 
(2007) p. 459 - 465. 
142 See article 39 of the Act of Accession.  
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which is that old Member States were suspicious of countries with very different 
social, cultural, political and economic backgrounds. Thus, an existing level of 
mistrust, involving the ability of these countries to implement the EU criminal law 
standards, is not only apparent, but in fact it has officially been declared with the 
introduction of the safety valve of art. 39 of the Act of Accession.  
Taking all the above into account, it is hard to believe, for example, that a Greek 
judge
143
 who comes from an indicative strong civil law jurisdiction will accept, 
without at least some hesitation, to recognise and execute a judicial decision from for 
instance a Romanian judicial authority where the European Commission, on the one 
hand, in its report in 2004 found, among others
144
 strong political pressure on judges 
while exercising their official duties, significant shortage of judges, and serious 
phenomena of corruption; and on the other, in its report issued in 27 June 2007, found 
that ‗progress in the judicial treatment of high-level corruption is insufficient‘145. 
In addition, it is characteristic of the statement by the Finland Presidency in 2006, 
during the informal JHA Ministerial meeting
146
, where it was admitted that the 
negotiations on new instruments on mutual recognition ‗have slowed and become 
more difficult‘ due to the requirement of consensus that applies in the third pillar, and 
because during 2004, as a result of the enlargement of the EU, the number of 
negotiating partners grew from 15 to 25. In addition as the Presidency states, 
instruments on cooperation in criminal matters ‗come up against the limits of mutual 
trust and confidence between Member States‘. 
Undoubtedly, the European Union genuinely hopes to develop the principle of 
mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation and, undeniably this aim 
cannot be achieved if the issue of mutual trust is not addressed urgently.                             
As the European Commission has stressed
147
 ‗reinforcing mutual trust is the key to 
making mutual recognition to operate smoothly‘. At the same time, as the ECLAN 
study suggests, in reality, this trust is still not spontaneously felt and is by no means 
                                                             
143 This will also be supported in the next chapter by some interviewed Greek judges.  
144 See the 2004 Regular Report on Romania‘s progress towards accession.  
145 See ‗Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Romania's 
progress on accompanying measures following Accession‘, COM (2007) 378 final, Brussels, 
27.6.2007. 
146See Finland‘s EU Presidency statement, Informal JHA Ministerial Meeting, Tampere 20-22 
September 2006.  
147 See ‗Communication from the Commission‘, id. COM (2005) 195. 
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always evident in practice, even if mutual confidence between Member States‘ 
judicial and prosecution authorities appears to be growing
148
. 
However, mutual trust, as a learning process, has as prerequisite no less than the 
mutual knowledge of the different legal systems, cultures, and socio-ethical values of 
the Member States. This should be a main priority for Member States.                           
Yet, this purpose can primarily be achieved by making small steps, to begin with, that 
would eventually lead to the major one - namely the adoption of common values. 
On the one hand, exchanging of judges, peer reviewing between judges and 
prosecutors
149
, evaluation of the different legal systems, promoting networking among 
practitioners of justice and developing judicial training 
150
 are some of the small steps 
that could be done in order to improve knowledge of each other‘s systems, improve 
mutual trust and therefore give legal practitioners a stronger sense of belonging to a 
common judicial culture. Alternatively, and at a second stage, Member States should 
pursue in the direction of the adoption of common values upon which the European 
Union is based. These values nevertheless require common justiciable standards 
which are met equally throughout Member States and for which Member States share 
common views. This goal, however, will gradually lead to mutual trust not only 
between the relevant judicial authorities of the Member States, but also, and most 
importantly, to mutual trust between the citizens in their and each others, criminal 
justice systems
151
. 
Thus, if EU still wants to keep taking actions at a criminal level it must at least 
adopt common concepts about the very basic elements of the criminal offences and 
proceedings which would then be the basis on which the common values can rely on. 
In this framework, it would be a good start if the Member States would urgently 
address and take specific legislative initiatives regarding the minimum procedural 
standards, and in particular, the very much debated rights of the defendant
152
.                   
In the light of the failure to reach agreement on the proposal for a Framework 
                                                             
148 See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
149 See Susie Alegre, ‗Mutual trust – Lifting the mask‘, Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area, 
Editions De L‘ Universite De Bruxelles, 2005, p.45. 
150 See ‗Communication from the Commission‘, id. COM (2005) 195. See also See ECLAN study, id. 
2008. 
151 See John A.E Vervaele, ‗Mutual trust and Mercosur integration in South America‘, Mutual Trust in 
the European Criminal Area, Editions De L‘ Universite De Bruxelles, 2005, p.305. 
152 See the ‗Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the European Union (presented by the Commission)‘, Brussels, 28.4.2004, 
COM(2004) 328 final. 
41 
 
Decision on procedural rights
153
, the ECLAN study suggests that most experts 
maintain that work on this matter should now resume. Even in the Member States 
which were against the adoption of that FD in June 2007, the national reports of the 
study indicate that several practitioners favour resumption of the work for the 
approximation of the essential rights
154
. In any event these ‗trust-building‘ 
measures
155
 would eliminate the provoked reactions and fears and would increase the 
safety valve for both the sufficient protection of fundamental rights and the smooth 
operation of the EU criminal law now as in the long term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
153 On 3 May 2004 the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain 
procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. The proposal, however, 
caused several reactions and controversy between Member State and it was frozen. At the end of 2006, 
the Austrian Presidency presented a proposal for the text of an instrument on procedural rights in 
criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 12-13 June 2007 could 
not find any agreement and therefore is still pending.  
154 See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
155 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 132. 
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VI. The implementation of the EAW 
     
The Framework Decision was formally adopted in June 2002. The deadline to 
introduce legislation to bring the EAW into force was 1 January 2004.                            
The implementation of the Framework Decision has required the adoption of new 
legislation, or at least the amendment of the existing national provisions in all 
Member States
156
. For example, Portugal and Slovenia have had to amend their 
Constitutions in order to give effect to the EAW. Others have implemented the 
Framework Decision in a way which gives priority to their national constitutions or 
which appears to favour their own nationals. Italy, for example, has provided that 
execution of an EAW may be refused where the requested person is an Italian citizen 
who did not know that the conduct was prohibited. Yet, one should not ignore that the 
Commission has been critical stating that such approach by Member States goes 
further than the Framework Decision allows
157
. 
Article 34 (4) of the Framework Decision requires the Council to conduct a 
review of the application of the EAW. To that end, the Commission produced a report 
in February 2005 evaluating the operation of the EAW
158. The Commission‘s report 
was primarily based on their analysis of national laws giving effect to the EAW and 
the response to questionnaires addressed to the Member States. In January 2006 the 
Commission published a revised report to take account of the Italian legislation 
adopted since the presentation of the original report. In this revised report the 
Commission concludes that despite some initial delays the Arrest Warrant is now 
operational in all the Member States
159
. In fact, the figures are very illustrative of the 
operation of the EAW: More than 6.000 arrest warrants have been issued only during 
the year 2006 and more than of 1.000 of these arrest warrants resulted in the effective 
surrender of the person sought
160
; whereas in 2009 these figures were double as more 
                                                             
156 See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
157 See Commission Staff Working document, id.2005, p.5. 
158 See ‗Report from the Commission‘ id., COM (2005) 63 Final. 
159 See the ‗Report from the Commission on the EAW‘, COM (2006) 8 Final, where it states inter alia 
that the EAW has now been implemented by all the Member States as Italy, as the last country, adopted 
its domestic implementing legislation on 14 May 2005.  
160 See Information note from General Secretariat to Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters on the subject: ‗Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical operation 
of the European arrest warrant‘ - Year 2006, Brussels, 30 January 2008, 11371/4/07 REV 4 COPEN 
106. 
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than 14.000 arrest warrants have been issued and more than 2.700 resulted in the 
effective surrender of the person sought
161
, proving its effective practical operation.  
However, the European Commission is very critical on how Member States have 
implemented the Framework Decision. Indicative is the critique made by the 
European Commission to Belgium, for example, for its exclusion of euthanasia and 
abortion from the offence of ‗murder or grievous bodily harm‘ as provided in the 32 
listed offences
162
. This, nevertheless, brings us back to the aforementioned point that 
the different views between Member States regarding the meaning and essence of the 
listed offences is capable of causing notably problems concerning the smooth and 
effective operation of mutual recognition and mutual trust thereof.  
The enactment of the European Arrest Warrant initially raised serious concerns 
regarding the rule of law; its compatibility with the national Constitutions;                     
its relation with the effective protection of human rights, and its validity as a third 
pillar‘s instrument. In the third pillar context, the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant is the only measure that has –despite the political 
unanimous approval- provoked serious creaks to the effective operation, if not even 
the existence, of the European Arrest Warrant, and is the first time that there has been 
such wide judicial criticism of the implementation of any measure adopted ever in the 
EU‘s area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  
During the years of its existence, the status of the EAW appeared to be threatened 
and came under attack
163
 by its successive annulments from the Supreme (some times 
even Constitutional) Courts of certain EU Member States. As a result, several Courts 
have either declared their national law - implementing the EAW - unconstitutional           
or upheld it as part of a ‗speedy‘ process of the criminal cooperation between the EU 
Member States. In that climate, the European Court of Justice very recently dealt for 
the first time with the incredibly controversial question of the validity of the 
constitutionality of the EAW Framework Decision at the EU level.  
The most representative cases will be discussed in the following section, having as 
criterion which Courts raised Constitutional and human rights concerns, after which 
the recent Judgment of the European Court of Justice will illustrate the question of the 
legality of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision. 
                                                             
161 See the ‗Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical operation of the 
European Arrest Warrant‘, Council Doc. 7551/6/10, REV 6, Brussels, 16 November 2010.  
162 See Commission Staff Working document, id. 2005, p.6.  
163 See House of Lords, 30th Report of Session 2005-06, ‗European Arrest Warrant – Recent 
Developments, Report with evidence‘, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/lords/index.cfm 
44 
 
1. Issues regarding the constitutionality of the surrender of own nationals and the 
protection of fundamental rights as raised in the various national Courts. 
 
The window to the ‗conflict‘ between the national Constitutional Courts and the 
ECJ as to the development and impact of the law opened with the Judgment of 27
th
 
April 2005 of the Polish Constitutional Court.
164
 In this case
165
 the Constitutional 
Court was asked whether article 607 (t) of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure 
(hereinafter CCP) was compatible with Article 55 section 1 of the Polish Constitution. 
In particular, article 607 (t) of the CCP provided that: ‗where a European Arrest 
Warrant has been issued for the purposes of prosecuting a person holding Polish 
citizenship or enjoying the right of asylum in the Republic of Poland, the surrender of 
such a person may only take place upon the condition that such a person will be 
returned to the territory of the Republic of Poland following the valid finalisation of 
proceedings in the State where the warrant was issued‘. At the same time, article 55 
sections 1 of the Polish Constitution provided that: ‗The extradition of a Polish citizen 
shall be prohibited‘. The Court had to therefore examine the relation between the 
terms ‗surrender‘ and ‗extradition‘.  
Having said that, the Polish Constitutional Court was of the opinion that the main 
question was, in essence, whether the surrender of a Polish citizen indicated on the 
grounds of a European Arrest Warrant to a Member State of the EU, is a form of 
extradition
166
. Interestingly, the Court went on to analyze the historical meaning of the 
term ‗extradition‘ in the Polish law167. It looked at the meaning of the term 
‗extradition‘ in the constitutional context and in the context of the CCP as well as            
it compared this term with the term of ‗surrender‘ in the EAW context.  
As the two institutions — of ‗extradition‘ and ‗surrender‘ — are not different             
in substance, surrender was considered to be a specific category of extradition. 
Characteristically the Court stated that
168: ‗As the (core) sense of extradition consists 
of the surrender to a foreign state of an indicted or convicted person, in order to 
enable the conduct of criminal proceedings against this person, or the serving of 
                                                             
164 Judgment P1/05 available online at: htpp://www.trybunal.gov.pl  
165 For a detailed analysis of the facts of the case and the reasoning of the Court see Kazimierz Bem, 
‗The European Arrest Warrant and the Polish Constitutional Court Decision of 27 April 2005‘, in 
Elspeth Guild, Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, 2006, p.125-136.  
166 See par. 3 of the judgment, p. 12. 
167 See par. 3.1 of the judgment, p.12. 
168 See par. 3.6 of the judgment, p.17. 
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punishment established by a sentence concerning this person, therefore the surrender 
of a person indicted by the EAW for the purpose of conduct against that person on the 
territory of another EU member state of criminal proceedings or of serving of a 
delivered sentence of imprisonment or some other custodial measure, must be 
recognised as its modality. If surrender is only a category (type, particular form) of 
extradition as regulated in Article 55 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, then its 
particular elements (differences in relation to the statutory institution of extradition) 
cannot result in the derogation of the constitutional impediment barring surrender, 
consisting of Polish citizenship of the indicted person‘.  
The Court even went a step further by saying that in the human rights protection 
context, surrender for those concerned is a more ‗painful‘ institution than that                   
of extradition, since it excludes the application of the principle of double criminality 
and is possible to affect within shorter time limits
169
. Therefore, the Court concluded 
that as the constitutional lawmaker prohibited extradition of a Polish citizen, ‗the 
same prohibition applies even more to surrender based on the EAW, which is realised 
for the same purpose (i.e. is essentially identical) and is subject to a more painful 
regime
170‘. 
The result was that the provision of the CCP was declared unconstitutional and, 
consequently, lost its binding force eighteen months from the date of the ruling's 
publication. During this transitional period, however, the Constitutional Court obliged 
the Polish courts -oddly enough- to apply the unconstitutional provision.                       
Since then, the amendment that was required to ensure the Constitution's coherent 
relationship to EU law entered into force on November 7 in 2006. According to the 
amended article 55 of the Polish Constitution the extradition of Polish citizens is still 
prohibited, although this rule is no longer absolute
171
. The precondition for extradition 
is ‗a request made by a foreign state or an international judicial body if such a 
possibility stems from an international treaty ratified by Poland or a statute 
implementing a legal instrument enacted by an international organisation of which the 
Republic of Poland is a Member‘. 
 
                                                             
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 For an analysis of the Judgment and of the new amended article 55 of the Polish Constitution see 
Angelika Nußberger, ‗Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the implementation of the European 
Arrest Warrant‘, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1 January 2008. 
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Few months later, Germany was the second country to seriously challenge the 
operation of the EAW, which was implemented twice. The first implementation was 
with the Statute EuHbG in 21.07.2004, namely 6 months later than the expiration of 
the implementation date. The status of the EAW first appeared to be threatened by the 
Federal Constitutional Court which in its decision in 18
th
 July 2005 declared the 
German law to implement the Framework Decision null and void
172
.                                     
In that case, Mamoun Darkazanli, a Syrian-born German, suspected of being an            
Al Qaeda operative, had been held in custody for extradition to Spain under the 
warrant procedure. On appeal, on 18 July 2005, the Federal Constitutional Court held 
that the law applying the warrant did not respect fundamental rights and procedural 
guarantees and so was contrary to the German Constitution
173
.  
The main argument in the Court‘s decision was that the German implementing 
law had not provided for an appeal mechanism and had failed to ‗exhaust the margins 
afforded to it‘ in the Framework Decision in relation to the fundamental rights of 
suspects. In addition, the Court examined in detail the issue of extradition of German 
citizens, and in particular the relation between the German citizenship and the 
German legal order. The Court was of the view that citizens who remain in the 
German territory should be protected from the uncertainties of criminal procedure and 
criminal conviction in a foreign legal system, as their trust in the German legal order 
has a high Constitutional value
174
, guaranteed as a fundamental right. The German 
Parliament, thus, the Court found, did not take into account this special relation 
between the citizen and the State, as it did not transpose in the national legislation 
grounds of refusal based on the ‗territoriality‘.  
The result of the decision, which notably ruled unconstitutional the implementing 
law not in some particular provisions, but on the whole, was that the EAW could no 
longer apply in Germany and the suspect in question was released. It should, 
therefore, take a new law from the German Parliament to reinstate the arrest 
                                                             
172 See the Judgment BVerG, 2 BvR 2236/2004 of 18.07.05, Available from: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de  
173 See Geyer Florian, ‗The European Arrest Warrant in Germany. Constitutional Mistrust towards the 
Concept of Mutual Trust‘, in Guild (Ed.), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant 
(Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), pp. 101–124. See also Alicia Hinarejos Parga, 
‗Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), Decision of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04) 
on the German European Arrest Warrant Law‘, Common Market Law Review, (2006), Vol.  43, p.p. 
583–595.  
174 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, CMLR, id. 2006, p.1295.  
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warrant
175
. What is notable however, is that this case, in essence, brought to the 
surface the existing scepticism between Member States as to the attempted EU 
integration in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and to the main 
question of the existence (or not) of mutual trust. As correctly Valsamis Mitsilegas 
argues, this decision sent ‗a strong, critical message in the debate over the existence 
of mutual trust and the direction and development of EU criminal law
176‘. The Court, 
thus, rejected the introduced automaticity by the mutual recognition and it did not take 
mutual trust for granted
177
. 
Following a very intensive and controversial debate, the new Statute 
implementing the EAW
178
 came into force on the 2
nd
 August 2006, and Germany is 
currently fully applying the EAW, and the principle of mutual recognition thereof
179
. 
When drafting the second Bill, and in order to avoid unpleasant surprises from the 
Federal Constitutional Court, the government tried to fully comply with the Court‘s 
ruling by literally including whole passages of the judgment. The new implementing 
legislation has included more rights of appeal, new grounds for refusal, and more 
complicated procedures
180
 which could ensure a more protective position of the 
accused, but seem to be contrary to the spirit of the Framework Decision which 
envisages a more simplified extradition procedure.  
After Germany, the next ‗attack‘ on the constitutional existence of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW came from the Supreme Court of Cyprus
181
. The facts of the 
case are summarised as follows
182
: The judicial authorities of the UK issued an EAW 
                                                             
175 Following the general elections in Germany, the Bill has nevertheless been adopted by the Federal 
Government on 25.01.06. See the German Press release of 25.01.06. 
176 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, EFAR id. 2007, p. 463.  
177 See Valsamis Mitsilegas,  id. 2009, p. 135.  
178 Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz – EuHbG 2006.  
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181 See Judgment Attorney General of the Rebublic v. Konstantinou of 7/11/2005, in [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 
42, p.1163. In addition, ‗European Arrest Warrant – High Coust of Cyprus‘ (Europaiko Entalma 
Sillipsis – Anotato Dikastirio Kiprou), Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2/2006, p.179.  
182 For a detailed analysis of the facts of the case and the Judgment see Elias A. Stefanou and Andreas 
Kapardis, ‗The First Two Years of Fiddling around with the Implementation of the European Arrest 
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to the Cypriot authorities to arrest and surrender a person who was charged with 
conspiring to defraud the British government, but who had both the UK and Cypriot 
nationality. The application for the issue of an EAW, filed by the Attorney General, 
was dismissed by the district Court of Lemesos on the ground that the national law 
transposing the Framework Decision on EAW was unconstitutional.                               
The Attorney General appealed against the decision and the case was heard by the 
Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Cyprus.  
The Attorney General limited his arguments to two grounds. Firstly, he supported 
the supremacy of the European Law over any national law. He claimed that since the 
House of Representatives had enacted a law which implemented the provisions of the 
Framework Decision, precedence should be given to European Law over the 
provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, he suggested that, alternatively, the 
provisions of the law must be construed to conform to Article 11 of the Constitution 
of Cyprus as the execution of a EAW did not amount to extradition under Article 11.2 
(f) of the Constitution, but rather related to surrender of an arrested person to the 
competent authorities as contemplated by article 11.2 (c) of the Constitution of 
Cyprus. Article 11.2 (c) –at that time- stated that: ‗No person shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases when and as provided by law: […] (c) […] the 
arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or 
when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or 
fleeing after having done so‘. On the other hand, Article 11.2 (f) –at that time- stated 
that: ‗No person shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases when and 
as provided by law: […] (f) […] in the case of an alien against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition‘.  
  In its decision, however, the Court did not follow this reasoning. It was of the 
opinion that irrespective of whether it could be brought under Article 11.2 (c) or 11. 2 
(f), the Constitution of Cyprus provides an exhaustive list of the reasons for which a 
person may be arrested. Yet, arresting a person in the context of the EAW is not one 
of the reasons permitted by the Constitution and article 11.2 (c) is aiming at specific 
purposes that did not correspond with those of the EAW; hence the law implementing 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Warrant in Cyprus‘, in Elspeth Guild, Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, 2006, 
p. 75-83. 
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the Framework Decision could not be construed in conformity with the 
Constitution
183
.  
As to the question of supremacy of the Cypriot implementing law to the 
Constitution the Court stated that Framework Decisions might be binding as to the 
result to be achieved, but they are not directly applicable. In consequence, given that 
the Cypriot EAW law did not conform to the domestic constitutional requirements,                           
the Framework Decision was not properly transposed into the Cypriot legal order and 
therefore could not be accepted as a superior legislation to the Constitution. 
Interestingly, the Court came to these conclusions having referred to decisions that 
dealt with the conformity of EAW with constitutional provisions, issued by the 
Supreme Constitutional Courts of Germany and Poland, Areios Pagos of Greece and 
the French Council of State. In addition, it is notable that it made a full reference to 
the ECJ‘s Pupino184 ruling by stressing that even if the effect of this case is important, 
it should be noted that the obligation arising from this case – namely the obligation of 
conforming interpretation in relation to Framework Decisions adopted in the context 
of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union
185
 - is conditional upon the national 
judge deciding whether an interpretation of its national law is in accordance with the 
Framework Decision. Applying this theory to the case in question, the Court found 
that the Constitution was prohibitive to permit another interpretation than the one that 
the Court followed. 
The result of this case was that it caused amendment of the Cypriot 
Constitution
186
. Article 11.2 (f) now expressly permits the issuance and execution of a 
EAW against Cypriot nationals as well as a new Article 1(A) has been inserted which,                          
in conjunction with the revised Article 179, acknowledges the supremacy of EU law 
over the domestic -constitutional or derivative- provisions when an EU rule is already 
part of the national legal order.  
                                                             
183 See Alexandros Tsadiras, ‗National Courts - Cyprus Supreme Court (Αλώηαην Γηθαζηήξην Κύπξνπ), 
Judgment of 7 November 2005 (Civil Appeal no. 294/2005) on the Cypriot European Arrest Warrant 
Law‘, Common Market Law Review, 2007, pp. 1515-1518. 
184 See Pupino case C-105/03 of 16/06/2005. OJ C 193, 06/08/2005, p.03. 
185 See Pupino case, par. 43.  
186 As Eftichis Fitrakis points this decision is significant because it shows that a common law country 
like Cyprus which applies the principle ‗all crime is local‘, had -after this decision- to make 
constitutional changes in order to permit the surrender of its own nationals. See Eftichis Fitrakis, 
‗European Arrest Warrant‘ (Europaiko Entalma Sillipsis), Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2006, p. 210-220. 
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A few months later it was the Czech‘s Constitutional Court187 turn to challenge 
the Framework Decision. In this case, the petitioners claimed that certain provisions 
of the amendment provisions of the Criminal Code
188
 and the Criminal Procedure 
Code
189
 permitted the surrender of the citizens of the Czech Republic to a foreign 
country for the purpose of their criminal prosecution under the EAW, which, 
however, was contrary to provision 14 (4) of the Charter according to which:                      
‗No citizen may be forced to leave his or her homeland‘. In addition, they claimed that 
Section 412 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which provided for the cancellation 
of the dual criminality principle for the listed offences in the Framework Decision 
was contrary to Art. 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
190
 as a 
Czech citizen could be surrendered for criminal prosecution a foreign country, but for 
an act which may not have been criminal under the Czech Law.  
The Czech Constitutional Court rejected the allegation that the permanent 
relationship between a citizen and the state has been infringed by passing the national 
legislation on the EAW. The Court gave a broader interpretation to art. 14(4) of the 
Charter by saying that this article is not related to extradition or surrender, but it 
prevents from excluding a Czech citizen from the community of citizens of the Czech 
Republic
191
, which, yet, is not the case with the EAW. On the contrary, the surrender 
of a citizen under the EAW and its characteristics –namely surrender for a limited 
time for criminal proceedings being held in another EU Member State and conditional 
upon his return to his homeland- did not and could not fall within the meaning of the 
scope of art.14 (4) of the Charter as it did not constitute ‗force‘ to leave his homeland.  
Regarding the second argument, namely that the abolition of the dual criminality 
principle for the listed criminal offences is in contradiction with the nullum crimen 
sine lege principle, the Constitutional Court rejected this argument too. It was of the 
opinion that since par. 412 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code did not define the 
criminal offences not subject to the dual criminality principle, that provision was not 
in contradiction with art. 39 of the Charter. In addition the Court stated that par. 412 
                                                             
187 Judgment no. Pl. ÚS 66/04 from May 3, 2006, ‗Constitutionality of Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant‘, Re [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 24.  
188 In particular, section 21(2) of the Criminal Code. 
189 In particular, sections 403(2), 411 (6) (e), 411 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
190 Article 39 provided that: ‗Only a law may designate the acts which constitute a crime and the 
penalties or other detriments to rights or property that may be imposed for committing them‘.  
191 See par. 3 of the Judgment no. Pl. ÚS 66/04 from May 3, 2006, ‗Constitutionality of Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant‘, Re [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 24.  
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(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was rather a procedural law than a substantive 
law.  
The list in Section 412(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code concerns the procedure 
on the surrender only and, therefore, the surrendered person will not be prosecuted in 
another Member State for a criminal conduct listed in Section 412 (2), but for a crime 
defined in the substantive criminal law of this Member State. In addition, the list of 
criminal offences in Section 412(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not mean 
the application of criminal substantive law of another Member State in the Czech 
legal order. Therefore, the Court stated that surrender pursuant to the EAW is not the 
imposition of punishment in the sense of art.39 of the Charter; hence it is not in 
contradiction with the nullum crimen sine lege principle.  
 Having examined the most important cases of the national constitutional Courts 
one could detect the difficulty that the judicial authorities in several Member States 
had to tackle in order to dispose of the raised constitutional concerns. These concerns, 
however, were mainly related with two main characteristics of the nature of criminal 
law and also with two very sensitive elements strongly connected to the national 
sovereignty: the question of surrender of nationals and the question of the abolition of 
the principle of double criminality.  
They are also connected to the main debate over the supremacy of EU Law over 
national, even constitutional, law. However, one should note that from the analysis of 
the above mentioned judgments, it is apparent that there is an ambiguity and also 
different views in national legal orders as to the status of the third pillar. As Valsamis 
Mitsilegas puts it the approach taken by the national Constitutional Courts has been 
different, with the German Constitutional Court being the most reluctant to accept 
uncritically obligations imposed by the EU
192
. Yet, none of them explicitly ruled that 
EU law has primacy over national law
193
 or questioned the validity of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW itself. This was the case that gave the ECJ the opportunity to 
make, for the first time, an authentic decision in a preliminary ruling procedure
194
 that 
would settle the EAW question, a very much debated and controversial issue that 
involves foundational infrastructure issues of EU integration as well as national 
constitutional limits.   
                                                             
192 See Valsamis Mitsilegas,  id. 2006, CMLR, p. 1277-1311.  
193 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, 2009, p. 138. 
194 ECJ made use of article 35 TEU as well as of art. 234 TEC in order to answer queries posed by 
national courts regarding the interpretation or validity of European rules. 
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2. Issues regarding the legality of the Framework Decision confronted by the ECJ. 
 
As stated above, the recent judgment of Advocaten voor de Wereld 
195
 of the ECJ 
constitutes the first challenging test of the validity of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW at the EU level. The facts of the case are in summary the following:               
The applicant, Advocaten voor de Wereld, a non-profit making association, brought 
an action before the Belgian Courts for the annulment, in whole or in part, of the 
Belgian law implementing the Framework Decision. The main objections put forward 
by the association were two. 
As to the first raised argument, namely that the Framework Decision was itself 
invalid since under article 34 (2) (b) TEU, Framework Decisions might be adopted 
only for the ‗purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States‘, which, however, was not the case with the EAW Framework Decision;         
hence it should have be chosen to implement the EAW by way of convention and not 
by Framework Decision, the Court rejected this argument. In particular, Advocaten 
voor de Wereld submitted that since the EAW Framework Decision replaced 
convention law in the field of extradition among Member States, this was the legal 
instrument that should have been used. In addition, they questioned the power of 
Framework Decisions to harmonize national criminal law, claiming that this must be 
limited to conventions. 
However, the Court was of the opinion that that mutual recognition of the arrest 
warrants required the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States 
with regard to judicial co-operation in criminal matters, and in particular, of the rules 
relating to the conditions, procedures and effects of surrender as between national 
authorities
196
. Therefore, there was nothing to justify the conclusion that the 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States by adopting 
Framework Decisions under art. 34 (2) (b) TEU was directed only at the Member 
States‘ rules of criminal law mentioned in art. 31 (1) e TEU.  
                                                             
195 Case 303/05, ‗Advocaten voor de Wereld‘. Judgment of 3 May 2007, [2007], 3 C.M.L.R.1. See also 
Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‗Constitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar‘, European Law Review, (2008), 
33, p. 230-242 and Steve Peers, ‗Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar 
after the Pupino and Segi Judgments‘, Common Market Law Review, (2007), 44, p.883-929. See also 
Geyer, ‗Case Note: European Arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European Communities‘, 
European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 4, 2008, pp.149-161.  
196 See par. 29-30 of the judgment.  
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Having said that, the Court went a step further and clearly ruled that art. 34 (2) 
TEU -insofar as it lists and defines the different types of legal instruments which can 
be used in order to achieve the goals of the Union set out in Title VI of the TEU- 
cannot be construed as meaning that the approximation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States by adopting Framework Decisions cannot relate to areas other than 
those mentioned in art. 31 (1) (e) TEU and, in particular, the matter of the EAW.         
In addition, the Court stated that art. 34 (2) TEU does not establish any order of 
priority between the different instruments listed in this provision. As well as that it 
does not make any distinction as to the type of measures which may be adopted on the 
basis of the subject matter to which the Council, exercising its discretion, may want to 
take measures and to promote cooperation. It was decided accordingly that the 
Framework Decision was not adopted in a manner contrary to art. 34(2) (b) TEU. 
The Court also rejected the second argument - namely that the abolition of the 
principle of double criminality was incompatible with art. 6 (2) TEU. Its reasoning 
begins by recalling the importance of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and, in particular, article 7.1, stating that the principle of legality                 
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) ‗implies that legislation must define clearly 
offences and the penalties which they attract‘. This condition is met when the 
individual is in a position to know which acts or omissions will make him criminally 
liable
197
. However, the Framework Decision did not seek to harmonize the listed 
criminal offences in respect of their constituent elements or of the penalties which 
they attracted. Therefore, the Court very interestingly ruled that, while art. 2 (2) of the 
Framework Decision abolished the verification of the double criminality principle, the 
definition of those offences and of the penalties applicable continued to be in the 
authoritative sphere of the issuing State
198
. The Court, having said that, recalled that 
all Member States -according to art. 1 (3) of the Framework Decision- respect 
fundamental legal principles and fundamental rights
199
 as enshrined in art. 6 TEU, and 
thus, respect the principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties
200
.  
 
                                                             
197 See par. 50 of the judgment.  
198 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 141-142. 
199 As Steve Peers makes the point the Court in this case confirmed that within the Third Pillar the 
human rights principles are also applicable when considering the validity of EU law and the national 
application of EU law. See Steve Peers, CMLR, id. 2007, p. 926. 
200 See par.51-54 of the judgment. 
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Furthermore, the Court found the opportunity to clarify that the categories of the 
listed offences in art. 2 (2) of the Framework Decision featured among those the 
seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting public order and public safety 
justified the abolition of the principle of double criminality. With regard to the fact 
that the lack of definition of the categories of offences in question could lead to 
different implementation within the various legal systems of the Member States, the 
Court reminded us that it would ‗suffice‘ to point out that it was not the objective of 
the Framework Decision to harmonize the substantive criminal law of the Member 
States and that nothing in the TEU made the application of the EAW conditional on 
harmonisation of the criminal laws of the Member States. It followed that the 
abolition of double criminality is not incompatible with art. 6 (2) TEU; hence neither 
is it inconsistent with the principle of legality and the principle of equality and            
non-discrimination, principles which are both guaranteed by art. 6 (2) TEU and both 
are applicable to the third pillar
201
.  
It is undoubted that the recent judgment of the ECJ in Advocaten voor de Wereld 
confirmed the legality of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and 
indeed that it paved the way for the further development of the EAW as a judicial 
cooperation tool. It is also undoubted that it recognized the wide margin of discretion 
of Member States, as was expressed in particular with regard to the definition of the 
32 listed offences, and thereby confirmed that Member States have a strong say to the 
implementation of the Framework Decision. However, this discretion of Member 
States is not absolute or unlimited. The Court recognized at the same time the 
Council‘s discretion as to the choice of the legal instrument which, in fact, is not an 
insignificant issue, since there are key questions and consequences concerning 
procedure and competence involved. In addition, it is undoubted that the Court made 
clear that it is the task, if not obligation, of each Member State to ensure that the 
fundamental rights are protected sufficiently when establishing for example the legal 
                                                             
201 See the recent Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg (Judgment of 6 October 2009), which concerned the 
principle of equal treatment as regards national implementation of the European Arrest Warrant. In this 
case the ECJ, applying the principle of equal treatment in the third pillar, ruled that art.12 EC (the 
principle of non-discrimination) does not preclude the legislation of a Member State of execution 
which allows for the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant issued against one of its nationals 
with a view to the enforcement of a custodial sentence, whilst requiring, for a refusal in the case of a 
national of another Member State having a right of residence as an EU citizen, that it be subject to the 
condition that the person has lawfully resided for a continuous period of five years in the Member State 
of execution. 
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content of criminal offences and penalties
202
. Yet this approach taken by the ECJ 
confirmed the importance of fundamental rights as a means of limiting Member 
State‘s actions under the third pillar. The wording used by the Court (i.e. ‗must 
respect fundamental rights‘) implies that national authorities when applying the EAW 
are subjected to a human rights review by the ECJ
203
. Consequently, one can rightly 
argue that the role of the national parliaments as well as of the national Courts                     
is conditioned -ultimately- by EU law
204
. 
It is apparent that the Court strongly supported the principle of mutual recognit ion 
as a form of judicial cooperation in criminal matters which appears to be as an 
alternative to harmonization. With its highly political judgment
205
, the Court tried to 
establish some basic interpretative principles, for the attention of national Courts 
applying or controlling the legality of national legislation which implements the 
European arrest warrant.  The ECJ now seems to be the ‗depositary‘ of the application 
of the principle of mutual recognition. Member States might have been entrusted with 
the power to define criminal offences, but at the same time Member States are 
strongly recommended by the ECJ to respect their obligation to recognize the 
decisions of other Member States in conformity with their national law.  
However, if someone considers the nature and the essence of the conflict between 
the different Constitutional Courts and the EAW he would –at least- expect a more 
decisive approach by the European Court of Justice. Issues very much debated and 
contested like the surrender of nationals and the question raised by several 
Constitutional Courts as to whether the EAW is rather an extradition procedure than a 
new mechanism of judicial cooperation which, however, lacks sufficient protection of 
human rights, remained unanswered. The ECJ had a unique opportunity to make clear 
most of the raised controversial issues, but it preferred to remain silent. It is, therefore, 
left to be seen whether Member States‘ Courts will be willing to set aside national 
rules, sometimes even Constitutional ones, conflicting with third pillar instruments.  
                                                             
202 See Daniel Sarmiento, ‗European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the quest for 
constitutional coherence‘, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1 January 2008, who argues 
inter alia that the ECJ created an obligation under EU law on national authorities, the ultimate control 
of which is entrusted to the Luxembourg Court. 
203 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 142. 
204 See Dorota Leczykiewicz who argues that the importance of this case is that it impliedly recognized 
the supremacy of third pillar law over national law. ELR, id. 2008, p. 230-243. 
205 See Vassilis Hatzopoulos, ‗With or without you ... judging politically in the field of Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice‘, 2008, European Law Review, p. 1-16.  
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In any event, it is certain that the window of conflict between national Constitutional 
Courts and the ECJ is still open. 
From the above analysis one can draw the following conclusions:                              
The implementation of the EAW was not an easy going case. On the contrary,            
it demanded serious amendments of the national legislation (even Constitutional) in 
order to comply with the scope and aim of the Framework Decision
206
.                             
Indeed, the application of the EAW in the various jurisdictions revealed the lack of 
certainty of law. At the same time, as the ECLAN study concludes, Supreme Courts 
in all Member States have shown themselves anxious to respect the letter and the 
spirit of the EU instrument as faithfully as possible
207
. Furthermore, all jurisdictions 
were seriously aware of the differences between national legal systems across Europe, 
and the need for additional safeguards to protect their own citizens‘ from allegedly 
inferior criminal law. However, this constitutes an unchallengeable argument that 
trust between Member States is not that much promoted and established, so that 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters can work effectively now and in the long 
term. It is now evident that some degree of ambiguity exists in the relationship 
between state sovereignty and mutual trust
208
. 
Besides, this point is strengthened by the European Commission, which, in a very 
frank statement, noted that the Member States are still reluctant to recognise criminal 
decisions taken in another Member State of the Union
209
. It, therefore, seems to be a 
confession made by the Commission that mutual recognition in practice does not 
work effectively in the existing framework. This is the reason why the Commission, 
in this Communication, concludes by calling for a strengthening of mutual trust as this 
is an ‗absolute necessity‘, if the European judicial area is to be achieved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
206 See ECLAN study, id. 2008, where it is argued that the current situation certainly indicates that 
there are numerous differences of treatment, including some significant ones, between nationals and 
residents, either in law or in practice. 
207 Ibid.  
208 See Massimo Fichera, id. 2009, p. 82.  
209 See ‗Communication from the Commission‘, id. COM (2005), 195 final. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The principle of mutual recognition in the extent of its operation in the third pillar 
constitutes, undoubtedly, a legal and political revolution. Having its origin in the field 
of cooperation between Member States in the internal market as well as to the 
abolition of borders within the European Union, it was transplanted to the criminal 
law sphere as a successful tool which had shown satisfactory results in its operation in 
the internal market. However, if one tries to compare the operation of the principle in 
the two systems (single market – criminal law), and then he will unavoidably lead to 
two different, but main, conclusions:  
Firstly, the main objection is that the area of Criminal Justice is qualitatively 
different from the Internal Market. The first one is very much connected with the 
limitation of the citizens rights, whereas the latter aims mainly at profit maximization 
and a degree of flexibility exists thereof, which has a very minor significance in the 
exercise of the citizens‘ rights; and, 
Secondly, mutual recognition in the context of criminal law requires significant 
changes in order to work effectively, changes which in some cases need to be even 
Constitutional, whereas mutual recognition in the context of Internal Market needs 
only slight changes which, yet, can not be equally applied in criminal justice.  
Therefore, questioning if there is any relevance between the original concept of 
the principle of mutual recognition in the context of Internal Market and the ‗copied‘ 
concept in the judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the answer is clear and logical:                      
Mutual recognition itself cannot serve effectively the aims of criminal justice as it 
does in the context of internal market.  
Mutual recognition in criminal matters needs additional prerequisites and 
safeguards which could make it operational in the context of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. As Valsamis Mitsilegas puts it ‗EU intervention in criminal matters 
must not be equated with intervention regarding the internal market‘210.                          
In particular, from all the above analysis, it is obvious that mutual recognition 
requires ‗armoured‘ mutual trust. The new model of mutual recognition and 
enforcement of criminal judicial decisions requires a sufficient level of mutual 
                                                             
210 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 118. Also see Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗The Constitutional 
Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU‘, Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 43, 2006, p. 1282, where he argues that ‗mutual recognition represents a ―journey into the 
unknown‖, where national authorities are in principle obliged to recognize standards emanating from 
the national system of any EU Member State on the basis of mutual trust, with a minimum of 
formality‘.  
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confidence between the Member States in each other‘s criminal justice systems.  
Besides, as the ECLAN study suggests ‗it has not yet been possible to establish the 
desired Area of Justice in the EU based on mutual recognition of decisions and on the 
mutual trust which underpins it; attempts to do so appear increasingly chaotic, 
certainly not smooth‘211.  
The European Arrest Warrant is a good example from which to argue that this 
trust is not sufficiently established between Member States, in order to become a 
paradigm to be copied in the near future in all the fields of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Doubts and reservations, undoubtedly, remain in practice and must 
be overcome if mutual distrust is to be avoided. Then, the question which arises is 
how to achieve this goal.  
An essential prerequisite is the political willingness of Member States to create 
common values upon which the principle of mutual recognition can effectively rely. 
Minimum harmonization of the law is essential in order to avoid ‗discordant views‘ 
from Member States while implementing the criminal law instruments, which can 
seriously challenge – if not damage – the smooth operation of the principle of mutual 
recognition. The adoption of the European Arrest Warrant and of the European 
Evidence Warrant without having harmonized all of the listed offences is certainly 
evidence that the Commission did not view full harmonization as an absolute 
requirement for the functioning of mutual recognition. This, at the same time, implies 
that the Commission was aware of the difficulty of achieving agreement for the 
harmonization of the listed offences. This, however, weakens the principle of mutual 
recognition and its application, which should be seen through minimum 
harmonisation and not vice versa. To that end, the adoption of common definitions 
with regard to the 32 listed offences in both the EAW and the EEW seems to be                
a first, but very essential, condition in order for these instruments to work effectively 
now as in the long term and to avoid unpleasant constitutional challenges by the 
Constitutional Courts of Member States.  
Nevertheless, given that EU has started taking actions in the very sensitive field of 
criminal law; this should mean that the individual rights in the criminal proceedings 
must equally become an issue that concerns the Union within its borders at the same 
level. The EU must ensure that the aim of mutual recognition does not undermine the 
very rights it seeks to safeguard. 
                                                             
211 See ECLAN study, id. 2008. 
59 
 
Yet, at the moment, there is not any sufficient and effective EU monitoring 
mechanism of any breach of Member State‘s obligation under international human 
rights law. There are sufficient international instruments for protecting human rights 
across Member States, but there is not an adequately monitored and regularly 
evaluated way of protecting them.  
Thus, Member States must ensure that the protection of human rights is not just a 
typical prerequisite of EU membership, but that it constitutes a primary target of the 
EU not just in theory, but in practice as well. One way to prove and secure this target 
is the development of a more systematic, effective, and perhaps enforceable 
mechanism of monitoring the human rights between the Member States. The 
European Court of Justice should have a stronger say in the monitoring of human 
rights in Member States, in parallel with the European Court of Human Rights.  
At the same time, an independent body of experts with the cooperation of the 
Commission which, however, will have substantive power of monitoring and 
imposing sanctions on the Member States that violate their international obligations 
under international human rights law, might be a first attempt to ensure two very 
important aspects of EU Law. Firstly, that the criminal justice systems of Member 
States meet the standards set out in the international instruments, which standards, 
however, must always govern how states treat people under their jurisdiction. 
Secondly, that Member States comply in practice with the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles on which the Union is founded. 
In the following chapter, Greece will be used as a particular case study in order to 
explicitly examine the impact and the operation of the principle of mutual recognition 
in a traditionally civil law jurisdiction. Greece has been chosen on the basis that is a 
country where the operation of the European Arrest Warrant has proved to be 
significantly controversial due to the serious and very controversial issues of 
compatibility of the EAW with the Greek Constitution. The surrender of Greek 
nationals, the abolition of double criminality as well as the level of protection of 
human rights, are some of the main issues raised during the years of its existence in 
the Greek legal order. To that end, the implementation and operation of the European 
Arrest Warrant will be examined in detail in the following chapter in order to reveal 
all this debate as well as the difficulties that arose, and finally, some possible changes 
will be suggested. 
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Chapter 
2 
‘The Impact of the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
on the Greek Criminal Legal Order’ 
 
 
       
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The principle of mutual recognition regarding the judicial cooperation between the 
EU Member States in the sensitive field of criminal law has proved to be one of the 
most controversial and significantly debated issues in the Greek Jurisdiction. The only 
measure based on the principle of mutual recognition which has been implemented in 
the Greek legal order, due to several reasons, is the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant in 2004. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the main issues related to the operation of 
the principle of mutual recognition in the Greek Jurisdiction, drawing upon interviews 
with judges, policy makers and practitioners. In particular, the chapter will begin by 
looking at the ‗big picture‘ of the principle of mutual recognition in the Greek legal 
order. The analysis will then focus on the parliamentary debate on the implementation 
of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. It will then go to 
examine the implementation of the Council Framework Decision in Greece and its 
systematic article by article analysis, as well as its interpretation by the national 
Courts accompanied by the views of Greek academics and Greek practitioners.  
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II. The ‘Big Picture’ of the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
in the Greek Jurisdiction 
 
The principle of mutual recognition, as has been primarily envisaged and 
developed in the various European legal instruments, has been seen, in the Greek 
Jurisdiction, as a system which –in general terms- significantly helps the cooperation 
between the judicial authorities of Member States, but which cannot, and should not, 
lead to an ‗automatic‘ or ‗direct enforceability‘ of judicial decisions. 
Of all the instruments which have been adopted in the European Union and are 
based on the principle of mutual recognition, until now only the European Arrest 
Warrant has been implemented in the Greek Jurisdiction. Neither the Framework 
Decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation 
orders or freezing orders nor the Framework Decision on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties have been transposed in the 
Greek Jurisdiction
212
. According to the official answer of the Greek Ministry of 
Justice
213
 this significant delay is due to the following political and practical 
reasons
214
:  
a. great number of international (not European necessarily) legal instruments to 
be implemented; 
b. Political priority to the domestic national legislation: It is notable that even if 
the previous political leadership of the Ministry of Justice was informed by the 
relevant department of the Ministry about the urgent pending bills (among 
which the aforementioned in chapter one European legislation), the political 
leadership did not show the corresponding political will, as a result of which 
the pending bills are still in the standing committees of the Ministry. However, 
after the elections of October 2009, the new Minister of Justice, Transparency 
and Human Rights has significantly pushed to implement the pending bills as 
soon as possible. 
c. Availability of the Greek Parliament: In order for European Legislation to 
become part of the Greek law it needs to go through a very complex and time 
consuming procedure depending inter alia on the availability of the Greek 
                                                             
212 Two special committees have recently (November 2009) been set up in the Ministry of Justice in 
order to propose the draft implementing law.  
213 Now called ‗Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights‘.  
214 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008. 
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Parliament to bring into discussion and vote on the relevant Bill. This slow 
procedure also affects the European instruments to be implemented; 
d. Lack of specialized staff in the Greek Ministry of Justice: The Greek Ministry 
of Justice consists of only one section on European Union issues (for both 
civil and criminal matters), in which there are only 3 officers to deal with all 
the relevant issues and problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
III. The negotiations of the Greek Government in Brussels towards the adoption of 
the Framework Decision on the EAW 
 
As has already been noted, the only instrument that has been implemented in the 
Greek legal order and operates since 2004, is the European Arrest Warrant.                   
As regards negotiations at EU level, in general terms, in the Greek Ministry of Justice 
there is no formalized procedure of informing or consulting with practitioners. 
However, it is represented in the negotiations by judges, public prosecutors, lawyers, 
and academics. The experience of the above mentioned categories of practitioners and 
their specialization in the field of mutual recognition creates the base for the 
formulation of the policy of the Ministry of Justice
215
.  
In that framework, the Greek Ministry of Justice participated in the negotiations 
on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
having its focus mainly in human rights concerns. Unlike with other delegations 
which raised even constitutional concerns (in particular with the surrender of their 
own nationals), Greece tried to assure as many as possible guarantees for the 
sufficient protection of human rights. In particular, the Greek delegation
216
 gave all of 
its efforts to achieve the consent of the Member States in order to include as a general 
rule that the Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognized by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was, eventually, 
included in par. 12 of the Preamble
217
. 
In addition, the Greek delegation focused its effort in order secure that the EAW 
will not be executed in cases where it has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting 
or punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, 
nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person‘s 
position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons
218
, which, as seen above, was 
finally included in par. 12 of the Preamble of the Council Framework Decision.  
 
                                                             
215 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008.  
216 Two of its main members were Mr. Chamilothoris and Mr. Vgontzas.  
217 See the relevant statement made by the –at the time of negotiations- Greek Minister of Justice Mr. 
Filippos Petsalnikos. Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1286, available online 
at: http://www.parliament.gr. 
218 Ibid.  
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Finally, the Greek authorities towards the negotiation of the Council Framework 
Decision pressured and succeeded in order to include in the Preamble in par. 13 that: 
‗No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
219‘. It is apparent that the Greek 
negotiating strategy was based on a number of issues all related to human rights 
concerns. This proves that the Greek government tried, on the one hand, to comply 
with its obligation under EU law to reach to an agreement at a political level at the 
Council with the rest of its EU partners; while, at the same time, it tried to convince 
the already concerned Greek public opinion that it will ensure the sufficient protection 
of human rights and that their personal liberties will not be jeopardized.  
Nevertheless, in order to appraise the operation of the EAW in the Greek 
jurisdiction and the problems that were caused, one should start the analysis from the 
parliamentary discussions as being the very first and absolutely necessary step before 
the analysis of the operation of the EAW itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
219 Ibid.  
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IV. Parliamentary Debate on the European Arrest Warrant 
 
 
The discussion in the Greek Parliament on the implementation of the Framework 
Decision of the European Arrest Warrant was held in the 35
th
 Session of the 
Parliament on the 22
nd
 of June 2004, on the 36
th
 Session on the 23
rd
 and the 37
th
 
Session on the 24
th
 June 2004
220
 respectively. It was one of most controversial issues 
discussed in the Parliament. However, in order to appraise the points that were 
stressed during the parliamentary debate, one should keep in mind what was the 
political situation in Greece at that time.  
Three months before the discussion in the Parliament, Greece had national 
elections. In particular, the elections to elect the 300 MPs of the Greek Parliament, the 
so-called Vouli (Greek: Βνπιή), were held on Sunday the 7th March 2004. The 
conservative party of Nea Democratia won the elections, ending eleven years of rule 
by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
221
. Two smaller parties belonging to 
the left wing entered in the Greek Parliament: the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), 
and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SY.RI.ZA). 
Shortly afterwards -and just almost a month before the opening ceremony of the 
Olympic Games hosted and organized by Greece- the Greek Minister of Justice 
brought the Bill in the Parliament. However, he had to face the strong objections of 
the Opposition. The main arguments put forward by the Opposition can be 
categorized in four main groups: (a) the Bill was ‗express‘; (b) the extradition 
(surrender) of Greek citizens is unconstitutional; (c) the abolition of double 
criminality is also unconstitutional; and (d) the protection of human rights is 
insufficient.  
 
a. The Bill was ‘Express’ 
 
With regard to the first argument, the Opposition stressed that the Government 
brought the Bill into discussion in the Parliament without it having been discussed 
thoroughly in the relevant scientific Committees of the Parliament and without having 
asked in advance and ahead of time the opinion of either the Hellenic Criminal 
                                                             
220 See the Parliamentary Minutes, available online at: http://www.parliament.gr. 
221 See the official results by the Hellenic Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, 
available online at: http://www.ypes.gr/ekloges. 
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Barrister‘s Association222 or the Association of the Greek Judges and Public 
Prosecutors
223
 or even giving the sufficient time to the academics to discuss it and 
express their views. Characteristic are on the one hand the statement of the President 
of the Athens Bar Association at that time who said that he would prefer a more 
‗fertile‘ debate about this Bill, since it encloses provisions which ‗seriously affect, if 
not and damage, the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the citizens‘224 and on the 
other the statement by Professor Kaifa-Gbanti who argued that this quick procedure is 
not only unjustified, but also ‗offensive for the very notion of democracy‘225. 
The Minister of Justice, following the alleged pressure
226
 by the international 
community due to the holding of the Olympic Games of 2004 in Athens, decided as 
quickly as possible to implement not only the Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant, but at the same time, in the same Bill, to implement the Framework 
Decision on combating terrorism, as a counterterrorism package. However, one 
should not ignore the fact that, despite the pressures, Greece had already failed to 
implement the EAW Framework Decision within the prescribed implementing 
deadline
227
 and was one of the very few ‗old‘ Member States which had not done so. 
This, however, does not diminish the importance of the fact that the Bill was brought 
very quickly into discussion in the Parliament and that caused, as will be shown, 
confusion between the MPs.  
 Characteristic of this confusion is the statement made during the discussions in 
the Parliament by the MP Panagiotis Kammenos belonging to the governing party.  
He tried to connect the tragic events of the 11
th
 September of 2001 in the USA and the 
events of the 11
th
 March of 2004 in Madrid with the holding of the Olympic Games. 
As he characteristically stated: ‗We have in front of us organizations which threaten 
the peace and the public security. We have in front of us the Olympic Games of 2004. 
It is not the most pleasant situation to deprive the citizens from their rights, but we 
                                                             
222 See the Press Releases of 2004, available at: http://www.hcba.gr. 
223 See Eleytherotypia article of Vana Fotopoulou, 23/06/2004, available online at: 
http://www.enet.gr/online. 
224 See the Press Releases of 2004, available at: http://www.dsa.gr. Also interview with Mr. 
Anagnostopoulos in 02/05/2008. 
225 See Kaifa-Gbandi, The law on the EAW and terrorism and the statements of faith in the 
Constitution‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.836, (in Greek).  
226 See the statement made by the MP Fotis Kouvelis during the discussion on the implementation who 
argued that this Bill is a result of the pressure made by the international community to the Greek 
Government. Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p. 1284. In addition, see the 
statement made by the MP Antonis Skillakos who argues the Bill is the result of the pressure that the 
USA pushed to the Greek Government. Ibid. p.1281. 
227 The deadline was the 31st of December of 2003. See article 34 par.1 of the Council Framework 
Decision.  
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must take measures in order not to have in Greece same events as the 09/11 or the 
03/11 
228‘. Also, MP Verginis, belonging to the governing party too, stated that there 
is an ‗absolute relevance‘ between the two tools as they both intend to create a 
‗common powerful European answer to the international terrorism‘229. This however, 
provoked the parliamentary reaction of the Opposition. MP Filippos Petsalnikos, 
belonging in the PASOK party and being the Minister of Justice at the time of 
negotiations of the EAW, accused the Government that it was clearly trying to 
confuse the Parliament as in the Bill in question included two issues (EAW and 
terrorism) different in between them
230
. 
 
b. The Extradition (surrender) of Greek Citizens is Unconstitutional 
 
The next point raised by the Opposition was that the operation of the EAW in the 
Greek Jurisdiction was contrary to the Greek Constitution. In fact, this argument 
provoked a very controversial and much debated discussion in the Parliament.        
The proponents of this argument
231
 were of the opinion that the arrest and surrender of 
a Greek national under the framework of the European Arrest Warrant was 
incompatible with the Greek Constitution. In particular, the question that they raised 
was whether or not Greek citizens can be extradited provided that article 5 paragraph 
4 of the Greek Constitution provides that every Greek citizen has the right of free 
movement and freedom of residence in the country and the right to leave or enter 
Greece. 
 Yet, one should not ignore the fact that this article does not provide directly for 
the prohibition of extradition of Greek citizens. However, the supporters of this claim 
argued that this is presumed by the fact that the Constitution grants Greek citizens the 
right to enter, stay and leave from the country - with some exceptions to this right in 
which extradition is not included. They, therefore, argued that due to the very close 
relation between the citizen and the State (which is under the obligation to protect its 
citizens), the extradition of a Greek national would violate article 5 of the 
Constitution. 
                                                             
228 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1286.  
229 Ibid. p. 1309. 
230 Ibid. p. 1286. 
231 This was supported by the Opposition in total and by some academics, as it will be shown further of 
this chapter. 
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MP Fotis Kouvelis, belonging to the radical left party, accused the Government 
that through this Bill it assigns the rights of the Greek State to arrest and bring a 
Greek accused national in front of the Greek Justice, which was –according to his 
view- both unconstitutional and unacceptable
232
. MP Charalabos Kastanidis, 
belonging to the PASOK party, underlined the ‗direct‘ –as he characterized it- 
unconstitutionality of the surrender of the Greek nationals to a foreign judicial 
authority creating in such a way a ‗status of absolute insecurity233‘ for the Greek 
nationals. MP Theodora Tzakri, also a member of the PASOK party, went a step 
further by stating that this unconstitutionality introduces a ‗clear danger of abolishing 
the attained democratic guarantees‘234.  
Having all these reactions by the Opposition, the Minister of Justice was 
admittedly in a very tight spot. Speaking in Parliament and due to the potential 
political cost, he decided to make a clear, explicit and indisputable statement:                              
‗No Greek citizen will be extradited 235‘. In addition, the Minister of Justice went a 
step further by assuring the Parliament that the Ministry has secured in an ‗inviolable‘ 
way that in practice all Greek nationals will be judged in Greece and that Greeks will 
remain in a very ‗strict‘ way under the jurisdiction of the Greek justice236. 
Furthermore, MP Viron Polidoras, belonging in the governing party and trying to 
support the efforts of the Minister of Justice, clearly stated that all Greek citizens will 
remain in the Greek jurisdiction
237
. Yet, all these statements seemed to be more a 
political ‗firework‘ in order to diminish the reactions by the Opposition, rather than 
reflecting the reality. In fact, as will be seen below, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Greece in all of its cases
238
 found no violation of article 5 of the Constitution and 
thereof the surrender of Greek nationals due to the operation of the EAW was and still 
is absolutely compatible with the Greek Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
232 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1284.  
233 Ibid, p. 1294. 
234 Ibid, p. 1303. 
235 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 23rd June 2004, session 36th, p.1326.  
236 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p. 1292. 
237 Ibid, p.1297. 
238 In all of its cases the Supreme Court permitted finally the extradition of Greek citizens overcoming 
in that way the issue of unconstitutionality. A detailed analysis is given further of this chapter. 
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c. The Abolition of Double Criminality is Unconstitutional 
 
The next main point raised by the Opposition was the abolition of the principle of 
double criminality. MP Evangelos Venizelos, belonging to the PASOK party and 
being also a Professor of Law, strongly criticized the Greek Government because –
according to his view- by abolishing the double criminality principle, this, in a 
democratic society, violates the rule of law as there is no rule of law without 
respecting the fundamental principle of ‗Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege‘.       
As he stated, the Greek Parliament is not obliged to simply ‗copy‘ the catalogue of the 
32 offences listed in the Framework Decision as this would create an absolute 
‗vagueness‘ in the Greek legal order. On the contrary, the Parliament should examine 
if –instead of copying the catalogue- there is a need to make any modifications to the 
criminal code and to the criminal procure code in order to include offences of the 
catalogue which are not punishable in the Greek legal order. In such a way, the Greek 
courts would avoid cases where they would be obliged to surrender a requested 
person for an offence which was not punishable in the Greek jurisdiction
239
. 
The next ‗attack‘ came from the socialist MP Konstantinos Rovlias who accused 
the Government that this Bill creates to the Greek citizens a ‗feeling of insecurity‘240.            
This happens so, not only because the Greek Justice may surrender a Greek to a 
foreign State, but mainly because it may surrender a Greek to be judged, if not and 
jailed, for a crime whose elements he may not know, or -even worse- for a crime that 
in fact does not constitute punishable criminal behaviour according to the Greek 
criminal code. He also criticized the abolition of the double criminality rule by stating 
that the ‗epigrammatic and vague‘ reference of the Bill to a list of 32 offences 
constitutes a breach of article 7 of the Constitution, namely of the fundamental 
principle of ‗No punishment without law‘.  
The response of the Minister of Justice to all this criticism by the Opposition was 
immediate, but not persuasive enough. He argued that the Council Framework 
Decision itself ‗does not permit for essential changes‘ and that Member States while 
implementing a Framework Decision ‗do not have the chance to implement the 
European legislative tool in a different way from the one originally adopted‘241.               
                                                             
239 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1288. 
240 Ibid, p. 1301. See also the Parliamentary Minutes of 23rd June 2004, session 36th, p.1323. 
241 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1291. It is notable that MP 
Antonios Fousas, belonging to the governing party, stated that it is significant that the abolition of the 
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Yet, even if somebody would agree with this statement in principle
242
, this does not 
mean that Member States do not have the possibility –if not the obligation- to make 
all the essential modification to their internal national law in order to make the 
operation of the Framework Decision both effective and functional or to implement 
the Framework Decisions taking into account the other fields of national criminal law 
which, however, may interact with the handling of the EAW
243
. Nevertheless, this did 
not happen in the case of Greece.  
The Minister argued that all the offences included in the list of the 32 crimes for 
which the double criminality principle is abolished, are already included as conducts 
criminally punishable according to the Greek Criminal Code. However, he seemed to 
ignore the report made by the scientific Committee of the Parliament, where it was 
clearly and explicitly pointed out that some of the offences from the list do not 
constitute criminal offence in the Greek legal order. The examples given by the 
Committee were: (a) xenophobia; (b) illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and 
other growth promoters; (c) sabotage; and (d) some computer related crimes
244
.  
 
d. The Protection of Human Rights is ‘Insufficient’ 
 
The last objection raised by the Opposition was that the Bill did not guarantee 
sufficiently the protection of human rights. They accused the governing party that 
through this Bill they were in essence questioning the supremacy between Security 
and Fundamental Freedoms whereas such comparison should not be the matter of the 
discussion. Characteristic is the statement of MP Charalambos Kastanidis, belonging 
to the PASOK party, who expressed his fear that the purpose of the Bill was to ‗over-
strengthen the Security against the individual Rights and Freedoms‘245. MP Fotis 
                                                                                                                                                                              
double criminality is restricted ‗only‘ to a very ‗limited number‘ of 32 offences. See the Parliamentary 
Minutes of 23rd June 2004, session 36th, p.1324. 
242 Even if one should keep in mind that the Framework Decision are different in nature from the 
Directives.  
243 See the ‗Evaluation Report n the fourth round of mutual evaluations - ‗the practical application of 
the European Arrest Warrant and corresponding surrender procedures between Member States – 
Report on Greece‘, Council, COPEN 167, 13416/1/08, Brussels, 20 October 2008, where the Council 
recommends to the Greek Ministry of Justice ‗to review the conformity of the implementing law with 
the Framework Decision, as well as the correlation between the former and domestic criminal 
procedural law, and fill the gaps where appropriate‘.   
244 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1283. See also Eleytherotypia 
article of Alikis Matsi and Antonis Galanopoulos, 23/06/2004, available online at: 
http://www.enet.gr/online. See also the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p. 1301. 
244 See also the Parliamentary Minutes of 23rd June 2004, session 36th, p.1323. 
245 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1293. 
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Kouvelis went a step forward by stating that the Bill not only did not guarantee the 
rights of the individual, but also that it was beyond the principle of proportionality. As 
he characteristically stated ‗any adopted measure should serve the principle of 
proportionality and in the case of the EAW this did not happen‘246 while he concluded 
that the Bill ‗undermines the Rights of the individual‘247.  
The MPs of the governing party rejected all these arguments and clearly supported 
the view that it sufficiently guarantees human rights requirements. In particular,           
MP Kiriakos Mitsotakis stated that the Bill keeps effectively the ‗difficult balance 
between the Security and the protection of Human Rights‘ and, thus, there is no room 
for anyone to express his doubts
248
. Also, the Minister of Justice made clear that the 
expressed concerns or fears by the Opposition are ‗meaningless‘ since the Framework 
Decision explicitly provides that it fully respects fundamental rights and freedoms
249
 
as well as, at the same time, he tried to connect the Security and the protection of 
Human Rights by saying that ‗in order [for] one to be free citizen he must also feel 
secure‘. And this, he concluded, is absolutely secured in the Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
246 Ibid, p.1284.   
247 Ibid, p.1285.  
248 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 22nd June 2004, session 35th, p.1290.  
249 Ibid, p.1292. See also the Council Framework Decision on the EAW in par. 12 of the Preamble.  
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V. The Greek Implementing Law on the EAW 
 
Following a very controversial debate, whose main characteristic was the 
exchange of accusations between the governing party and the Opposition, the time for 
voting came. In order for a Bill (Ννκνζρέδην, Nomoskhedio) to become Law (Νόκνο, 
Nomos) the Greek Parliament has to vote for it in three voting sessions
250
:                
firstly in principle, then per article (when amendments may be proposed and either 
approved or rejected) and then as a whole. A ‗simple‘ (50% plus one) majority is 
sufficient for any such vote to pass. The Bill in question, finally, passed in all three 
voting sessions by majority voting by the governing party. Once the Bill was passed, 
it was sent to the President of the Republic to promulgate and publish in the 
Government Gazette. The European Arrest Warrant was implemented, eventually,          
as part of the Greek Law with the Statute 3251 of 2004 which came into force on 09 
July of 2004. 
The Greek implementing Law is divided into 6 chapters and is constituted of 39 
articles in total. It is notable that the Greek Law does not follow the same structure as 
the Council Framework Decision. In particular, chapter one includes the general 
provisions of Law 3251/2004; chapter two regulates the matters pertaining to the 
issuing and transmitting of the European Arrest Warrant; chapter three deals with the 
execution of the EAW; chapter four provides for the terms of transit of the requested 
person; chapter five determines the effects of the surrender; and last, chapter six 
comprises the final and transitory provisions of the Law.  
 
a. Chapter One 
 
Chapter one of the implementing law consists of the first three general provisions. 
Article 1 provides for the notion of the European Arrest Warrant which is meant to be 
a decision or a ruling issued by the judicial authority of a Member State in order to 
arrest and surrender of a person who is in the territory of another Member State,                
for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial 
sentence or a detention order. However, one should note that the fact that the Greek 
Legislator went a step forward from the originally adopted Framework Decision by 
adding in the implementing law that the EAW can be either a decision or a ruling,              
                                                             
250 For the detailed official results of the voting see: http://www.parliament.gr 
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is truly problematic
251
. The arising question is what is, in fact, a ruling issued by the 
judicial authorities of a Member State? It is, however, left to the national Courts to 
give the meaning and the essence of the vague term ‗judicial ruling‘ and to clarify            
if an EAW based on such ruling can be executed in the Greek legal order.  
Article 1 par. 2 also includes a general provision on fundamental rights,                      
as a fundamental principle, which refers to Article 6 TEU and states that:                              
‗the implementation of the provisions hereof may not result in the violation of the 
fundamental rights and principles which are laid down in the Constitution in force and 
in article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union. In any event, the person requested 
will not be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where is a serious risk that he or 
she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment‘. It is interesting to note that this provision of the Greek 
implementing law is using different wording from the one used in par. 1 (3) of the 
Council Framework Decision. It is apparent that the Greek Legislator chose to use             
a stronger and more prohibitive wording (i.e. may not result in the violation) than the 
one used in the Council Framework Decision as it wanted to make clear that it will 
absolutely secure the protection of human rights and that there will not be any risk for 
the violation of human rights. This proves the significance that the Greek Legislator 
attaches on the protection of fundamental rights and principles and sends the message 
that nothing can result to the violation of these rights and principles.  
The Greek Ministry of Justice is, also, of the opinion that the reference to 
fundamental rights –to the extent that these have not been explicitly determined-            
in the mutual recognition instruments (including the EAW) implies that a control 
should be exercised by the executing judicial authority on the procedural safeguards 
and the respect of the rights of the defense in the issuing Member State
252
. 
Nevertheless, this control should merely refer to the legality of the European 
Arrest Warrant and not to its execution. If, therefore, the judicial authority of the 
executing State ascertains that the EAW violates the fundamental rights of article 6 of 
the Treaty and article 1 par. 2 of the Framework Decision, and issues a decision 
rejecting the complaint, it does that not because of the fact that the execution of the 
                                                             
251 See article 1of the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant of 13 June 2002 
where it is provided that the EAW is meant to be only a judicial decision issued by a Member State.  
252 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008.  
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warrant runs up against some reason for refusal, but because it has not been legally 
issued
253
.  
Furthermore, article 2 provides the details that a European Arrest Warrant should 
contain. Among these, the EAW should include: … [g] The penalty imposed, if there 
is an irrevocable decision or the prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the 
law of the issuing Member State. Yet, this requirement undoubtedly constitutes a 
breach of the originally adopted Framework Decision, as the latter provides that the 
decision needs to be final, and not irrevocable
254
. This, according to Mr. 
Chamilothoris, is a mistake in the transposition of the Framework Decision to the 
Greek legal order
255
. In fact, the Greek Courts following Mr. Chamilothoris 
suggestions, in several cases
256
 have preferred to use the term ‗final‘ decision, rather 
the term provided in the Greek implementing law ‗irrevocable‘. As the Courts have 
ruled, the condemnatory decision must have passed from the all the stages of the 
essential trial (namely to be final) and must be enforceable according to the law of the 
issuing State, without being necessary to be an irrevocable decision.   
 The last article of the first chapter, namely article 3, provides that the central 
authority empowered to assist the competent authorities responsible for the 
administrative transmission and reception of an EAW is the Ministry of Justice
257
. 
Nevertheless, one should not ignore that during the implementation of the Framework 
Decision it was preferred to have a partly decentralized procedure for executing a 
decision issuing in another Member State. In particular, the competence to gather, 
transmit, and execute the EAW was given to the Public Prosecutors by the 15 Courts 
of Appeal in Greece
258
.  
 In that way using a complete decentralized system was avoided, as that would 
mean that the competence to gather, transmit and execute an EAW would be given to 
the Public Prosecutors of the 63 Courts of First Instance. Yet, one could rightly argue 
                                                             
253 In fact, with the essence of this argument agrees Mr Chamilothoris who argues that article 1 par.3 of 
the Framework Decision does not create a new mandatory reason for refusal of execution of the EAW, 
but rather it reaffirms the necessity for respect of the fundamental rights, addressed to the judicial 
authorities of the Member State which issued the warrant and the country of execution as well.  
254 See article 4 (3) of the Framework Decision of the 13 June 2002.  
255 The same approach is taken by Mr. Anagnostopoulos. Interview in 02/05/2008.  
256 See for example the recent cases No. 33/2007 of the Court of Appeal of Athens (in Council) in 7th 
June 2007 and the Case No.25/2007 of the Court of Appeal of Athens (in Council) in 10th May 2007. 
257 Even if in the Law is provided in article 3 par.2 that the central authority may be entitled to keep 
statistical data, however, unfortunately, neither a mechanism for the evaluation of the results that arise 
in practice, nor a forum of discussion for problems that appear nor proposed ways of solution, exist. 
258 See articles 4, 6 and 9 of the Greek implementing law. For further details on the general structure 
and the role of the judicial authorities in Greece with regard the EAW, see the ‗Evaluation Report – 
Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
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that the main objection to this system is the lack of a direct system of information of 
the relevant departments of the Ministry of Justice regarding the distribution of the 
EAW within the Greek territory. According to the Ministry of Justice, however, 
surely the centralised procedure for executing decisions issued in another Member 
States on the basis of a mutual recognition instrument has more advantages than a 
decentralised one, as in this way the delay in the decision-making and the ‗danger‘ of 
formulation of different opinions can both be avoided
259
.  
 
b. Chapter Two – GREECE as the Issuing the EAW State 
 
Chapter two of the implementing law consists of the following five provisions 
which deal with the matters of the issuing and transmitting of the European Arrest 
Warrant. Article 4 provides that the competent authority for issuing an EAW in 
Greece is the Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal who has territorial jurisdiction: 
(a) for the trial concerning the offence for which the arrest and surrender of the 
extraditee is requested; (b) for the execution of the custodial sentence or the detention 
order. 
At the same time, an EAW can be issued, according to article 5, for acts 
punishable by Greek penal laws by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least twelve months or, where sentence has been passed or a 
detention order has been made for sentences of at least four months.                
Furthermore, article 6 provides for the details about the transmission of an EAW 
giving practically two options: (a) if the location of domicile or residence of the 
requested person is known, then the competent public prosecutor to the Court of 
Appeal transmits the European arrest warrant directly to the competent executing 
judicial authority or (b) if the location  of domicile or residence of the requested 
person is not known, then the competent public prosecutor to the Court of Appeal 
makes the requisite enquiries through the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the 
contact points of the European Judicial Network in order to obtain that information 
from the executing Member State.  
However, the Council in its evaluation report on the implementation of the 
Framework Decision found that only those SIS/INTERPOL alerts with an indication 
                                                             
259 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008.  
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that the requested person is in Greece or is a Greek national are checked
260
.                  
The reason given by the officials of the Greek Ministry of Justice to the expert team 
of the Council was the lack of capacity for checking all alerts entered in the system 
irrespective of whether there is any indication of a link with Greece, since the 
available national databases are not connected and have to be checked one by one. 
 In addition, it is notable that the Council found that from the Greek Law is not 
clear which Court or authority would be competent and which procedure should be 
followed under Greek law to hear an action to correct, delete or obtain information,    
or to obtain compensation in connection with an SIS alert in cases where the EAW 
which gave rise to the SIS alert was not issued by Greece
261
. This, yet, has been seen 
by the Council to be contrary to article 111 par.1 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement. 
Finally, article 7 of chapter two of the Greek implementing law gives the 
possibility to the Public Prosecutor to ask the executing judicial authority to order the 
seizure and handing over of the property which may be used as evidence;               
whereas article 8 entitles the judicial authority of the executing State to ask the waiver 
of any privilege or immunity regarding jurisdiction or execution given in the 
requested person by the executing State.  
 
c. Chapter Three – GREECE as the Executing EAW State 
 
Chapter three of the implementing law introduces the main provisions of the Law. 
It consists of twenty one articles (articles 09-29). In general terms, these provisions 
deal with issues of execution of the European Arrest Warrant, but at the same time 
regulate the most controversially debated issues such as the abolition of double 
criminality principle and the imposition of the mandatory and optional grounds of 
refusal of the execution of an EAW.  
In particular, article 9 determines that the competent judicial authority for the 
receipt of the EAW, the arrest and detention of the requested person, as well as the 
submission of the case to the competent judicial authority and the execution of the 
decision on the surrender or not of the requested, is the Public Prosecutor to the Court 
of Appeal.  
                                                             
260 See the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
261 Ibid.  
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c. (1) The Double Criminality Principle  
 
The subsequent article 10 provides for the cases in which the execution of the 
European Arrest Warrant is allowed. In particular, the EAW is executed in the Greek 
legal order if the punishable act, for which it has been issued, also constitutes an 
offence according to Greek criminal law, independently of the legal description, 
which (offence) is punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order, for a maximum period of at least twelve months
262
. In addition,           
the execution of the EAW is permitted if the courts of the issuing State sentenced the 
requested person to a custodial sentence or a detention order of at least four months in 
regard to a punishable act which is also described by the Greek criminal laws as a 
misdemeanour or as a felony
263
.   
Article 10 in par. 2 regulates the sensitive issue of the abolition of the principle of 
double criminality. The Greek implementing law provides that the execution of the 
EAW is allowed, without verification of the double criminality of the act, for the 
following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they 
are defined by the law of the issuing Member State:  
. participation in a criminal organisation, 
. acts of terrorism, 
. trafficking in human beings and procurement to prostitution, 
. violation of sexual liberty, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, 
. illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 
. illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives, 
. offences pertaining to corruption and bribery, 
. offences against the financial interests of the European Communities  
. laundering of the proceeds of crime, 
. counterfeiting currency, including of the euro, 
. computer-related crime, 
. environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and     
  in endangered plant species and varieties, 
. facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence, 
                                                             
262 See article 10 par.1 (a) of the Law 3251/2004. 
263 See article 10 par.1 (b) of the Law 3251/2004. 
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. intentional  homicide, grievous bodily injury, 
. illicit trade in human organs and tissue, 
. kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking, 
. racism and xenophobia, 
. organised or armed robbery, 
. illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art, 
. fraud, 
. extortion, 
. counterfeiting and piracy of products, 
. forgery of public documents and trafficking therein, 
. forgery of means of payment, 
. illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters, 
. illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials, 
. trafficking in stolen vehicles, 
. rape, 
. arson, 
. crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 
. unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, 
. sabotage. 
 
Yet, if someone tried to carefully compare the list provided in the originally 
adopted Framework Decision with the list provided in the Greek implementing law, 
then he would be lead to the conclusion that in the Greek implementing law there 
have been added a few offences which are not included in the Council‘s Framework 
Decision
264
. In particular, this has happened with the crimes of: a. procurement to 
prostitution; b. violation of sexual liberty; and c. bribery. 
However, the European Commission has been critical of the implementation of 
the double criminality list. In particular, the Commission has pointed out that the 
Greek implementing law is not ‗in line‘ with the Framework Decision insofar as there 
is no reference to the crime of ‗racketeering‘265. However, the Greek Ministry is of the 
opinion that the Greek Legislator considered that the meaning resulting from the 
                                                             
264 See also the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
265 See Annex to the report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States - Staff working document‘ Doc 6815/05 COPEN 42+ADD 1 of 1 March 2005. 
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translation of ‗racketeering‘ is covered by the crime of extortion and, therefore, need 
not be included in the list
266
.  
Another point that has been raised by the Commission is that some categories of 
offences are, in fact, wider than in the Framework Decision. Given examples are the 
illicit trading and trafficking in drugs, corruption and bribery
267
. Nevertheless,               
the point of view of the Greek authorities
268
 is that, according to the Greek law, 
trading of drugs and trafficking in drugs are two different crimes, so the Legislator 
decided that both should be included in the list. Regarding the crime of bribery, this is 
included in the wider meaning of the term ‗corruption‘. In this latter term, other 
crimes are also included, so the Legislator considered as appropriate to put also the 
crime of corruption in the list, so as to cover with its wideness other crimes relevant to 
bribery
269
.  
 
c. (2) Grounds for mandatory non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant
270
 
 
The next article of the implementing law is article 11. It is one of the most 
criticized articles of the law as it provides for the cases in which the execution of the 
European Arrest Warrant is prohibited. The first three (out of eight) mandatory 
grounds for refusal of the execution of the EAW correspond to article 3 of the Council 
Framework Decision. The judicial authority refuses to execute the EAW if:                      
(a) the offence, on which the  European Arrest Warrant  has been issued,  is covered 
by amnesty according to the  Greek criminal laws, as a long  as Greece had 
jurisdiction to prosecute such offence
271
; (b) the executing judicial authority is 
informed that the requested person has been  irrevocably judged by a Member State in 
respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been a sentence, the sentence 
has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the 
law of the sentencing Member State
272
. In essence, this ground for refusal guarantees 
respect for the principle of res judicata (ne bis in idem), a principle which is imposed 
                                                             
266 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008.  
267 See Annex to the report, id. 2005. 
268 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice in 28/03/2008. 
269 It is worth mentioning that in the Greek version of the Framework Decision is used the word 
‗δσξνδνθία‘ (dorodokia) which means bribery, while in the English version is used the word 
‗corruption‘.  
270 See Annex (2).  
271 This ground corresponds to article 3 par. 1 of the Council Framework Decision.  
272 A principle similarly expressed in the Schengen Treaty (article 54). This ground corresponds to 
article 3 par. 2 of the Council Framework Decision.  
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on all the EU Member States. The assessment of the existence of this condition on 
behalf of the executing judicial authority, evidently presupposes, as a rule, its 
penetration in another Member State‘s legal system which is the Member State of 
conviction which has to interpret and apply it.  
The next ground for refusal (c) provides that the judicial authority refuses to 
execute the EAW if the person against whom the European Arrest Warrant has been 
issued may not, owing to his age, be held criminally responsible for the acts on which 
the arrest warrant has been issued according to the Greek criminal laws
273
. 
The following five mandatory grounds for refusal (d-h) correspond to the optional 
grounds of refusal of the Council‘s Framework Decision which –in the Greek 
implementing law- have been implemented as mandatory. In particular, article 11 
provides that the judicial authority deciding on the execution of a EAW refuses to 
execute it in the case: (d) where the criminal prosecution or punishment of the 
requested person is statute-barred according to the Greek criminal laws and the 
punishable acts fall within the jurisdiction of the Greek judicial authorities according 
to the Greek criminal laws
274
. 
It is apparent that this reason presupposes the existence of the principle of double 
criminality. To put it in other words, the act, that is the object of the EAW, should be 
covered as well as punished by the legislation of the Greek legal order. It covers all 
the 32 listed offences of article 2 par.2 of the Framework Decision, if, of course, they 
constitute criminal acts according to the Greek criminal laws. In order for this ground 
to be applicable not only has the criminal act or the penalty of the warrant to be 
subject to a period of limitation according to the Greek law, but, additionally, it has to 
be ascertained by the Greek executing judicial authorities that these same criminal 
acts belong to the Greek jurisdiction according to the Greek Criminal Procedure 
Law
275
. This was in fact questioned, as will be seen further on this chapter, in the very 
recent case No. 1024/2008 of the Supreme Court of Greece
276
. 
 In the mandatory ground for refusal in subsection (e) the judicial authority has to 
refuse the execution in the case where the EAW has been issued for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his sex, race, religion, ethnic 
origin, nationality, language, political opinions, sexual orientation or his activities for 
                                                             
273 This ground corresponds to article 3 par. 3 of the Council Framework Decision.  
274 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 4 of the Council Framework Decision.  
275 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris (24/03/2008). 
276 For further see the relevant section on the case law of this chapter.  
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freedom. It is important to note that this ground for refusal, in fact, corresponds to par. 
12 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision on the EAW which the Greek 
Legislator preferred to convert into a mandatory reason for refusal of the execution of 
an EAW. This, however, reflects and stresses the importance and remarkable 
sensitivity that the Greek Legislator attaches to the protection of human rights and           
the respect of human dignity as being fundamental principles which are to be found 
not only in the implementing the EAW Law, but also in the whole text of the Greek 
Constitution
277
.  
The next case where the execution of the EAW is prohibited is (f) where the 
person for whom the EAW has been issued for the purposes of execution of a 
custodial sentence or a detention order is a Greek national and Greece undertakes to 
execute the sentence or the detention order in accordance with its criminal law
278
. 
Furthermore, article 11 (g) centralizes its interest on the principle of territoriality 
which has been transposed in the Greek implementing law as a mandatory ground for 
refusal. In particular, the judicial authority must refuse to execute the EAW in the 
case where the EAW has been issued in regard to offences which (i) are regarded 
according to the Greek criminal law as having been committed in whole or in part in 
the territory of Greece or in a place treated as such, or (ii) have been committed 
outside the territory of the issuing Member State and the Greek criminal laws do not 
allow prosecution for the same offences when committed outside the Greek 
territory
279
. However, this may lead to a serious limitation of judicial discretion.             
A very recent case, a characteristic example of this point, will be discussed 
thoroughly in the following section on the case law
280
. 
The last ground for refusal is provided in article 11 (h) which states that the 
judicial authority deciding on the execution of a EAW shall refuse to execute the 
EAW in the case where the person against whom the EAW has been issued for the 
purpose of prosecution is a Greek national and is being prosecuted in Greece for the 
same act
281
. If such a person is not being prosecuted, the European Arrest Warrant 
shall be executed if it is ensured that, after being heard, he is returned to the Greek 
                                                             
277 See for example articles 4-25 of the Greek Constitution.  
278 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 6 of the Council Framework Decision, but with the 
difference that it additionally requires that the requested is a Greek national. 
279 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 7 of the Council Framework Decision. 
280 See Decision No. 6/2007 of the Court of Appeal of Athens (in Council). 
281 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 2 of the Council Framework Decision, but with the 
difference that it additionally requires that the requested is a Greek national. 
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State, in order to serve there the custodial sentence or the detention order passed 
against him in the issuing State.  
In fact, this provision leads to the over-protection of Greek nationals, as              
they are more protected than other EU nationals and third country nationals.                          
This over-protection of the Greek citizens is, deemed to be, ‗problematic‘282.           
Indeed, there is no substantial reason why Greek nationals should be more protected 
than other foreign nationals who are not equally treated as the Greek nationals only 
because they are not Greek nationals. The Greek implementing law on the EAW as 
well as the Greek criminal law have all the necessary safeguards to protect 
sufficiently Greek nationals. It seems that the Greek Legislator chose to include 
protective provisions for the Greek nationals only for political reasons as the 
surrender of Greek nationals has always been a very sensitive issue for Greek public 
opinion. It was, therefore, expected that any Greek Government would try to secure as 
much as possible the status of the Greek citizens in order to avoid ‗unpleasant‘ 
criticism from an already negatively disposed view of the EAW in public opinion.  
However, one can argue that this over-protection could be overcome, and avoided, 
through the existing safeguards for the protection of the Greeks citizens, namely:               
(a) the mandatory ground for refusal according to which the surrender is refused if the 
crime has been committed partly or in whole in Greece (art.11 par. g), and (b) the 
optional reason according to which when an individual for which an EAW is issued, 
is prosecuted in the Member State of execution for the same act as the one on which 
the EAW is based (art.12 par. a).  
These two reasons are enough to guarantee that if a Greek citizen has committed a 
crime abroad, the Greek prosecuting authority has the discretion under the Greek 
penal code to prosecute him for the same crime and bring him in front of Greek 
Justice. Consequently, if the Greek justice wishes to keep a Greek citizen and hold a 
trial against him, it may do so, without being necessary to have the additional 
provision of article 11 (h). To put it in other words, the purpose of art.11 (h) could 
also be achieved with the application of article 11 (g) and 12 (a), but avoiding in such 
a way the creation of a more favourable status only for the Greek nationals.                     
As has been pointed out, there should not be any obstacles in delivering Greek 
citizens to be tried abroad only because they are Greek citizens
283
.  
                                                             
282 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris in 24/03/2008. 
283 See also Mr. Chamilothoris. Interview in 24/03/2008. 
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Nevertheless, one should not ignore that in general terms the fact that the Greek 
implementing law has converted some of the optional grounds for refusal to 
mandatory has been criticized both by the European Commission
284
 and the Greek 
Judges. The statement of the Chairman of the Greek Court of Appeal,                             
Mr. Chamilothoris, who said that this constitutes ‗a breach‘ on behalf of the 
implementing Member State of its obligations arising from the spirit and the effects of 
the Framework Decisions, is characteristic
285
. Indeed, the Framework Decision gives 
the discretion to decide whether or not to execute an EAW to the judicial authority.                 
It is, therefore, placed upon the judge to decide.                
When Member States, while implementing the Framework Decisions, convert 
some of the optional grounds for refusal to mandatory, this in fact deprives the judge 
of the right that has been awarded to him by the Framework Decision itself, namely 
the right of discretion. The Framework Decision, indeed, gives the power to decide 
whether to execute an EAW to the judicial authority which further suggests that               
it does not leave to the national Legislator the discretion to decide whether a ground 
for refusal should be mandatory or optional. This should be left to the competent 
authority to decide on the execution, namely to the national judge. Thus, in converting 
the optional grounds of refusal into mandatory ones, the national Legislator acts 
contrary with the essence and the spirit of the Framework Decision on the EAW.        
This approach is of one the main reasons rendering the operation of the EAW, in 
practice, inflexible
286
.  
 
c. (3) Grounds for optional non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant
287
 
 
The subsequent article 12 provides the cases where the execution of the EAW can 
be prohibited. In particular, the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the 
EAW in five cases: (a) if the person against whom the European Arrest Warrant has 
been issued is being prosecuted in Greece for the same act as that on which the arrest 
warrant is based
288
. This ground for refusal establishes, in other words, pendency as          
                                                             
284 See Report from the Commission, based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 
SEC(2005) 267. See also Annex to the report, id. 2005. 
285 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris in 24/03/2008. 
286 Ibid. It is left to be seen if such attitude will matter the ECJ.  
287 See Annex (3).  
288 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 2 of the Council Framework Decision. 
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a reason of optional non-execution of the warrant of arrest. It has been argued that, in 
order to apply this reason, the criminal prosecution in the Member State of execution 
does not necessarily have to precede chronologically the ones commenced for the 
same criminal act in the country of issue of the warrant
289
.  
Ground (b) refers to the case where the Greek authorities have decided either not 
to prosecute for the offence, on which the EAW is based, or to stop the prosecution
290
. 
Ground (c) provides the possibility of refusal of the execution if the requested person 
has been irrevocably convicted in respect of the acts, for which the EAW has been 
issued, in a Member State of the European Union, so that further proceedings are 
prevented. Once again one should note the aforementioned argument about the 
mistaken use in the Greek implementing law of the term ‗irrevocably‘ instead of the 
term ‗final‘ used in the Council‘s Framework Decision.  
Ground (d) gives the opportunity to the judicial authority of the executing judicial 
authority to refuse execution if it is informed that the requested person has been 
irrevocably judged by a third State in respect of the same acts provided that, where 
there has been a sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or 
may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country
291
. This ground 
for refusal, in fact, provides for the protection of the principle of ne bis in idem, 
which, as has already been seen, is also included in article 11 (b) as a reason for 
mandatory refusal of execution of the EAW. This time it is expressed as an optional 
ground for refusal of the warrant. Nevertheless, a closer look will show that there is 
one significant difference: in the previous case of mandatory reason for refusal the 
judgment, which constitutes an insurmountable obstacle for the execution of the 
warrant, originates from another Member State‘s judicial authority of the European 
Union. On the contrary, this ground for refusal, which is an optional impediment, 
originates from a third country‘s judicial authority.  
This differentiation is justified since the confidence which the Member States 
have developed among them concerning their judicial systems in their effort to create 
a unified territory of Freedom, Security, and Justice is, of course, on a ‗higher level‘ 
in comparison with the one demonstrated by third countries‘ judicial systems. 
Nevertheless, one should note that this does not mean that even between the EU 
                                                             
289 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris in 24/03/2008. 
290 This ground corresponds to article 4 par. 3 of the Council Framework Decision. 
291 This was criticized by Mr. Anagnostopoulos who is of the opinion that the Greek Legislator should 
have converted this ground of refusal into a compulsory and not optional ground for refusal.  
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Member State‘s judicial authorities there are not obstacles in their cooperation.            
This, yet, bring us back to a question which arose in the first chapter, namely the 
question of trust between the diverse and foreign judicial authorities, not only 
between the EU Member States, but also between the EU Member States and third 
countries. This question regarding the level of trust in the Greek Jurisdiction will be 
examined in the following subsection.   
The last ground for the optional refusal of execution of the EAW (e) focuses on 
the case where the European Arrest Warrant has been issued for the purpose of 
execution of a custodial sentence or a detention order, where the requested person is 
domiciled or resides in Greece and Greece undertakes the obligation to execute the 
custodial sentence or the detention order according to its criminal laws.                            
As is apparent, this ground for refusal cannot be invoked for all the persons to be 
surrendered, but only to those who are closely connected to Greece, and in particular, 
to those who are native inhabitants or have their permanent or temporary residence in 
Greece. However, at the same time, this provision compared to the provision of  the 
afore-mentioned article 11 regarding the grounds for refusal for Greek nationals 
suggests once again that, in fact, the Greek implementing law treats differently Greek 
and foreign nationals as for the former article 11 prohibits the execution of the EAW, 
whereas for the latter, article 12 permits the execution of the EAW for the foreign 
nationals unless Greece undertakes the obligation to execute the sentence or the 
detention order. This, yet, proves, once again, the protective status for the Greek 
nationals, but not for foreign citizens.  
 
c. (4) The question of trust in the Greek Jurisdiction  
 
The ‗big picture‘ of trust in the Greek legal order is satisfactory. The Greek 
judicial authorities, in general, have trust in foreign legal systems. However,               
in some cases, the Greek judges do have some reservations about the given guarantees 
of the fair trial principle in foreign judicial systems. This happens mainly in the cases 
of the new Member States of the EU and the third (non EU) countries.                          
As Mr. Chamilothoris, Mr. Bgontzas and Mr. Anagnostopoulos have pointed out
292
 
the Greek judges, but also the Greek lawyers, would have ‗second thoughts‘ about 
                                                             
292 Interview in 24/03/2008 and in 02/05/2008 and in 02/05/2008 respectively. As Mr. Vgontzas 
characteristically stated he would feel ‗fear‘ for EAW‘s issued for example in Bulgaria or Rumania or 
Lithuania or even by the UK judicial authorities.   
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arrest warrants which were issued by the judicial authorities for example of Romania 
or Bulgaria where it has been found by the European Commission that a high level of 
corruption exists
293
, but also about EAW‘s issued by other EU countries which, 
however, have been held responsible by the European Court of Human Rights for 
serious infringements of the right to fair trial. As they characteristically conclude, in 
order to overcome these problems and in order to increase the trust between the 
foreign European judicial authorities, the European Commission should bring into 
focus the periodical exchange of judges, the peer reviewing between judges and 
prosecutors as well as the promotion of networking between practitioners. 
A very interesting point was raised by Mr. Anagnostopoulos who argued that as a 
defense lawyer would have second thoughts not only for warrants issued in the afore-
mentioned cases, but also for European Arrest Warrants issued by the Greek judicial 
authorities too. As he characteristically stated, Greece abuses its authority to issue an 
EAW. This happens so, because according to his experience, in several times which 
concerned foreign citizens, the EAW was issued in order to shorten the procedures 
without satisfying the legal conditions, and in particular, the condition of the plea of 
the accused
294
.   
Nevertheless, such attitude by the Greek judicial authorities raises serious 
concerns with regard to the question of proportionality. Indeed, it seems that,                   
in several cases, the Greek judicial authorities have issued EAWs without that being 
really necessary
295
. This has happened in cases, for example, where the EAW might 
be used for the sole purpose of attendance at a hearing before a Court, even if the 
offence is a misdemeanor
296
. However, this suggests that, in fact, the Greek 
authorities do not apply a sufficient proportionality check while issuing an EAW 
which, in turn, is not in conformity with the Council Framework Decision
297
. 
 
                                                             
293 See the 2004 ‗Regular Report on Romania‘s progress towards accession‘. See also the ‗Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Romania's progress on accompanying 
measures following Accession‘, COM (2007) 378 final, Brussels, 27.6.2007. 
294 This was, in fact, the case in a Greek EAW to the English judicial authorities concerning an English 
and a Greek national in order to be prosecuted for the crime of illicit trafficking of ancient object. The 
Greek national gave an apology, however, the English was never asked to give his apology even if the 
Greek judicial authorities knew his permanent address in the UK and instead they issued a EAW 
against him which was finally rejected by the English judicial authorities on the basis that the rights of 
the requested were violated because he did not have the opportunity to give his apology in front of the 
Greek judicial authorities before the issuance of the EAW. Interview with Mr. Anagnostopoulos in 
02/05/2008. 
295 See also the statistics provided in annex of this thesis.  
296 See the ‗Evaluation Report  – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
297 See par. 7 of the Preamble of the Council Framework Decision on the EAW.  
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c. (5) Guarantees to be given for the execution  
 
The next article of chapter three of the Greek law is article 13
298
. It provides for 
the guarantees to be given for the execution of the EAW in cases where the warrant 
has been issued for the purposes of executing a sentence or a detention order imposed 
by a decision rendered in absentia
299
. In particular, if the person concerned has not 
been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the  date and  place of the hearing 
which led to the decision  rendered in absentia, the execution of the EAW by the 
competent judicial authority may be subject to the condition that the issuing judicial 
authority gives an  assurance  deemed adequate  to guarantee that the requested person 
will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial of the case in the issuing member state 
and to be present at the judgment. Once the competent public prosecutor to the Court 
of Appeal receives the EAW he is obliged, according to article 14, to arrange the 
arrest of the requested person.  
 
c. (6) Rights of the requested person  
 
The following articles 15-18 deal with the rights of the requested person under the 
Greek implementing law. These rights are associated, on the one hand, with the legal 
nature of the procedures of issuance and execution of the EAW per se and, on the 
other, with the need to provide to the requested person effective protection against any 
potential significant infringements of his/her rights.  
In particular, according to article 15 of the Greek implementing law,                        
once the requested person is (immediately) arrested, he must be brought without delay 
to the Public Prosecutor by the Court of Appeal
300
. At this stage, the Public 
Prosecutor, after verifying the requested person's identity
301
, is obliged to inform that 
person of the EAW and its contents, of his/her right to be assisted by a legal counsel 
and an interpreter as well as of the possibility granted to him/her to consent to his/her 
surrender to the issuing State
302
. In addition, the arrested person is entitled either 
himself/herself or through his/her lawyer to ask for and receive copies of all of the 
                                                             
298 This article corresponds to article 5 of the Council Framework Decision.  
299 This article has been amended by the latest adopted Framework Decision 2009/299 JHA of 
26/02/09.  
300 See Annex (1). 
301 For this issue see the recent case No. 216/2008, in Poinika Chronika, 2009, p. 42. 
302 This article corresponds to article 11 of the Council Framework Decision.  
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documents, but at his/her own expense
303
. In any event, it should be stressed that 
according to the Greek legislation the arrested person has the right to appeal within 24 
hours of his/her arrest to the Judicial Council of the Court of Appeal when he/she 
disputes his/her identity
304
.  
The arrest of the requested person and his/her transfer to the Prosecutor to the 
Court of Appeal does not automatically mean his/her detention. In case where the 
requested person‘s detention is deemed disproportionate, the Public Prosecutor, under 
specific circumstances, can order the provisional release of the requested person and 
the imposition of restraining measures
305
. The restraining measures imposed on the 
requested person can be replaced by detention, if a risk of absconding appears. 
Nevertheless, if it has been imposed to the requested person an order of detention or 
any means of restraining measures, he/she is entitled, within a period of two days 
following the issue of the relevant order, to have recourse to the Judicial Council of 
the Court of Appeal
306
. The Court of Appeal has to appoint a court date within a 
period of five days and after hearing the opinion of the Public Prosecutor has to 
immediately decide irrevocably. 
At this point it is worth mentioning the particular importance attached to the 
consent of the requested person. The implementing law has dedicated two articles to 
regulate the issues of consent. The Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal must 
clearly inform the requested person of the consequences of the consent to surrender, 
of the renunciation of the entitlement to the speciality rule, as well as of his/her right 
to appear with a legal counsel and with an interpreter
307
. Further, the public 
prosecutor has to emphasize to him/her the irrevocability of his/her above-mentioned 
statements. One clear thing is that any potential consent must reflect the fact that the 
person concerned has expressed them voluntarily and in full awareness of the 
consequences
308
, which ensures the balance between the obligation of the State to 
prosecute the person and the right of the person to defend him.  
 
                                                             
303 See article 15 par. 2 of the Greek 3251/2004 law.  
304 See article 15 par. 4 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
305 See article 16 par. 1 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
306 See article 16 par. 2 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
307 See article 17 par. 1 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
308 See article 13 par. 2 of the Council Framework Decision, a provision which would seem to represent 
a strengthening of the rights of the requested person. 
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Depending on whether the arrested person consents to his/her surrender, the Law 
makes the distinction of the procedure to be followed: if he/she consents, then the 
Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal forwards the European Arrest Warrant and 
all the relevant documents to the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeal.                                
The requested person then is entitled to a hearing before the Presiding Judge of the 
Court of Appeal
309
. The latter is obliged to take a final decision within a period of 10 
days after consent has been given
310
.  
On the other hand, if he/she does not consent, the Public Prosecutor to the Court 
of Appeal is obliged to forward the warrant and all the relevant documents to the 
competent Judicial Council of the Court of Appeal, where the arrested individual has 
the right to appear and be heard in person
311
. In that case, the final decision by the 
Judicial Council must be taken within a period of 60 days after the arrest of the 
requested person
312
. Conversely, in specific cases where the European Arrest Warrant 
cannot be executed within the aforementioned time limits, the competent Public 
Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal has to immediately inform the issuing judicial 
authority, giving the reasons for the delay
313
. In such a case, the time limits can be 
extended further by 30 days
314
. However, having taken into account that both the 
Council Framework Decision and the Greek implementing law entail that the 
procedure of the requested person‘s surrender must be completed within specific 
deadlines, it follows that if, on account of any reason whatsoever, the timely surrender 
of the requested person is impossible, then, in case he/she is detained, he/she must be 
released, and, in case he/she is not detained, any restrictions imposed on him/her must 
automatically be removed.  
Nevertheless, the rights of the arrested person do not end at this point.                       
In particular, in the event that the arrested person does not consent, then an appeal 
with specific reasons
315
 may be lodged to the Supreme Court by the requested person 
or by the Public Prosecutor against the final decision issued by the Judicial Council of 
                                                             
309 See article 17 par. 3 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
310 See article 21 par. 1 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
311 See article 18 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
312 See article 21 par. 2 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
313 If for example the judicial authority deciding on the execution of the warrant finds the information 
forwarded by the issuing Member State to be insufficient, it has to request through the public 
prosecutor by the Court of Appeal, the urgent submission of the necessary supplementary information, 
and therefore the time limits must be extended. See article 19 par. 2 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
314 See article 21 par. 3 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
315 For this issue see the recent case of the Supreme Court No. 1006/2009, Poinika Chronika, 2010, 
p.287. 
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the Court of Appeal. This must happen within a period of twenty four hours following 
the publication of the decision in accordance with the provisions of article 451 of the 
Greek Code of Criminal Procedure
316
. The Supreme Court, sitting in chambers, has to 
take its decision within a period of eight days following the lodging of the appeal.  
The requested person is entitled to be summoned in person or through his process 
agent twenty four hours prior to the hearing under the care of the Public Prosecutor to 
the Supreme Court
317
. 
However, one could rightly argue that this ‗suffocating‘ time limit of 24 hours in 
order for the arrested person to appeal to the Supreme Court seems to be 
problematic
318
.  The Council in its report on the implementation of the EAW suggests 
that this time limit is ‗extremely short‘ and that may hamper the right of the accused 
to appeal
319
.  Indeed, it involves the danger that the arrested individual may not be 
able to find a lawyer or even if he does that his/her lawyer may not have adequate 
time to find all the relevant documents, to submit the essential evidence and to 
prepare the appropriate defense. Nonetheless, if that is really the case, then this raises 
serious questions, about the compatibility of this provision with the right of fair trial 
provided in article 6 of the ECHR.  
Once the judicial authority has decided on the execution of the warrant, hence the 
surrender of the requested, it must notify the issuing judicial authority of its decision, 
without delay
320
. Then, the remaining action to accomplish the puzzle of the operation 
of the EAW is the surrender of the requested person. To that end, under the care of the 
Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal, the requested person must be surrendered as 
soon as possible on a date agreed with the authorities of the issuing State
321
.                           
In any event, he cannot be surrendered later than 10 days after the final decision on 
the execution of the European arrest warrant
322
. At the time of surrender, the same 
Public Prosecutor provides to the competent authorities of the issuing State, all 
information relative to the duration of detention of the requested person.                 
                                                             
316 See article 22 par.1 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. With respect to the appeal a report has to be drawn 
up before the Registrar to the Court of Appeal. For the meaning of this provision see the recent case of 
the Supreme Court No. 2027/08 in Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.2009.  
317 See article 22 par. 2 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
318 See in the following chapter the relevant arisen case of the Supreme Court of Athens No. 
1325/2005. 
319 See the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008, p.40. 
320 See article 26 of the Greek 3251/2004 law and the corresponding article 22 of the Council 
Framework Decision.  
321 See article 27 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
322 This is in line with article 23 par. 2 of the Council Framework Decision.  
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This happens, because according to article 26 of the Council Framework Decision, the 
issuing Member State must deduct all periods of detention arising from the execution 
of the warrant from the total period of detention to be served in the issuing Member 
State as a result of a custodial sentence or detention order being passed. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the surrender may exceptionally be temporarily 
postponed for serious humanitarian reasons, for example if there are substantial 
grounds for believing that it would manifestly endangers the requested person's life or 
health
323
. Furthermore, the competent judicial authority may, after deciding to execute 
the EAW, postpone the surrender of the requested person so that he/she may be 
prosecuted in the Greek State or, if he/she has already been sentenced, so that he/she 
may serve, in the Greek territory, a sentence passed for an act other than that referred 
to in the European arrest warrant
324
. 
 
d. Chapter Four 
 
Chapter four of the Greek implementing law consists of only three articles (30-
32). It provides for the terms of transit of the requested person through the Greek 
territory
325
 as well as the terms for the application submitted by Greek judicial 
authority for the transit of a requested person
326
. The competent authority to receive 
the transit request, to decide on it, as well as to submit a request, for the transit of the 
requested person through the territory of a Member State of the European Union,          
to the competent authority of such State, when this is necessary for his/her surrender 
to Greece, is the Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal
327
.  
 
e. Chapter Five  
 
The next chapter is chapter five. Its four articles (33-36) refer to the effects of the 
surrender. In particular, article 33 provides that when the requested person has been 
surrendered to the competent Greek authorities, then the period of his/her detention in 
                                                             
323 See article 27 par. 3 of the Greek implementing law which corresponds to article 23 par. 4 of the 
Council Framework Decision. 
324 See article 28 of the Greek law which corresponds to article 24 par. 1 of the Council Framework 
Decision.  
325 See article 30 of the Greek 3251/2004 law which corresponds to article 25 of the Council 
Framework Decision.  
326 See article 32 of the Greek 3251/2004 law. 
327 See article 31 and 32 of the Greek implementing law.  
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the executing State is deducted from the total period of deprivation of liberty in 
Greece as a result of a custodial sentence or a detention order being passed.  
The subsequent article 34 has a particular interest as it provides for the 
entrenchment of the rule of speciality (i.e. that the requesting State may only 
prosecute with regard to those offences agreed to by the requested State), and its 
exceptions. In particular, in par. 1 it is provided that the requested person who has 
been surrendered to the competent public prosecutor by the Court of Appeal cannot be 
prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of his/her liberty for an offence 
committed prior to his/her surrender other than that for which the European arrest 
warrant had been issued
328
. 
Par. 2 of article 34 of the Greek implementing law provides for the cases where 
the rule of speciality may not be applied. Like article 27 par. 3 of the Council 
Framework Decision, seven cases are provided where the executing judicial authority 
may not apply the aforementioned paragraph 1 of article 34 and therefore it can 
prosecute, sentence, or otherwise deprive the liberty of the requested person for other 
offences, committed prior to his/her surrender, but not included in the EAW.  
In particular, this may happen when: (a) the surrendered person having had an 
opportunity to leave the Greek territory, nevertheless has not done so within a period 
of forty five days of his final release or has returned to that territory after leaving it
329
. 
Yet, the definition of ‗final discharge‘ is not provided either in the Council 
Framework Decision, or even in the Convention on Extradition of 1957, or in other 
similar documents. This may be in practice problematic. The question that comes out 
is what will happen in the case where the person, who, after his surrender, was 
subjected to another measure of enforcement, namely where detention was replaced 
with a measure of suppression other than related to imprisonment, and who is 
released. Does this person have, in fact, the right to leave the territory according to 
this article? Or to put it in other words, what does the term ‗final discharge‘ include? 
It is not clear if it includes only imprisonment or/and completion of any kind of 
restriction of personal liberty. 
 
 
                                                             
328 See the corresponding article 27 of the Council Framework Decision with the title ‗Possible 
prosecution for other offences‘.  
329 See the corresponding article 34 par. 2 (a) of the Council Framework Decision.  
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To answer this question, one should go back to the purpose and the nature of 
applying any kind of measures of enforcement. According to the Greek Criminal 
Procedure Law,
330
 the purpose of these measures is to ensure the participation of the 
suspect, accused, or even sentenced person in all the stages of the legal procedure. 
(pre-trial, hearing at the court, execution of the sentence). They are aimed, in other 
words, at ensuring that the person in question will not avoid the administration of 
justice. If the surrendered person is subject to any kind of measure other than 
imprisonment (i.e. bail, obligation to appear every 15 days in the local police station 
etc.) this should not mean that he still has the right to leave the country.           
Undoubtedly, all these measures lead to a degree of limitation of personal liberty and, 
therefore, it should be accepted that the term ‗final discharge‘ includes also the 
completion of any kind of restriction of personal liberty, namely any kind of 
suppression, in order for article 34 par. 2 (a) to be applied.   
The subsequent six exceptions to the rule of speciality according to article 34 
involve cases: (b) where the offence is not punishable by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order
331
; (c) where the criminal proceedings do not give rise to the 
application of a measure restricting personal liberty
332
; (d) when the surrendered 
person could be liable  to a penalty or a measure not involving the deprivation of 
liberty, in particular, a financial penalty or a measure in lieu thereof, even if the 
penalty or measure may give rise to a restriction of his/her personal liberty
333
;               
(e) when the surrendered  person  has expressly renounced before the  competent 
judicial authority of the executing state the speciality rule, at the same time with his 
consent to be surrendered to the Greek State
334
; (f) when the  person after his/her 
surrender has expressly renounced entitlement to the speciality rule with regard to 
offences committed prior to his surrender
335
; (g) when the executing  judicial  
authority gives its consent after the submission of a  relevant request by the competent 
Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal
336
. 
 
                                                             
330 See article 296 of the Greek Criminal Procedure Law. 
331 See the corresponding article 27 par. 3 (b) of the Council Framework Decision.  
332 See the relevant article 27 par. 3 (c) of the Council Framework Decision.  
333 See article 27 par. 3 (d) of the Council Framework Decision.  
334 See article 27 par. 3 (e) of the Council Framework Decision.  
335 See article 27 par. 3 (f) of the Council Framework Decision.  
336 See article 27 par. 3 (g) of the Council Framework Decision.  
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The last two articles of chapter five of the Greek implementing law set the 
requirements and the details of the subsequent surrender -without the consent of the 
executing Member State- of a person, who has been surrendered to the competent 
Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal in execution of a EAW, to a Member State 
of the European Union pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued for an offence 
committed prior to his/her surrender
337
. On the other hand, article 36 provides that a 
person, who has been surrendered to the competent public prosecutor by the Court of 
Appeal in execution of a European Arrest Warrant, cannot be extradited to a third 
State, without the consent of the competent authority of the executing Member State.  
 
f.  Chapter Six  
 
The last chapter of the Greek implementing law consists of the final and transitory 
three provisions of the Law
338
 regarding expenses and the relation of this Law with 
other legal instruments in the field of extradition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
337 See article 35 of the Greek implementing law.  
338 See the recent case of the Supreme Court No.1811/09 regarding the meaning of the final provisions.  
Poinika Chronika, 2010, p. 596, in Greek. 
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VI. The Academic Point of View on the EAW 
 
Since the announcement of the adoption of the Council Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant in 2002 and the subsequent implementation in the Greek 
jurisdiction of the Framework Decision, in the Greek legal literature two main 
tendencies appeared: the academics who have been proponents of the evolution of 
judicial cooperation in the field of criminal law at the European level and, on the other 
hand, the academics who have been critical of both the notion, in general, of the 
principle of mutual recognition and the operation of the European Arrest Warrant in 
the Greek legal order. Their criticisms are focused mainly in three spheres:                      
(a) lack of legal basis for the European Union to adopt measures based on the 
principle of mutual recognition; (b) the abolition of double criminality as being 
contrary to the Greek Constitution; and (c) the surrender of Greek nationals as being, 
once again, contrary to the Greek Constitution.  
In the following section, all arguments of both sides will be examined and 
criticisms thereof.  
 
A. Lack of legal basis  
 
The first argument put on the table for discussion between the academics is the 
alleged lack of legal basis of the European Union to adopt such measures as the 
European Arrest Warrant based on the mutual recognition principle as such principle 
does not exist in the Treaty on the creation of the European Union with respect to the 
judicial cooperation between Member States in criminal matters. According to this 
view the ‗magic invention‘339 of the tool of the principle of mutual recognition is used 
to overcome the significant delays that appeared while implementing the instruments 
of the third pillar. However, this notion is to be found nowhere in the Treaty of the 
EU.  
In that respect, they claim that either articles 29, 31, or 34 par. 2 (b) of the TEU do 
not give rise to the ability of the EU to use the Framework Decisions as a tool in order 
to establish the mutual recognition principle. In other words, it is a principle which is 
not provided directly in the TEU and, thus cannot be ‗legalized‘ through the use of 
                                                             
339 See Kaifa-Gbandi, ‗Newer developments in the EU Criminal law and democratic deficits, 2006, 
Poinika Chronika, p. 582, (in Greek). See also Eutuxi Fitraki, ‗The EAW in practice: New 
developments, new concerns, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2006, p. 210, (in Greek). 
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Framework Decision. This happens, it is argued, because the Framework Decisions 
which are based on the notion of the principle of mutual recognition are not adopted 
in order to lead to the approximation of the national laws of the Member States, as it 
should be, but in order to create for the first time new rules which lead to new 
institutions.  
As they argue, the characteristic example of that point is the Framework Decision 
on the European Arrest Warrant where the extradition procedure was replaced with 
the surrender procedure
340
, however, without this possibility to be given directly from 
the TEU. According to article 31 (b) and 34 par. 2 (b) of the TEU the Council has the 
capability to adopt Framework Decisions in order to facilitate extradition between the 
Member States. Nevertheless, according to this side of academic opinion, the Council 
Framework Decision on the EAW itself provides for a new system of surrender 
which, indeed, replaced the older system of extradition. To that end, the Framework 
Decision uses new terminology (surrender instead of extradition) and it includes 
totally new procedures which lead to the surrender of nationals, instead of extradition.  
The supporters of this claim argue that all this new system is based on the new 
concept of the principle of mutual recognition which, nonetheless, is not provided 
directly in the TEU. According to their view, it is indubitable whether or not the EU 
has the competence to deal with these issues in such a framework. To strengthen their 
argument they claim that, in fact, the Council has characterized the principle of 
mutual recognition as being the cornerstone of the judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, but this legislative initiative by the Council cannot, and should not pass any 
such Law, as this goes beyond the power granted by the TEU to the Council
341
.            
As they characteristically argue, the power of the Council is granted upon its creation 
and is special and limited as to its scope
342
 as well as the Council is often criticised for 
the so-called democratic deficit
343
. Therefore, as long as the Treaties do not establish 
                                                             
340 See D. Spinelis, ‗The EAW and the replacement of the extradition procedure- Hopes and Fears, in 
the honor of A. Giotopoulou-Maragkopoulou, 2003, p.1273, (in Greek). 
341 Kaifa-Gbandi, ‗The EAW: The provisions of the Law. 3251/2004 and the transition from the 
extradition to the surrender, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.1296, (in Greek). 
342 Ibid. See also A. Manitaki, ‗The assignment of competences to the EU and the reservation of 
sovereignty according to art. 28 par. 2 and 3 of the Constitution, Δ.Δ.ΔU.D.., 2003, p.755, (in Greek). 
343 See Grigorios Kalfelis, who also argues that the Council uses wrongly the provisions 31 (b) and 34 
par.2 TEU and that leads not to a creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, but to an Area 
of ‗one-dimensional and unilateral suppression‘. ‗The EAW - One-dimensional consolidation of the 
European suppressive mechanisms?, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2006, p.199, (in Greek). See also Dionisios 
Mouzakis, ‗The criminal jurisdiction of the EC, Poinika Xronika, 2004, p.485 (in Greek) and Kaifa-
Gbandi, ‗Searching for the EC jurisdiction on the criminal suppression- A crucial bend of the evolution 
of the criminal law in the framework of the EU, 2004, Δ.E.E.D, p. 63, (in Greek).  
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the judicial cooperation on the principle of mutual recognition, this cannot happen, as 
they support, alternatively on the initiative of the Council. In that respect, they also 
argue that the Framework Decision on the Arrest Warrant lacks an appropriate legal 
basis and, thus, it constitutes an excess of the granted power of the Council
344
.  
The supporters of this argument, consequently, claim that the Greek Parliament, 
while implementing the Framework Decision on the EAW, should have been more 
generous than it really was. As they argue, the Framework Decision did not bind any 
of the Member States with regard to the provisions based on the principle of mutual 
recognition in the judicial cooperation in criminal matters, because the latter was/is a 
result of the excess of the granted power of the Council and not a granted EU 
fundamental principle. Therefore, the Greek Parliament should have pointed this out 
and it should have implemented the Framework Decision in a different way which 
would respect the fundamental provisions of the TEU as well as fundamental rights 
and which –at the same time- would send a strong message to the Council345, 
something which, eventually, did not happen.  
However, one could argue that the counter-argument to this point is the legal basis 
on which the Framework Decision on the EAW is founded, namely the principle of 
mutual recognition. As has already been thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter, 
the principle of mutual recognition was first presented at the Tampere European 
Council in 1999 as the ‗cornerstone‘ of the European judicial area and its vital 
importance was recognised in the Hague Programme, which linked its development to 
enhanced mutual trust between the Member States. It may not, indeed, have its legal 
basis on a specific provision of the TEU, but article 34 par. 2 TEU empowers the 
Council to unilaterally take measures, including Framework Decisions, in order to 
achieve the purposes of the TEU.  
In particular, article 34 par. 2 of the TEU provides that ‗the Council can take 
measures and promote cooperation, using the appropriate form and procedures as set 
out in this title, contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union.                        
To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or of the 
Commission, the Council may: (b) adopt Framework Decisions for the purpose of 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States‘. In that context, 
thus, one should subsume the effort of the Council to adopt the Framework Decision 
                                                             
344 Kaifa-Gbandi, id. 2004, p.1296, (in Greek). 
345 Ibid. See also Kaifa-Gbandi, id. 2004, p.836, (in Greek). 
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on the EAW based on the principle of mutual recognition as a means for the 
enhancement of the judicial cooperation in criminal matters through the abolition of 
extradition between Member States and the introduction of a new simplified system of 
surrender, namely the European Arrest Warrant. 
Yet, it should not be ignored that neither article 34(2) TEU nor any other 
provision of Title VI of the EU Treaty makes any distinction as to the type of 
measures which should be adopted on the basis of the subject-matter to which the 
joint action in the field of criminal cooperation relates. In fact, this was questioned in 
the recent case of Advocaten voor de Wereld
346
 of the ECJ. As has already been 
explained in detail in the previous chapter, the ECJ with its judgement tried to settle 
the EAW question with regard to the validity of the Framework Decision with article 
34 of the TEU by supporting ‗the Council's discretion to give preference to the legal 
instrument of the Framework Decision in the case where, as here, the conditions 
governing the adoption of such a measure are satisfied
347‘. In addition, the ECJ 
asserted that the Framework Decision on the EAW was ‗only binding in relations 
between Member States‘ and therefore, any other interpretation to the contrary ‗would 
deprive of its essential effectiveness the Council's recognised power to adopt 
framework decisions in fields previously governed by international conventions
348‘.  
 
B. Abolition of the Principle of Double Criminality 
 
The second main argument is that the abolition of the principle of double 
criminality is itself contrary to article 7 par. 1 of the Greek Constitution which 
provides for the entrenchment of the fundamental principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege. In particular, the proponents of this argument claim that the principle, 
which was traditionally connected with the older system of extradition between 
Member States, has now been widely and significantly changed, while the extent of 
such change is difficult for one to assess
349
. At the same time they argue that the 
abolition of the double criminality under the new system of surrender through                
                                                             
346 Case 303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld. Judgment of 3 May 2007, [2007], 3 C.M.L.R.1. See also 
Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‗Consitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar‘, European Law Review, (2008), 
33, p. 230-242 and Steve Peers, Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar 
after the Pupino and Segi Judgments, Common Market Law Review, (2007), 44, p.883-929. 
347 See par. 41 of the Judgement.  
348 See par. 42 of the Judgement. 
349 See Kaifa-Gbandi, id. 2004, p.1298, (in Greek). 
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the operation of the EAW creates a status of absolute legal uncertainty for the 
citizens
350
as they may be surrendered to the issuing the EAW State for an offence 
which, however, may not constitute an offence according to the Greek Criminal Code. 
That constitutes a breach of the Greek Constitution, in particular in the light of the 
lack of a common system of criminal laws at the EU level. It has been argued that a 
common area of Justice regarding the cooperation in criminal matters does not exist 
and that the double criminality principle should not have been abolished
351
. 
However, one should not ignore that when we are talking about the operation of 
the EAW, in fact, we mean that the executing State facilitates the exercise of a 
criminal claim of a foreign judicial authority rather than satisfying its own criminal 
claim
352
. Having this in mind one could rightly argue that the arrest and the 
subsequent surrender of the requested person constitutes part of inter-States 
cooperation in criminal matters, where the applicable law is the law of the issuing 
EAW State. In that case, the principle of double criminality (and hence article 7 of the 
Greek Constitution) can only be breached in the case where the EAW has been issued 
based on an offence which is not described in any law of the issuing State (principle 
of legality). However, one should not also ignore that the ECJ in its Advocaten ruling 
clearly held that the principle of legality in criminal matters stems from the issuing 
State.  
One should also refer to article 11 (g) of the Greek implementing law
353
.               
From this provision is apparent that the abolition of double criminality concerns only 
offences which have been committed in the territory of the issuing the EAW State 
and/or -in any event- which have been committed wholly or partly outside of Greek 
territory. This provision constitutes a ‗limitation‘ of the abolition of the double 
criminality only to offences committed outside of the Greek territory
354
. There is, 
thus, no incompatibility of the abolition of the double criminality requirement with 
article 7 of the Greek Constitution since the Greek executing authority carries out the 
EAW for an offence which was not committed within its jurisdiction, but for which it 
                                                             
350 See Elisavet Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The law on the EAW and the encounter of terrorism - the 
basic characteristics and a first interpretative approach, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.776, (in Greek). 
351 See Dimitrios Kioupis ‗The Law 3251/2004- A brief presentation of its basic points, Poinikos 
Logos, 2004, p. 974, (in Greek).  
352 See Olga Tsolka, ‗EAW: an ambitious tool for the promotion of the judicial cooperation in the 
framework of the EU, Nomiko Bima, 2002, p. 103, (in Greek). 
353 See also the corresponding article 4 par. 7 of the Council Framework Decision. 
354 See Elisavet Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id. 2004, p.777, (in Greek). 
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is willing to assist the foreign judicial authority as part of their common solidarity to 
combat the criminal behaviours listed in the Framework Decision.  
It must also be noted that the dual criminality principle was gradually abolished 
well before the operation of the EAW
355
. A characteristic example is the Convention 
drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, relating to 
extradition between the Member States of the European Union in 1996,                     
where according to article 3, the principle of dual criminality was –since then- 
abolished for the crimes of conspiracy and association to commit several offences 
listed in that Convention
356
.  
Moreover, a guarantee to compensate for the abolition of the principle of double 
criminality is the reference in all the mutual recognition instruments to the absolute 
respect of fundamental rights
357
. Having taken this into account, one can argue that 
the fight against crime as well as the abolition of double criminality for specific 
offences, but for which the Member States do have the will and the determination to 
fight effectively, find their limitation to the protection and respect of fundamental 
rights, as these have been determined in article 6 of the TEU and the ECHR. 
Therefore, human rights protection constitutes, indeed, the safety valve and the 
counterbalance to the elimination of double criminality and it can restrict any 
potential consequences and reactions from the abolition of the afore-mentioned 
principle.  
The second objection concerning dual criminality is related to the list itself of the 
32 offences for which the double criminality requirement is abolished. In particular, 
the proponents of this argument claim that from the list itself it is very hard to 
determine how many criminal acts are referred and related to the abolition of the 
double criminality, as this list contains a diverse category of different offences which 
are broadly described, without particular definitions, and which cannot constitute 
specifically defined offences
358
; and, thus, the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena 
                                                             
355 See Pararas P., ‗The Constitution and the EAW, 13/01/2002, Newspaper ‗The Bima‘, where he 
argues that the principle of dual criminality should have been totally abolished as it is a theory ‗out of 
date‘. Available online at: http://tovima.dolnet.gr. , (in Greek). 
356 See ‗Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, relating to 
extradition between the Member States of the European Union‘, Official Journal C 313 , 23/10/1996   
p. 0012 – 0023. 
357 See article 1 par. 2 of the Greek implementing law as well as point 13 of the Preamble of the 
Council Framework Decision.  
358 See Elisavet Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id. 2004, p.775, (in Greek). See also Kaifa-Gbandi, id.  2004, 
p.1300 where she claims that the abolition of the principle of double criminality regarding the listed 
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sine lege is once again infringed
359
. Furthermore, this attitude leaves open the 
opportunity to the issuing State to add in the future other offences which have no 
relation to the essence of the criminally punishable behaviour; however, that may lead 
to the accumulation of criminal power by the State and to the transfer of the criminal 
jurisdiction to the politically and economically powerful States against the weaker 
States
360
. 
Nevertheless, one can find the counter-argument of this point in the above-
mentioned decision of Advocaten voor de Wereld. As already has been analysed in the 
previous chapter, the Court was of the opinion that the definition of the listed offences 
and of the penalties applicable continue to be matters determined by the law of the 
issuing Member State
361
, which, must respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, as the Framework Decision does not 
seek to harmonise the criminal offences in question in respect of their constituent 
elements or of the penalties which they attract.  
In addition to the ECJ reasoning, it is important to note that the above mentioned 
argument lacks cogency for one more reason: the criminal characterization of an act 
for which an EAW has been issued belongs to the exclusive competence of the issuing 
State. The judicial authority of the executing State, when is called to execute the 
warrant, it does so in the framework of the cooperation of the different judicial 
authorities in the common European area of Justice in order to assist each other in the 
administration of Justice. In that framework, the punishability of the act of the 
requested person can be verified only in abstracto (namely only if the act is described 
generally in the criminal laws) and not in concreto (namely if the act for which the 
EAW has been issued exists with the same elements as in the issuing State and the 
executing State). Thus, when the EAW has been issued for an act which is, according 
to the Greek criminal laws, punishable in abstracto, but, the latter cannot be applied 
because of the lack of the connecting link, then the EAW can and, in fact should be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
offences in the Greek implementing law was not only ‗inaccurate‘, but also ‗contrary to both the Greek 
Constitution and the rule of law‘, (in Greek). 
359 See Giannis Bekas, ‗Political choices and the Law - The Extradition - surrender of the requested 
and the EAW‘, Poinikos Logos, 2007, p. 555, (in Greek). 
360 See Christos Milonopoulos, ‗The abolition of the double criminality as an abuse of right and the 
case law of the ECJ on the EAW, Poinikos Logos, 2007, p. 1, (in Greek). See also Christos 
Milonopoulos, ‗Report on the Bill of the EAW, Poinika Chronika, 2004, p.1048, (in Greek). 
361 See par. 52 of the Judgement. 
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executed without this implying any incompatibility of the abolition of the double 
criminality with article 7 of the Greek Constitution
362
.  
 
C. The Surrender of Greek Nationals 
 
The third objection raised during the debate on the EAW instrument by the 
opponents of its operation is that the surrender of the Greek nationals under the 
framework of the EAW is contrary to the Greek Constitution. In particular, it is 
asserted
363
 that article 5 of the Greek Constitution in par. 2 and par. 4 as well as the 
general legal tradition do not permit the extradition of Greek nationals
364
.  
As to the first objection, namely that article 5 par. 2 prohibits the extradition of the 
Greek nationals, the latter provides that: ‗The extradition of aliens prosecuted for 
their action as freedom-fighters shall be prohibited‘. The supporters of this argument 
claim that it is clear from the grammatical meaning of the above-mentioned provision 
that extradition is permitted exclusively and only for foreign citizens
365
. It is nowhere 
to be found in any other provision of the Greek Constitution that Greek nationals can 
be extradited. In contradistinction to the lack of specific provision allowing the 
extradition it is implied that this was not in the thoughts and will of the Constitutional 
Legislator and therefore the surrender of the Greek nationals is prohibited
366
.  
The discussion goes back to 1975, while drafting the Greek post-military junta 
Constitution. Greece had just gone through a 7 years dictatorship (1967-1974) and 
inevitably the first Constitution after the collapse of the junta would reflect the social 
and political values of this period of time
367
. In that context the meaning of protection 
of those who fight for freedom in the Greek legal and constitutional order was and 
                                                             
362 See Christos Milonopoulos, id. 2004, p.1049, (in Greek) where he accepts this point, but he finds an 
incompatibility with article 7 of the Greek Constitution when the act is not either in abstracto 
punishable.  
363 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris (24/03/2008), Interview with Mr. Vgontzas in 02/05/2008 and 
Mr. Anagnostopoulos in 02/05/2008. 
364 See ‗Comments and Proposals of the National Commission for Human Rights for the application of 
the Law 3251/2004, 22/03/2007, which argues also the unconstitutionality of the surrender of Greek 
nationals. Available online at: http://www.nchr.gr, (in Greek). 
365 See Aristotelis Charalampakis, ‗Problems with regard the correct meaning and execution of the 
EAW, Poinikos Logos, 2005, p. 759, (in Greek). See also Chari Papacharalampous, ‗The criminal law 
of the enemy: EAW, terrorism, and extraordinary antiterrorism legislation in the U.S.A‘, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2002, p.190, (in Greek). See also Dimitrios Simeonidis, ‗The EAW and the extradition of 
Greek citizens‘, Timitikos Tomos Maloledaki, p. 971, (in Greek). 
366 See Ioannis Manoledakis, Maria Kaifa-Gkmpanti, ‗Comments on the Commission‘s Proposal 
regarding the adoption of a Framework Decision related to the EAW‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, p.1108, (in 
Greek). 
367 For a detailed analysis see Kostas Maurias, ‗Constitutional Law‘, Sakkoulas, 2004, (in Greek). 
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still is a very sensitive issue. One should not ignore that even in the implementing 
law, and in particular in article 11 (e), the Greek Legislator added that that the 
execution of the EAW is refused on the grounds of ‗his/her activities for Freedom‘. 
This, however, was criticized by the European Council which, in its report, noted that 
‗the Greek Legislator overstepped the Framework Decision in that respect and that          
it was not, thus, empowered to insert this addition relating to ‗activities for freedom‘,  
no matter how understandable it may be in view of recent Greek history‘368. 
Nevertheless, the supporters of this argument claim that during the parliamentary 
discussions on the Constitution of 1975  the –at that time- MP Kaklamanis asked the 
Minister of Justice to add in this provision that the ‗extradition is prohibited for Greek 
nationals whatever their crime committed‘, but the Minister of Justice Stefanakis 
claimed that there is no need for this to be done since it is evident and implicit that 
this amendment is needless given that extradition is referred only to the foreign 
nationals
369, but for those who are ‗freedom fighters‘. They, thus, claim that from both 
the literal meaning of this provision and from the historical will of the Constitutional 
Legislator it is apparent that Greek nationals cannot be extradited
370
 due to the 
operation of the EAW which has been characterized as  ‗weakening the rule of Law 
safeguards‘371.  
The second basis that they invoke is that the extradition of Greek nationals is 
prohibited by article 5 par. 4 which provides that ‗individual administrative measures 
restrictive of the free movement or residence in the country, and of the free exit and 
entrance therein of every Greek shall be prohibited
372
. Such measures may be 
imposed in exceptional cases of emergency and only in order to prevent the 
commission of criminal acts, following a criminal court ruling, as specified by law‘. 
However, as they argue, extradition is not included therein and therefore the non-
extradition of the Greek nationals which is strongly connected with their right of 
personal freedom as entrenched in article 5 of the Constitution, is absolutely secured 
as a ‗silent prohibition‘373. 
                                                             
368 See the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008, p. 40. 
369 See Parliamentary Minutes of the discussion on the Constitution in 1975, p. 757.  
370 See Giannis Mpekas, ‗Political choices and the Law - The Extradition - surrender of the requested 
and the EAW‘, Poinikos Logos, 2007, p. 549, (in Greek). See also Christos Milonopoulos, ‗Extradition 
of nationals and the execution of the EAW against nationals, Poinikos Logos, 2005, p. 751, (in Greek). 
371 See Grigoris Kalfelis, ‗Extradition of Greek nationals, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2007, p. 1191, (in Greek). 
372 See Dagtoglou, ‗Constitutional Law – Individual Rights, 2005, p.495, (in Greek). 
373 See A. Charambakis and Nikoleta Tsiakoumaki, ‗Problems regarding the correct meaning and 
execution of the EAW, Poinikos Logos, 2005, 768, (in Greek). 
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Nonetheless, both arguments have their counter-arguments. First of all, one should 
keep in mind that the Framework Decision on the EAW since its operation replaced 
the old system of extradition and therefore from the technical-terminology point of 
view we no longer talk about extradition, but rather of surrender of nationals.  Taking 
this into account, as to the first argument (incompatibility to article 5 par. 2) it is 
notable that this article is very much connected to actions related with the attempted 
overthrowing of the political power exercised within a country, without there having 
democratic legitimation
374
. As a political, thus, crime, the freedom-fighter can seek 
asylum under this provision of the Greek Constitution.  
The arising then question is what does the notion of freedom-fighter mean and 
whether article 5 par.2 of the Greek Constitution can be applied in cases where the 
requested person claims to be a freedom-fighter. As to the meaning of the notion of 
freedom-fighter there is not any sufficient interpretation of what it constitutes. 
However, the Supreme Court of Greece has put as a limit in the application of this 
article in the sense that the freedom-fighter cannot use acts that can damage human 
value. Characteristic example is a case
375
 regarding a requested person who bombed 
the Jewish synagogue in Rome resulting to the death of one person and the injury of 
many others. The Italian authorities asked the Greek authorities to extradite him.           
He claimed that he was a freedom-fighter. However, the Supreme Court of Greece 
interpreting article 5 par. 2 of the Greek Constitution rejected his argument by stating 
that the refusal of extradition of a person who claims to be a freedom-fighter cannot 
be justified if that person has used actions that may jeopardize or even harm the life of 
innocent people. This is contrary to article 2 par. 1 of the Greek Constitution that 
protects the value of human being and thus, such cases cannot be regarded as being 
freedom-fighters.   
In this context, article 5 par. 2 cannot be applied –to either foreign or Greek 
nationals- when the requested person has committed other crimes (i.e. the ones listed 
in the Framework Decision on the EAW) to the political crimes as described in article 
5 under the constitutional notion of actions as a freedom-fighter. However, it will be 
very interesting to see how the Greek Courts will interpret the notion of freedom-
fighter within the context of the operation of the EAW, if such a case appears. 
Nevertheless, -at the moment- one can draw the safe conclusion that if a Greek 
                                                             
374 See Pararas P., id. 2002, (in Greek). 
375 See Supreme Court case No.820/1989, in Poinika Chronika, M, p.183, in Greek.  
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national is prosecuted for any criminal behaviour related to the listed crimes of the 
Framework Decision this cannot (and in fact should not) mean that the Greek 
Constitution prohibits his surrender because of article 5 par. 2. To put it in other 
words, the fact that the Constitution prohibits the extradition of a foreign citizen for 
actions related to freedom, as a political crime, has no relevance with the purpose of 
the EAW which is the administration of Justice for common crimes which cannot –in 
any case- characterized as political crimes under the provision of article 5 par. 2 of the 
Greek Constitution. In that respect, thus, there is no incompatibility of the surrender 
of Greek nationals with article 5 par. 2 of the Constitution
376
.  
Furthermore, as to the second basis (namely that is contrary to article 5 par. 4) this 
is not a persuasive enough argument. The nature of the arrest of the requested person 
and his subsequent surrender according to the EAW Framework Decision is different 
from the one described in article 5 par. 4. The latter, in its essence, refers to the case 
of deportation of Greek nationals which is a totally different institution from the case 
of surrender under the Framework Decision of the EAW
377
. The purpose of 
deportation is to remove a person from the territory of a State because either he has 
committed a particular offence or because he is illegally residing in the territory of 
that State. It, thus, belongs to the very meaning of the exercise of the governmental 
power of the State.  
However, the nature of the surrender in the EAW is different: it constitutes a 
significant step in judicial cooperation between Member States, but in no case can it 
constitute the exercise of governmental power of the State as in the case of 
deportation. This happens so because the State now has no discretionary power to 
decide whether or not to execute the EAW, as it has undertaken the obligation to leave 
to the judicial authority the exclusive responsibility to decide on its execution.  
One can arrive at the same conclusion if one goes back to the parliamentary 
discussion in 1975 where the Constitutional Legislator clearly referred while drafting 
this provision to cases of deportation, but not extradition. In addition,                                 
in the amendment of the Greek Constitution in 2001, the –at the time- Minister of 
Justice Mr. Stathopoulos referring to the same provision stated that this related to the 
                                                             
376 See D. Spinellis, who argues that the indirect interpretation of article 5 par. 2 of the Constitution is 
contra legem. 2003, p.1286, (in Greek). See also Olga Tsolka, id. 2002, p. 111, (in Greek). 
377 See Eleni Kamperou-Ntalta, ‗Crimes committed by Greek nationals to a foreign State‘, Poinika 
Chronika, 2005, p.313, (in Greek). 
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possibility of deportation
378
. It is, therefore, clear that this provision prohibits the 
deportation of Greek nationals and not the surrender (or extradition) due to the 
operation of the EAW.  
The third basis used in order to prove the unconstitutionality of the surrender of 
the Greek nationals is the Greek legal tradition in general. According to this 
argument
379
 the Greek State has traditionally and historically continuously refused to 
extradite Greek nationals without any distinction or exception. This had happened in 
all the previous legal instruments of extradition between Member States (bilateral, 
multilateral, or in the framework of the Council of Europe and the EU) which Greece 
has ratified and where the Greek Legislator had made clear reservation on the 
surrender of Greek nationals.  
Characteristic is the example of article 2 (c) of the Law 2718/1999 which 
implemented the Convention on extradition between Member States
380
 where it is 
clearly provided that Greece will not extradite its nationals. Having this into account, 
the supporters of this claim argue that it is very difficult to call into question the 
constitutional entrenchment of the right of the Greek nationals to feel ‗secure‘ while 
being in the Greek territory that they will not face the risk to be extradited to a foreign 
judicial system, but with which they are not familiar
381
. Nevertheless, the fear of some 
academics goes one step further by stating that the fact that the Greek Legislator in 
the EAW Framework Decision did not explicitly prohibit the extradition                     
(or surrender) of the Greek nationals to a foreign judicial authority leaves open the 
window of opportunity for the extradition of Greek nationals to third (non EU) 
countries (i.e. USA) which would create many serious legal issues
382
.  
Yet, when one invokes the legal tradition in order to prove the unconstitutionality 
of a specific provision one should take into consideration that this is the last source of 
law in the general order of Laws. In the same first position with the Greek 
Constitution are the fundamental Treaties establishing the EU.
383
 Article 28 par.1 of 
the Greek Constitution formally integrates international and European law into Greek 
                                                             
378 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 24th January 2001, session 6th. 
379 See Dimitris Simeonidis and Stefanos Paulou, ‗EAW and extradition of Greek nationals, Poinika 
Chronika, 2006, p.196, (in Greek). 
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law by giving clear precedence over domestic law to the obligations undertaken by 
Greece at EU level: ‗The generally recognised rules of international law, as well as 
international conventions as of the time they are ratified by statute and become 
operative according to their respective conditions, shall be an integral part of 
domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law‘.                  
In addition, the interpretative clause states that: ‗Article 28 constitutes the foundation 
for the participation of the country in the European integration process‘. It is, thus, 
apparent that if there is something to be found either in the TEU and its principles or 
in the law of the EU which, however, may contradict the Greek legal tradition, or 
even the Greek domestic law (excepting only the provisions of the Greek 
Constitution) then this automatically should mean that the EU law has an increased 
formal (constitutional) validity, and thus, prevails over the latter.  
In these circumstances, it should not be ignored that the adoption of the Council 
Framework Decision and the operation of the European Arrest Warrant constitute part 
of the European legislation. However, at the same time, the implementation of the 
Framework Decision and its execution in the Greek legal order, as in all the EU legal 
orders, constitutes an accomplishment of the obligations undertaken by the Greek 
Republic, as a Member of the EU, to abolish extradition and replace it by a system of 
surrender between the judicial authorities which would serve the purpose of the Union 
becoming an area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. In this context, the execution of 
the EAW, under the umbrella of the human rights protection
384
, has –according to 
article 28 of the Greek Constitution- an increased validity as opposed to any invoked 
custom, even if such custom is a constitutional one. Having taken all these into 
account, it is apparent that -for several reasons- the alleged unconstitutionality of the 
arrest and the subsequent surrender of a Greek national lack persuasive force.   
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VII. The point of view of the Greek Practitioners on the principle of mutual 
recognition and the EAW 
 
 It is commonly accepted among Greek practitioners that the differences in the 
substantive criminal law between Member States affect –to some extent- the effective 
application of the mutual recognition principle in the context of the judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and make the acceptance of the complete abolition of 
the principle of dual criminality difficult. The reality, yet, is that the Greek 
practitioners have different views between them as to whether the verification of the 
double criminality principle hampers or not in practice judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. In particular, Mr. Pantelis and Mr. Anagnostopoulos were of the 
opinion that it does not hamper the judicial cooperation
385
; whereas Mr. 
Chamilothoris agreed that it does hamper the judicial cooperation between Member 
States as it may constitute an ‗obstacle‘ to the surrender of the requested national386. 
On the contrary, its abolition for the specific listed offences constitutes a step forward 
for the effective judicial cooperation between Member States in order to jointly 
combat the contemporary types of crime for which they share same points of view.           
Nevertheless, Mr. Vgontzas went a step further by stating that in practical terms the 
verification of double criminality was even in the previous system of extradition 
informally abolished as, for example, the Greek judicial authorities considered fraud 
as being the same crime as in Russia, even if the crime of fraud in Russia did not 
coincide exactly with the elements of the equivalent crime in Greece
387
. Therefore, all 
this theoretical discussion about the abolition of the principle of double criminality, 
because of the operation of the EAW, is practically of limited importance
388
.  
However, in any event, they all, correctly, believe that it would be very useful to 
create a database which would contain all the national definitions of offences listed in 
the catalogue of the EAW with respect to the abolition of dual criminality, as they 
believe (even if they characterize it as a very ambitious goal) that this will improve 
the cooperation between the judicial authorities, increase the trust and provide 
equivalence and transparency between the different and diverse legal systems as well 
as it will reduce the reactions by the opponents of the abolition of the principle in 
                                                             
385 Interview in 28/03/2008 and 02/05/2008 respectively.  
386 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris (24/03/2008). 
387 Interview with Mr. Vgontzas in 02/05/2008. 
388 See also Antonis Vgontzas, ‗Judicial Cooperation between EU and USA – A new prospect in the 
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question
389
. On the other hand, a list also of offences excluded from the abolition of 
the double criminality would be a very helpful step in order to make mutual 
recognition more effective and operational. This will, undoubtedly, improve the 
cooperation, increase the trust and provide equivalence and transparency between the 
different and diverse legal systems
390
.  
On the other hand, according to the Greek Ministry of Justice, the differences in 
procedural law should be a reason not to recognize and execute a decision, unless in 
the future there will be an approximation of the rights of the suspected and of the 
accused. Yet, the Ministry, correctly, points that mutual trust should exist between 
Member States, but individual constitutional rights should not be affected or even 
violated. At the same time, it is felt that the reference to the fundamental rights in the 
mutual recognition instruments implies that a control should be exercised by the 
executing authority on the procedural safeguards and the respect of the rights of the 
defense in the issuing Member State
391
.  
  Furthermore, it is notable that an attempt of the European Union to codify the 
various instruments based on the mutual recognition principle would be an important 
step in the direction of effective judicial cooperation as it would facilitate 
implementation and improve consistency on the one hand, and, on the other, it would 
accommodate the judicial authorities in Member States. It is, thus, essential that the 
European Union continues to take measures to support and facilitate mutual 
recognition. One of the suggested measures -and the most important– is felt to be the 
promotion of a mechanism which would evaluate the quality of the judicial system in 
Member States
392
. Nevertheless, both the Greek Ministry and the Greek 
practitioners
393
 strongly believe that harmonization (approximation) of criminal laws 
(both substantive and procedural) is a necessary condition to further effective 
developing cooperation based on mutual recognition. Indeed, this might have been the 
case. Mutual recognition itself might not be a sufficient condition. It seems that what 
is also needed is at least a minimum level of harmonization of laws in order to operate 
effectively now and in the future. 
                                                             
389 Ibid. Also Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris (24/03/2008). 
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 Furthermore, it is very important to note that the practitioners, generally, are well 
informed of the new mutual recognition instruments, and in particular of the EAW, as 
they participated in both the stage of negotiations and the stage of drafting the 
implementing legislation. In addition, according to the Ministry of Justice, there is a 
constant mechanism of informing and educating the practitioners on the meaning and 
application of the new instruments based on the principle of mutual recognition.  
 However, one should not ignore that our contact with Mr. Chamilothoris and Mr. 
Anagnostopoulos gave another view
394
. Mr. Chamilothoris was of the opinion that 
despite the efforts, a deficit exists and Mr. Anagnostopoulos characterized the 
briefing of the practitioners as very much deficient. They strongly believe that there 
should be a more periodical and constant briefing on the EAW mainly to the judges to 
whom its application has been assigned. As far as Mr. Chamilothoris experience is 
concerned he could claim that some judges face it for the first time. And the reality is 
that even if they are trying to be careful, yet, the undeniable fact is that better briefing 
is still required.  
 Nevertheless, the general picture is that the Greek practitioners have faced some 
(minor) difficulties up to now. The main difficulty that can be found in judicial 
cooperation in this period of time lies in the lack of homogeneity in the penal legal 
orders of the European States as well as the important methodological and systemic 
differences between domestic criminal justice systems and criminal law doctrine.           
In the light of these differences, it is felt that the creation of European coordinating 
bodies such as Eurojust, and the operation of national networks of contact such as the 
EJN are very helpful. 
 Another notable aspect is that the practitioners believe that the differences in 
Member States‘ legislation regarding the use of coercive / investigative measures, in 
fact, hamper cooperation between the judicial authorities. This happens because, for 
example, different rules apply in Greece to put someone in custody, or to confiscate 
someone‘s property than apply in France or in the United Kingdom. The issue of the 
preliminary investigation by the police is even more difficult. 
 The Greek Judges believe that these cases reveal more problems, as they are 
unsure as to whether the police authorities in Member States respect the guarantees 
for the protection of human rights while they investigate a suspect. To that end,                 
it is felt that more control and more appropriate sanctions for violations of the rights 
                                                             
394 Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris (24/03/2008). 
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of the defendants are some of the desired measures
395
. The weakness of the 
preliminary police investigation is because police investigation stage has become 
increasingly influenced by the Executive. Consequently, EU harmonisation is 
necessary regarding the coercive/investigative measures. In this context, the 
decoupling of executive decision-making from the (judicial) surrender process under 
the EAW is a very welcome step. 
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VIII. Review of the Greek Case Law on the EAW 
 
The Greek implementing law gives the power to deal with the European Arrest 
Warrant from the legal point of view to three jurisdictional authorities
396
:                       
(a) The Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal
397
; (b) The Court of Appeal
398
; and 
(c) The Supreme Court
399
. Their role depends each time on whether Greece is the 
issuing or the executing the EAW State.  
At this section the development of the case law of the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court of Greece since the operation of the Framework Decision on the EAW 
in the Greek Jurisdiction will be examined. The following seven categories have 
emerged in these two Courts these years involving: (a) the effects of converting some 
optional grounds for refusal to mandatory ones; (b) the question of the 
Constitutionality of the surrender of Greek nationals; (c) the decision to stay the 
proceedings to ask for additional information; (d) the verification of double 
criminality; (e) the irrevocability of the decision; (f) the guarantees to be given 
according to article 13 of the Greek implementing law; and last, but not least, (g) the 
meaning of the term ‗judicial authority‘.  
 
A. Grounds for Refusal 
 
As to the first band of the raised arguments, the fact that the Greek Legislator has 
converted some optional grounds for refusal into mandatory ones or has added new 
grounds for refusal which are not provided in the original adopted Council 
Framework Decision (article 11 of the Greek implementing law) has proved to be a 
serious obstacle to the surrender of the requested person to the issuing the EAW 
judicial authority which seriously reaffirms what Mr. Chamilothoris characterized as 
being a ‗serious limitation to judicial discretion400‘.  
 
 
                                                             
396 For a detailed analysis of the structure of the Greek Courts see the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on 
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a. (1) Article 11 (g) of the 3251/2004 – ‘The offence has been committed wholly 
or in part in the Greek territory’ 
 
Two of the leading cases concerned article 11 (g). The first case which appeared 
was case No. 1255/2005 of 20/05/2005
401
. The facts of the case were in summary that 
the German judicial authorities issued an EAW against a German national for five 
committed crimes of fraud and one attempt. Some of these crimes had been 
committed in German territory and some others in the territory of Greece. The Court 
of Appeal decided to surrender the requested person to the German authorities.  
However, the German national appealed in front of the Supreme Court of Greece 
invoking the argument that his surrender was contrary to article 11 (g) of the Greek 
implementing law. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Court of Appeal 
was mistaken in its judgement as long as ‗the alleged crimes have been committed 
partly in the Greek territory or the results of such criminal behaviour have been 
occurred wholly or partly in the Greek legal order‘. The Court went even a step 
further by stating that this principle also applies to the continuous committed crimes 
where each of the separate committed crimes includes the same elements with the 
main crime.  Therefore, the Supreme Court annulled the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and refused the surrender to the German authorities only for the offence 
committed partly in the Greek territory applying article 11 (g) of the Greek 
implementing law
402
.  
The second case which deals with the same provision, but has a particular interest, 
is case No. 6/2007 of the Court of Appeal of Athens in 06/02/07
403
. In that case the 
German authorities requested the Greek judicial authorities to arrest and surrender a 
German national who had, allegedly, committed the crime of fraud wholly in Rome, 
Italy. To put it in other words, the crime of fraud for which the EAW was issued by 
the German authorities was not committed in either the issuing the EAW State 
(Germany) or even the executing the warrant State (Greece), but in a third country 
(Italy). The result was that the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that due to the 
mandatory reason of refusal of the execution of the EAW provided in article 11 (g) 
                                                             
401 See the judgment of the Supreme Court in Poiniki Dikaiosini, Case Law of the Supreme Court (in 
Greek) 2005, p. 1498.  
402 The same approach was taken in the Court of Appeal of Athens Case No. 29/2005. See the judgment 
of the Council of Court of Appeal in Poiniki Dikaiosini, Poiniki Dikonomia, 2005, p.1160.  
403 Case not yet reported.  
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(ii), the Greek judicial authorities had no jurisdiction to arrest and surrender the 
requested person, and, therefore, they had to release him.  
Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that this case involves as mentioned 
above, the exercise of the so-called extraterritorial jurisdiction by the German 
judicial authorities. By that is meant that a State (Germany) exercises its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction when none of the components of the alleged crime has 
been committed in the territory of that State, but it seeks for judicial assistance. In 
these cases, it should be, generally, accepted that in the framework of the judicial 
cooperation between Member States in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the 
EAW should be executed if two conditions are met cumulatively: (a) the issuing State 
exercises its extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (b) the offence constitutes an offence also 
according to the criminal law of the executing State
404
. Otherwise, the execution 
should be refused. In this framework, thus, the Greek Court, at a first glance, should 
have executed the EAW as both conditions are met.  
However, the fact that the Greek Legislator has transformed the exercise of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Member State to a mandatory ground of refusal has 
two main consequences which are both contrary to the spirit of the Framework 
Decision: (a) the further limitation of the judicial discretion, as the judicial authority 
of the executing State cannot provide mutual assistance and execute the EAW on the 
exclusive basis of his discretion; and (b) a more practical result which is that a 
criminal can be released, as happened in this case, where the only way that this person 
could be brought in front of Justice was that a new warrant should be issued by the 
Italian judicial authorities to the Greek authorities, something which, eventually, did 
not happen. It is felt, thus, that the transposition of the territoriality clause as a 
mandatory reason to refuse the arrest and surrender of a requested person is proved to 
be, in practical terms, an obstacle to effective judicial cooperation
405
 and may render 
the operation of the EAW ineffective.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
404 See ‗Explanatory memorandum to the Commission proposal for a framework decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant‘ COM (2001) 522 final/2, p.16.  
405 This was also the view with Mr. Chamilothoris. Interview with Mr. Chamilothoris in 24/03/2008. 
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a. (2) Article 11 (f) of the 3251/2004 – ‘The requested is a Greek national’ 
 
In two other cases the Court of Appeal had to deal with article 11 (f). In particular, 
in the first case No. 4/2006 of 18/05/2006 the Court of Appeal of Pireas
406
 was asked 
to apply article 11 (f) in the following circumstances: A Greek national was sentenced 
by the Court of First Instance of Evry in France to a custodial sentence of four years 
for the crime of manslaughter as well as for the crime of bodily injury. The Public 
Prosecutor of the Court of First Instance of Evry issued the EAW in question asking 
the Greek authorities to surrender the Greek national in order for it to execute the 
imposed sentence in France. The requested individual did not consent to his surrender 
to the French authorities and the case was held before the Court of Appeal.  
The latter was of the opinion that when the case concerns Greek nationals who are 
sentenced by a foreign judicial authority to any sentence then the Greek judicial 
authorities covenant not to execute the EAW according to the provision 11 (f),                
but they are obliged to order the execution of the imposed sentence in the Greek 
territory according to the Greek criminal laws. As characteristically was stated in that 
decision ‗the Greek judicial authorities have no other option‘. It was, therefore, 
decided not to execute the EAW and hence to keep the Greek national to execute his 
imposed sentence in the Greek legal order. The same approach was taken in the case 
No. 25/2007 on the 10/05/2007 by the Court of Appeal of Athens
407
 where the Court 
found that that the Greek implementing law gives no discretion to the Court to decide 
in a different way as it is obliged to refuse the surrender and order the execution of his 
imposed sentence in the Greek jurisdiction according to the Greek criminal laws. 
Therefore, once more, the Greek judicial authorities refused to execute the EAW. 
  
a. (3) Article 11 (b) of the 3251/2004 – ‘The requested has been irrevocably 
judged’ 
 
The next notable case No 10/2006 of 22/12/2006
408
 concerned the application of 
article 11 (b) of the Greek implementing law. The facts of the case were, in summary, 
the following: The Italian judicial authorities issued an EAW to the Greek judicial 
authorities regarding an Iraqi national (resident of Germany) in order to prosecute him 
                                                             
406 Case not yet reported. 
407 Case not yet reported.  
408 Ibid.  
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for offences related to human trafficking. According to the Italian EAW the accused 
had committed these crimes while travelling by lorry from the Greek territory (port of 
Hgoumenitsa) to the Italian territory (port of Ancona). However, while he was in the 
Greek territory he was arrested by the Greek authorities and he was sentenced by the 
Court of Appeal of Kerkira to imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months.  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal of Thessaloniki which had to decide on his 
surrender to the Italian authorities was of the opinion that since the requested person 
was tried and sentenced by the Greek judicial authorities for the same acts as in the 
Italian EAW, then, because of article 11 (b) of the Greek law the Greek judicial 
authorities must refuse to execute the Italian request.  
 
a. (4) Article 11 (h) of the 3251/2004 – ‘The requested is Greek national and is 
being prosecuted in Greece’ 
 
The next case regarding the application of the grounds for refusal provided in the 
Greek implementing law is case No.2030/2007 of 16/11/2007 of the Supreme Court 
of Greece
409
. In this case, the Belgian authorities requested the Greek judicial 
authorities to arrest and surrender a Greek national in order to prosecute her for the 
crimes of participation in a criminal organization and money laundering. All the 
alleged relevant crimes were committed exclusively in Belgian territory. The Court of 
Appeal of Ioannina decided to execute the warrant. However, the requested person 
appealed in front of the Supreme Court of Greece seeking that her surrender was 
contrary to article 11 (h) because it was not ensured that she would be returned to the 
Greek State, in order to serve there the custodial sentence or the detention order 
passed against her in the issuing  Member State.  
However, the Supreme Court of Greece rejected this claim because, as it stated, 
the reassurance of returning any Greek national back to the Greek State in order to 
serve his/her sentence ‗does not necessarily presuppose that this should be given by 
the relevant requesting judicial authority, but it could be given by any authority, as 
such also being any administrative authority‘. Therefore, the Court found no violation 
and ordered the execution of the Belgian EAW.   
 
 
                                                             
409 Case not yet reported.  
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a. (5) Article 11 (d) of the 3251/2004 – ‘The prosecution is statute-barred’ 
The last, but very interesting, point from the Greek case law was made by the 
Supreme Court in two very recent cases, No.1024/2008
410
 and No. 1266/2009
411
.                  
The first concerned an EAW issued by the German judicial authorities,            
whereas the second was issued by the British authorities, both against two Greek 
nationals in order to prosecute them for committing the offence of tax evasion. 
However, the Court refused to surrender the requested persons because of the 
application of article 11 (d).  
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, in both cases, ruled that the fact that 
this provision has been transformed into a mandatory reason for refusal establishes a 
‗prohibitive provision‘ for the execution of the EAW which, however, as the Court 
characteristically said, is contrary to what the Council Framework Decision provides. 
In addition, the Court stated that if the EAW is executed, but the criminal prosecution 
or punishment is statute-barred according to the Greek criminal laws, this would,            
in fact, violate the general principle of the Statute of Limitations, a principle which is 
closely connected to the principle of the public order.  
The Court, thus, pointed out that if the Greek Legislator wanted to give the power 
to the executing judicial authority to execute an EAW which, however, is based on an 
act or punishment which is statute-barred according to the Greek criminal laws,            
but not according to the criminal laws of the issuing State, he would explicitly provide 
this option in the Law. Yet, this was not the choice of the Legislator who preferred to 
refuse the execution in cases where the prosecution or punishment of the requested 
person is statute-barred only according to the Greek criminal laws and not also/either 
according to the criminal laws of the issuing State. Therefore, the Supreme Court for 
these offences refused the surrender. 
However, the dissenting opinion of the Court, in the first case, very interestingly 
supported that the interest protected in this case was strictly related to the Greek,           
and not to the German authorities. In particular, as they stated, the crime of tax 
evasion is directed against lawful rights which, however, are closely related only to 
the legal order of the executing State. It was, thus, felt that since the requested person 
had committed in another legal order the crime of tax evasion this should mean that 
this person should not be arrested and surrendered by the Greek judicial authorities as 
                                                             
410 See the judgment in Poinika Chronika, 2008, p. 513.  
411 See the judgment in Poinika Chronika, 2010, p.326.  
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the punishable act does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Greek judicial 
authorities, and thus, article 11 (d) of the 3251/2004 could not be applied.              
However, the majority opinion of the Court, correctly, rejected this argument since 
article 6 par. 1 of the Greek criminal code provides that the Greek laws can be applied 
in cases where a Greek national has committed in a foreign country a crime which is 
considered criminal in both the Greek criminal laws and the criminal laws of the State 
where the act is allegedly committed, as happened in the case in question.  
 
B. The question of the Constitutionality of the surrender of Greek nationals 
 
The Supreme Court of Greece since the first operation of the European Arrest 
Warrant was in all of its cases indisputably against the alleged unconstitutionality of 
the surrender of the Greek nationals to other Jurisdictions. The first leading case 
which seriously challenged the constitutionality of the surrender of Greek nationals 
was case No. 591/2005 of 08/03/2005
412
. The facts of the case were, in summary, the 
following: The Spanish judicial authorities issued on 23/12/2004 an EAW concerning 
a Greek national, being also a priest and a teacher, who was accused by the Spanish 
authorities of committing in Barcelona, Spain, in the period 2001-2002 the crime of 
child sexual abuse against a girl younger than ten years old. The Greek national did 
not consent to his surrender and the Court of Appeal of Crete, having the relevant 
jurisdiction, decided to execute the warrant. However, the arrested person appealed in 
front of the Supreme Court of Greece, where he raised constitutional objections, while 
he remained in custody until the Supreme Court reached its decision. 
In particular, the defence mainly claimed that: (a) the surrender of Greek nationals 
is prohibited by the Greek Constitution (article 5), and (b) in any event there is a 
Greek Constitutional legal tradition which prohibits the surrender. It is notable that 
the defence sustained their claims with reference to the aforementioned academics 
that supported the unconstitutionality of the surrender, due to the operation of the 
EAW, with main provisions of the Greek Constitution.  
The Supreme Court of Greece in its judgment found no violation of the surrender 
of any provision of the Greek Constitution. In particular, the Court rejected the claim 
                                                             
412 See the facts of the case in Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.1093. See also the judgment in Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2005, with the dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court by Aleksandros 
Papadopoulos, p. 550 who strongly supports the unconstitutionality of the surrender under the EAW 
framework, (in Greek). 
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that articles 5 par. 2 and 4 prohibit the surrender of the Greek nationals by stressing 
that there is no ‗contradiction‘ of the surrender with any Constitutional provision413. It 
even went a step further by stating that the law which implemented the Council 
Framework Decision constitutes the implementation of the obligations undertaken 
unanimously by the Member States in order to combat different types of crimes at the 
EU level. The Court also rejected the second raised basis, namely that in all the 
previous Conventions of extradition Greece had raised reservations on the surrender 
of the Greek nationals. It characterized this as being an argument without having any 
‗legal influence‘ on the decision, and thus, the Supreme Court ordered the execution 
of the Spanish European Arrest Warrant.  
Few months later, on 17/01/06, the Supreme Court of Greece was asked in case 
No. 109/2006 to rule again on the question of the compatibility of the surrender with 
the Constitutional provisions
414
. The case concerned an EAW issued by the judicial 
authorities of Leeds, UK, against a Greek national in order for the former to prosecute 
him for committing the offences of sexual abuse and kidnapping against a young 
English woman. The case was brought in front of the Supreme Court of Greece where 
the Court reaffirmed what it had said few months previously. It found that the 
provision in article 5 cannot be interpreted in such a way that establishes an obstacle 
in the surrender of the Greek nationals. Therefore, the Court stressed once again that 
the essence of the rights provided and guaranteed in this article has nothing to do with 
the surrender as provided in the Framework Decision on the EAW. The Court went 
even one step further by stating that the prohibition of the surrender of Greek 
nationals to another Member State has not any more any ‗practical importance‘ as 
Member States have developed between them ‗mutual trust and they commonly 
respect the fundamental freedoms and principles of the Equitable State‘.  
The next challenge before the Supreme Court of Greece came in case                            
No. 1773/2007 on the 28/09/2007
415
. This case concerned an EAW issued by the 
German authorities against a Greek national in order for the former to prosecute him 
for the crime of fraud which was allegedly committed in Germany. The main 
                                                             
413 See ‗Comments‘ on the case 591/2005, Dimitrios Zimianitis, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p. 837 (in 
Greek) where he supports the compatibility of the surrender with all the provisions of the Greek 
Constitution. See also ‗EAW and the surrender of nationals in order to be prosecuted‘, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, p. 587, (in Greek). 
414 See the Judgement in Poinikos Logos, 2006, p. 99, (in Greek). 
415 See the judgment of the Court in Poinika Chronika, 2007, p. 597 as well as in Poinikos Logos, 2007, 
p. 368, (both in Greek). The same approach was taken in the cases No. 2310/2007 and No.2030/2007 
both in Greek.  
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argument put by the defence of the requested person was that his surrender to the 
German authorities was unconstitutional because of the application of the article 5 
par.2 and 4 of the Greek Constitution.  
The Supreme Court, once again, stressed that it does not appear from any 
provision of the Constitution that the latter prohibits the surrender of the Greek 
nationals. On the contrary, the Court very interestingly said, that currently this 
prohibition has ‗no reason for existence‘ because the historical reasons of its 
existence, namely that the State was obliged to protect their citizens from the 
difficulties of extraditing them in a foreign judicial system, ‗do not any more exist as 
mistrust between the judicial systems of the EU Member States is unjustifiable‘416.                        
In addition, the Court rejected the claim that there is a constitutional custom according 
to which the Greek State because of the reservations that had made to the previous 
legal instruments on extradition of the Greek nationals was bound not to surrender 
him. The Court said that since the EAW replaced the previous status of extradition 
then such custom does not any more exist, and thus, ordered the surrender of the 
Greek national.  
The last, but not least, interesting case, is case No 558/2007 of 15/03/2007 by the 
Supreme Court
417
. The case concerned an EAW issued by the German judicial 
authorities against a Greek national who was prosecuted for committing the crime of 
tax evasion. The Supreme Court once again reaffirmed its position that there is 
nothing to prevent the surrender of Greek nationals. The Court, very interestingly, 
pointed out that the prohibition of the surrender of Greek nationals does not arise 
either from the Greek Constitution or any provision of the Greek Criminal Procedure 
Law as the provisions on the EAW constitute lex specialis. This is so because 
between the judicial authorities of the Member States of the EU there is mutual trust 
founded on the fundamental Freedoms, while the historic reasons for the prohibition 
of the surrender, namely the obligation of the State to protect its citizens and to 
protect them from an unknown legal environment do not any longer justify such 
prohibition as there is not any mistrust between the European judicial authorities. The 
same approach was followed in two very recent cases, No. 2166/2009
418
 and 
                                                             
416 The same reasoning was stressed by the Supreme Court in the case No. 1066/2007 of 15/05/2007 
where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position.  
417 See the judgment of the Court in Poinika Chronika, 2007, p. 597 as well as in Poinikos Logos, 2007, 
p. 368, (both in Greek). 
418 See the judgment of the Court in Poinika Chronika, 2010, p.684. 
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No.1083/2008
419
, showing that the Supreme Court has, without any doubt, 
consolidated its position.  
From all the afore-discussed cases it is apparent that the Supreme Court, since the 
first operation of the EAW, rejected the expressed constitutional concerns and fears of 
some academics and practitioners. Having the jurisdiction to genuinely interpret the 
provision of the Greek Constitution, the Supreme Court shut the window of 
opportunity on Greek criminals to use the Greek Constitution as an ‗excuse‘ not to be 
surrendered. The Supreme Court is very clear: if a Greek national commits a crime in 
a Member State of the EU then the administration of Justice cannot be obstructed only 
because this person is a Greek national. Therefore, the discussion on the 
constitutionality of the surrender of the Greek nationals remains only on a theoretical 
basis. 
However, one should note that very interestingly the Supreme Court of Greece did 
not follow the same path with the other European –even Constitutional- Courts with 
regard the question of the constitutionality of the surrender of their nationals.                   
As has already been examined in the previous chapter, the Constitutional Courts of 
Poland and Germany as well as the Supreme Court of Cyprus expressed their serious 
concerns, and in fact, their objection regarding the incompatibility of the surrender 
with their Constitution. The result in all these cases was that shortly after the 
judgements, legislative –even constitutional- reforms were introduced in order to 
conform their national law to EU law. 
However, that was not the case in Greece. The Greek Courts since the very first 
leading case on the question of the constitutionality of the surrender of Greek 
nationals did not question the compatibility of surrender with the Greek Constitution 
unlike the other European Courts. Even if the defence was expressing its objections 
by raising the question of the unconstitutionality of the surrender with specific 
provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court as well as the Courts of Appeal 
explicitly rejected all the expressed arguments and fears and strongly supported the 
compatibility with the Constitution of the surrender of the Greek nationals to any EU 
Member State. This, yet, at the same time means that Greece did not have to reform 
its national law and that Greek Courts tried to follow the ECJ‘s approach taken in 
Pupino, namely, to interpret national –even Constitutional- law in conformity with the 
obligations undertaken by Greece under EU law.  
                                                             
419 See the judgment of the Court in Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.350. 
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C. The decision to stay the proceedings in order to ask for additional 
information  
 
Since the operation of the European Arrest Warrant in the Greek legal order there 
have been several cases in which the Supreme Court had to stay the proceedings in 
order to ask from the issuing judicial authority additional information regarding the 
contents of the EAW. A characteristic example is case No.2358/2007 of 
21/12/2007
420
. This case concerned an EAW issued by the judicial authorities of 
Poland against a Polish national in order to prosecute him because he was refusing to 
pay alimony for his children. However, because the alleged crime by the Polish 
judicial authorities is not included in the 32 listed offences for which double 
criminality is abolished the Greek judicial authorities had to verify double criminality 
of the alleged crime committed by the requested person.  
Nevertheless, according to the Greek criminal Code, and in particular to article 
358, such behaviour can constitute a crime only if the obligation of the parent who 
refused to pay alimony is based on a judicial decision. Yet, from the provided 
information by the judicial authorities of Poland it was not evident where the 
obligation of the requested person was arising from. Thus, the Court, applying article 
19 par. 2 of the Greek implementing Law, decided to stay the proceedings for 40 days 
and ask the Polish judicial authorities to provide them with the necessary 
supplementary information.  
 
D. The verification of double criminality 
 
The abolition of double criminality has –in general terms- no implications in the 
judicial cooperation between the Greek judicial authorities and the other EU judicial 
authorities. At the same time, the verification of the double criminality with respect to 
offences not included in the list of the Framework Decision has not yet caused any 
problems as the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal verifies the double 
criminality without facing, up to now, any serious obstacles. Characteristic examples 
                                                             
420 Case not yet reported. The same reasoning was expressed by the Supreme Court in the cases No. 
504/2005 and No. 124/2007, in Greek. 
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are the cases
421
: a. No. 306/2007 in 12/02/2007; b. No.1836/2007 in 12/10/2007; and 
c. No. 382/2008 in 15/02/2008.  
The first case concerned an EAW issued by the French judicial authorities against 
a French national in order to prosecute him for committing, in France, several crimes 
of fraud. The second case concerned an EAW by the Italian judicial authorities 
against a Bulgarian national in order to be prosecuted for committing several 
burglaries. In the third case the Italian authorities asked the Greek judicial authorities 
to surrender an Albanian national in order to prosecute him for crimes related to drug 
trafficking. In all of the above cases the Supreme Court did not find that the abolition 
of the double criminality rule with respect to the listed offences was either 
unconstitutional or an obstacle to the judicial cooperation or incompatible with the 
rights of the accused.  
However, it is interesting to note that in all cases the Supreme Court, even if                
it stresses that for these offences there is no need to verify the double criminality, at 
the same time, it makes a reference in the judgement that the offences in question 
constitute offences also according to the Greek Criminal Code by giving in the 
judgement even the specific provision of the Criminal Code. This, yet, raises 
questions as the essence of the partial abolition of the double criminality with regard 
to the specific offences in that the judge has no need to make such reference since he 
is not expected to verify in its national law the existence of the offence in question.  
In particular, this seems to be contradictory to the Framework Decision.                  
The Courts in their judgement do not have to refer to the specific provision of their 
domestic national law which provides for the punishment of the criminal behaviour as 
the fundamental nature of the abolition of the double criminality regarding the listed 
offences is that the executing judicial authority recognizes, in general terms,                   
the elements of the described in the EAW crime without being necessary to verify 
each time which provision of the Greek law also provides for this crime and what 
punishment that law provides. In other words, such an attitude seems to be an indirect 
verification of the double criminality principle for the listed offences which is 
contrary to both the literal meaning and the spirit of the Framework Decision.  
With respect to the cases which do not fall in the category of the listed offences, 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have shown, in general terms, trust in the 
foreign judicial system and the verification of double criminality has not, up to now, 
                                                             
421 Cases not yet reported.  
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caused any problems to the judicial cooperation. Characteristic examples are the 
recent cases No.2155/2008
422
; and case No.415/2008 in 20/02/2008
423
.                       
The second case, in particular, is the resumption of the afore-mentioned case 
No.2358/2007 regarding the Polish national accused for not paying the alimony to his 
children. The Polish judicial authorities having provided the Greek Supreme Court 
with the required information the latter had to verify the double criminality principle 
because the criminal offence for which the Polish national was requested according to 
the Polish Criminal Code is not included in the list of the Framework Decision. 
The Supreme Court found no difficulty to verify the double criminality as the 
same offence for which the arrest warrant was issued is provided in the Greek 
Criminal Code
424
and thus, the Supreme Court gave its permission to surrender the 
Polish national to the Polish judicial authorities
425
. However, it will be very 
interesting and tempting to see how the Supreme Court will rule in a case where the 
double criminality of the offence for which the EAW is issued is not abolished on the 
one hand, and on the other where this offence does not constitute an offence 
according to the Greek Criminal Code at all or it constitutes the same, but with 
different elements from the one allegedly committed by the requested person.  
 
E. The irrevocability of the decision 
 
As noted earlier of this chapter, the Greek implementing Law requires that in 
order to execute an EAW, the decision on which is based, must be irrevocable
426
 
(contrary to the provision of the Council Framework Decision which requires to be 
final). However, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in order to avoid 
any possible problems arising from this provision of the Greek law seem to adopt the 
afore-expressed view of Mr. Chamilothoris. The given examples are two
427
:                       
(a) case No. 25/2007 of 10/05/2007; and (b) case No.33/2007 of 07/06/2007.                     
In both cases the Court of Appeal of Athens ruled that the condemnatory decision 
must have passed from the all the stages of the essential trial (to be final) and must be 
enforceable according to the law of the issuing State, without it being necessary to be 
                                                             
422 See the judgement in Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.823.  
423 Case not yet reported.  
424 See article 358 of the Greek Criminal Code. 
425 The same approach was taken in another case No.2348/2004. 
426 See Article 2 (1) of the Greek implementing law.  
427 Cases not yet reported.  
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an irrevocable decision. It, therefore, avoided using directly the term irrevocable, but 
preferred to use the stages of the trial as the point of reference. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the recent case No.1594/2007
428
 went even a 
step forward. It clearly stated that even if the Greek implementing law states that the 
EAW should contain the penalty imposed, if there is an irrevocable decision, this does 
not mean that the law requires necessarily referring to an irrevocable decision.                 
It is sufficient if, the Court stated, the issuing State provides the prescribed scale of 
penalties for the offence under its law without being necessary to have in fact an 
irrevocable decision.   
 
F. The guarantees to be given according to article 13 of the Greek                                                                                                                                     
implementing law 
 
Several cases concerned the application of article 13 of the Law 3251/2004. 
Characteristic examples are the recent cases
429
: No.1853/2007 of 15/11/2007 and 
No.382/2008 of 15/02/2008. In both cases, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
issuing EAW State provided sufficient guarantees that the requested person would be 
able to apply for retrial of his case and be present at the judgement. In both cases it 
was also proved by the information given in the EAW that the judicial authorities 
were providing such guarantees, and thus, the Supreme Court ordered the execution of 
the EAW. Nevertheless, it is apparent that whenever the procedural rights of a 
requested person are infringed or may be infringed, then the Supreme Court is not 
willing to close its eyes in order to execute a EAW, but rather it will carefully and 
intensively seek for the reassurance by the issuing State that such rights are fully 
guaranteed.  
 
G. Meaning of the term ‘judicial authority’ 
 
One very interesting case was case No. 1735/2005 of the Supreme Court in 
07/09/2005
430
. This case dealt for the first time with the question of what constitutes a 
judicial authority in the light of article 1 and 2 of the Greek implementing law.           
                                                             
428 See the Judgment in Poinikos Logos, 2007, p.1136, (in Greek). 
429 Cases not yet reported.  
430 See the judgement in Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2006, p. 162 and Poinikos Logos, 2005, p. 1696, (both in 
Greek). 
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The facts of the case were -in summary- the following: The Danish Ministry of 
Justice, being the competent authority to issue an EAW according to the Danish law 
433/10.6.2003 which implemented the Framework Decision on the EAW, issued an 
EAW against a Danish national in order to be prosecuted in Denmark for four, in 
total, offences. However, the Greek Court of Appeal while deciding on the execution 
of the warrant in question, refused to execute it. The reason was that the EAW can be 
issued only by ‗judicial authorities‘ which means that it cannot be issued by any 
police or governmental executive authorities such as the Ministry of Justice even               
if this has been designated as the competent authority to issue an EAW.                
Therefore, the Court of Appeal refused the surrender because, otherwise, that would 
violate the Greek legal order as being contrary to the fundamental constitutional 
principle of the separation of Powers.  
Nevertheless, the Public Prosecutor acting in accordance with art. 22 of the Greek 
implementing law, appealed in front of the Supreme Court in order to annul the 
judgement of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed with the opinion of 
the Court of Appeal and ordered the execution of the EAW. The invoked reasoning 
was that ‗according to the Greek law and in the light of an effective co-operation for 
the fight against crime in the EU, as a single judicial area, and of the existing 
differentiation of the legal systems of the Member States, since there is not, in the 
present stage, harmonisation of national laws, it is left only upon to the issuing the 
EAW State to designate the competent authority to issue the EAW and not to the 
executing State to decide whether this authority is, in fact, ‗judicial‘ or not‘. 
Therefore, the Court stated that, in accordance with the Framework Decision, the 
legal characterization of the foreign authority as being ‗judicial‘ belongs only to the 
issuing State
431
. On the contrary, the executing judicial authority has to refuse to 
execute the warrant only if the conditions of issuing the warrant, associated with the 
issuing authority of the Member State, violate fundamental constitutional provisions, 
which are related with the human rights of the requested person.  
However, such approach taken from the Supreme Court of Greece seems to ignore 
that one the main innovations of the Council Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant is the removal of the possibility of political involvement from the 
surrender proceedings. This means that the execution of the European Arrest Warrants 
                                                             
431 The same exactly approach was followed in the recent case No. 2252/08, published in Poinika 
Chronika, 2009, p.829 and in the case No. 819/2008, in Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.159. 
127 
 
is simply only a judicial process under the supervision of the national judicial 
authority which is, inter alia, responsible for ensuring the respect of fundamental 
rights. Therefore, since the designation of an organ of the State as a judicial body, 
impacts on fundamental principles upon which mutual recognition and mutual trust 
are based
432
, this organ cannot be the Ministry of Justice. It is felt, accordingly,             
that the Supreme Court should have followed the opinion of the Court of Appeal and 
should have refused the execution of the Danish EAW; in any event it is felt that the 
Greek judicial authorities may examine the law of the issuing State and especially the 
provisions for the sufficient respect of fundamental rights.  
 
H. Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, all the aforementioned cases suggest that the EAW is, in practical 
terms, operational and effective. Greek Judges are, in general terms, willing to 
accommodate and facilitate the execution of an EAW through interpreting Greek law 
in the light of EU law. On the contrary, it is apparent that Greek courts refuse to 
execute an EAW mainly in cases where the crime has been committed partly or 
mainly in the Greek territory by a Greek national. This, yet, suggests that the Greek 
judicial authorities do have trust, in general, in foreign legal systems as it is evident 
that, unlike other judicial authorities, they have not refused the surrender of Greek 
nationals due to the Greek Constitution. Also, they have not followed the scepticism 
expressed in other -even Constitutional- judicial systems or the criticism made by 
some Greek academics.  
This, yet, further suggests that -at the same time- the Greek Courts are in the same 
line with the ECJ ruling on the case of Gozutok
433
where the Luxembourg Court, as 
has already been thoroughly examined in the previous chapter, stated that ‗there is a 
necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal 
justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other 
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were 
                                                             
432 See also Commission Staff Working document, Annex to the report from the Commission, where the 
Commission is critical on this issue by stating that the Framework Decision ‗does not define what a 
judicial authority is, this question being left to the national law of Member States. Whilst  it  is 
understood  that  the Minister of  Justice  is designated by national Danish  law as being a  judicial 
authority,  it  is difficult  to view such a designation as being in the spirit of the Framework Decision‘.  
SEC (2005) 267, Brussels, 23.02.2005, p.13. 
433 See the joined cases C – 187/01 ‗Gozutok and Brugge‘ C – 385/01 of 11 February 2003.  
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applied‘. Nevertheless, one should not ignore that the Greek Courts in several cases 
have been critical as to the conformity of the Greek implementing law with the 
Council Framework Decision.  
On the other hand, it is also very interesting to note that neither the Courts of 
Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Greece make in their judgements any explicit 
reference to the ECJ rulings. In fact, they might be almost in line with the ECJ 
rulings, but without making use in their decisions of the judgements of the 
Luxembourg Court. In particular, it is notable that unlike to other European Supreme 
Courts, the Greek Supreme Court in all of its judgements has not ever made any 
explicit use of the most popular case of Pupino
434
.  
However, one should not ignore that the Greek Courts, following impliedly the 
reasoning of Pupino, are trying to interpret the Greek national law in conformity to 
the EU law as well as to the ECJ judgements even if they do not make any explicit 
reference and even if the implementation of the Greek law by the Greek Legislator 
has limited the scope for judicial discretion. In addition, it is important to note that the 
Greek Courts, following once again the Pupino as well as the very recent case of 
‗Advocaten voor de Wereld‘435, expressly have stated that both EU law and the 
national application of EU law will be interpreted, each time, in the light of human 
rights principles. This is an inviolable rule for the Greek Courts which makes apparent 
that the Greek Judges are prepared to check each time the compatibility of the 
execution of any EAW with fundamental rights. It seems that if there is any doubt that 
the execution of an EAW may violate any of the fundamental rights then the Greek 
Judges will refuse its execution. This attitude, yet, sends at the same time a strong 
message to those Greek practitioners who have been critical about the Supreme Court 
accusing it as being a Euro-blinded Court which follows faithfully the directions given 
by Brussels
436
, and thus, possibly, not sufficiently protecting fundamental rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
434 Case C-105/03, ‗Pupino‘, [2005] ECR I-5285, 16/06/2005. 
435 Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3 May 2007. 
436 Interview with Mr. Vgontzas in 02/05/2008. 
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IX. Conclusion 
 
The principle of mutual recognition has been an issue which provoked a very 
controversial debate in the Greek public opinion. Its only application, namely the 
European Arrest Warrant, has caused several reactions and concerns mainly with 
regard to the question of the constitutionality of its operation in the Greek legal order 
and its conformity with the sufficient protection of fundamental rights.                          
The parliamentary discussion on the implementation of the Council Framework 
Decision proved that the EAW was, in fact, a very sensitive issue, but which, at the 
end, successfully passed through the parliamentary voting.  
Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that the Greek implementing law is 
generally a copy and paste of the Council Framework Decision
437
 without having at 
the same time changes in the criminal code as well as the criminal procedure code. 
This yet may, in practice, cause problems in the operation of the EAW. In particular, 
it is felt that practitioners may face problems while handling the EAW in practice as it 
is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the law and practices that apply in respect of the 
EAW
438
. To that end, it is felt that an amendment of the implementing law is required, 
with the active participation of the practitioners, in order to give to the Framework 
Decision complete validity and eliminate any possible contradiction with the rest of 
the Greek criminal law. This, in particular, is needed as to the grounds for refusal and 
the list of offences covered and not by the abolition of the principle of double 
criminality
439
. It is also important to reconsider the strict time limits for the right to 
Appeal in front of the Supreme Court
440
 as well as to specify the maximum period of 
the duration of the temporary transfer of the requested person to the issuing State
441
.  
In addition, the way that the Council Framework Decision has been implemented 
in the Greek legal order has been, in some cases, problematic. In particular, this has 
happened in the implementation of the grounds of refusal where the Greek Legislator 
has transformed some optional grounds of refusal to mandatory ones as well as it has 
added some other which, however, are not provided in the originally adopted Council 
                                                             
437 See the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
438 Ibid. The Council is also suggesting that in order to remedy this situation, it would be advisable that 
practitioners be invited to take part in  producing written guidelines providing detailed guidance on 
how the Greek implementing law should be applied in practice. 
439 See also ibid. 
440 See art. 22 par. 1 of the Law 3251/2004. 
441 See art. 23 par. 4 of the Law 3251/2004. 
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Framework Decision. This, as has already been seen, is not only contrary to the 
Council Framework Decision, but also seriously eliminates the judicial discretion 
which, in turn, is not in line to the spirit of the EU Legislator who wanted to leave 
upon the national judge the power and discretion to decide on the application of the 
grounds of refusal. It also can make on the one hand the operation of the EAW very 
ineffective and on the other it can make it easier for the criminals to choose the most 
‗convenient‘ legal environment for their illegal activities. It should, therefore, have 
been chosen, while implementing the Framework Decision, instead of restricting the 
judicial discretion, to keep the grounds for refusal as optional which would mean that 
the judicial authorities, being the depositary of the fundamental principles and 
guarantees of the equitable State, would be more able to facilitate more effectively the 
purposes and goals of the EAW and hence would be more able to contribute to the 
creation of a common EU Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Nonetheless, the Greek Courts have, in practice, rejected all the fears and 
concerns expressed by both practitioners and academics by efficiently 
accommodating the operation of the EAW and by stating as clearly as possible that its 
application constitutes the ‗passport‘ through which a final criminal decision of a 
judicial authority of a Member State asserts its free movement between the Member 
States
442
. Greek judges have, in fact, tried to find explanatory ways in order to fully 
accommodate the EAW imperatives within the framework of the protection of 
fundamental rights and the Greek Constitution even if there is a significant lack of 
specialization and training of judges with regard to the operation of the European 
Arrest Warrant
443
. This, yet, leads to one main conclusion, which is that the EAW has 
positively passed and without serious problems, as happened in other EU Member 
States, the test for the operation of the principle of mutual recognition in the judicial 
cooperation in criminal matter in the enlarged EU. The effectiveness of the operation 
of the EAW in the Greek legal order can be gauged also from the figures presented in 
annex (4) of this thesis.  
At the same time, the Greek implementing law and its application in the Greek 
Jurisdiction suggest that the relation between EU law and Greek law is closely linked. 
Even if an explicit reference to the ECJ case law has been avoided, it is apparent that 
the Greek Courts follow the principles which arose from the Court of Luxembourg.                
                                                             
442 See the Judgment No. 25/2007 of the Court of Appeal of Athens in 10/05/2007. Case not yet 
reported. 
443 See the ‗Evaluation Report – Report on Greece‘, id. 2008. 
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This, further, suggests that Greece supports and facilitates the effort for a common 
European judicial area in the field of criminal law. While, as discussed in chapter one, 
other EU Member States were seriously challenging the validity and the legality of 
the EAW as well as their national Constitutional Courts were challenging its operation 
in regard to the constitutionality of the surrender of their own nationals and the 
protection of fundamental rights, the Greek case proves that these matters did not 
concern Greece and that the latter was trying to facilitate the EU requirements. 
However, this support is not unlimited or unconditional.  
In particular, it is apparent that, despite the general success of the operation of the 
principle of mutual recognition, further steps are required to be taken in order to 
accomplish the goal of creating an EU area of Freedom, Security and Justice.            
Issues related to the absolute protection of human rights are closely linked to Greek 
national sovereignty and, thus, will play a key role in the development of the 
implementation in Greece of EU criminal law. In that framework, it is felt that not 
only the application of the principle of mutual recognition, but also any instrument or 
principle which is related to the field of criminal law, will have its boundaries in the 
guarantee that these measures are accompanied by the effective protection of human 
rights. If this condition is not sufficiently guaranteed then, it is expected that serious 
objections will be raised by Greece as to the proposed or adopted measure and its 
application. It also seems that the Greek legal order requires -in the short term-              
that EU will, urgently, focus its interest in the adoption of common rules for the rights 
of the suspected and of the accused.   
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Chapter 
3 
‘Harmonization of Substantive Criminal Laws in Europe’ 
 
       
I. Introduction 
Harmonization of criminal laws in Europe has been an issue which has raised 
a very intensive and controversial debate. The discussion was until recently 
limited due to the fact that it was questioned whether criminal law falls within the 
Community‘s sphere of competence and/or within the exclusive competence of 
Member States.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam gave harmonization a significant boost as article 31 
of the Treaty urged the Member States to approximate their criminal law 
provisions with a view to improving mutual co-operation in criminal affairs.            
At the same time, the European Court of Justice played a very significant role 
through its jurisdiction to the evolution of EU criminal law. Also, the Treaty of 
Lisbon constitutes a very significant step for the enhancement of the adopted 
harmonized criminal laws and their effective application in the various national 
legal orders. 
In this context, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the main issues 
regarding harmonization of only substantive criminal laws in Europe.                        
In particular, it will be starting the analysis by looking at the evolution of 
harmonization throughout the fundamental Treaties of Europe. It will then go to 
examine the competence of the European Community to define criminal offences 
and impose criminal sanctions by examining, in particular, the two famous cases 
regarding the protection of the Environment and Ship-Source Pollution.  
The analysis will then focus on the competence of the European Union to 
adopt substantive criminal law by using as examples the following three areas:    
(a) the fight against terrorism; (b) the fight against organized crime; and                   
(c) the fight against money laundering. These areas have been chosen on the basis 
that they are very serious offences with prominent threats on security, they have 
largely a transnational element and they constitute the most representative cases of 
the substantive EU criminal law which have significant importance and effect on 
the domestic national law, on the protection of fundamental rights, and for which 
the obstacle of double criminality has been overcome. 
 
133 
 
II. Harmonization of Criminal Law in Europe 
Harmonization of criminal law in the European Community and European Union 
has been for many years –and still remains- a very controversial and much debated 
issue, as it involves a very complex process of harmonizing systems in the very 
sensitive field of national criminal law
444
. Beginning from the creation of an 
economically integrated Europe which is based on the internal market
445
 and its free 
circulation across open borders, transnational crime has gradually become one of the 
main focuses of the European Community and the European Union, as there is 
common concern between Member States for the emergence of areas of criminality 
that affects the interests of the EU.  
The development of this fastest-growing area of EU law can be divided into three 
main steps
446
: (a) the period before the Treaty of Maastricht; (b) the period of 
evolution from the Maastricht Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam and beyond;                
(c) the very significant changes that have emerged due to the Treaty of Lisbon which 
has already entered into force. These steps will be –in summary- discussed in the 
following section in order one to appraise the function of harmonization towards an 
EU criminal law.  
a. Before the Treaty of Maastricht 
Before the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in general terms, the European 
Communities did not have any express competence in the area of criminal law and 
criminal procedure as this field was regarded to be lying at the very core of national 
sovereignty and, thus, was left outside the scope of the EEC
447
. However, there was           
a general understanding that the gradual development of the EU internal market with 
the abolition of borders in 1980‘s on the one hand, and the rapid development of 
transnational crime on the other, strengthened the need for a much closer cooperation 
                                                             
444 See Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‗The European Union and Penal Law‘, European Law Journal, Vol. 4, 
No. 1, March 1998, pp. 87–115. 
445 For the operation of harmonization in the internal market see Dougan, ‗Minimum Harmonization 
and the Internal Market‘, Vol. 37, Common Market Law Review, (2000), p.853. 
446 See Peter-Alexis Albrecht and Stefan Braum, ‗Deficiencies in the Development of European 
Criminal Law‘, European Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 293–310. Also, Valsamis 
Mitsilegas, ‗EU Criminal Law‘, Oxford and Portland, 2009, pp 107-110. For the regimes and sources 
of European Criminal Law see Christopher Harding, ‗Exploring the intersection of European Law and 
National Criminal Law‘, European Law Review, 2000, 25(4), 374-390. 
447 For an early discussion see Janet M. Dine, ‗European Community Criminal Law?‘, Criminal Law 
Review, 1993, pp.246-254.  
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between the Member States regarding the new areas of criminality that, however, 
significantly affected their common interests
448
.   
In fact, the only early provision related to criminal law is to be found in the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community at article 194 (1) which 
imposed a duty to Member States to prosecute anyone within its jurisdiction who 
infringed his duties and his obligation for professional secrecy
449
.                        
However, cooperation between Member States did exist also outside the EU 
framework. Characteristics are the examples of cooperation within the 
intergovernmental framework of the Council of Europe which had led to the adoption 
of criminal law instruments that had an influence to some extent to the internal EU 
law
450
 as well as the example of the establishment of TREVI, an intergovernmental 
network of national officials set up by the Rome European Council in 1975
451
,           
having as its main focus the fight against terrorism. However, when the Treaty of the 
EU entered into force all these arrangements were absorbed into the institutional 
framework of the Union
452
. 
Yet, all these efforts reveal that although EC did not have any official competence 
in the area of criminal law as it was left outside the Treaties
453
, Member States were 
concerned that the problems caused by transnational crimes and crimes against the 
interests of the Community would be an unavoidable factor justifying further 
initiatives on the field of criminal law.  
 
b. The Treaty of Maastricht 
In 1992, Member States went a step forward and put a new legal basis regarding 
their legal relations by creating the European Union
454
. The new model of cooperation 
between Member States was founded on the European Communities
455
 and was built 
                                                             
448 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, pp 05-57. See also V. Mitsilegas, J Monar and W. Rees, ‗The 
European Union and Internal Security‘, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp 19-22.  
449 See for an early discussion of criminal law in the EC, J.W. Bridge, ‗The European Communities and 
the Criminal Law‘, The Criminal Law Review, 1976, pp 88-97. 
450 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, pp 05-57. 
451 A further prominent example is the Schengen Agreement 1985, which was supplemented by the 
Schengen Implementing Convention 1990.  
452 See Estella Baker and Christopher Harding, ‗From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal 
study of the third pillar‘, 2009, European Law Review, p.2. 
453 See the 8th report of Activities of the Commission in 1974 where it is noted that criminal law ‗is a 
subject which does not as such enter the Community‘s sphere of competence, but remains within the 
province of each Member State‘.  
454 OJ 1992 C 191. For an overview analysis of Treaty see D. Curtin, ‗The Constitutional Structure of 
the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces‘, Common Market Law Review, vol. 30, 1993, pp17-69. 
455 See article 1 of the TEU. 
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on the so-called ‗three pillar‘ structure which was in fact the most striking feature of 
the TEU
456
.The rationale of creating the three pillars structure was that Member States 
wanted a more systematic and established mechanism of cooperation in the fields of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as in Justice and Home Affairs
457
. 
It was, in fact, the first time that the European Union had an official competence 
in the field of Justice and Home Affairs which included inter alia judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters
458
. In order to enforce this new European cooperation, Member 
States created new legal instruments which included ‗Joint Positions‘, ‗Joint Actions‘, 
and ‗European Conventions‘. Although the Treaty of Maastricht did not change the 
idea that criminal law is a matter which belongs not to the European Community,    
but to the sphere and competence of the Member States, the creation of the third 
pillar, undoubtedly, resulted in the establishment and improvement of the cooperation 
of Member States in criminal cases.  
In practical terms, the Union adopted Conventions harmonizing substantive 
criminal law regarding for example fraud against the EU budget
459
, as well as Joint 
Actions harmonizing, for example, drug trafficking
460
, organized crime
461
, racism and 
xenophobia
462
, money laundering
463
 and other types of international crime. However, 
as Valsamis Mitsilegas notes, the powers given to the Union to exercise the 
competence in the field of Justice and Home Affairs remained limited and unclear
464
. 
This weakness of the operation of the third pillar was discussed in the 
intergovernmental conference on the review of the TEU
465
 resulting in the new Treaty 
of Amsterdam. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
456 See Stephen Weatherill, ‗Cases and Materials on EU Law‘, 2007, Oxford, pp 04-11.  
457 See Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, ‗EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials‘, Fourth Edition, 2008, 
Oxford, pp 14-20. 
458 See article K.1 (7) of TEU. 
459 See the Council Act of 26 July 1995. OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995. 
460 See the 96/750/JHA Joint Action of 17 December 1996. OJ L 342, 31.12.1996, p. 6–8. 
461 See the 98/733/JHA Joint action of 21 December 1998. OJ L 351, 29.12.1998, p. 1–3. 
462 See the Joint action/96/443/JHA of 15 July 1996. OJ L 185 of 24.07.1996.  
463 See the 98/699/JHA Joint Action of 3 December 1998. OJ L 333, 9.12.1998, p. 1–3. 
464 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, pp 09-11. See also P.C. Muller-Graff, ‗The Legal bases of the 
Third Pillar and its Position in the framework of the Union Treaty‘, Common Market Law Review, 
vol.31, 1994, p.509. 
465 See the General Report of 1997. 
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c. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
Having in mind both the obvious weakness of the third pillar and the increasing 
challenges for the Member States in areas such as organized crime, drug-trafficking, 
money laundering and other areas of international crime, the experts participating in 
the 1996/1997 intergovernmental conference agreed on the need to improve and 
optimize the decision-making in the third pillar, as well as to introduce new objectives 
and instruments in order to improve effectiveness and accountability
466
, although  
there were different opinions on the question whether this could be achieved by 
further ‗communitarization‘467. 
Nevertheless, the result, after long negotiations, was to sign of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in October 1997
468
, a Treaty which significantly intensified the 
development started through the Treaty of Maastricht. One of the main innovations of 
this new Treaty was that the third pillar itself contained a new and stronger model of 
cooperation between the Member States by including provisions on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and having as its objective the creation of an 
‗Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice‘.  
Furthermore, particular targets mentioned were
469
: organized crime, terrorism, 
trafficking in persons, drug and arms trafficking, corruption and fraud. All these aims 
were to be achieved, among others, through: [a] the approximation of rules on 
criminal matters in the Member States. Also, article 34 TEU
470
 introduced new tools 
for the effective cooperation of the Member States under the framework of the third 
                                                             
466 See Neil Walker, ‗Justice and Home Affairs‘, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1998, 
pp 01-05. See also J.Monar, ‗European Union – Justice and Home Affairs; a Balance Sheet and an 
Agenda for Reform‘, in G. Edwards and A. Pijpers (Eds), The Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (1997), pp.326-339. 
467 See R. Bieber, ‗The Third Pillar and the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference‘, in R. Bieber and J. 
Monar (eds), ‗Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union, European Interuniversity Press, 
Brussels, pp. 383-390. See also D. O‘Keeffe, ‗Recasting the Third Pillar‘, Common Market Law 
Review, 1995, Vol.32, pp. 893-920. Also see the ‗Progress Report on the Intergovernmental 
Conference of 17 June 1996‘ (doc. CONF 3860/1/96 REV 1). See also Jorg Monar, ‗Justice and home 
affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: reform at the price of fragmentation‘, European Law Review, 
1998, p.321. 
468 The Treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. See the original text: OJ C340 of 10 November 1997. 
See also Alan Dashwood, ‗European Community Legislative Procedures after Amsterdam‘, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 1, 1998, pp.25-38. 
469 As Steve Peers suggests EU has not itself the aim of harmonizing all national substantive criminal 
law but, rather, concerns itself with certain listed crimes, although the lists in Articles 29 and 31 (e) are 
both expressly non-exhaustive. See S. Peers, ‗EU Justice and Home Affairs Law‘, second edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 382-387. 
470 Ex-article K.6.  
137 
 
pillar
471
, including the Framework Decisions as well as the ECJ was given jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings inter alia on the validity and interpretation of Framework 
Decisions and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing 
them
472
.  
 
d. From the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Tampere European Council,  the Hague 
Programme and the Stockholm Programme 
 
Shortly after the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European 
Council in 1999 organized a special meeting in Tampere, where the Council 
expressed its determination to make full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. At the same time the Council sent a strong political message to 
reaffirm the importance of this objective and agreed on a number of policy 
orientations and priorities which would speedily make this area a reality
473
.  
For the purposes of this chapter it is important to note that the European Council 
in this meeting also expressed the view that with regard to national criminal law, 
Member States should give efforts to agree on common definitions, incriminations 
and sanctions which would be focused in the first instance on a limited number of 
sectors of particular relevance, such as financial crime, drugs trafficking etc.                
Also the Council called in its Conclusions for the approximation of criminal law and 
procedures on money laundering
474
. Since then, the EU has mainly used Framework 
Decisions, rather than any other instrument, to achieve all these goals.  
The European Council in November 2004 endorsed the so-called                      
‗Hague Programme‘, a five-year programme for closer co-operation in Justice and 
Home Affairs from 2005 to 2010. With regard to harmonization, in the plan 
implementing the Hague Programme, there is a specific reference concerning the fight 
against organized crime; proposals on counterfeiting as well as trafficking in persons, 
                                                             
471 For an evaluation of the reforms which the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced see Jorg Monar, id. 
1998, pp. 320-335. See also Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, ‗EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials‘, 
Fourth Edition, 2008, Oxford, pp 229-267. 
472 See article 35 TEU (ex-article K.7). See also Albertina Albors – Llorens, ‗Changes in the 
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice under the Treaty of Amsterdam‘, Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 35, 1998, pp. 1273-1294.  
473 See the Introduction of the Tampere European Council - Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 
October 1999. 
474 See par. 55 of the Presidency Conclusions. 
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fraud, and other types of international crime
475
.  Yet, the European Council on 1 
December 2009 adopted the successor to the Hague Programme, the so-called 
Stockholm Programme
476
, setting out the priorities for 2010-2014 for the EU. 
However, it is noteworthy that in this Programme, as noted in chapter one, the 
principle of mutual recognition is fully promoted, whereas harmonization will be used 
only where ‗necessary to facilitate mutual recognition‘477.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
475 See point 3.3 of the Hague Programme. OJ C 198/15 of 12/08/2005.  
476 See the ‗Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens‘, 
Brussels, 02/12/2009, 17024/09.  
477 See id. Point 3.1.1. 
139 
 
III. The competence of the European Community to define criminal 
offences and impose criminal sanctions 
 
The debate on the question of the competence of the European Community in the 
field of criminal law has been long-standing with different and often conflicting 
expressed views. This vagueness is reasonable if one takes into account the absence in 
the Treaty establishing the European Community of any explicit reference on the 
competence of the Community regarding criminal law
478
. Even after the introduction 
of the third pillar through the Treaty of Maastricht and the expressly Union‘s 
competence in criminal law matters, the EC remained without an explicit competence 
to define criminal offences and impose criminal sanctions. 
Nevertheless, in a number of cases the European Court of Justice has 
demonstrated that criminal law interacts with the implementation and application of 
Community Law. One of the prime examples is the right to free movement where the 
Court inter alia stated that
479: ‗In principle, criminal legislation and the rules of 
criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are still responsible. 
However, it is clear from a consistent line of cases decided by the Court,                     
that Community law also sets certain limits in that area as regards the control 
measures which it permits the Member States to maintain in connection with the free 
movement of goods and persons‘. As, thus, it is evident, the European Court since 
1981 based on the principle of proportionality placed specific limits regarding the 
application of national criminal law, in cases where the latter would have diverse 
effect to the Community Law rights or where it deemed necessary for the effective 
application of Community Law
480
.  
Nevertheless, since then, there have been expressed opposing views that could be 
categorized in two main bands: (a) the one supporting that the European Community 
is not competent as regards criminal law matters; and (b) the other one arguing that 
the European Community has competence insofar as being a necessary means to 
enforce Community law
481
.  
                                                             
478 See V. Mitsilegas, ‗Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal 
law‘, European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 8, 2006, p. 302. 
479 Case Casati, referred to Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p.61. 
480 Ibid, p. 62.  
481 For a discussion of these two different approaches see Martin Wasmeier and Nadine Thwaites, ‗The 
"battle of the pillars": does the European Community have the power to approximate national criminal 
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The supporters of the first band taking the ‗literal‘ view of the Treaties argue             
–in summary- that since there is no any explicit provision in the TEC on criminal law,           
it is meant that the latter is not included in the purposes of the European Community, 
and thus, the Community has no competence to harmonize national criminal law as 
this falls out with the Community‘s competence. On the other hand, those in favour of 
Community competence to define criminal law and to impose criminal sanctions 
argue that criminal law should not be considered as a policy that is separate from the 
Community policies, but rather as a means to achieve these. In that sense they argue 
that the Community can ask Member States to use criminal law in order to enforce 
Community law as well as to safeguard the integrity of the Community‘s legal 
order
482
.  
Nevertheless, this debate was often accompanied by the European Commission 
arguing that the Community does have competence in the field of criminal law              
in order to ensure the achievement of Community‘s objectives. A characteristic 
example
483
 of this approach was the first Money Laundering Directive which was 
adopted in 1991
484
. During the negotiations, the European Commission in its proposal 
expressed its view that criminalizing money laundering by Member States ‗is not only 
a necessary repressive means of combating money laundering, but also a previous 
prerequisite for cooperation between financial institutions and judicial or law 
enforcement authorities‘485. The same approach was taken in all the following Money 
Laundering Directives in 2001 and 2005, namely after the introduction of the third 
                                                             
482 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p.65. See also ibid.  
483 Another example is the so-called Corpus Juris, a funded project by the Commission regarding the 
fight against the financial interests of the Community and proposing the establishment a new European 
criminal code for the detection, investigation, and prosecution of offences affecting the financial 
interests of the Community.
 
However, the very optimistic project of the Corpus Juris was not finally 
incorporated in the legal order of the European Community. See M. Delmas- Marty and J.A.E. 
Vervaele, ‗The implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States‘, vol.1, Antwerp, Interentia, 
2000. Also see M. Delmas – Marty, ‗Guest Editorial: Combating Fraud – Neccesity, Legitimacy, and 
Feasibility of the Corpus Juris‘, Common Market Law Review, vol.37, 2000, pp. 247-256.  Also, J.R. 
Spencer, ‗The Corpus Juris Project and the Fight against Budgetary Fraud‘, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, vol. 1, 1998, pp.77-106. Also, the 9th Report of the House of Lords, European 
Communities Committee, on ‗Prosecuting fraud on the Communities‘ finances – The Corpus Juris‘, of 
26 May 1999, Session 1998-99 as well as the criticism on this Report by J.R. Spencer, ‗The Corpus 
Juris Project –Has it a future?‘, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 2, 1999, pp.355-
367. 
484 See the Council Directive 91/308/EEC of June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money laundering, OJ L 166 of 28 June 1991. However, money laundering will be 
examined in detail further on this chapter. 
485 See the Proposal for a Council Directive on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering, COM 90 - 106 Final of 23 March 1990. 
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pillar, which led, as Valsamis Mitsilegas correctly notes, to a de facto criminalization 
of money laundering in the Member States of the EU
486
. 
Nevertheless, there were a number of cases –in particular, after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam- where tools of the third pillar were used in combination with tools of the 
first pillar in order to achieve Community‘s objectives487. The logic behind this 
strategy was that for the effective application of specific policies of the Community,   
it was necessary to adopt also criminal law measures, but it was unclear whether these 
could be taken under the framework of the first pillar. Given the constitutional 
implications in the structure of the European Union and the European Community as 
well as the reluctance of the Member States to give to the Community any 
competence in criminal matters, it has been chosen to use tools from both the first and 
the third pillars: (a) a first pillar Directive which describes the regulated subject 
matter; and (b) a third pillar Framework Decision which specifies that the regulated 
matter under the Directive constitutes also a criminal offence under the framework of 
the third pillar and also determines the imposed criminal sanctions
488
.  
Yet, this path lead the European Court of Justice to intervene, as it was called to 
rule on the legality of one adopted under this framework measure challenged by the 
Commission. Also, the Court, in another case, was called to rule on the legality of 
another measure taken by the Council exclusively under the third pillar. Both cases 
gave to the European Court a very significant opportunity to distinguish the 
relationship between EU and EC law regarding criminal law, hence to give answers to 
very controversial and hotly debated substantial constitutional issues on which there 
has been no precedent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
486 See Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 67.  
487 See G.J.M. Corstens, ‗Criminal Law in the First Pillar?‘, European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law, and Criminal Justice, Vol. 11/1, 2003, pp.131-144. 
488 See Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p.69.  
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a.  The case regarding the protection of the Environment 
 
In 1998 the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on the protection of the 
Environment through criminal law
489
 which was the first international convention 
using criminal law for the prevention of environmental violations
490
. A few years 
later, on the 27
th
 January 2003, the Council adopted a third pillar Framework Decision 
2003/80 JHA on the protection of the environment through criminal law provisions
491
.  
The Commission reacting to the Council‘s choice to adopt criminal law measures 
in a field which was regarded to belong to the Community‘s objectives brought an 
action challenging the legality of the Framework Decision and seeking its annulment 
as not being the appropriate legal instrument by which to require Member States to 
introduce sanctions of a criminal nature at national level as well.  
The European Court of Justice sitting as the Grand Chamber, in its judgment
492
, 
ruled in favour of the Commission and annulled the Framework Decision.                 
Using articles 29 and 47 TEU it stressed that nothing in the TEU is to affect the TEC.                                         
The Court, then, went on to examine the aim of the Framework Decision and whether 
it fell within the objectives of the Community‘s policy regarding the protection of the 
environment. In that respect, it concluded that ‗it is clear both from its title and from 
its first three recitals that its objective is the protection of the environment‘493.  
Furthermore, the Court recalled that as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the 
rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community‘s competence494.               
However, it went a step further by stating that this finding does not prevent the 
Community Legislature, when the ‗application of effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential 
measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking measures which 
relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary in order 
to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully 
                                                             
489 For the protection of the environment through criminal law see M. Faure and G. Heine, ‗Criminal 
Enforcement of Environmental Law in the European Union‘, Comparative Environmental Law and 
Policy Series, 2005, pp.1-90. See also Francoise Comte and Ludwig Kramer, ‗Environmental Crime in 
Europe‘, Europa Law Publishing, 2004.  
490 See the ‗Convention on the protection of the Environment through Criminal law‘, Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg, 04/11/1998. 
491 See the ‗Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 17 January 2003 on the protection of 
environment through criminal law‘, O.J L 29/55 of 05/02/2003. 
492 See Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, of 13 September 2005.  
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effective‘495. The Court, thus, concluded that, on account of both their aim and their 
content, articles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision have as their main purpose the 
protection of the environment and they could have been properly adopted on the basis 
of article 175 EC
496
. In those circumstances, the entire Framework Decision infringed 
article 47 TEU as it encroached on the powers which article 175 EC confers on the 
Community
497
, and thus, the Framework Decision was annulled
498
. 
On the one hand, it is questionable whether the decision by the European Court of 
Justice extends far beyond the sphere of environmental law
499
 as an example of the 
question of distribution of competences between the first and third pillars
500
.
 
                   
On the other hand, it is undoubted that this judgment confirmed the primacy of EC 
law over EU law
501
 as well as that it has been a landmark decision
502
in the sense that 
for the first time the Court explicitly recognized competence to the Community to 
require from Member States to adopt and impose criminal sanctions in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the Community policies
503
.  
In fact, the Court interpreted the Treaties creatively
504
 in order to establish such 
criminal competence to the Community. This is of great importance if one considers 
that traditionally criminal law has been a core element of national sovereignty of 
Member States. However, what was clear due to this judgment is that in the battle of 
the pillars
505
, the Community seems to be the winner: if a measure is to be adopted 
aiming at the achievement of a Community objective, in particular, even through the 
imposition of criminal sanctions, then the Community will have the competence to 
determine what means (even criminal) are necessary to achieve this objective. This is 
more evident if one considers that this judgment resulted in the adoption of the 
                                                             
495 Ibid par. 48.  
496 Ibid par. 51.  
497 Ibid par. 53.  
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499 See point 6 of the ‗Communication on the implications of the Court's judgment of September 13‘, 
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505 Martin Wasmeier and Nadine Thwaites, ‗The "battle of the pillars": does the European Community 
have the power to approximate national criminal laws?‘, European Law Review, 2004, vol. 24, p. 613. 
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Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008
506
 regulating the protection of the 
environment through criminal law and significantly contributing to the more effective 
implementation of environmental protection policy at EU level. 
 
b. The case regarding ‗Ship-Source Pollution‘ 
 
Almost two years after the delivery of the judgment in the environmental case, the 
Court of Justice was called once again to rule on the question of competence of the 
European Community in criminal law matters. This time the case concerned            
ship-source pollution
507
. In particular, the Commission took an initiative to take legal 
proceedings and annul the Council Framework Decision on strengthening the criminal 
law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution
508
                 
as according to the view of the Commission, this infringed article 47 of the TEU.                
According to the Commission, the Community is empowered to require Member 
States to provide for penalties –including, if appropriate, criminal penalties–                 
at national level, where this proves necessary in order to achieve a Community 
objective and this was the case with regard to questions of ship-source pollution.  
The Court of Justice, as in its judgment in the environmental case, began its 
syllogism by referring to articles 29 and 47 TEU and by examining whether the 
Framework Decision could have been adopted on the basis of the EC powers
509
.           
It then found that the provisions laid down in the contested Framework Decision 
relate to conduct which is likely to cause particularly serious environmental damage 
as a result, in this case, of the infringement of the Community rules on maritime 
safety
510
. However, and contrary to the submission of the Commission,                          
the determination of the type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied, 
according to the Court‘s view, did not fall within the Community‘s sphere of 
competence
511
. It followed that the Community could not adopt provisions such as 
articles 4 and 6 of Framework Decision, since these articles relate to the type and 
level of the applicable criminal penalties. Consequently, those provisions were not 
                                                             
506 See Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328, 06.12.2008, p. 28-37. 
507 See Case C-440/05 of 23/10/2007.  
508 See the Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005. OJ L 255/164 of 30/09/2005. 
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adopted in infringement of Article 47 EU
512
. Nevertheless, articles 4 and 6 of the 
Framework Decision were inextricably connected to the provisions of the Framework 
Decision which encroached upon EC competence, as were the final provisions of the 
Framework Decision and thus, the latter had to be annulled in its entirety
513
.                    
This judgment resulted in the adoption of Directive 2009/123/EC
514
, amending 
Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution introducing criminal penalties for 
infringements and so strengthening its substantive provisions. 
To summarize, it is questionable whether the ECJ adequately clarified the 
delimitation of the Community competence with regard to criminal law matters. Also, 
it seems that the extent of this competence remained unclear
515
. This is of greater 
importance if one considers the view of the President of the ECJ Mr. Skouris who 
stressed
516
 inter alia that ‗the importance of these cases has been over-estimated as 
the Court in both cases did not examine the issue of competence, but only the issue of 
legal basis. The Court did not examine whether the Community or Member States had 
the competence to adopt criminal law provisions as the latter had already given this 
competence through the Framework Decision. Thus, the President concluded that ‗the 
Court did not establish any competence of the Community or of the Union regarding 
criminal law as this was not at all the question in these cases. To put it in other 
words, the Court did not recognize any general competence of Community in the area 
of criminal law‘.   
 Despite this view of the President of the ECJ, one should note that it is 
unfortunate that the Court of Justice did not give greater weight to the fact that 
Member States have preferred to attribute criminal competence to the EU under the 
third pillar, and not to the EC under the first pillar
517
. However, as Valsamis 
Mitsilegas notes, the Court of Justice has by no means given carte blanche to the 
adoption of a wide range of first pillar criminal law measures
518
. Whilst the 
Commission was successful in the environmental case, in the shipping-source 
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pollution case, its victory was rather limited
519
. The Court this time was prepared to 
reiterate its position, namely that the criminalization of specific activities for the 
effective application of a particular Community objective falls within the competence 
of the Community, but, at the same time, it was rather clear that the determination and 
imposition of the specific criminal sanctions should be a matter which would fall 
within the third pillar. In any event, the extent of the Community competence in 
criminal law matters still remains, in essence, an open issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
519 See Martin Hedemann – Robinson, ‗The EU and environmental crime: the impact of the ECJ‘s 
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IV. Harmonization and Criminal Law in the light of Lisbon Treaty  
 
While Europe was constantly changing, it was common sense between the 27 
Member States that they needed more effective and coherent tools so that they could 
function more properly and respond to the rapid changes in the world. The result was 
that on 13 December 2007, EU leaders signed the Treaty of Lisbon
520
 (the so-called 
Reform Treaty), and thus brought to an end several years of negotiation about serious 
institutional issues and concerns. The Treaty of Lisbon, which officially entered into 
force on 1 December 2009, amends the current EU and EC treaties, but without 
replacing them.  
Nevertheless, it is undoubted that the biggest and perhaps the most important 
changes that the Treaty of Lisbon brings, concern the third pillar and the EU criminal 
law
521. The ‗Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‘ constitutes one of the highest on 
the list priorities of the Union‘s objectives: Article 3 (2) of the consolidated version of 
the TEU states that the Union will ‗offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime‘522. Also, Title V of 
the consolidated version of the TEU which covers the current areas of the third pillar, 
states that ‗the Union will constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the 
Member States‘523.       
One of the major innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon is the abolition of the 
existing pillars structure: The third pillar is abolished and EU criminal law is 
‗communitarised‘524. This practically means that the decision-making is changing in 
the sense that the Council and the Parliament co-decide. Yet, the strengthening of the 
role of the Parliament will alleviate the expressed concerns and fears about the so-
                                                             
520 See the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007/C-306/01. Also see the 
consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ C 83 of 30 March 2010. 
521 See Steve Peers, ‗EU criminal law and the Treaty of Lisbon‘, European Law Review, 2008, pp.507-
529. 
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523 See article 67 of the consolidated version of the TEU.  
524 However, as Valsamis Mitsilegas notes, a number of intergovernmental elements will still remain. 
See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 37.  
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called ‗democratic deficit‘ in the previously existing function of the third pillar525. 
Also, the role of the European Court of Justice is significantly strengthened with the 
Court having full jurisdiction to rule on infringement proceedings in criminal 
matters
526
 as well as to give preliminary rulings
527
. Yet, these innovations may open 
the window of opportunity without conditions between the national Courts and the 
European Court to exchange views and examine the relationship between the EU 
criminal law and the national criminal law, with all the significant constitutional 
implications from the application of EU principles being a key role in the 
development of EU criminal law. The view of the President of the ECJ Mr. Skouris  
in this matter is very illustrative: ‗I think‘, he said, ‗that in fact this will be the case 
and I hope that only significant questions will be raised to the Court in order the 
latter to express its view in the way that it should do
528‘.  
Another significant change with the Treaty of Lisbon is the introduction of a new 
system for the adoption of criminal law. In particular, in the new ‗Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice‘, the instruments to be used for the adoption of criminal 
legislation are Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions
529
. 
As it is apparent, under the Lisbon Treaty, Framework Decisions, Conventions and 
Common Positions, do not any longer constitute instruments through which criminal 
law can be adopted, while instead there have been chosen instruments which 
constitute Community‘s instruments and which will mean that Community law 
principles will apply in the areas currently covered under the third pillar
530
.  
As to harmonization, the Treaty of Lisbon expands criminal law competence and 
grants to the Union the competence to establish minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime 
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis
531
. In particular, the list of the 
areas of crimes is the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, 
money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime 
                                                             
525 It is important to note that the Parliament will have a right to veto.  
526 See art. 258, 259, and 260 TFEU.  
527 See art. 276 TFEU. 
528 Interview with the President of the European Court of Justice Mr. Vasilios Skouris in 09/01/2010. 
529 Art. 288 (1) TFEU.  
530 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 41.  
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and organised crime. This exhaustive list may be expanded ‗on the basis of 
developments of crime‘532 by a unanimous decision by the Council and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament. However, it is noteworthy that it is now the 
Union that is granted the competence to adopt such minimum rules on criminal law 
definitions and sanctions, rather than to require Member States to adopt proportionate, 
effective and dissuasive penalties
533
. 
Also, the Union‘s competence to act in criminal matters is expanded, according to 
article 83 (2) TFEU, if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States ‗proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy in an area which has been subject to harmonization measures‘. To that end, 
Directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the area concerned
534
. However, this provision is important 
for one more reason: it seems that it reflects the ECJ case law on environmental crime 
and ship-source pollution as the Treaty, like the Court, uses effectiveness to justify the 
Union‘s criminal law competence, though in a broader scope (namely policies than 
objectives). This, however, raises serious questions regarding the meaning of what is 
‗essential‘ and who will prove that a criminal law measure is ‗essential‘ in this 
context
535
. These questions, nevertheless, are left to be seen.  
It is evident that the Treaty of Lisbon brings a new era in the process of European 
integration. Undoubtedly, the merging of the first and third pillars will establish a 
more coherent and more easily understood and applied scheme of EU competence in 
the area of EU criminal law
536
. Nevertheless, in particular with regard to 
harmonization, the shift to the Community method, namely to qualified majority 
voting and the co-decision procedure, along with a strengthening in the role of the 
Commission and the Court of Justice, will constitute a very significant step for the 
enhancement of the adopted harmonized criminal laws and their effective application 
as well as for the facilitation of an enhanced judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  
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V. EU criminalization of terrorism, organized crime 
and money laundering 
   
1. The Fight Against Terrorism 
 
a. The European Union and the fight against terrorism 
 
Terrorism has been for Europe for many decades one of the key strategic 
threats
537
. The TREVI group, as discussed earlier, had originally focused primarily on 
the cross-border fight against the terrorist groups which were trying to destabilize 
several of the EC Member States at that time
538
. However, it was only after the 
introduction of title VI TEU through the Treaty of Maastricht that EU action against 
terrorism was for the first time provided with a specific legal basis
539
, which was then 
preserved by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
The legal basis of the EU action against terrorism is to be found in the 
fundamental Treaties establishing the EU
540
. Article 29 par. 2 TEU, specifically 
mentions terrorism as a form of crime which should be targeted ‗in particular‘.                
Also, article 31 (e) TEU provides that common action on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters include the adoption of measures establishing minimum rules 
relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field of 
terrorism.  
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 See ‗The La Gomera Declaration‘ adopted at the informal Council meeting on 14 October 1995 
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b.  The EU responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks - The Council 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism 
 
 The atrocious and unprecedented terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 threw 
Europe into turmoil and immediately altered the discussions for a decisive and 
catalytic response of the European Union to the terrorist attacks which were 
considered by some as being acts of war
541
. Until that time, the reality was that there 
was no common legal definition of terrorist acts, no harmonized system of penalties 
and no basis for accelerated extradition
542
. On the contrary, different situations in 
Member States in relation to legislation related to terrorism existed. Some of the 
States had no specific regulations on terrorism
543
. In these States, terrorist actions 
were punished as common offences. In other States, specific typified laws concerning 
terrorism existed. This was the case in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom
544
.  
However, in the wake of the tragic events in the USA, the European Commission 
presented a proposal for a ‗Framework Decision on combating terrorism‘ to the 
special meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Brussels on 20 
September 2001
545
. Shortly afterwards, namely on the 13 June of 2002, the Council 
adopted the final Framework Decision on combating terrorism
546
. The Framework 
Decision aims at harmonising the definition of terrorist offences in all Member States 
and ensures that the latter set up penalties and sanctions for those having committed 
or being liable for such offences that reflect the seriousness of the offences
547
.                  
It also sets out jurisdictional rules to guarantee that terrorist offences may be 
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547 See par. 6 of the Preamble of the F.D.  
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effectively prosecuted
548
 and, finally, it adopts specific measures with regard to 
victims of terrorist offences because of their vulnerability
549
. 
Before analyzing the instrument itself, it is interesting to note that the deadline for 
its implementation was the 31 of December 2002. Nevertheless, the national 
implementation of the Framework Decision brought about remarkable changes in the 
domestic legal systems the most important of which was that it was no longer 
regarded as sufficient that terrorist offences were considered simply common 
offences, but the terrorist nature of these offences was now required to be part of the 
definition
550
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
548 Ibid par. 7.  
549 Ibid par. 8.  
550 See Kimmo Nuotio, ‗Terrorism as a catalyst for the emergence, harmonization and reform of 
criminal law‘, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2006, pp. 998-1016. 
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c. Overview of the Framework Decision 
 
C.1 The definition of terrorism 
 
Defining terrorism has been for a long time a very controversial and sensitive 
issue which has been -at the same time- an important obstacle to the creation and 
achievement of effective counter-terrorism strategies and measures in international 
law
551
 as one country‘s terrorist is often another country‘s freedom fighter552.  
Overall, one can assume a high degree of consensus amongst the Member States as to 
the need for a common action against terrorism, but when it comes to deciding on a 
common definition, these differences remain. The arising, thus, question is why 
terrorism should be treated separately from the existing international and national 
crimes where conduct overlaps different categories (such as murder, assault, arson or 
crimes against humanity). The rationale for criminalization and treating of terrorism 
as a distinct category of criminal harm is more symbolic. It expresses the 
determination of the international community to condemn and stigmatize ‗terrorism‘ 
as such and beyond its ordinary criminal characteristics. Thus, by doing so, the 
international community is willing to send a strong message to those who try to 
jeopardize its fundamental values and interests through the use of terrorism
553
.  
From time to time the meaning of terrorism has changed
554
. The core meaning of 
terrorism might have been clear enough, however, there is often scope for genuine 
debate whether particular acts or types of action, really belong to that meaning
555
.         
On the other hand, even terrorists do not see or regard themselves as other do. 
Characteristics are the examples of fighters for freedom and liberation, such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which have been regarded by some as 
terrorists or actual self-defense movements as the Afrikaner resistance movement.    
                                                             
551 For a discussion on the difficulties in defining terrorism see Elisabeth Simeonidou-Kastanidou, 
‗Defining Terrorism‘, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol.12/1, 2004, 
pp.14-35. See also Marcello Di Filippo, ‗Terrorist crimes and international co-operation: critical 
remarks on the definition and inclusion of terrorism in the category of international crimes‘, European 
Journal of International Law, 2008, pp. 533-570. 
552 See Omer Elagab and Jeehaan Elagab, ‗International law documents relating to terrorism‘, third 
Edition, Routledge – Cavendish, 2007, p.xxv.  
553 See Ben Saul, ‗Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.1-66.  
554 For a historical analysis of the meaning of the term terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, ‗Defining 
Terrorism‘ in ‗Inside Terrorism‘, revised and expanded edition, Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 
1-41.  
555 See Adam Roberts, ‗Countering Terrorism: A Historical Perspective‘, in ‗Counterterrorism: 
Democracy‘s Challenge‘, edited by Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller, Hart, 2008. See also Adrian 
Guelke, ‗Varieties of terrorisms‘, in ‗The new Age of Terrorism and the International Political 
System‘, I.B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 52-70.  
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All these reveal the fact that terrorism has proved increasingly elusive in the attempts 
to construct one consistent definition.  
This problem was not resolved either with the UN Security Council Resolution 
1373, as Member States did not succeed in adopting a common definition of the term 
‗terrorism‘, though sometimes the UN has condemned it in the abstract or specific 
acts of it
556
.  Also, the European Parliament in a number of non binding resolutions
557
 
and recommendations
558
 on terrorism has tried to contain a definition of terrorism, but 
this effort had limited influence on the creation of a commonly accepted definition by 
the Member States. This international lack and maybe the most difficult legal and 
political issue, was, thus, complemented with article 1 of the Council Framework 
Decision on combating terrorism which sets a three-part definition of terrorism 
consisting of
559
: (a) the context of the action; (b) the aim of the action; and (c) the 
specific acts of the action that have being committed.    
With regard to the context of the action of terrorism, each Member State must take 
the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts, defined as offences under 
national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or 
an international organization, are criminalized
560
. Secondly, with regard to the aim of 
the action, this must be with an aim either of ‗seriously intimidating a population‘;             
or ‗unduly compelling a Government or international organisation‘ to act or fail to 
act; or ‗seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation‘.561                  
The third part of the definition regards the specific acts that must be related to one of 
the provided offences.
562
  
Furthermore, the Council Framework Decision defines offences related to a 
terrorist group and other offences linked to terrorist activities which should be 
criminalized. In particular, for the purposes of the Framework Decision, ‗terrorist 
group‘ means a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period 
                                                             
556 See Frederick H. Gareau, ‗State Terrorism and the United States – From Counterinsurgency to the 
War on Terrorism‘, Clarity Press, 2004, p. 3-35.  
557 See the ‗Resolution on combating terrorism in the European Union‘, OJ C 55 of 24/02/1997. 
558 See the ‗Recommendation on the role of the EU in combating terrorism‘, of 5 September 2001.  
559 See Steve Peers, ‗EU Responses to Terrorism‘, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2003, 
p.228.  
560 See article 1 par. 1 of the F.D. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Ibid.  
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of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences
563
. Member States are 
obliged to criminalize
564
: (a) directing a terrorist group; and (b) participating in the 
activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material 
resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such 
participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.                       
On the other hand, as for the linked offences, Member States are also obliged to 
criminalize
565
: (a) aggravated theft; (b) extortion with a view to committing one of the 
acts listed in Article 1(1); and, (c) drawing up false administrative documents with a 
view to committing either a terrorist offence or participate to a terrorist group.  
The list of ordinary offences contained in articles 1 and 2 of the Framework 
Decision has been criticized by some authors as being too extensive and as not 
reflecting the particular danger inherent in terrorist acts
566
. In that sense it has been 
suggested that the definition does not satisfy the requirement of legal certainty of 
Article 7 par. 1 ECHR because the terms are too vague
567
 and includes largely 
subjective notions. As they characteristically argue, under this definition, acts, for 
example, of urban violence or anti-globalization demonstrations could be considered 
as terrorist acts since they might cause extensive destruction to public places likely to 
result in major economic loss and are aimed at compelling Governments or 
international organizations to perform or abstaining from certain acts.   
However, one can find the counter-argument in the Preamble of the Framework 
Decision. In particular, after referring to the protection of fundamental rights,              
the Preamble makes clear that it ‗respects fundamental rights‘ as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and establishes the general rule that nothing in the Framework Decision can be 
interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms such 
as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of association or of expression, including 
the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions with others for the protection of 
his or her interests and the related right to demonstrate
568
. Thus, this implies that 
demonstrating in order to influence a Government or an organization does not               
                                                             
563 See article 2 par.1 of the F.D. For the purposes of the F.D ‗structured group‘ means a group that is 
not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have 
formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure. 
564 See article 2 par. 2 of the F.D.  
565 See article 3 of the F.D.  
566 See Tony Bunyan, ‗The War on Freedom and Democracy‘, Statewatch analysis of 6 September 
2002. 
567 See August Reinisch. ‗The Action of the European Union to Combat International Terrorism‘, in 
‗Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism‘, ed. Andrea Bianchi, Hart, 2004, p.144-151. 
568 See par. 10 of the Preamble of the F.D.  
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(and should not) mean that the demonstrators aim at compelling the institution to 
perform an act ‗unduly‘ in the sense of art. 1 par.1 of the Framework Decision, but 
rather that they exercise their recognized right to freedom of assembly
569
.   
 
C.2 The imposed penalties 
The Council Framework Decision comprises also a further element of minimum 
harmonization. This element regards the imposition of penalties. The debate about the 
issue of criminal sanction was extensive
570
. The Commission proposal of 19 
September 2001 contained a detailed list of prison sentences, ranging from two to 
twenty years maximum penalties that Member States should adopt as a bottom line. 
Nevertheless, in the text finally agreed even though detailed penalties for terrorism as 
defined by the Framework Decision are largely left to the Member States, the latter 
are obliged to take necessary measures for terrorism offences to be punishable by 
effective, proportionate and deterrent criminal sanctions, which may entail 
extradition
571
. Member States are also obliged to make individuals responsible for a 
violation liable to imprisonment of a maximum term of not less than fifteen years for 
leading a terrorist group and eight years for participating in terrorist activities.
572
  
Furthermore, Member States are obliged to take the necessary measures to 
criminalize ‗terrorist-linked offences‘ such as aggravated theft, extortion, and the 
drawing up of false administrative documents
573
 as well as inciting or aiding or 
abetting a terrorist offence
574
. However, for those offences no maximum penalty 
levels are set. Furthermore, a special provision on possible penalty reduction exists for 
terrorist offenders who cooperate with the administrative or judicial authorities
575
.  
As is apparent, the Framework Decision in essence obliges Member States to 
punish the defined terrorist offences with sentences heavier than those imposable 
under national law for the basic offences committed without the intent characteristic 
of terrorist offences
576
. This seems to be justified due to the specific features of 
                                                             
569 See Nikola Vennemann, ‗Country Report on the European Union‘, in ‗Terrorism as a challenge for 
National and International law: Security versus Liberty?‘, Springer, 2004, p. 234-238. As she argues 
the same principle applies to the case of freedom fighters.  
570 See August Reinisch. id. 2004, p.119-162. 
571 See article 5 of the F.D.  
572 See article 5 par. 3 of the F.D. 
573 See article 3 of the F.D. 
574 See article 4 of the F.D. Yet, these acts will be defined by Member States according to their national 
law. 
575 See article 6 of the F.D.  
576 See article 5 par. 2 of the F.D.  
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committing a terrorist offence, namely: (a) the intention and motivation of the 
terrorist; (b) the risk of serious damage to a country or an international organization; 
and (c) the danger inherent in acts committed with such an intention. At the same 
time, it is apparent that far from definitely harmonizing the national laws in regard to 
the penalties, Member States accepted the risk of having divergent penalties for 
terrorist offences in the different national laws.  
 
c.3 Other provisions 
One of the innovations of the Framework Decision is that it establishes liability of 
‗legal persons‘ in the form usually imposed by EU measures, where the acts were 
‗committed for their benefit‘577. There is also a form of liability based on negligence, 
where the legal person ‗can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by 
that person‘ has made the commission of a specified criminal act possible ‗for the 
benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority‘578. Such liability does not 
exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons
579
. Article 8 then specifies the 
form that sanctions must take ‗effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, 
which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other sanctions 
too
580
. Finally, article 9 sets out specific rules with regard to the jurisdiction over the 
offences covered by the Framework Decision and article 10 obliges Member States to 
take all the measures possible to ensure appropriate assistance for the victims of 
terrorism and their families. 
Undoubtedly, overall the Framework Decision is a very significant step ahead for 
systematic EU action against the terrorism. However, one should not ignore that the 
Framework Decision establishes the so-called minimum common denominator in the 
sense that it does not go beyond a minimum harmonization of the criminal laws 
leaving it to the Member States a wide margin of discretion. Nevertheless, as Steve 
Peers correctly points out, this process is a ‗race to the bottom‘, where the risk is that 
defendants may fall subject to the Member State with the lowest standards of rights 
for the accused
581
.  
 
 
                                                             
577 Ibid article 7 par. 1. 
578 Ibid article 7 par. 2. 
579 Ibid article 7 par. 3. 
580 Ibid article 8. 
581 See Steve Peers, id. 2007. 
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c.4 The amending 2008/919 JHA Framework Decision on terrorism 
The rapid evolution of the terrorist threat and of its techniques as well as the use 
of Internet in order to inspire and mobilize local terrorist networks and individuals in 
Europe, led the Council in 28 November 2008 to adopt the 2008/919 Framework 
Decision
582
 which rather amends and does not repeal the Framework Decision 
2002/475 JHA on combating terrorism. In fact, the new instrument expands the scope 
of the 2002 Framework Decision to introduce to the EU legal order offences related to 
terrorism in order to contribute to the more general policy objective of preventing 
terrorism through reducing the dissemination of those materials which might incite 
persons to commit terrorist attacks
583
.  
In particular, the 2008 instrument introduces three new offences:                              
(a) public provocation to commit a terrorist offence
584
; (b) recruitment for 
terrorism
585
; and (c) training for terrorism
586
. The basis for the introduction of these 
offences has been the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of 
terrorism. The offences in question exist along with the three other offences in the 
2002 Framework Decision, namely ‗aggravated theft‘, ‗extortion‘, and the ‗drawing 
up false administrative documents‘. All these acts constitute offences for the purposes 
of this Framework Decision only when they are committed intentionally
587
.              
On the other hand, incitement for the new added offences is not punishable
588
 and the 
criminalization of attempt is left to the discretion of Member States
589
.  
However, it is important to note that the new instrument introduces a new 
element: for any of the acts to be punishable according to this Framework Decision,           
it is not necessary that a terrorist offence is actually committed
590
. As Valsamis 
Mitsilegas notes, this has led to the Framework Decision being strongly criticized for 
compromising freedom of expression (and academic freedom in particular), and for 
cementing a criminal law of prevention, where the focus is not on the actual 
commission of acts, but on the control of individuals who are perceived as a threat at 
                                                             
582 See the ‗Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism‘, OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, p. 21–23. 
583 See recital 7 of the Preamble of the F.D 
584 For meaning of the term ‗public provocation to commit a terrorist offence‘ see article 1 (1) of the 
F.D. 
585 For the meaning of the term ‗recruitment for terrorism‘ see article 1 (1) of the F.D. 
586 For the meaning of the term ‗training for terrorism‘ see article 1 (1) of the F.D. 
587 See article 1 (2) of the F.D. 
588 See article 4 (2) of the F.D. 
589 See article 4 (4) of the F.D.  
590 See article 3 (3) of the F.D. 
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a temporal stage far removed from the commission of crime
591
. It is, thus, left to be 
seen how these provisions will be implemented in the various national legislations of 
the Member States, since the deadline for the implementation of the Framework 
Decision was the 9
th
 December 2010. 
To summarize, all these measures make apparent that the European Union has 
contributed to a great extent to the fight against terrorism, especially through the 
closer cooperation between the authorities of Member States. It must also be noticed 
that the 11 September 2001 attacks gave a major impetus to cooperation in the field of 
Justice and Home Affairs and a significant boost to the cross-pillar activity. 
Harmonization of criminal laws was considered to be absolutely necessary in order 
for Europe to act as a single unit against the threat of terrorism. However, any effort 
for the adoption of any counter-terrorism measure must find its boundaries in the 
protection of Fundamental Rights, as human rights should be seen as complementary, 
and not conflicting, goals of the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
591 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗The third wave of third pillar law. Which direction for EU criminal 
justice?‘, European Law Review, 2009, p. 525-526. See also M. Kaiafa - Gbandi, ‗The Prevention of 
Terrorism and the Criminal Law of Pre-Preventive Enforcement: New Criminal Acts for the Fight 
against Terrorism in the European Union‘, (in Greek), 2009, Poinika Chronika, p. 385 - 400. 
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2. The fight against organized crime 
 
The fight against organized crime has been a global concern especially over the 
last decade, affecting many areas of the United Nation‘s592 and European Union‘s 
actions and policies as well. Organized crime has been felt not only as a threat to 
security, but also as a source of major damage to the social, economic, political, and 
cultural developments of any society. Yet, even if it is not a new phenomenon, there is 
a new threat of transnational organized crime in the post-Cold War period. With the 
rapid development in information and technology, criminals are more mobile and 
illicit markets are expanding from the domestic economy across national boundaries, 
corrupting the legitimate economy and undermining political institutions
593
. 
Organized crime, has, thus, evolved in times of an increasing globalization and 
expanding international trade, especially within the enlarged Europe without internal 
frontiers, so the range of organized crime activities has diversified and broadened. At 
the same time it symbolizes a number of weaknesses in the security arrangements, 
notably the permeability of national borders, the vigor of free trade and the evolution 
of the global community
594
. All of these factors have led to international pressure to 
harmonize the law against organized crime, even if there is not always a clear 
understanding of what ‗it‘ is595 as well as justifying the expansion of EU powers in 
criminal matters.  
The European Union‘s response in the fight against organized crime is adapted to 
the complexity of this phenomenon which complexity is further reflected in the 
various attempts at the criminalization of organized crime at EU level.                           
The term ‗organized crime‘ is not only largely differentiated in each Member State, 
but also represents different phenomena
596
. Yet, national paradigms have influenced 
international initiatives (including European ones) regarding the fight against 
                                                             
592 See the United Nations Convention against ‗Transnational Organized Crime of November 2000.  
For a detailed analysis of the UN efforts to combat transnational organized crime see David McClean, 
‗Transnational Organized Crime – A commentary on the UN Convention and its Protocols‘, Oxford 
University Press, 2007.  
593 See Angela Veng Mei Leong, ‗The Disruption of International Organized Crime – An Analysis of 
Legal and Non-Legal Strategies‘, Ashgate, 2007, p. 17.  
594 See Emilio Viano, ‗Global Organized Crime and Internal Security‘, Ashgate, 2000, p. 14.  
595 See Michael Levi, ‗Reflections on organized crime: Patterns and Control‘, The Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 37, 1998, p. 337.  
596 This was confirmed by a comparative internal EU report which verified the ‗idea that organized 
crime in Europe is not controlled by large, monolithic and well-structured criminal organizations, but 
rather by small organizations and networks with multinational orientation. See M.Den Boer, ‗The Fight 
Against Organized Crime in Europe: A Comparative Perspective‘, European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research, 2001, vol. 3, p.259-260. 
161 
 
organized crime
597
. All these have led the European Union to develop a systematic, 
integrated and multilevel framework of both preventive and repressive measures in 
order to combat organized crime
598
. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against 
organized crime will be discussed in detail. 
 
a. Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight 
against organized crime 
 
Since 3 May 2000 the Union‘s efforts to combat organized crime have been based 
on a paper entitled: ‗the prevention and control of organized crime: a European 
Union strategy for the beginning of the new millennium‘599, which invited the 
European Commission to develop policy initiatives to combat organized crime.                    
To that end and before the end of 2004, the Commission announced that it would 
prepare a Framework Decision to replace the Joint Action of 1998
600
. Almost at the 
same time, the Commission presented the so-called Hague Programme according to 
which ‗a strategic concept on tackling organized crime at EU level would be 
developed and implemented
601‘ by setting up strategic priorities complemented by 
concrete actions. The Commission finally presented its proposal on the fight against 
organized crime on 19/01/2005.
602
 The finally adopted instrument which repeals the 
above-mentioned Joint Action, was adopted three years later, namely on 
                                                             
597 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗From National to Global, From Empirical to Legal: The Ambivalent 
Concept of Transnational Organized Crime‘, in ‗Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized 
Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, ed. Margaret E. Beare, University of Toronto Press, 2003, 
pp. 55-87. 
598
 For an early discussion of the criminal policy in Europe see Gunther Kairer and Hans-Jorg Albrecht, 
‗Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe‘, Freiburg, 1990.  
599 See ‗The prevention and control of organized crime: a strategy for the beginning of the new 
millennium‘, OJ C 124 of 3.5.2000. 
600 See the ‗Joint Action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in 
the Member States of the European Union‘ (1) (98/733/JHA), OJ L 351, 29/12/1998 p. 0001 – 0003. 
For a discussion see Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗Defining organized crime in the European Union: the limits 
of European criminal law in an area of freedom, security and justice‘, European Law Review, 2001, 
p.568. Also, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Jörg Monar and Wyn Rees, ‗The European Union and Internal 
Security – One Europe or several?‘, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 97.  
601 See point 10 (8) of the ‗Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for 
European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice‘, COM/2005/0184 final. 
602 See the ‗Proposal for a Council framework Decision on the fight against organized crime‘ 
COM/2005/0006 final. 
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24/10/2008
603
. The deadline for its implementation in the Member States was set for 
11 May 2010
604
.    
According to the finally adopted measure, the Framework Decision not only takes 
into account, but also builds on the important work done by international 
organizations
605
 and, in particular, the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime
606
 (the so-called ‗Palermo Convention‘). The aim of 
this Framework Decision is to harmonize Member States‘ definitions of crimes 
related to a criminal organization and to lay down corresponding penalties for these 
offences.  
In particular, there are two types of conduct of which Member States must 
recognize at least one as an offence
607
: (a) conduct by any person who, with intent and 
with knowledge of either the aim and general activity of the criminal organization
608
 
or its intention to commit the offences in question, actively takes part in the 
organization‘s criminal activities, including the provision of information or material 
means, the recruitment of new members and all forms of financing of its activities, 
knowing that such participation will contribute to the achievement of the 
organization‘s criminal activities; and (b) conduct by any person consisting in an 
agreement with one or more persons that an activity should be pursued, which if 
carried out, would amount to the commission of offences referred to in Article 1
609
, 
even if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the activity. 
Furthermore, Member States must take steps to criminalize the above offences in 
that the first results in a maximum term of imprisonment of a minimum of two to five 
years, and the second in a maximum term of imprisonment equivalent to that of the 
planned activities or in a maximum term of a minimum of two to five years
610
.   
However, the Member States may reduce, or allow for an exemption from, these 
penalties if the offender renounces criminal activity and assists the authorities by 
                                                             
603 See ‗Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organized 
crime‘.  OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42–45. 
604 See article 10 of the F.D.  
605 See Recital 6 of the F.D. 
606 See ‗The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime‘, adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. 
607 See article 2 of the F.D.  
608 For an analysis of the organization as an autonomous criminal actor, see Christopher Harding, 
‗Criminal Enterprise – Individuals, organizations and criminal responsibility‘, Willan Publishing, 
2007, p. 224-242. 
609 For the meaning of the terms ‗criminal organization‘ and ‗structured association‘ see article 1 of 
the F.D. 
610 See article 3 of the F.D.  
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providing them with otherwise unobtainable information on the offence and the other 
offenders or identify or bring to justice the other offenders; or deprive the criminal 
organization of illicit resources or of the proceeds of its criminal activities; or prevent 
further offences referred to in Article 2 from being committed
611
. 
Furthermore, the Framework Decision introduces the liability of legal persons
612
. 
In particular, Member States must hold any legal person accountable for the above 
offences that have been committed on its behalf by a person who has a central role in 
the legal person in question, even if that person has acted in an individual capacity. 
These legal persons must be punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties, which include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other 
penalties, for example
613
: (a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; (b) 
temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; 
and (c) placing under judicial supervision and other.  
Finally, the Framework Decision provides a complete set of jurisdictional rules
614
.                          
In particular, each Member State must ensure that its jurisdiction covers the offences 
if they are committed on its territory, in whole or in part, by its national or on behalf 
of a legal person set up on its territory. However, if the offence is committed outside a 
Member State‘s territory, it may choose whether or not to apply the last two rules.              
If the offence falls within the jurisdiction of several Member States, they must 
cooperate, for example with Eurojust, in order to decide on the prosecuting country. 
However, in doing so, the Member States must take special account of where the 
offence was carried out, the nationality or place of residence of the offender, the 
country of origin of the victim and the territory where the offender was found.                
Also, it is important to note that for offences that have been committed on the territory 
of a Member State, the investigations and prosecutions by that Member State must be 
carried out without depending on having a report or an accusation from a victim
615
. 
As is evident, the Framework Decision establishes the definitions of offences for 
participating in a criminal organization as well as providing for corresponding 
penalties to be imposed on the offenders, irrespective of whether they are natural or 
legal persons committing or responsible for the commission of the acts. However, 
some problems inevitably arise regarding this Framework Decision: (a) the terms of 
                                                             
611 See article 4 of the F.D. 
612 For the meaning of the term ‗legal person‘ see article 5 (4) of the F.D.  
613 See article 6 of the F.D.  
614 See article 7 of the F.D.  
615 See article 8 of the F.D.  
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‗criminal organization‘ and ‗structured association‘ are broad and vague terms which 
may contradict the principle of legal certainty; (b) the fact that the Council finally 
preferred to criminalize, following the example of the Palermo Convention, either 
participation in an organized criminal group or conspiracy leaving outside of its scope 
criminalizing the direction of an organized criminal group, has provoked the strong 
reaction of the Commission.  
As has been argued elsewhere
616
, the Framework Decision ‗fails to achieve the 
objective sought by the Commission in relation to Joint Action 98/733/JHA and in 
relation to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime‘. 
Also, the Commission has argued that the Framework Decision ‗does not achieve the 
minimum degree of approximation of acts of directing or participating in a criminal 
organization on the basis of a single concept of such an organization, as proposed by 
the Commission and as already adopted in Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on the 
fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the Framework Decision enables Member States 
not to introduce the concept of criminal organization, but to continue to apply existing 
national criminal law by having recourse to general rules on participation in, and 
preparation of specific offences‘. 
In fact, the Commission in its argument has got a point. As Valsamis Mitsilegas 
correctly notes the fact that the Council harmonized either participation in a criminal 
organization group or conspiracy ‗does not help towards legal certainty and creates a 
potentially very extensive scope of criminalization of organized crime across the 
European Union
617‘. This is of particular importance, if one considers that 
participation in a criminal organization is an offence for which the principle of dual 
criminality no longer applies under the EU mutual recognition instruments. However, 
this may further lead to significant diversity while implementing the instrument in 
question. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
616 See the Statement by the Commission, joined by France and Italy attached to the ‗Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on the fight against organized crime‘, Brussels, 10 May 2006 (15.05), 
Doc. 9067/06.  
617 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id., 2009, p.529. 
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3. The Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
 
a. What is Money Laundering  
As has been noted, money laundering is ‗a process, often a highly complex one, 
rather than a single act‘618 by which criminal proceeds are sanitized to disguise their 
illicit origins. In order to accomplish their goals, launderers use a wide range of 
techniques, often diverse and complex, depending on variables such as the degree of 
complexity of the structure of the criminal organization and the type of criminal 
activities in the illegal markets and their infiltration into legitimate industries
619
.                
However, whatever the nature of the technique used, all contain three common 
features
620
: (a) launderers need to conceal the true ownership and origin of the 
proceeds; (b) launderers need to retain control of the proceeds; and finally (c) they 
need to change the form of the proceeds. The process of laundering itself is generally 
explained as composing of three stages
621
: (a) placement; (b) layering; (c) integration. 
All these different stages may be viewed alone, but it is not rare that these steps may 
occur simultaneously or they may overlap.  
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that just hiding of unlawful funds without 
disguising their criminal origin is not money laundering. It is, therefore, only when 
the criminal origin of the money that has been concealed, disguised or obscured, and 
thus the appearance of legitimacy of that money has been created in a place where 
sanctions against its criminal origins exist, that this process constitutes money 
laundering
622
. Money laundering, then, is the process of transforming the proceeds of 
illegal activities into legitimate capital
623
.  
 
                                                             
618 See William C. Gilmore, ‗Dirty Money – The evolution of international Measures to counter Money 
Laundering the Financing of Terrorism‘, Third edition, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004, p.32. 
619 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‗Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union – A New 
Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles‘, Kluwer Law International, 
2003, p.25.  
620 See William C. Gilmore, id. 2004, p. 32.  
621 For details on the process see Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p. 27. See also William C. Gilmore, id.  
2004, p. 32. See also Trevor Millington and M. Sutherland, ‗The Proceeds of Crime‘, second edition, 
OUP, pp. 571-601. The same approach with regard to the steps of the money laundering process has 
been taken in a various international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force and the 
United Nations. See the FATF Report of 06/02/1990 and the United Nations international Drug Control 
Programme Fact Sheet No.5 for the General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, 
New York, 08-10 June 1998.  
622 The same approach has been taken in the relevant international conventions. For example, article 3 
(1) (b) (i) of the Vienna Convention 1988 against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances.  
623 See Peter Alldridge, ‗Money Laundering Law‘, Hart, 2003, pp.2-19. 
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b. The fight against Money Laundering in the European Union 
 
The European Community was seriously concerned since its creation for the 
protection of its financial systems due to the completion of the single market.                   
It was also aware that the credit and financial institutions were mainly used to launder 
proceeds from criminal activities as criminals try to use the freedom of capital 
movements and the freedom to supply financial services in order to facilitate such 
activities
624
. It was, thus, felt that the soundness and the stability of the institutions 
concerned as well as confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously 
jeopardized
625
 if certain, effective, dynamic and coordinating measures were not taken 
at Community level in order to counter money laundering. In this context, in the 
following section the evolution of the EU anti-money laundering measures will be 
examined by focusing, in particular, on the three anti-money laundering Directives.  
 
c. The first money laundering Directive  
 
The 1991 Directive on money laundering
626
 has been a landmark Directive in the 
fight against money laundering in the European Community as it was the first 
legislative measure that was adopted by the EC in this area and has been cited as one 
of the major original instruments alongside the 1988 UN Vienna Convention as well 
as the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering and the 40 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force
627
 (FATF) on Money 
                                                             
624 See the Preamble of te Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering (91/308/EEC). 
625 Ibid.  
626 See the ‗Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering‘, OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77–83. 
627 FATF is an ad hoc body established by the so-called Group of Seven (G7) at the 1989 Paris 
Meeting, having as its main targets the examining of money laundering techniques and trends, 
reviewing the action which had already been taken at a national or international level, and setting out 
the measures that still needed to be taken to combat money laundering. Since 2001, it also focuses on 
the world-wide effort to combat terrorist financing. One of the main contributions of FATF is the 
formulation of the so-called ‗40 Recommendations‘ which provide a complete set of counter-measures 
against money laundering covering the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial 
system and its regulation, and the international co-operation. The influence of the FATF is very 
important in the fight against money laundering as many countries (including the case study of Greece 
which will be analyzed in the next chapter) have transformed several of these Recommendations into 
national laws. For an overview see: http://www.fatf-gafi.org.  Also, Peter Alldridge, id. 2003, p.104 
and P. Duyne, K. Lampe and J. Newell, ‗Criminal finances and organizing crime in Europe‘, Willem-
Jan van der Wolf, 2003, p.110. For a detailed analysis of FATF see also, William Gilmore and Michael 
Levi, ‗Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New 
Paradigm for Crime Control?‘, European Journal of Law Reform, 2002, pp.337-377. 
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Laundering
628
, which have been, several times, revised. The rationale and the main 
objective of the Directive were to cover aspects of both prevention and control
629
.    
As Gilmore comments the trigger for Community action in this area was the 
perceived need to ensure the integrity and cleanliness‘630 of the financial system in the 
light of moves towards the creation of the Single Market
631
. 
The legal basis used for the proposed Directive was the first and the third 
sentences of article 57 (2) of the EEC Treaty. However, this legal basis provoked the 
serious reactions of the Community institutions
632
. Most of the reactions were a result 
of the controversy surrounding the scope and objective of the measure. Given these 
reactions, it was finally decided to use also article 100A EEC Treaty as a legal basis 
which deals with the adoption by the Council of measures for the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States having as their objective the establishment and 
operation of the single market. Yet, as Valsamis Mitsilegas notes, ‗although this 
formula deemed satisfactory, the addition of article 100A to embrace the criminal law 
character of the measure is far from unproblematic
633‘ and this is more evident given 
the debate over the competence of the Community regarding criminal law.  
Nevertheless, the preamble itself of the Directive constitutes an illustrative policy 
justification perceiving money laundering as being a particular threat to Member 
States' societies
634
 as it may lead to losing the trust of the public in the financial 
system and it may significantly damage the financial system itself
635
. To that end, the 
Directive prohibited money laundering as it was felt that it was necessary that it must 
be combated mainly by penal means
636
. However, the preamble stated that a penal 
approach should not be the only way to combat money laundering since the financial 
system can play a highly effective role
637
. The Directive, thus, contained a number of 
provisions establishing the criminalization of the money laundering phenomenon and 
imposing significant obligations for credit and financial institutions.                               
                                                             
628 See He Ping, ‗The new weapon for combating money laundering in the EU‘, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 2004, pp.115-121. 
629 For an extensive analysis of the 1991 Directive background see Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p.52-
63. 
630 See the ‗1990 Commission Proposal and Explanatory Memorandum‘ reproduced in W. Gilmore, in 
International efforts to combat money laundering, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.244.  
631 See William C. Gilmore, id. 2004, p.194-195.  
632 For a detailed analysis see Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p.56-58.  
633 Ibid.  
634 See Recital 3 of the Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
635 See Recital 1, id. 
636 See Recital 4, id. 
637 See Recital 5, id. 
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As Valsamis Mitsilegas points out, this combination of criminalization and prevention 
policies renders the Directive ‗a unique piece of legislative drafting in relation to prior 
international instruments in this field‘638. 
 
c.1 The prohibition of Money Laundering 
 
Article 2 of the Directive provided for the criminalization of money laundering.                
The arising, then, question is what is meant for the European Community as ‗money 
laundering‘. Article 1 of the Directive defined money laundering as the following 
conduct when committed intentionally
639
: 
- The conversion or transfer of property640, knowing that such property is 
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, 
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property     
or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity 
to evade the legal consequences of his action; 
- The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in 
such activity; 
- The acquisition, possession, or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of 
participation in such activity; 
- Participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, 
abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any of the actions 
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.  
This provision, in fact, reiterated identically the provisions used by the Vienna 
Convention regarding the definition of money laundering. However, in particular with 
regard to the meaning and the use of the term ‗criminal activity‘, this has provoked a 
significant debate as in the initial Commissions‘ proposal, it was included that the 
offences from which the laundered property emanates relates to property from 
‗serious crime‘, further elaborated as a crime specified in Article 3 par. 1 (a) and (c) 
                                                             
638 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p.64. 
639 See article 1, third indent of the Directive. The same are defined in the third Directive.  
640 For the meaning of the term 'property` see article 1, fourth indent of the Directive. However, this 
interpretation has been criticized in that it broadens considerably the scope of the money laundering 
definition to include an overextended range of transactions and this might be a source of great legal 
uncertainty. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p. 66. 
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of the Vienna Convention, terrorism and any other serious criminal offence (including 
particular organized crime), whether or not connected with drugs, as defined by the 
Member States. As characteristically the Commission stated in its proposal ‗in spite of 
the importance that laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking has in the context of 
money laundering in general, it would not have been appropriate to exclude 
laundering of other serious crimes from the scope of the Directive‘641.           
Nevertheless, and due to the provoked reactions
642
, it was finally agreed to include 
instead of the term ‗serious crime‘, the broad term ‗criminal activity‘ meaning a crime 
specified in Article 3 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention and any other criminal activity 
designated as such for the purposes of the Directive by each Member State
643
.              
Yet, this has practically led to significant discrepancies in the implementation of the 
Directive as some Member States have chosen to include an exhaustive list of 
predicate offences
644
, while other have preferred to use a basis for all crimes
645
. 
 
c.2 The imposed duties on financial and credit institutions  
Based on the FATF Recommendations
646
, the Directive imposed on credit and 
financial institutions a number of obligations such as: (a) to require (with a number of 
exceptions) identification of their customers (principle of ‗know your customer‘) by 
means of ‗supporting evidence‘ in a number of cases647. However, as Valsamis 
Mitsilegas correctly notes, the first money laundering Directive imposed a broad 
identification duty, but, in fact, it did not mention any specific method for 
identification
648
. This approach left to Member States a large margin of discretion, 
which resulted in different national legislations. Yet, as Gilmore makes the relevant 
point, this is justified and has been necessary given the ‗diverse range of factual 
situations which are presented in practice‘649 and this is the reason why, in fact, it has 
                                                             
641 See par. 2 of the ‗Proposal for a Council Directive on prevention of the financial system for the 
purpose of the money laundering‘, COM (90) 106 Final –SYN 254, of 23 March 1990. 
642 Ibid.  
643 See Article 1, indent 5 of the Directive.  
644 Characteristic is the example of Greece which will be examined in detail in the following chapter.  
645 Characteristic is the example of France. See for this issue the Report from the Commission, ‗First 
Commission's report on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive (91/308/EEC) to be 
submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council‘, COM (95) 54 final, Brussels, 03.03.1995, 
where the Commission makes the comment that ‗differences in the scope with respect to the kind of 
criminal proceeds covered by the definition of money laundering persist in the Member States' 
legislation‘.  
646 See, in particular, recommendations 10-12 of the 40 FATF Recommendations of 1990.  
647 See article 3 of the Directive.  
648 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p. 71, as well as chapter 5.  
649 See William C. Gilmore, id. 2004, p.199.  
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not proven to be problematic; (b) to report certain transactions that are likely to be 
connected to money laundering operations as this has been one of the major and 
necessary conditions for an effective fight against money laundering
650
; (c) to ensure 
that credit and financial institutions refrain from carrying out transactions which they 
know or suspect to be related to money laundering; (d) not to disclose to the customer 
concerned nor to other third persons that a money laundering investigation is being 
carried out; (e) that the credit and financial institutions ensure that they: (i) establish 
adequate procedures of internal control in order to prevent operations related to 
money laundering; and (ii) take appropriate measures so that their employees are 
aware of the relevant provisions. As Gilmore comments, all these measures designed 
to involve the private sector to such an ‗unprecedented extent‘ were necessary to 
ensure that those whose participation was required would, in fact, be in a position to 
play their role fully and effectively
651
.  
 
c.3 Sanctions  
The Directive is complemented by a broad provision on the sanctions that 
Member States need to adopt for the purpose of effective application. In particular, 
Article 14 provided that each Member State had to take appropriate measures to 
ensure full application of all the provisions of the Directive and must, in particular, 
determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures adopted 
pursuant to the Directive. Yet, one should note that the Directive was ‗silent‘ on the 
nature of the imposed penalties
652
. This, in practical terms, led in the past to 
significant differences in the implementation between the different jurisdictions of the 
various Member States
653
. Also, the specific sanctions provided for the same 
infraction were rather different from one Member States to another. Nevertheless,  
one should note that although the Directive did not intend to harmonize the specific 
penalties to be imposed, the Commission in its report recalled that the following 
principles must be observed
654
: (a) the principle of effectiveness: the sanctions should 
produce a clear and concrete result; (b) the principle of proportionality: the sanctions 
                                                             
650 See Guy Stessens, ‗Money Laundering – A new International Law enforcement Model‘, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p.159.  
651 See William C. Gilmore, id. 2004, p.201. 
652 Ibid, p. 78. 
653 See the ‗First Commission‘s report‘, id. COM (95) 54 Final of 03/03/1995.  
654 See the ‗First Commission‘s report‘, id. COM (95) 54 Final of 03/03/1995, p.16. 
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should be ‗appropriate‘ to the infraction committed; and (c) the principle of 
dissuasion: the sanctions should be sufficiently dissuasive to prevent infringements. 
 
d. The second money laundering Directive 
 
The rapid developments of the money laundering techniques and typologies led on 
the one hand the European Parliament to call for an ‗updating and extension‘ of the 
1991 Directive
655
, while on the other, the FATF revised its 40 Recommendations in 
1996 with the main aim of extending the list of predicate offences for money 
laundering. At the same time, the European Commission on 19 July 1999 presented a 
proposal for a Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
656
 
which was the result of inter-institutional synergy with the main reasons for the 
decision to reform the 1991 Directive being in international, domestic, and EU 
developments which had overtaken the scope of the existing instrument
657
. According 
to this proposal, it was felt ‗appropriate‘ to update the Directive as it should not only 
reflect best international practice in the area of money laundering, but should also 
continue to set a high standard in protecting the financial sector and other vulnerable 
activities from the harmful effects of the proceeds of crime
658
. In its explanatory 
memorandum, the Commission referred in detail to its relationship with and the 
influence of FAFT, noting inter alia that ‗just as the 1991 Directive moved ahead of 
the original FATF 40 Recommendation‘, the European Union should now give ‗effect 
to or even go beyond the 1996 update of the FATF 40 Recommendations
659
.  
The second anti-money laundering Directive was finally agreed on 4 December 
2001. The reasoning behind the adoption of the new Directive was that the limitation 
to drugs proceeds according to the 1991 Directive was soon found to be too restrictive 
and also it was seen that the tightening of controls in the financial sector had 
prompted money launderers to seek alternative laundering methods. Therefore,               
                                                             
655 See Doc. A4-0187/96, OJ C 198, 8.7.1996, p. 245. 
656 See the ‗Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering‘ (2000/C 177 E/03), COM(1999) 352 final, 1999/0152(COD). For a detailed analysis of the 
background of this Directive see Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, p. 86-98. 
657 See Helen Xanthaki and Constantin Stefanou, ‗The new EU draft Money Laundering Directive: a 
case of inter-institutional synergy‘, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 2000, pp.325-335. 
658 See recital 5 of the Preamble of the Proposal.  
659 See Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, ‗The EU Legislative Framework Against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis In The Light Of Evolving Global Standards‘, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2007, p.123. 
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the 2001 Directive amended the earlier 1991 Directive in two main respects:                          
First, it widened the definition of criminal activity giving rise to money laundering to 
include all serious crimes, including offences related to terrorism. Second, it applied 
to activities and professions beyond credit and financial institutions (which were 
covered by the 1991 Directive) which now were subject also to the same obligations 
as regards customer identification, record keeping and reporting of suspicious 
transactions. Yet, none of the issues were undertaken lightly since the right balance 
must be sought between fighting crime and developing the economy, protecting 
human rights and punishing criminals, and respective contributions and harmonization 
of laws
660
. 
In particular, with regard to the money laundering offences, these have been 
extended to cover not only ‗crimes specified in Article 3 (1) (a) of the Vienna 
Convention and any other criminal activity designated as such for the purposes of the 
first money laundering Directive by each Member State‘, but also ‗any kind of 
criminal involvement in the commission of a serious crime‘. As serious crimes, 
according to the second Directive are, at least
661
: 
- any of the offences defined in Article 3(1) (a) of the Vienna Convention; 
- the activities of criminal organizations as defined in Article 1 of Joint Action 
98/733/JHA; 
- fraud, at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention 
on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests; 
- corruption
662
; 
- an offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by 
a severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the penal law of the Member 
State. 
The second main innovation of the new Directive is that it significantly widened 
the range of non-financial activities and professions upon whom the obligations laid 
down in the Directive are imposed.  These are
663
:  
- auditors, external accountants and tax advisors; 
                                                             
660 See He Ping, id., 2004, p.119. 
661 See the amended article 1 (E) of the second Directive. Member States, though, still have the 
possibility to designate any other offence as a criminal activity for the purposes of this Directive. 
662 On the relation between corruption and money laundering see David Chaikin, ‗Commercial 
corruption and money laundering: a preliminary analysis‘, Journal of Financial Crime, 2008, pp. 269-
281.  
663 See article 2 (a) of the Directive.  
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- real estate agents; 
-   notaries and other independent legal professionals; 
-   dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals, or works of art, 
auctioneers, whenever payment is made in cash, and in an amount of EUR 15000 or 
more; 
-   and last, but not least, casinos. 
 
Finally, article 3 has been amended in that Member States must, in any case, 
ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive ‗take specific and 
adequate measures necessary to compensate for the greater risk of money laundering 
which arises when establishing business relations or entering into a transaction with a 
customer who has not been physically present for identification purposes‘ ('non-face 
to face' operations).  
 
e. The third Money Laundering Directive 
 
The deadline for the implementation of the second money laundering was 15 June 
2003
664
. However, only one year after this deadline and while one would expect that 
the European Commission would discuss the implementation of the second money 
laundering, instead it presented a proposal for a third Directive
665
 which would amend 
and replace the two earlier instruments. The justification for this proposal was the 
substantial revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations issued in June 2003
666
.                                      
The FATF in a number of areas considerably extended the level of detail in its 
Recommendations, notably as regards customer identification and verification,              
the situations where a higher risk of money laundering may justify enhanced measures 
and also situations where a reduced risk may justify less rigorous controls.                      
This led the European Commission to believe that the revised FATF Forty 
Recommendations should be applied in ‗a coordinated way‘ at EU level667.                      
The main logic behind the adoption of this new Directive is, thus, to take into account 
new risks that have developed from criminal activity in new areas as well as 
vulnerabilities that have been exposed by the increased understanding of how the 
                                                             
664 See art 3 (1) of the 2001 Directive. 
665 See the ‗Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing‘, 
COM (2004) 448 Final of 30 June 2004.  
666 Ibid, p.3.  
667 Ibid.  
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source of funds is hidden for criminal purposes. Nevertheless, it is also undoubted that 
the tragic events of 11 September and the subsequent ‗war on terror‘ influenced not 
only the FATF whose mandate was extended to cover terrorist finance
668
, but also the 
European Commission which in the presented proposal clearly made specific 
reference to the coverage of terrorism and terrorist financing.  
The third money laundering Directive which repeals the previous Directives was 
finally published in November 2005
669
. The deadline for the implementation was 15 
December 2007
670
. It reproduces much of the second Directive (reporting 
requirements, the requirement for training and appointing nominated officers), but it 
is significantly more detailed and increases the scope of the regulatory sector. 
Undoubtedly, the main innovation of this Directive is clear even from the title of the 
Directive which refers to the ‗prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing‘. The very first recital of the 
Preamble makes the connection between money laundering and terrorism in that 
‗dirty money can damage the stability and reputation of the financial sector and 
threaten the single market, and terrorism shakes the very foundations of our 
society‘671. Taking into account the revised FATF Recommendations672, the new 
Directive finds it ‗appropriate‘, in accordance with the new international standards, to 
introduce more specific and detailed provisions relating to the identification of the 
customer and of any beneficial owner and the verification of their identity
673
.  
In that framework, article 1 of the new Directive prohibits money laundering and 
terrorist financing. It is noteworthy that despite the Commission proposal requesting 
it, the directive does not impose as such the ‗criminalization‘ of money laundering 
and terrorist financing activities. The Council and the Parliament rejected the 
inclusion of the criminalization requirement in a first pillar directive, and thus, it was 
chosen to use the word ‗prohibit‘. For the purposes of this Directive, ‗terrorist 
financing‘ means the provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they 
                                                             
668 See the revised 40 Recommendations as well as the 9 Special FATF Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing which set out the basic framework to detect, prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism 
and terrorist acts.  
669 See the ‗Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing‘. OJ L309/15 of 25/11/2005.  
670 See article 45 of the Directive.  
671 Recital 1 of the Directive.  
672 Ibid Recital 5.  
673 Ibid Recital 9.  
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are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences within the 
meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism
674
. Terrorist financing, thus, covers two distinct aspects:             
on the one hand the financing of terrorist attacks and on the other the financing of 
terrorist networks, including recruitment and promotion of terrorist causes.                      
As terrorism requires money to finance terrorist acts and terrorist organizations,                    
it is essential to cut the financial resources of terrorists in the fight against terrorism. 
This justifies the feasibility of extending the framework on money laundering to cover 
the district phenomenon of terrorist finance. Yet, this approach was taken following 
the series of the nine Special 2001 Recommendations of FATF.  
A very significant aspect of the new Directive is the new definition of ‗serious 
crimes‘ at the origin of the proceeds to be laundered675. The option has been to align 
the Directive with the definition of serious crimes in the third pillar instruments.                 
To that end, as ‗serious crime‘ is considered to be: (a) terrorist acts as defined in 
Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; (b) drug offences; (c) activities 
of criminal organizations; (d) fraud; (e) corruption; (f) all offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than 
one year or, as regards those States which have a minimum threshold for offences in 
their legal system, all offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention 
order for a minimum of more than six months. 
A second important innovation of this Directive is that it devotes a whole chapter 
into customer due diligence and identification
676
. Comprising of articles 6-19,                
the Directive reflects a detailed and systematic depiction regarding due diligence. 
Article 6 is a new provision according to which ‗anonymous accounts or anonymous 
passbooks are prohibited‘. Furthermore, these due diligence measures require 
identification of beneficial owners and the verification of the beneficial owner's 
identity. The Directive also provides a complete set of rules for simplified due 
diligence for certain low risk situations to enhanced customer due diligence for 
situations that present a higher money laundering or terrorist financing risk and at 
least for non-face-to-face business, politically exposed persons and international 
correspondent banking relationships, norms that are new to the EU concept of the 
fight against money laundering. Yet, it is noteworthy that based on the
 
FATF 
                                                             
674 Ibid article 1 (4).  
675 See article 3 (5) of the Directive.  
676 See chapter 2 of the Directive.  
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Recommendation 5
677
, the Directive provides that the institutions and persons covered 
by this Directive must apply to each new and existing customer ‗due diligence 
requirements‘, but may determine the extent of such measures on a ‗risk-sensitive 
basis‘ depending on the type of customer, business relationship, product or 
transaction
678
. Yet, as Bill Gilmore and Valsamis Mitsilegas correctly comment,           
this ‗may be a useful principle in ensuring that the institutions and professions 
concerned are not unnecessarily overburdened with obligations‘679.    
At this point it is interesting to note the debate over the question whether the 
above duties apply to lawyers when engaged to a number of specified financial 
activities
680
. Given the special lawyer-client relationship with an increased level of 
trust and professional confidentiality it has been argued and seriously questioned that 
the imposition of money laundering duties on lawyers has the potential to create a 
conflict of interest for a lawyer who might have to balance protecting the interests of 
his client on the one hand, and on the other the administration of justice. In order to 
limit as much as possible any reaction in the sense of guaranteeing the right to fair 
trial, the Directive includes a number of provisions, relying on the discretion of 
Member States, exempting lawyers from duties of suspicion transaction reporting
681
.  
Nevertheless, this was questioned in a recent case in front of the ECJ, after a 
reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d' Arbitrage of Belgium
682
.               
The claimants –including the French Bar Association of Brussels- applied for the 
annulment of certain articles of the Belgian law which transposed the Directive, on 
the ground that they infringed provisions of the Belgian Constitution read in 
conjunction with article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as, inter 
alia, the obligation on lawyers to inform the authorities if they came across facts 
which they knew or suspected to be linked to money laundering unjustifiably 
impinged on professional secrecy and the independence of lawyers. Interestingly, the 
Court of Justice ruled that ‗lawyers would be unable to carry out satisfactorily their 
task of advising, defending and representing their clients, who would in consequence 
                                                             
677 This provides that ‗Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) 
above, but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type 
of customer, business relationship or transaction‘. 
678 See art. 8 (2), 11 (2) and 13 (1). See also Nicholas Ryder, ‗The Financial Services Authority and 
money laundering: a game of cat and Mouse‘, Cambridge Law Journal, 2008, pp. 640-642.  
679 See Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, id., 2007, p. 125-127. 
680 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2003, pp 146-151. 
681 See article 23 (2) of the F.D. 
682 See the case C-305/05 – Judgment delivered on 26 June 2007.  
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be deprived of the rights conferred on them by Article 6 of the ECHR, if lawyers were 
obliged, in the context of judicial proceedings or the preparation for such proceedings, 
to cooperate with the authorities by passing them information obtained in the course 
of related legal consultations683‘.  
The Court also found that the obligations of information and of cooperation with 
the authorities responsible for combating money laundering, did not infringe the right 
to a fair trial as guaranteed by article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights
684
. As it is, thus, evident, as a rule, if the nature of certain transactions is such 
that they take place in a context with no link to judicial proceedings, this means that 
these activities fall outside the scope of the right to a fair trial, and hence are not 
exempted from the duty to cooperate in combating money laundering. This was the 
case with advice and assistance given by lawyers in financial and real estate 
transactions that had no link with judicial proceedings.  
Another significant aspect of the Directive is that it provides a whole chapter on 
the reporting obligations imposed on institutions and persons covered by this 
Directive. In particular, Member States must require that the institutions and persons 
covered by this Directive pay ‗special attention‘ to any activity which they regard as 
particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to money laundering or terrorist 
financing and in particular complex or unusually large transactions and all unusual 
patterns of transactions which have no apparent economic or visible lawful 
purpose
685
.  
However, the most important innovation regarding reporting duties is the 
introduction of express provisions covering the so-called Financial Intelligence Units 
(FIU) whose importance has been increased. To that end, each Member State must 
establish a Financial Intelligence Unit with specific tasks in order effectively to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing
686
. This follows FATF 
Recommendation 13. The FIU must have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely 
basis, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires 
to properly fulfill its tasks
687
. It is also noteworthy that the institutions and persons 
covered by this Directive now have obligations to report suspicion transactions 
directly to the FIU, and not to other competent authorities. Yet, one should note that 
                                                             
683 See par. 32 of the judgment.  
684 See par. 37 of the judgment.  
685 See article 20 of the Directive.  
686 See article 21 of the Directive. 
687 Ibid.   
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the fact that the Directive makes no reference to the protection of the collected 
information raises serious questions and concerns concerning the protection of 
personal data. 
The Directive also requires Member States to ensure that natural and legal persons 
are liable for infringements of the national law provisions adopted pursuant to the 
Directive and that penalties should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive
688
.                
This allows for a degree of flexibility in national implementation. Only in the case of 
credit and financial institutions does the Directive require that without prejudice to 
criminal sanctions, Member States should ensure that the appropriate administrative 
measures can be taken or administrative sanctions can be imposed. 
An important innovation of this Directive is also the so-called prohibition of 
disclosure. According to the previous two instruments credit and financial 
institutions and their directors and employees were obliged not to disclose to the 
customer concerned or to other third persons the fact that information had been 
transmitted to the authorities or that a money laundering investigation was being 
carried out
689
. However, according to the new Directive this has changed not only in 
that this obligation covers ‗terrorist financing investigations‘, but also that the 
prohibition of disclosure is extended to investigations that ‗may be carried out‘690.  
Finally, as to the legal professionals, the new Directive does not give Member 
States the possibility to allow them to disclose to their clients that a report on 
suspicions of money laundering has been filed with the competent authorities which 
may, in turn, undermine any subsequent investigation
691
. Also, it is noteworthy that 
the new Directive reinforces the key role of the Financial Intelligence Units in the 
reporting process
692
. This shows the importance that the Community attaches to the 
information related to money laundering and terrorist financing in order to be treated 
by a specialized body.  
It is undoubted that the third Directive is an important step forward for the 
reinforcing of the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering, and also now of terrorist financing, taking into account the latest 
international developments in this field. Undoubtedly, the terrorist attacks of 09/11 
and hence the expansion of the FATF‘s mandate to cover terrorist finance played a 
                                                             
688 See article 39 of the Directive.  
689 See article 8 of the 1991/308 Directive.  
690 See article 28 of the 2005/60 Directive. 
691 Ibid.  
692 See article 9 of the 2005/60 Directive. 
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very significant role in the prioritization of further amendments to the EC anti-money 
laundering legislative framework as money laundering was (and still is) the main 
source of terrorist finance. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Harmonization of laws in Europe has affected ever wider areas of regulatory 
activity
693
 such as consumer protection, environmental protection, labor market 
regulation, contract and tort law and especially the last few years, to an increasingly 
evident degree, criminal law.  Harmonization of Member State‘s criminal laws has 
been a major area of activities in the third pillar of the EU ever since the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Undoubtedly, the existing legal diversity alongside with the rapid 
development of technology constitute a very useful tool in the hands of criminals
694
: 
they may take advantage of the heterogeneity and they may ‗choose‘ the less 
‗dangerous‘ for their criminal activities legal environment. Harmonization is, thus,           
a necessity in order to ensure a high level of security within the Union
695
.   
The debate on harmonization of criminal law has been primarily focused on the 
issue of the competence of the Community to adopt and impose criminal sanctions 
since- up to the Treaty of Lisbon- only the Union had a clear competence on criminal 
law issues. However, the European Court of Justice gave answers which are of 
significant constitutional importance and which proved to be the precursor of the 
changes to come through the Treaty of Lisbon. As Valsamis Mitsilegas notes, the ECJ 
has treated criminal law ‗as a means to an end‘ by accepting Community competence 
to legislate in the field in order to achieve the effectiveness of Community law
696
.                               
This means that criminal law is not a separate Community policy or objective,              
but rather another field of law which aims to achieve the Community‘s policies or 
objectives. Yet, one should note that the Court abstained from clarifying whether 
criminal law can be used in order to achieve any Community policy or objective. 
On the other hand, the Union, over the last few years, has extensively used 
criminal law through the third pillar in order to achieve harmonization in the context 
of transnational or serious crime. This harmonization has resulted in the adoption of 
‗heavily securitized and broad‘ EU criminal legislation697. Characteristics examples 
are the fight against terrorism, the fight against money laundering and the fight 
                                                             
693 See Stephen Weatherill, ‗Harmonization: How much, how little?‘, European Business Law Review, 
2005, Vol. 16, p. 533.  
694 See Anne Weyembergh, ‗Approximation of criminal laws, the Constitutional Treaty, and the Hague 
Programme‘, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, p.1579.  
695 See Sibyl Stein, ‗Combating Crime in the European Union: The Development of EU policy after the 
Convention‘, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 12/4, p.337-347. 
696 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, id. 2009, p. 110. 
697 Ibid.  
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against organized crime.   Undoubtedly, in these examples one can see not only the 
effort, but also the determination of the European Union to develop and improve the 
existing legal framework with respect to its vital ambition to develop a genuine ‗area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice‘. This goal is achieved by taking into account 
international standards as well as expressed national concerns. Yet, all the above-
mentioned instruments practically prove the increasing influence of Union law on 
domestic national criminal law. It is undoubtedly a rapidly growing area of law whose 
impact on national law will be much clearer in the forthcoming years. This impact,         
in particular in the fields of terrorism, organized crime and money laundering, will be 
examined in detail in the following chapter, using Greece as a case study.  
Undoubtedly, the changes for criminal law because of the Treaty of Lisbon may 
have a significant impact on its development. The new Treaty contains a clear legal 
basis for EU action on specific offences, which must be cross-border and serious
698
.               
In particular, the EU is only able to legislate to influence national criminal law in two 
main circumstances: (a) Where serious crime with a cross-border dimension is 
concerned, for example, in relation to terrorism; trafficking in human beings; sexual 
exploitation of women and children; illicit drug trafficking; illicit arms trafficking; 
money laundering; corruption; counterfeiting of means of payment; computer crime; 
and organized crime; (b) Where the law in a certain field has already been harmonized 
throughout the EU, and uniform definitions and sanctions are needed to make the law 
work effectively and consistently.  
On the other hand, it is undoubted that the Treaty of Lisbon gives priority to the 
principle of mutual recognition and leaves harmonization to be used only when it is 
‗necessary‘ to ensure a high level of Security699. However, the communitarization of 
the third pillar and the significant changes in decision making along with the abolition 
of the national veto may jeopardize this and lead to an increased production of 
harmonized criminal law measures with a significant impact on national legal orders. 
At the same time, it will be very interesting to see how the Court of Justice will deal 
with the introduction of preliminary rulings in pending cases before a court or tribunal 
of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, where the European Court of 
Justice has to act with the minimum of delay
700
. These are significant challenges for 
                                                             
698 See article 83 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
699 See article 67 par. 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
700 See article 267 of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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both the Court and the Member States. It is left to be seen how these will be dealt 
with, in practice.   
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Chapter 
4 
‘The Impact of the EU Harmonized Substantive Criminal Laws  
on the Greek Criminal Legal Order’ 
 
 
       
 
I. Introduction 
 
Harmonization of criminal laws has been felt as one of the most sensitive,                 
but at the same time controversial, issues which has raised serious debate and 
reactions in the Greek Jurisdiction. It is felt that harmonization is a necessary 
condition to further effective in developing criminal laws in Europe as well as judicial 
cooperation regarding criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition.  
In this context, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the main issues regarding 
the impact of harmonization of EU criminal laws on domestic law, using Greece as a 
case study. In particular, three main areas will be discussed in detail: (a) the fight 
against terrorism; (b) the fight against organized crime and (c) the fight against money 
laundering. These areas of interest have been chosen on the basis that they constitute 
substantive EU harmonized criminal laws (for which a thorough analysis has been 
done in the previous chapter from the EU perspective), and which have significant 
importance and effect when implemented in domestic Greek law. It is also noteworthy 
that for these crimes the obstacle of double criminality has been overcome in the 
context of the principle of mutual recognition. Furthermore, these three areas of 
criminality are serious, have transnational and national relevance, and they have also 
had a very high security priority in the past two decades, not only in the European 
Community, but the Greek legal order too.  
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II. The Fight Against Terrorism in the Greek Legal Order   
 
a. The ‘big picture’ of the Greek Legislation in combating terrorism 
     
The main provision codifying terrorism in the Greek legislation is article 187A    
of the Greek Criminal Code, which was introduced by Statute 3251/2004 and will be 
thoroughly analyzed in this chapter. Prior to the adoption of the said Statute, terrorist 
acts were punishable under article 187 of the Criminal Code on criminal 
organizations
701
, which encompassed both organized crime and terrorism, and were 
labelled the ‗terror-law‘ by the media702. However, the inclusion of both types of 
criminal acts in the same provision was criticized. Academics noted that terrorist 
offences have special characteristics that required more focused legislation
703
. 
Greece has ratified a number of international treaties related to terrorism, notably 
the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 
1999 (ratified by Statute 3034/2002), and the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977 (ratified by Statute 1789/1988). It should be noted 
that Greece has signed, but has yet to ratify, the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005, the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005, and the 2003 Protocol to the European 
Convention of 1977. Finally, Greece will have to implement in the near future the 
new Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. 
Very recently, on 20 September 2010, a number of provisions of Statute 
3251/2004 and article 184A of the Criminal Code were amended by Statute 
3875/2010. The amendments will be noted and briefly commented upon in the 
following analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                             
701 Art.187 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Statute 2928/2001, criminalises the establishment of 
or participation in a ‗structured and continuously active group made of three or more persons 
(organisation)‘ which aims at the perpetration of a series of predicate offences. For a thorough analysis 
of the article see the following chapter on organised crime. 
702 See Eleftherotypia newspaper, ‗Government satisfied with adoption of terror-law‘ (in Greek), article 
of 8/6/2001, available online at: www.enet.gr. 
703 Milonopoulos, ‗Statute 2928/2001 for the citizen‘s protection from crimes of criminal 
organizations‘, Poinikos Logos, 2001, p.794, (in Greek).  
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b. The Greek Implementing Law (Statute 3251/2004) 
 
The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism was 
implemented as part of the Greek Law with Statute 3251/2004, the same Statute that 
implemented the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.  
Apart from the arguments discussed in chapter two, in the parliamentary debate, 
one can add one more main argument regarding only terrorism: the definition of 
terrorism is broad and vague. Characteristic of this view is the statement made by the 
representative – at the time – of the PA.SO.K party, MP Papageorgiou, who argued 
inter alia that ‗it is undoubted that any effort to define terrorism by definition is 
unfortunate‘704. At the same lines MP Fotis Kouvelis stressed that ‗the broad terms 
used in the Bill with regard to terrorism create huge problems for fundaments rights 
as well as a broad framework for different interpretations of these terms‘705. 
However, the Minister of Justice argued that there was no issue of vagueness in the 
terms used in the Greek implementing law as it had used ‗the same definition as in 
Council Framework Decision which is binding and gives no space for adopting 
different views‘706. As with the European Arrest Warrant, the implementing law 
eventually came into force on 9 July 2004. 
The Council Framework Decision was implemented in art.40, 41, and 42, which 
comprise the second part of said Statute. Art.40 of Statute 3251/2004, the lengthiest of 
the three, implements the criminal law provisions of the Framework Decision;             
art.41 regulates the liability of legal persons; and finally art.42 refers to matters of 
criminal procedure. It should be noted that the Greek Legislator opted for the 
integration of the provisions of the Council Framework Decision into the relevant 
Greek codifying laws, when possible; thus, art.40 provides for the addition of a new 
article in and for further modifications to the Greek Criminal Code, while art.42 in 
par.1 to 4 amends the relevant articles of the Greek Criminal Procedure Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
704 See the Parliamentary Minutes of 24th June 2004, session 35th, p.1352. 
705 ibid, p.1354. 
706 ibid, p.1360. 
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Article 40 – ‘Acts of terrorism’  
The first paragraph of art.40 provides for the addition of a new art.187A in the 
Greek Criminal Code
707
. The new article enumerates the criminal offences for which 
the anti-terrorism provisions apply, implementing the respective provisions of art.1 
par.1 of the Framework Decision. The list comprises of serious criminal offences 
against life, health, and property. 
In order for these offences to be punished under the special anti-terrorism 
provisions, their perpetrator must have committed them in a manner that can seriously 
harm a country or an international organization, intending to harm or destroy their 
fundamental structures, to force them to perform or abstain from an act,                           
or to intimidate the population. These conditions are copied almost verbatim from 
art.1 par.1 of the Framework Decision. However, a difference should be noted:               
the use of the term ‗public authority‘ in art.187A par.1 (v) of the Criminal Code708 
(added by the implementing law) instead of the term ‗Government‘ used in the 
Framework Decision
709
. One could argue that the first term is broader than the 
second, since apart from the ‗Government‘ it can also refer to quasi-governmental or 
non-governmental agencies. The Greek implementing law seems to broaden the scope 
of the Framework Decision in that respect, allowing for a wider range of acts to be 
categorized as terrorist offences. 
If one of the listed offences is perpetrated under the conditions already mentioned, 
then the offender is punished by heavier sentences, in accordance with art.5 par.2 of 
the Framework Decision. Thus, for an offence that is otherwise punishable by 
incarceration
710
, the penalty cannot be less than ten years in prison under the 
implementing law. For offences otherwise punishable with imprisonment the penalty 
cannot be less than three years. Furthermore, the implementing law increases the 
statute-barring period to thirty years instead of twenty if the offence is punishable 
with life imprisonment, while if the latter is imposed, a conditional discharge is 
                                                             
707 The old art.187A is renamed as art.187B. 
708 See Statute 3251/2004, art.40, par.1 (1).  
709 See Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, art.1 par.1. 
710 Under the Greek Criminal Law system, criminal acts are categorised as felonies, misdemeanours 
and delicts (art.18 of the Criminal Code). Felonies are punished with incarceration (5-20 years in prison 
– art.52 of the Criminal Code), misdemeanours with imprisonment (10 days to 5 years in prison- art.53 
of the Criminal Code), and delicts with detention (1 day to 1 month in prison – art.55 of the Criminal 
Code). The same terms are used in the officially translated legislation.  
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possible only after a sentence of twenty-five years is served
711
. The law provides for 
heavier sentences in the case of concurrent offences as well
712
. In all these respects, 
the implementing law seems to be stricter than the Framework Decision, which 
contains no corresponding provisions, apart from the general dictate for ‗effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties‘713. 
Par.1 (4), 1(5) and 1(6) of art.40 of the implementing law (equivalent to art.187A 
par.4-6 of the Criminal Code) refer to offences related to participation in and aid 
offered to a terrorist organization. The law defines a terrorist organization as a group 
that is: (a) structured; (b) of some duration; (c) having at least three members acting 
jointly; and (d) aiming to commit terrorist offences. It, therefore, copies the definition 
used in art.2 par.1 of the Framework Decision. It is contested whether a group formed 
with the purpose to commit only one terrorist offence can be classified as a terrorist 
group under art.40 par.1 (4) of the implementing law. The wording of the article 
points to a positive answer, since it uses the singular form, referring to ‗the offence‘ 
of par.1
714. It has been maintained, that the requirement for a ‗continuous activity‘, 
combined with the plural form used in the Framework Decision, which speaks of 
‗terrorist crimes‘715, indicates the opposite direction, and that the group must aim to 
commit multiple offences
716
. Art.187A par. 4 was amended by Statute 3875/2010 so 
that it contained a provision for reduced penalty for participation in a terrorist 
organisation that had as a purpose the perpetration of misdemeanours; however,          
there was no amendment or clarification regarding the application of the Statute to 
organisations that aim to commit only one offence. 
Under the aforementioned paragraphs, the management of a terrorist organization 
is punished by incarceration for not less than ten years, and, after the recent 
amendment, with a reduced penalty if the organisation aims to commit 
                                                             
711 Normally offences punished by life imprisonment are statute-barred after twenty years (art.111 of 
the Greek Criminal Code), and a convict under life imprisonment can be conditionally discharged after 
serving twenty years (art.104 of the Greek Criminal Code). 
712 Pursuant to the Greek Criminal Code, art.187A par.1 in fine, in the case of a terrorist act resulting in 
multiple deaths, then the overall sentence is imposed according to art.91 par.1 of the Criminal Code, 
which provides for concurrent offences perpetrated with multiple acts, instead of the less strict par.2 
which would normally apply. 
713 See art.5 par.1 of the Framework Decision. 
714 See Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗The delimitation of the punishability of terrorism and the challenges for a 
criminal law under rule of law‘, Poinika Chronika, 2005, p.874, (in Greek). 
715 See art.2 par.1 of the Framework Decision. 
716 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The law on the EAW and the encounter of terrorism – the basic 
characteristics and a first interpretative approach‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.786, (in Greek). 
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misdemeanours
717
. The rest of the offences –participation, providing information or 
resources, funding– are punished by incarceration for not more than ten years.              
The penalty can be aggravated if the organization manufactures, procures or possesses 
weapons, explosives, and chemicals, and mitigated if no terrorist offence has been 
committed. It should be noted that the penalties imposed under the implementing law 
are stricter than those provided for in art.5 par.3 of the Framework Decision
718
. 
Other offences punishable under the implementing law are threatening to commit 
a terrorist crime
719
, and offences perpetrated in preparation for the terrorist crime
720
. 
However, the Greek law does not provide for the offences contained in art.3 par.2 (a), 
(b), (c) of the Framework Decision, that is public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence, recruitment and training for terrorism. Such acts are punished under the 
general provisions of the Criminal Code. The law also expands the application of 
art.187 par.2 of the Criminal Code, which criminalises obstruction of justice in 
prosecuting organized crimes, to terrorist offences
721
. 
The implementing law does not apply to offences that constitute high treason 
under art.134 of the Criminal Code
722
. While high treason is not often associated with 
terrorism, it is possible, in view of the definition of a terrorist offence adopted in the 
implementing law and presented above, that an act could be classified under both 
terms. The exception, not contained in the Framework Decision, is justified by the 
conceptualization of high treason as the foremost political crime. As such, it is tried 
by mixed jury courts, pursuant art.97 par.1 of the Greek Constitution, and therefore, 
could not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, as is the case with the 
terrorist crimes
723
. 
Another exception was included in par.1 (8) of art.40 of the implementing law 
(art.187A par.8 of the Criminal Code), concerning acts that could be characterized as 
terrorist offences under the definition adopted in Statute 3251/2004, but which 
constitute a manifestation of basic rights and freedoms –as laid down in the Greek 
                                                             
717 See art.187A par.5 as amended by Statute 3875/2010 art.2 par.3. 
718 For managing a terrorist group, the penalty under the Framework Decision can be no less than 
fifteen years; for the rest of the offences, no less than eight. 
719 Art.40 par.1(3) of the implementing law (art.187A par.3 of the Criminal Code), in accordance with 
art.1 par.1(i) of the Framework Decision. 
720 Namely theft, robbery, forgery and extortion. See art.40 par.1(7) of the implementing law (art.187A 
par.7 of the Criminal Code) and art.3 par.2(d),(e),(f) of the Framework Decision. 
721 See art.40 par.1(9) of the implementing law (art.187A par.9 of the Criminal Code). 
722 Art.187A par.2 of the Criminal Code (art.40 par.1(2) of the implementing law). 
723 See art.111 par.5 of the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure, as replaced by art.42 par.4 of Statute 
3251/2004. Also, Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id. p.785. 
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Constitution and in the European Convention of Human Rights– or a defence of 
democratic principles. The extent of the exception was not fully clarified
724
; yet,             
its adoption seemed to be in accordance with both the Framework Decision,              
which underlines its respect for the fundamental principles of human rights and 
democracy in its Preamble
725
 as well as in art.1 par.2
726
, and the Greek Constitution. 
This exception and all the references of art.187A to it were removed by article 2 of 
the amending Statute 3875/2010. 
The supply and reception of funds, assets, and information that facilitate a terrorist 
organisation is punishable under art.187A par.6 of the Criminal Code with 
incarceration of up to ten years, irrespective of the actual commission of any offence 
by the organisation. 
Furthermore, art.40 par.2 of the implementing law provides for the mitigation           
or suspension of the penalty, and even its absolution, for terrorist offenders who 
cooperate with the authorities towards the prevention of a terrorist crime or the break 
up of the organization. These provisions, introduced in the Criminal Code for the first 
time by Statute 2928/2001
727
 concerning organized crime, reflect the corresponding 
art.6 of the Framework Decision, which, however, provides only for a reduction of the 
penalty and not for its absolution. 
Finally, art.40 par.3 of the implementing law provides for the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the Greek State over terrorist offences, irrespectively of the place 
where they were committed. This extension of the Greek jurisdiction surpasses by far 
the respective art.9 of the Framework Decision
728
 and has been heavily criticized. 
 
Articles 41-42 – ‘Liability of Legal Person – Penalties’  
Art.41 of Statute 3251/2004 introduces administrative penalties for legal persons 
that are connected to terrorist offences, implementing art.7 and 8 of the Framework 
                                                             
724 See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The terrorist crime: the provisions of Statute 3251/2004 and their 
implications in the framework of our criminal law system‘, Nomiko Vima, 2005, p.625, (in Greek). 
725 See recital 10 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision. 
726 See Art.1 par.2 of the Framework Decision. 
727 Art.187A of the Criminal Code, renamed as art.187B by Statute 3251/2004. 
728 Which states in par.1(a) that ‗Each Member State may extend its jurisdiction if the offence is 
committed in the territory of a Member State‘. 
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Decision
729
. Art.42 provides for the application of special investigatory procedures to 
terrorist crimes
730
, placing them under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
729 It is noteworthy that the penalties became heavier after the recent amendments. See Statute 
3875/2010 art.10. 
730 These procedures were introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Statute 2928/2001 on 
organised crime, and will be analysed in the respective chapter. It should be noted that the Framework 
Decision does not deal with procedural matters. 
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c. The Academic Point of View 
 
The anti-terrorist provisions of Statute 3251/2004 that implemented the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism have since their 
adoption been the object of severe criticism by Greek academics. The new art.187A 
of the Greek Criminal Code along with the extension of the application of special 
investigation practices
731
 were seen by many as another proof of the shift of direction 
of criminal law towards the ‗criminal law of the enemy‘732, a direction that cannot be 
easily reconciled with the traditional and liberal character of criminal law in a 
democratic society
733
. At a theoretical level, it is maintained that the new provisions 
tacitly presuppose a ‗human right to security‘, the existence and desirability of which 
are debatable
734
.  
The implementing Statute has also been criticized for excessive adherence to the 
text of the Framework Decision to the detriment of its legal quality and compliance 
with the Greek Constitution. The choice of the Greek Legislator to copy the wording 
of the Framework Decision was condemned since it was argued that the Framework 
Decision ‗suffered‘ from a democratic deficit and in any case is binding only as to the 
results at which it aims and not as to the actual measures that have to be adopted by 
Member States
735
. The Framework Decision itself, in the Preamble, calls for 
‗approximate‘, not identical definitions of terrorism in Member States736.                          
On this basis it was maintained that the Legislator should adhere more to the 
principles of the Constitution, than to the text of the Framework Decision itself. 
                                                             
731 Introduced by Statute 2928/2001 on organized crime. 
732 See Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., pp.869-872, where the author criticizes the theories that propose the 
handling of criminals committing certain types of crimes not as persons entitled to protection of their 
basic human rights, but as enemies that must be eliminated for the benefit of society. See also 
Giannidis, ‗The new legitimization of Criminal Law and the end of classic doctrines‘, Poinika 
Chronika, 2007, p. 773, (in Greek). 
733 Giannidis, id., pp. 770-775. 
734 Livos negates the existence of such a right, supporting the state interference through special 
legislation only when lack of security equals lack of effective judicial protection, when ‗the security 
problem is transformed into a justice problem‘. Livos, ‗The security problem and security as a 
problem: The example of Criminal Law‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis I: Democracy, 
freedom, security, Sakkoulas, 2004, p.200 (in Greek). Giannidis sees security as an ―independent 
notion of international security‘ that serves as a new basis of legitimization of criminal law provisions 
(Giannidis, id. p.774]. See also Kaiafa-Gbanti, id., pp. 967-869. 
735 Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗The Law on European Arrest Warrant and terrorism and the declarations of 
allegiance to the Constitution‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.836 (in Greek); Simeonidou-Kastanidou, 
id., 2005, p.628. 
736 Preamble of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, point 6. See 
also Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id. 
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The arguments criticising Statute 3251/2004 can be summarized in four 
categories: 1. Vagueness and lack of certainty in the definitions; 2. Violations of the 
principle of proportionality; 3. Criminalization of beliefs; 4. Inconsistencies with the 
Criminal Code system and the Constitution. 
 
1. Definitional Vagueness 
The main criticism against the implementing anti-terrorist provisions of Statute 
3251/2004 is that they lack the necessary certainty in the definition of what 
constitutes a terrorist crime. The problem was already pointed out in the Report of the 
Academic Committee of the Greek Parliament that accompanied the Bill at the time 
of its introduction. The accompanying Report remarked on the ‗overwhelming use of 
vague terms‘737 in the definition adopted by the Council Framework Decision and its 
impact on the implementing Statute. 
The vagueness of the Framework Decision is reflected on art.187A par.1 of the 
Criminal Code, introduced by the implementing Statute 3251/2004, which follows 
closely the definition of terrorist crime adopted in the former. In the literature,              
the definition is criticised for the use of terms such as ‗seriously harming a 
country…‘, ‗seriously intimidating…‘, ‗forcing a country (…) to perform any act (…) 
or abstain there from…‘738. It is not clear what the criminal law intends to protect with 
the reference to a ‗country‘. Subsequently, it is very difficult, if not impossible,             
for one to say what exactly constitutes ‗serious harm‘ to a country739.                             
Thus, the additional harm caused by a terrorist act, founded on the importance of the 
interests to be protected and affecting and justifying the increased penalties provided 
for in the law, remains elusive
740
. 
The uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms in the definition of the criminal act 
is viewed by some as resulting in the unconstitutionality of the provision.                 
Critics argue that the vagueness of art.187A par.1, a criminal law provision, is a 
breach of art.7 par.1 of the Greek Constitution, which provides that all crimes must be 
                                                             
737 Milonopoulos, ‗Report on the Bill of the EAW‘, Poinika Chronika, p.1050, (in Greek). 
738 Art.187A par.1 of the Criminal Code. 
739 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2004, p.780; Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2005, p.873. 
740 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2004, p.838. 
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‗specified by law (…) defining the constitutive elements of the act‘741, and ultimately 
with the principle of legality
742
. 
The criminalisation of terrorism in such vague terms has significant procedural 
consequences. These include, among others
743
, the application of the special 
investigatory procedures provided for in Statute 2928/2001 on organized crime, the 
possible intervention of Europol
744
, the international jurisdiction of the Greek Courts 
for all terrorist offences regardless of the country where they were committed
745
, and 
the imposition of heavier penalties. Given that many of the consequences aim at 
enabling police intervention and have, therefore, serious implications for the freedom 
of citizens and human rights
746
 –in particular so in the case of the special interrogation 
procedures, which have been criticized themselves for the lack of a concrete 
legislative framework that would regulate their conduct
747– the problem is, still, 
aggravated. 
Finally, definitional vagueness affects not only the crime of art.187A par.1 of the 
Criminal Code, but also the rest of the acts criminalised in this provision, since they 
are in fact preparatory or participatory acts directly related to the main terrorist crime 
and its definition
748
. 
The main argument against these criticisms is based on the text of the Council 
Framework Decision itself, which is binding on the Greek Legislator.                                  
It has been argued that there was no option, but for the implementing law to follow 
closely the definition adopted in the Framework Decision; therefore, vagueness is 
primarily an issue with the Framework Decision and not a deliberate choice of the 
Greek Legislator
749
. Should each State freely modify the common definition,                 
the object of a common front against terrorism could be defeated, since terrorists 
                                                             
741 Art.7 par.1 of the Constitution is an expression of the principle ‗nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege 
certa‘. See Androulakis, Criminal Law: General Part, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2000, 
pp.131-135 (in Greek). 
742 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id. 
743 For a more detailed list of consequences see Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., pp.782-784. 
744 Pursuant to art.2 of the Europol Convention, the objective of Europol is to promote effectiveness 
and cooperation in the fight against serious organised crime, including ‗crimes committed or likely to 
be committed in the course of terrorist activities‘. 
745 Art.8 of the Criminal Code as modified by art.40 par.3 of Statute 3251/2004. 
746 See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2005, p.626-628, where she notes a paradox: the international 
application entails that acts against totalitarian regimes and in favour of democracy could be prosecuted 
under Greek anti-terrorist laws. Kaiafa-Gbandi also notes that reservations about police activity have 
been expressed in other countries even when there are no issues of definitional vagueness, as in the 
case of organized crime. See Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2005, p.873. 
747 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.627. 
748 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.625. 
749 Milonopoulos, id., 2004, p.1050. 
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could take advantage of the differentiations among jurisdictions so as to attain the 
minimum penalty or to even remain unpunished
750
. Nevertheless, one should note that 
the Framework Decision, a legislative tool of the third pillar of the European Union, 
leaves some leeway to Member States as to the manner of implementation, provided 
that its objective is met; in any case, the text of the Decision calls for ‗approximate‘, 
not, thus, identical definitions of terrorism in Member States
751
.  
A second counter-argument was based on the former provision of art.187A par.8, 
which exempted from the scope of criminalisation acts that aimed at the establishment 
of democracy or at the exercise of a fundamental right or freedom from being 
characterized as terrorist acts and falling into the definition of art.187A par.1.                   
It was argued that the provision, limiting the application of art.187A par.1, could act 
as a counter-balance to the vagueness of the latter and the broad definition of 
terrorism
752
. Nevertheless, the provision of art.187A par.8 had been itself criticised 
for using vague terms
753
, and such a use of unclear drafting towards the delimitation 
of the scope of another vague provision appeared problematic.                              
However, the exception previously contained in par.8 was removed in the recent 
amendments,   a development that has been viewed as an abolition of an important 
‗safety valve‘ of the law754. Yet, the aforementioned argument maintains its 
significance to the extent that such a delimitating interpretation could be based 
directly on the relevant provision of the Constitution and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the problem of vagueness and the resulting 
extremely broad punishability can be countered by the application of the appropriate 
interpretative method, more specifically through the teleological interpretation of the 
provision by the judge
755
. While the necessity of an interpretative intervention by the 
courts has been acknowledged by the academics
756
, concerns have been raised as to 
the implications of such a broad dependence on interpretation by the Courts,            
                                                             
750 Kioupis, ‗Statute 3251/2004 – a brief presentation of its basic points‘, Poinikos Logos, 2004, p.976, 
(in Greek).  
751 Preamble of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, point 6. 
752 Milonopoulos, id., p.1050. 
753 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2004, p.781; Milonopoulos, id. 
754 See Eleftherotypia newspaper, ‗Terrorist activity and demonstrations‘ (in Greek), article of 
22/9/2010, available online at: www.enet.gr 
755 Milonopoulos, id. 
756 See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2005, p.629. 
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instead of legislative clarity for the observance of the principle of legality expressed 
in art.7 par.1 of the Constitution
757
. 
 
2. The principle of proportionality 
The objection of the academics that touches on the issue of the observance of the 
principle of proportionality is connected to the definition of the terrorist crime found 
in article 187A para. 1 of the Criminal Code, and the Legislator‘s choice to include in 
it offences perpetrated by one person alone, the so-called ‗individual terrorist‘.            
Critics argue that the security of a country is threatened not so much by the acts of a 
single perpetrator, but by the activity of a terrorist group, which is the main form 
under which international terrorism operates
758
. Under the principle of 
proportionality
759
, the increased penalties imposed on terrorist crimes compared to 
common ones can be justified only by a respectively increased harm caused by the 
act. This harm, as something over and above the act itself, which would be punishable 
in any case, can be found, according to the exponents of this argument, in the special 
characteristics of a terrorist group: the existence of a structure that increases the threat 
to a country and facilitates its endurance over time
760
. It has been argued, for instance,            
that terrorist crimes perpetrated by a person acting alone cannot pose a sufficiently 
greater threat to a country than common offences. The heavier penalties imposed by 
the anti-terrorist provisions, thus, are said to fall foul of the principle of 
proportionality
761
. 
Contrary arguments to this view, favouring the inclusion of acts with a single 
perpetrator in the definition of the terrorist crime, invoke real-life examples of serious 
terrorist crimes that have been committed by individual terrorists, like the cases of 
                                                             
757 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2004, p.781. 
758 Ibid., p.784. 
759 On the notion of the principle of proportionality in the Greek criminal law, see Nikolaos 
Androulakis, ‗Criminal Law – General Part‘, Sakkoulas, 2006, pp.50-68 and 75; Christos 
Milonopoulos, ‗Criminal Law – General Part‘, Sakkoulas, 2007, pp. 14-15 and 66-69; Konstantintos 
Vathiotis, ‗Issues of Criminal Law‘, Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2007, pp. 01-10, 107, 116 and Nikolaos 
Androulakis, ‗Fundamental Notions of Criminal Trial‘, Sakkoulas, 2007, pp19-21,467-475, all 
references in Greek. 
760 Livos, ‗Organized crime: Meaning and procedural means for its encounter‘, in Greek Association 
of Criminal Law, Organized crime from a criminal law aspect), 2000, p.48 (in Greek); Simeonidou-
Kastanidou, ‗Statute 2928/2001 ‗for the citizens‘ protection from crimes of criminal organizations‘, 
Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, p.694, (in Greek). 
761 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2005, p.630; Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2005, p.872. 
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Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh
762
. The proponents of the criminalisation of 
terrorism in these terms, correctly note that the seriousness and dangerousness of a 
terrorist threat or act depend not only on the existence of a structured organization, 
but also on the technological means available to terrorists: an individual terrorist who 
is well equipped with the latest technological weapons can constitute a more serious 
threat to security than an organization that uses less sophisticated methods, and this 
fact was rightly not overlooked in the anti-terrorist provisions
763
. One could add onto 
this argument the recent developments in Union Law: the new Council Framework 
Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism specifically mentions individual terrorism
764
 
and adopts provisions against individual acts without requiring any type of connection 
with a terrorist organisation
765, in what has been described as a ‗total shift towards 
individual terrorism
766‘. 
The objections concerning the inclusion of single-person offences in the definition 
of terrorist crime are also reflected in the criticism against the provision of art.187A 
par.4 that punishes with increased penalties the formation of or membership                        
at a terrorist organization with the purpose of committing one or multiple terrorist 
crimes. It has been argued that if the participant in the organization aims at 
committing only one terrorist offence, then his actions cause no additional harm,               
as they do not contribute towards the actual source of the threat to security and public 
order, which is the structure and duration of a terrorist group that enables the 
perpetration of terrorist crimes over time
767
. Therefore, in this case, the increased 
penalty is unjustified and disproportionate. 
The rest of the offences included in art.187A of the Criminal Code have also 
attracted criticism as to the proportionality of the imposed penalties. It has been noted 
that, pursuant to art.187A par.3 of the Criminal Code, the threat of committing a 
terrorist crime can attract heavier penalties than the actual attempt to commit                   
                                                             
762 See Milonopoulos, id., p.1050; See also Milonopoulos, id., 2001, p.794, where the author criticises 
the law regulating terrorist crimes before the adoption of Statute 3251/2004 for the non inclusion of 
acts of individual terrorists. 
763 Kioupis, id., .976. 
764 See paragraphs (3) and (4) of the Preamble of the Framework Decision of 28 November 2008. 
765 See for instance the definitions of the crimes of ‗public provocation to commit a terrorist offence‘ 
and of ‗recruitment for terrorism‘ in art.1 of the Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2008 
amending art.3 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002. 
766 Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗The prevention of terrorism and the criminal law of pre-preemptive suppression: 
New criminal acts for the encounter of terrorism in E.U‘, Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.387, (in Greek). 
767 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2005, p.874. 
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a terrorist crime
768
, even though the latter can cause greater harm to the public order 
than the former
769
. Apart from violating the principle of proportionality, this provision 
has been criticized for being paradoxical and inconsistent with the penalty system of 
the Criminal Code, as well as for dissociating the harm of the preparation of a crime 
from the harm of the crime itself
770
.Similarly, it had been noted that the participation 
in a terrorist group aiming at committing terrorist misdemeanours constituted a crime 
punishable by incarceration, while the completed terrorist misdemeanour is 
punishable like all misdemeanours by imprisonment; after the recent amendments, 
however, a reduced penalty is imposed in such a case. 
 
3. Criminalization of thought 
The third major criticism against the anti-terrorist provisions of Statute 3251/2004 
concerns what is regarded as an imposition of heavier penalties on the basis not of 
concrete acts, but of a certain mentality of the perpetrator, who is ultimately 
criminalised for his beliefs rather than his acts. An example of this is the provision of 
art.187A par.7 of the Criminal Code, which imposes more rigorous penalties on 
certain crimes already punished under the Code if they are committed as a preparation 
for the terrorist crime
771
. The aggravating circumstance in this case is not some action, 
but some future intent of the offender which is extremely difficult to establish with 
any certainty. A common robbery, punishable in any case, has the same external 
manifestation as a robbery committed in preparation for a terrorist crime, the only 
differentiation being the motive of the perpetrator. It is argued that the additional 
factor justifying the heavier penalties is connected to the motive alone, and that the 
provision is actually criminalising the beliefs of the offender
772
. 
 Similar objections have been raised in relation to art.187A par.6 of the Criminal 
Code, which criminalises acts facilitating the formation of or participation in                   
a terrorist organisation. The provision does not demand, expressly in its amended 
form, that the formation of or accession to the organisation has actually taken place; 
                                                             
768 This is true in the case of misdemeanours: The attempt of a terrorist misdemeanour is punishable by 
imprisonment from 10 days to 5 years (art.187A par.1(iii) and 42 of the Criminal Code), while the 
threat of committing the same misdemeanour is punishable by imprisonment from 2 to 5 years 
(art.187A par.3).  
769 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., p.877. 
770 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., p.875; Milonopoulos, id., 2004, p.1050. 
771 The amended par. 7 refers to ‗a purpose to commit‘ rather than ‗a preparation‘ of the terrorist 
offence. Despite the different wording, the meaning of the provision seems to remain in essence the 
same. 
772 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id.; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2005, p.635. 
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without such a dependency, it is argued, the provision criminalizes a neutral action on 
the basis of the motive alone, rendering it furthermore a crime
773
. 
Apart from these two cases where the issue of the criminalisation of motives and 
beliefs is most evident, critics note the overall prominence of subjective factors
774
, 
based on the intention of the perpetrator and often dependent on uncertain and future 
circumstances, in the description of the offences and the subsequent difficulty for the 
judge to establish their occurrence with the required certainty
775
. More significantly, 
this feature has been attributed not only to the Greek implementing law, but also to 
the very concept of special legislation for terrorist crimes, on the basis that the 
difference between a terrorist and a common criminal lies precisely in their aims and 
motives
776
. This argument implies that the criminalisation of beliefs in any anti-
terrorist legislation is inevitable. Such a conclusion can also support an opposing set 
of arguments that depart from the acknowledgement that the new types of legislation, 
among which are the anti-terrorist laws, cannot be accommodated by the existing 
principles of criminal and constitutional law. As a result, the two possible options are 
either the repeal of the legislation or the introduction of new legal paradigms that can 
legitimize it, any attempt towards reconciliation being ultimately meaningless
777
. 
Relevant to the criticism concerning the criminalisation of beliefs is the debate on 
whether terrorist offences are in fact political offences and, therefore, subject to 
special provisions under the Greek Constitution. This connection is precluded in the 
Preamble of the Framework Decision
778
; however, academics have noted that 
terrorism can have strong political elements that cannot be ignored
779
.                             
However, the predominant view is that terrorist offences are not political offences 
when the harm they cause is disproportionate to their political motive, as in the case 
of murders and other serious crimes of the Criminal Code
780
. 
                                                             
773 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., p.877; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2004, p.786. 
774 See art.187 A par. 1 of the Criminal Code.  
775 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., p.875. 
776 See Manoledakis, ‗State security or freedom?‘, in Manitakis, Takis (eds.), Terrorism and rights: 
from state security to law insecurity, Savvalas, 2005, pp.29-30, (in Greek). 
777 For this argument see Giannidis, id., pp. 769-775. 
778 The Preamble of the Framework Decision mentions the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
of 27 January 1977, which ‗does not regard terrorist offences as political offences or as offences 
inspired by political motives‘. 
779 Kyritsis, ‗Terrorism and political crime: proposals for a classification‘, Poinika Chronika, 2005, 
pp.490-499 (in Greek); Belandis , ‗The trials of the cases of 17 Noemvri and ELA. The anti-terrorist 
laws in practice‘, Dikaiomata tou Anthropou, 2007, Pp. 1156-1157, (in Greek). 
780 See Manoledakis, id., pp.37-38. It has also been maintained that terrorist offences are political when 
they are widely supported in society. See Stathopoulos, ‗Political crime and the organization ‘17 
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4. Inconsistencies within the Criminal Code system 
The final argument against the anti-terrorist articles of Statute 3251/2004 is that it 
poses a threat to the internal coherence of the Criminal Code. Some of the 
inconsistencies between Statute 3251/2004 and the Criminal Code have already been 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs in relation to other objections against the law: 
the imposition of the penalty of incarceration for participation in a terrorist 
organization aiming at committing misdemeanours, which was recently amended,     
as well as the imposition of a heavier penalty on the threat of committing a terrorist 
act than the actual attempt of committing one. Apart from these, art.187A has been 
criticized for the provision of par.6, which typifies as autonomous crimes a series of 
acts that would normally be considered as participatory acts to the principal crime and 
be linked to it in accordance with the general rules of crime participation contained in 
the Criminal Code. This criminalisation of assisting acts independently of the 
existence of a principal criminal offence has been considered a departure from the 
participation scheme of the Criminal Code, and a simultaneous extension of 
punishability towards the very early stages of the preparation of a not yet existing 
crime
781
. 
It has been suggested that the drafting of the provision was due to a legislative 
omission, and that the courts should interpret the article in the light of the provision of 
art.2 par.2 (b) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 which refers to 
participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and require the existence of a 
terrorist organisation in order for the assisting acts to be punishable
782
. While such an 
interpretation is possible, it should be noted that the more recent Framework Decision 
of 28 November 2008 is abandoning the above requirement, criminalizing assisting 
acts such as the recruitment and training for terrorism regardless of the existence of a 
terrorist group or and commitment of a terrorist offence
783
. 
Finally, there have been concerns about the relationship of art.187A of the 
Criminal Code on terrorism with art.187 on organized crime, which regulated terrorist 
crimes until the adoption of Statute 3251/2004. In view of the criticism by academics, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Noemvri‘, Some more general thoughts on freedom and its limits‘, Elliniki Dikaiosini, 2003, pp.896-
897, (in Greek). 
781 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., p.877. 
782 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.786. 
783 See art.3 of the Council Framework Decision on 13 June 2002 as amended by art.1 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 28 November 2008. For a criticism of the new provisions see Kaiafa-Gbandi, 
id., 2009, p.385-400. 
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who noted that terrorism and organized crime have different aims and characteristics 
and called for different criminal law provisions
784
, the specific legislation concerning 
terrorist crimes was welcome; however, it has not been accompanied by a 
corresponding amendment of art.187, which has maintained its broad phrasing that 
encompasses both terrorist and criminal organizations. The parallel application of the 
two provisions on terrorism can be resolved through an interpretative approach,                 
in particular through the lex specialis doctrine; still, it has been argued that art.187 
should be amended to regulate only organized crime, so that there would be no 
overlap between the two articles
785
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
784 Milonopoulos, id., 2001, p.794; Kioupis, id., p.975. 
785 Ch. Milonopoulos (Υ. Μπισλόπνπινο), id., 2004, p.1051. 
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d. Final Remarks 
 
The adoption of a special Statute concerning terrorist offences, instead of the 
application of the provisions of Statute 2928/2001 on organised crime, seems to be a 
positive step, as it results in more a focused legislation that can address more 
effectively the particular traits of each type of criminal offence. However,              
Statute 3251/2004 on combating terrorism does not lack drawbacks. It was adopted 
almost a year and a half after the deadline for the implementation of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, under pressure in view of both the expired 
deadline and the security issues raised by the approaching Athens Olympics
786
.             
The hasty adoption, along with the uncritical and often verbatim copying of the text of 
the Framework Decision, have resulted in vague terms and provisions that are often 
difficult to reconcile with the rest of the Criminal Code. The recent amendments by 
Statute 3875/2010 addressed some of these issues, especially those related to the 
perpetration of terrorist misdemeanours, but in other aspects, such as the removal of 
the exception to art.187A par.8, seem to be prone to draw more harsh criticism. 
A careful interpretation by the Courts, in consistency with the Criminal Code 
system, can provide answers to the criticism raised against the Statute.                 
However, a significant aspect is that Statute 3251/2005 has not been applied by the 
Greek courts till today. The major terrorist trials of ‗17 Noemvri‘ and ‗ELA‘ were 
conducted under the previous Statute 2928/2001, and have dealt mostly with issues 
raised by that Statute. In view of the recent intense activities of new terrorist groups in 
Greece, and the arrests of some of their members, the anti-terrorist legislation is due 
to be tested before the Greek courts soon, and their answers to the issues presented in 
this chapter will be of great interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
786 Mitsilegas V., ‗The Impact of the European Union on the Greek Criminal Justice System‘, in L. 
Cheliotis and S. Xenakis (Eds), ‗Crime and punishment in contemporary Greece‘, Peter Lang 
Publishers, Forthcoming.  
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III. The Fight Against Organized Crime in the Greek Legal Order 
 
a. The ‘big picture’ of the Greek Legislation 
 
The first attempts towards the adoption of legislation against organised crime in 
Greece are dated in the early 1990‘s, with the introduction of Statute 1916/1990 ‗for 
the protection of society from organised crime‘. Despite its reference to organised 
crime, the Statute was mainly intended to be a response to a series of terrorist attacks 
by the terrorist group ‗17 Noemvri‘. Its provisions were seen as a threat to freedom of 
the press and personal freedoms, and were attacked heavily by the mass media and the 
Opposition. The Statute was finally revoked three years later, by Statute 2172/1993
787
. 
In view of the heavy criticism against the above Statute, no similar legislation was 
introduced in Greece in the following years. However, international developments in 
the field of the fight against organised crime, namely the Council Joint Action 
98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 and the adoption of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) on 15 November 2000, 
combined with the growth of criminal organisations inside Greece
788
, necessitated the 
adoption of special legislation targeted against organised crime. Therefore, on 27 June 
2001, Statute 2928/2001 was adopted. The Statute, entitled ‗Modification of 
provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure and other 
provisions for the citizens‘ protection from crimes of criminal organisations‘,               
was introduced in view of the adoption of the Palermo Convention and the Council 
Joint Action
789
. It remains the main Greek legislation against organised crime.               
As is evident from its title, the Greek Government opted for the amendment of a 
series of provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure that 
were related to organised crime activities and the methods of fighting them, rather 
than the introduction of a special criminal Statute that would apply only to the acts of 
criminal organisations. 
                                                             
787 For more details about Statute 1916/1990 and the debate concerning it see Livos, Organised Crime 
and Special Investigative Techniques. Vol.1: Doctrine of Organised Crime. Issue A: The 
criminological-doctrinal phenotype of organised crime, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2007, 
pp.55-64, (in Greek). 
788 See Explanatory Report on the Bill on ‗Modifications of provisions of the Criminal Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and other provisions for the citizens‘ protection from crimes of criminal 
organizations‘, Poinika Chronika, 2001, p.1007, (in Greek). 
789 Ibid. 
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Since the adoption of Statute 2928/2001 there have been a number of 
developments concerning it. Firstly, Statute 3251/2004 was adopted, which regulated 
terrorist activities prosecuted up to then under Statute 2928/2001, and which 
introduced some minor amendments to its provisions. Secondly, the Council of the 
European Union adopted the Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 25 
October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, the deadline for its implementation 
by Member States being 11 May 2010. A competent Special Law Drafting Committee 
has been set up in the Greek Ministry of Justice, for the purpose of transposing the 
above mentioned FD into the Greek legislation, but has not yet completed its work
790
. 
Lastly, Statute 3785/2010, adopted on 20 September 2010, finally incorporated the 
text of the Palermo Convention into the Greek legal order and amended a number of 
provisions of art.187 of the Criminal Code and Statute 2928/2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
790 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, 
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b. The Provisions of Statute 2928/2001 
 
As noted above, Statute 2928/2001 took into consideration the Palermo 
Convention (eventually ratified on 20 September 2010 by Statute 3875/2010) and 
Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998
791
. It consists of 14 articles, 
10 of which are relevant to the fight against organised crime. Articles1 to 3 of the 
Statute amend the Greek Criminal Code, while articles 4, 5, and 6 amend the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Art.7 regulates the completion of the investigative procedure. 
Art.8 refers to the liability of legal persons and companies. Finally, articles 9 and 10 
introduce measures for the protection of witnesses and other persons related to the 
criminal procedure. The articles of Statute 2928/2001 will be presented in the 
following paragraphs, with the focus being on those relevant to European and 
international legislation. 
 
Article 1 – ‘Criminal Organization’  
Art.1 par.1 of Statute 2928/2001 substitutes art.187 of the Criminal Code, 
formerly entitled ‗Conspiracy and association to commit offences‘, with a new article 
entitled ‗Criminal organisation‘, providing for the main criminal offences related to 
organised crime. 
Pursuant to the first paragraph of the new art.187, whoever forms or becomes a 
member of a criminal organisation that aims at the perpetration of a series of felonies, 
is punished by imprisonment of up to ten years. The organisation should be 
structured
792
, have a continuous activity and be comprised of three or more persons; 
therefore, mere association for the perpetration of a single crime, even a serious one, 
is not punished under this provision. The wording of the paragraph reflects the notion 
that it is the structure and the continuous readiness of the group to commit offences 
rather than the perpetration of the offences themselves that creates an increased 
danger to society and should be criminalised accordingly
793
. Furthermore, the actual 
                                                             
791 Explanatory Report, id. 
792 The Statute, similarly to the Council Joint Action, does not provide a definition of the term. A 
definition can be found in art.2(c) of the Palermo Convention: ‗structured‘ is a group ‗that is not 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally 
defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure‘. 
793 Manoledakis, ‗Security and Freedom (interpretation of Statute 2928/2001 on organised crime and 
relevant texts)‘, Sakkoulas, 2002, p.106, (in Greek). 
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perpetration of any crime is irrelevant, the law aiming at a stage before the 
commitment of a traditional crime. 
The limitation of the predicate offences to felonies only, that is to offences 
punishable with imprisonment for at least five and at most twenty years
794
, deviates 
from the Joint Action and the Convention
795
, which provide for predicate offences 
punishable by deprivation of liberty of a maximum of at least four years
796
.          
However, crimes that would be predicate offences under the Joint Action and the 
Convention and that are not included in the definition or par.1 can be punished under 
par.3 of art.187. 
Art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code omits a main component of organised crime 
according to theory, that of the aim of financial or material benefit.
797
. It, therefore, 
seems to regulate all types of criminal groups, and not only the ones that could be 
labelled as ‗organised crime‘, following apparently Council Joint Action, which,              
in article 1, states that the predicate offences must be ‗an end in themselves or                 
a means of obtaining material benefits‘. 
Statute 3875/2010 introduced the new paragraphs 2 and 3 in art.187 of the 
Criminal Code. The amended par.2 refers to the provision of information and material 
to a criminal organisation, punishable by incarceration of ten years at the most.             
Par.3 punishes the management of a criminal organisation by incarceration of at least 
ten years. 
The forth (former second) paragraph of art.187 of the Criminal Code targets the 
corruption often associated with organised crime, as well as attempts towards the 
intimidation of the judiciary
798
. This provision is linked to art.8 and art.23 of the 
Palermo Convention
799
, but, contrary to them, it criminalises only the offering of 
                                                             
794
 Art.18 of the Criminal Code. 
795 Art.1 of the Council Joint Action; Art.2(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
796 Kaiafa-Gbandi criticizes this definition on the basis of the imposed penalties, arguing that it is not 
sufficient for the affirmation of the seriousness of the offence; she offers the example of the Greek 
criminal legislation, pursuant to which penalties of up to five years are often provided for lesser crimes 
and can be converted to pecuniary penalties or be suspended. See Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗Towards a new 
delimitation of the punishability of organized crime in E.U. – Its implications for our national legal 
order‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.1438, (in Greek). 
797 See Livos, ‗Organised Crime: Definition and procedural means for its confrontation‘ in Greek 
Society of Criminal Law, Organised crime under the criminal law viewpoint. Proceedings of the VII 
Panhellenic convention, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2000, p.32, (in Greek). 
798 Pursuant to the provision, the use of bribery, threats, or violence against judicial officials in an 
attempt to avert the prosecution of the criminal organisation is criminalised by imprisonment of at least 
a year. 
799 The Council Joint Action only refers to the purported crimes as ‗a means of improperly influencing 
the operation of public authorities‘, making no further reference to any specific activities. 
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bribes, and not their acceptance. The omission, of course, does not prevent the 
prosecution of the acceptance of bribery under other relevant provisions of the 
criminal legislation. 
Par.5 (former par.3) of art.187 of the Criminal Code criminalises groups that do 
not fall under par.1. Since it does not strictly provide against organised crime,                   
it seems to exceed the scope of the relevant international and European legislation.           
It has been argued, however, that the element of ‗structure‘ must be required under 
this provision as well, so that simple agreements of two persons are not 
criminalized
800
. 
Aggravating
801
 and mitigating
802
 circumstances are contained in par.6 (former 
par.4) of art.187 of the Criminal Code. It should be noted that the aggravating 
circumstance of the pursuit of financial benefit is in fact one of the key elements of 
organised crime, and, therefore, it will normally apply in the majority of cases.                    
It has even been labelled ‗stupid‘ in relation to the offence of par.3, since it duplicates 
one of the conditions already contained in that paragraph
803
. 
Par.7 of the amended art.187 of the Criminal Code provides for the international 
application of its provisions to offences committed by or against a Greek subject or 
against the Greek State, even if they are not considered crimes according to the laws 
of the State in whose territory they were committed. In providing thus, art.187 makes 
full use of the relevant discretion contained in the Palermo Convention
804
.                     
The Council Joint Action provides for the liability of members of a criminal 
organisation irrelevantly of the State where the organisation is based or pursues its 
activities
805
. 
The final par.8, introduced by Statute 3875/2010, provides for the confiscation of 
the fortune acquired through the perpetration of the crimes of paras.1-4, according to 
art.238 of the Criminal Code. 
 
 
 
                                                             
800 Manoledakis, id., p.135. 
801 The manufacture and possession of weapons, explosives and chemicals and the pursuing of financial 
or material benefit. 
802 The non-commitment of any of the crimes at which the organization aimed. 
803 Manoledakis, id., p.138. 
804 See art.15 par.2 of the Palermo Convention. 
805 See art.4 par.1 of the Council Joint Action. 
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Article 2 – ‘Leniency Measures’  
Art.2 of Statute 2928/2001 introduces a new art.187A in the Criminal Code, 
entitled ‗Leniency Measures‘. This article has already been renamed as art.187B by 
Statute 2251/2004
806
, and will be referred to in the following paragraphs. 
The leniency measures of this article are related to three categories of persons: 
1. Members of a criminal organisation or group as described in par.1 and 3 of 
art.187 of the Criminal Code who denounce it to the authorities, contributing to the 
prevention of the intended crimes and the breaking up of the group. These members 
are not prosecuted for their participation, and the penalty for the predicate committed 
offences, is reduced or suspended.
807
. 
2. Victims of a criminal organisation that are themselves prosecuted under the 
legislation concerning aliens or prostitution. If such persons file a well-founded 
denouncement of the organisation, then the public prosecutor abstains from indicting 
them
808
. 
3. Illegal aliens that are to be deported. If the alien denounces crimes committed 
by a criminal organisation, his extradition can be suspended
809
. 
The above measures implement art.26 of the Palermo Convention. The Council 
Framework Decision contains respective provisions as well in art.4; however, art.4 of 
the Framework Decision provides for the mitigation of or exemption from penalty 
only of cooperating members of the criminal organisation, and not of persons 
prosecuted under other, irrelevant criminal provisions, as is the case with par.3 and 4 
of art.187B of the Criminal Code. 
 
Article 3 – ‘Offences related to explosives’  
Art.3 of Statute 2928/2001 amends art.272 of the Criminal Code on offences 
related to explosives and abolishes art.272A of the Criminal Code. It is one of the few 
provisions of Statute 2928/2001 that introduces more lenient legislation than the 
preceding one: it punishes the manufacturing, supply, or possession of explosives 
with the purpose of using them by imprisonment (deprivation of liberty from five to 
twenty years), whereas the previous provision punished the same offences by life 
imprisonment or imprisonment for at least ten years. 
                                                             
806 Statute 2251/2004, art.40 par.1. 
807 Art.187B par.1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. 
808 Art.187B par.3 of the Criminal Code. 
809 Art.187B par.4 of the Criminal Code. 
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Article 4 – ‘Special Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal’  
Art.4 of Statute 2928/2001 amends art.111 par.5 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, and adds the offences of par.1 of art.187 of the Criminal Code as well as 
the offences related to them to the crimes judged by the Court of Appeal and not a 
mixed jury
810
. The article follows a general tendency towards the limitation of the list 
of cases judged by a jury, despite the constitutional provision that appoints the mixed 
jury courts as the primary criminal courts
811
. 
 
Article 5 – ‘D.N.A Analysis’ 
Art.200A was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure by art.5 of Statute 
2928/2001. The new article provides for a compulsory D.N.A analysis for the 
identification, among others, of members of criminal organisations within the 
meaning of art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code. The compulsion should be regarded as 
involving sanctions in case of a refusal by the accused to be subjected to an analysis, 
rather than authorising the use of violence for the obtaining of the genetic material
812
. 
 
Article 6 – ‘Interrogatory acts on criminal organizations’  
Art.6 of Statute 2928/2001 introduces a number of special investigative 
techniques to the Code of Criminal Procedure, adding the new art.253A.                     
These techniques are: (a) investigative penetration, also known as undercover police 
operations; (b) controlled delivery; (c) lifting of confidentiality; (d) recording of 
activities, and (e) correlation of personal data. Art.253A of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure corresponds with art.20 of the Palermo Convention, which provides for the 
use of appropriate investigative techniques, specially naming controlled delivery, 
electronic surveillance and undercover operations. 
The article is noted for its unusual structure: the Legislator, in view of the 
criticism for dangerous restriction of liberties, attempted to manifest that these 
techniques were not new and were already practiced by the police
813
.                             
Thus, the aforementioned techniques are not described in the Code of Criminal 
                                                             
810 Mixed jury courts, comprising of four jurors and three judges, have the general jurisdiction for 
felonies and political crimes, pursuant to art.97 of the Greek Constitution. Felonies can come under the 
jurisdiction of Courts of Appeal, comprising of judges only, by special law. 
811 See art.97 par.1 and 2 of the Greek Constitution. 
812 Manoledakis, id., pp.157-158. 
813 Th. Samios, ‗Investigative techniques for criminal organizations‘, Poinika Chronika, 2001, p.1035, 
(in Greek). 
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Procedure; on the contrary, the Code refers to previous special legislation containing 
them. 
The use of special investigative techniques contained in art.253A is restricted to 
the offences of art.187 par.1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, and is furthermore strictly 
regulated, in view of the danger of possible abuses. 
 
Article 7 – ‘Completion of the Interrogation’  
Art.7 of Statute 2928/2001 abridges the preliminary procedure for the felonies of 
art.187 of the Criminal Code by rendering the ruling of the Council of Appeal on the 
indictment of the accused irrevocable
814
. 
 
Article 8 – ‘Liability of legal entities and enterprises’  
Legal persons financially benefiting from organised crime are held liable under 
art.8 of Statute 2928/2001. Liability of legal persons is provided for in both the 
Council Joint Action, and the Palermo Convention
815
. The Greek Statute demands that 
the legal entity simply benefits from and not that it participates in the act, being thus 
broader in scope
816
. It should be noted that the fines and sanctions imposed on legal 
persons are of an administrative nature, as under the Greek legal system legal persons 
cannot be held criminally liable
817
. 
 
Articles 9 and 10 – ‘Protection of Witnesses and Other Persons’  
Articles 9 and 10 of Statute 2928/2001 provide measures for the protection of 
witnesses and other persons related to the prosecuting procedure. This protection 
appears imperative if one takes into account the usual retaliation by criminal 
organisations against those who break the code of silence
818
. A similar provision is 
                                                             
814 Pursuant to art.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused can appeal in cassation against 
the ruling if he is indicted for a crime. 
815 Art.3 of the Council Joint Action; Art.5 and 6 of the Council Framework Decision of 25 October 
2008; Art.10 of the Palermo Convention. 
816 Contrast art.10 par. 1 of the Palermo Convention (‗…liability of legal persons for participation in 
serious crimes involving an organized criminal group…‘) and art.3 of the Council Joint Action 
(‗…legal persons may be held (…) liable for offences (…) committed by that legal person…‘)  While a 
person‘s action as an organ of the legal person could equal an action of the latter, the same is not true if 
that person acts privately. 
817 See Androulakis, Criminal Law: General Part, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2000, 
pp.147-150, (in Greek). 
818 Zachariadis, ‗Witness protection and leniency measures in the prosecution of organized crime 
(Remarks on articles 9 of Statute 2928/2001 and 187B of the Criminal Code)‘ , in Honorary Volume 
for Ioannis Manoledakis II: Studies on criminal law, criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, 
2007, p.769, (in Greek). 
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included in the Palermo Convention in art.24; however, it refers only to the protection 
of witnesses. 
The protection of anonymity provided to witnesses is limited under par.4 (former 
par.3, amended by Statute 3875/2010), since the witness‘ identity can be revealed if 
requested by one of the litigants or the public prosecutor. This exception can endanger 
the witness and is not included in the Palermo Convention; nevertheless, it is essential 
for the protection of the rights of the accused and the requirements of a fair trial. 
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c. The Academic point of view 
 
The threats posed to society by the rise of organised crime, as well as the necessity 
for its effective confrontation on a legislative level has been acknowledged by Greek 
academics, who have pointed out its corruptive effects on political, social and 
economic institutions
819
 that can lead even to the substitution of the lawful authorities 
by the criminal organisation itself
820
, and have classified it as an offence against 
public order
821
. However, Statute 2928/2001 ‗for the citizen‘s protection from crimes 
of criminal organisations‘ has been criticised as both over-reaching and under-
reaching, while some have argued that it is redundant and that the existing legislation 
for the confrontation of organised crime is sufficient
822
. 
Academics have argued against the substantive provisions of the Statute as well as 
the procedural ones. The main point of criticism for the former centres on the drafting 
of the scope of offences, especially the one of art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code, as 
amended by the Statute. The proportionality of the new regulations and their 
compatibility with the rule of law has also been contested, while critics have pointed 
out a number of inconsistencies within the criminal law system. 
The inclusion of special investigative techniques has drawn the most criticism 
with regard to the procedural provisions of the Statute. The techniques have been 
regarded by many academics as a threat to constitutional rights and liberties and as a 
departure from the liberal character of criminal law. 
 
1. Definitional issues 
Despite its title and the references to the Palermo Convention and the Council 
Joint Action of 21 December 1998 in its Explanatory Report
823
, Statute 2928/2001 
was introduced as a response not only to organised crime, but also to terrorism
824
. 
This legislative choice was met with criticism by the academics, who have pointed out 
                                                             
819 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗Statute 2928/2001 for the citizen‘s protection from crimes of criminal 
organizations‘. Basic characteristics and a first interpretative approach‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, 
p.694 (in Greek) ; N. Livos  id., p.17. 
820 Livos, id., 2007, p.4. 
821 Manoledakis, id., p.105. 
822 Greek Society of Criminal Law, ‗Findings in Organised crime under the criminal law viewpoint. 
Proceedings of the VII Panhellenic convention‘, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2000, p.245 (in 
Greek). 
823 Explanatory Report, id., p.1007. 
824 The Explanatory Report acknowledges the intention of the Statute to include terrorist activities, 
while arguing that they represent ‗but a small part of its field of applicability‘. See Explanatory Report, 
id., p.1008. 
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the fundamental differences between the two types of criminal activity
825
 and have 
remarked on the necessity to confront the two types of activities with different 
provisions
826
. This ‗deliberate confusion‘827 led to accusations for hypocrisy and 
falsehood
828
, while the media were not slow in labelling the Statute as the ‗terror-
law‘829. 
The main consequence of this attempt to include both types of crimes in the same 
definition was the much-criticised broadness in the description of the offence of 
art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code. While the definition of the ‗criminal organisation‘ 
in this article contains some fundamental characteristics of organised crime,                    
such as the structure, the duration and the participation of more than two members in 
the organisation, it does not mention a crucial element, included in both the Palermo 
Convention and the subsequent Council Framework Decision: the pursuit of financial 
gain. This omission enabled the inclusion of terrorists, who normally do not aim at 
profit, but at political intimidation, in the scope of Statute 2928/2001 and art.187 par.1 
of the Criminal Code. The business-like operation of organised crime, and                    
the subsequent perpetration of ‗market-based offences‘ was totally omitted from the 
definition
830
; similarly neglected were the differences among various criminal 
organisations that emanate from the way they define themselves
831
.                              
These omissions remained even after the adoption of Statute 3251/2004 on combating 
terrorism and the subsequent prosecution of terrorist activities under the special 
provision of art.187A of the Criminal Code. 
The link of the criminal organisation to a type of financial criminal activity cannot 
be deduced from the list of offences at the perpetration of which the organisation has 
to aim either, as they are diverse and do not have the pursuit of profit as a common 
                                                             
825 Livos, id., 2007, p.6; Papacharalampous, ‗The Bill of the Ministry of Justice on Organised Crime: 
‗aberratio ictus‘ with inestimable ‗collateral damage‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, pp.285-286, (in 
Greek). 
826 Milonopoulos, ‗Statute 2928/2001 for the citizen‘s protection from crimes of criminal 
organizations‘, Poinikos Logos, 2001, p.794, (in Greek). 
827 Pavlou, ‗Transboundary crime and the gradual adaptation of Greek criminal legislation towards its 
more effective confrontation‘, Poinika Chronika, 2002, p.780, (in Greek). 
828 Papacharalampous, id., p.289. 
829 See Eleftherotypia newspaper, ‗Government satisfied with adoption of terror-law‘, article of 
8/6/2001 available online at: www.enet.gr (in Greek); see also Kathimerini newspaper, ‗Opening for 
the terror-law‘, article of 3/8/2001 by Eva Karamanoli , available online at: www.kathimerini.gr (in 
Greek). 
830 Livos, id., p.6. See also Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.694, where she notes that the provision does 
not mention the basic characteristic of a terrorist organization ether, namely the possession of weapons. 
831 Ibid., p.84. 
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characteristic
832
. The resulting inclusion of almost all types of criminal groups in the 
provision has led to arguments that the new article cannot achieve its purpose, namely 
the confrontation of the special characteristics of organised crime
833
. Furthermore, 
critics argue that the broad phrasing utilised will not assist in the prosecution of 
dangerous criminal groups; rather, it will result in the stricter criminalisation of 
offences of less significance and demerit
834
. 
The definition of the main criminal offence in art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code 
has also drawn criticism with regard to the list of crimes at which the criminal 
organisation should be aiming. The list has been criticised as being too extensive and 
including offences that cannot logically be attributed to a criminal organisation,    
such as manslaughter and incest
835
. On the other hand, it has been also criticised as 
lacking: there is, for example, no mention of felonies committed by public officials. 
This omission, combined with the similar absence of the receipt of bribes as an 
offence in art.187 par.4, indicates according to critics the Legislator‘s insufficient 
realization of the corruptive power of organised crime, whose existence requires the 
collaboration of public officials
836
. 
Another point of criticism raised by the academics is the absence of a definition of 
the term ‗structured‘, used in the definition of the criminal organisation837. It has been 
argued, however, that this definition could be drawn from the Palermo Convention
838
. 
Finally, it has been noted that art.187 par.1 wrongly attributes the pursuance of the 
mentioned felonies to the member of the criminal organisation and not to the 
organisation itself
839
. 
 
                                                             
832 Tzannetis, ‗The meaning of criminal organization under the new article 187 of the Criminal Code‘, 
Poinika Chronika, 2001, p.1016, (in Greek). 
833 Kritharas, ‗Conceptualization of organized crime‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.899, (in Greek). 
834 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.694. 
835 Anagnostopoulos, ‗The bill on organized crime: Modernization or disintegration of liberal criminal 
law?‘, in Proceedings of the academic event of the Law Society of Northern Greece and the 
Association of Greek Criminal Lawyers with subject: ‗The bill on the confrontation of organized crime‘ 
(later Statute 2928/2001), Sakkoulas, 2002, p.38, (in Greek). 
836 Manoledakis, , id., pp.111, 123. On the relation between organized crime and corruption see Livos, 
id., 2000pp.53-54. 
837 As noted above, the Council Joint Action does not contain such a definition ether. It has been 
argued, however, that the omission contributes towards the vagueness of the Statute. 
838 According to the Palermo Convention, a ‗structured group‘ is ‗a group that is not randomly formed 
for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for 
its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure‘ (art.2(c) of the Convention). See 
Kritharas, id., p.897. 
839 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2005, p.1445. 
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The procedural provisions of Statute 2928/2001, introducing the obligatory DNA 
analysis and the special investigative techniques of art.200A and 253A of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure respectively have also been criticised for definitional vagueness 
and deficiencies. Academics attribute these shortcomings to the unusual structure of 
art.253A of the Criminal Code: the article simply mentions the techniques and refers 
for the particulars to a number of other Statutes that had introduced and regulated 
them. The result was, as critics correctly note, that a number of provisions targeted 
towards specific offences were accorded a much wider area of applicability without 
any kind of systematic adaptation to these new requirements, creating problems with 
their interpretation and implementation
840
. Furthermore, the Legislator has been 
accused for missing the opportunity for a more thorough and systematic regulation of 
said techniques in view of their upgraded role in the criminal procedure
841
. 
Critics also, correctly, note a number of omissions and unclear points in the 
procedural provisions, such as the persons against whom they can be ordered,                
the exact scope of the actions of the investigative officials, the right of the suspect to 
be eventually informed about the findings of the investigation, and the protection of 
third parties
842
. The omissions render it necessary for one to resort to the clarifying 
statements of the Minister of Justice, another indication of the poor quality of the 
provisions
843
. However, it has been, unconvincingly, argued that the deficiencies and 
the interpretative issues arising from the procedural provisions of Statute 2928/2001 
can be confronted through an appropriate application of a number of principles of law, 
such as the principle of proportionality and of non-violation of the core of personal 
rights, as well as through the consideration of the purpose of the investigative 
techniques and the requirements for their ordering that can be found in the respective 
provisions
844
. 
 
                                                             
840 See ‗Report on the Bill ‗Modification of provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and other provisions for the citizens‘ protection from crimes of criminal organizations‘, 
Poinika Chronika, 2001, p.1014. See also Samios, id., pp.1035-1036, (in Greek). 
841 Dalakouras), ‗The special investigatory techniques of article 6 of Statute 2928/2001‘, Poinika 
Chronika, 2001, p.1024, (in Greek). 
842 Ibid., pp.1026-1027. 
843 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, for instance, discussing the persons against whom the techniques can be 
ordered, references two such ministerial statements. See Simeonidou-Kastanidou id., pp.697-698. 
844 See Papadamakis, ‗Undercover operations and lifting of confidentiality as investigative techniques 
against organised crime‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis II: Studies on criminal law, 
criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, p.954 (in Greek); Spyrakos, ‗The correlation and 
combination of personal data for the suppression of organized crime‘, Poinika Chronika, 2001, p.1031, 
(in Greek). 
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2. The principles of proportionality and equality 
The observance of the principle of proportionality by the provisions of Statute 
2928/2001 has been contested. A first criticism is related to the criminalisation of the 
very early stages of the preparation of an offence with heavy penalties equal to those 
imposed on many serious felonies
845
. The lack of proportionality in the penalties has 
also been linked to the defects in the definition of the offence of art.187 par.1 of the 
Criminal Code: since the demerit of the act is not based on the increased threat to 
society that defines organised crime, the high penalties are unjustified
846
.                      
The application of the stricter substantive and procedural provisions of Statute 
2928/2001 over lesser offences, contrary to all concerns for proportionality, has been 
noticed and criticised in the literature
847
. 
However, the answer to these criticisms has been based on the nature of organised 
crime: the threat originates not so much from the external manifestation of a 
committed crime, but in the continuous readiness of the organisation to pursue 
criminal behaviour, on the basis of a criminal structure
848
. Thus, acts previously 
considered as peripheral take centre stage. Moreover, the high penalties can be 
justified through expediency-based considerations, since they aim at raising the ‗cost‘ 
of organised crime, thus, rendering it unprofitable
849
. 
Concerns related to the principle of equality have been raised in view of art.7 of 
Statute 2928/2001, which provides for the early completion of the investigative 
procedure by rendering the relevant decree of the Judicial Council irrevocable.          
Since the appeal in cassation against such a decree is permissible for the same 
offences when they are committed outside of the framework of a criminal 
organisation, the law seems to introduce an exceptional and unequal provision
850
.            
It should be noted, however, that academics have proposed the general expansion of 
this measure, as a desirable abridgement of the investigative procedure
851
. 
 
 
 
                                                             
845 Tzannetis, id., pp.1021-1022. 
846 Papacharalampous, id., p.289. 
847 Simeonidou-Kastanidou , ‗Towards a new definition of organized crime in European Union‘, 
Poinika Chronika, 2006, p.870, (in Greek). 
848 Livos, id., 2007, p.7. 
849 Ibid., p.8. 
850 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2001, p.699. 
851 Manoledakis, id., p.176. 
216 
 
3. Threats to constitutional rights and freedoms and the rule of law 
Statute 2928/2001 has been heavily criticised as a departure from the liberal 
character of the Greek criminal law system and the observance of the principle of 
legality
852
. It has been argued that art.253A of the Code of Criminal Procedure marks 
a ‗semantic expansion‘ of the institution of criminal investigation853. The provision, 
authorizing a number of ‗invasive‘ and, more importantly, secret investigative 
techniques, and broadening in effect the circle of persons affected by them, seems to 
indicate the development of a repressive, police-oriented criminal law
854
, while some 
have expressed concerns for a future escalation of the use of these techniques
855
. 
This possible invasion in the lives of a non-defined number of persons, unrelated 
even to the crime, and under a state of secrecy, has raised concerns as to the 
constitutionality of the provisions, which have been regarded by most of the 
academics as a threat to personal rights and freedoms
856
. It has been argued that the 
balance between security and freedom was totally in favour of the former
857
, and even 
that the restriction of personal rights was the Legislator‘s ulterior intention858.  
The main counter-argument to the above objections has been, correctly,                       
the indispensability of the special investigatory techniques in view of the methods 
employed by organised crime: secretive and conspiratorial criminal organisations can 
only be countered through the use of similar means, so that they lose their ‗advantage 
in information‘859. The effectiveness of methods like DNA analysis has also been 
praised
860
. Their introduction in the criminal legislation has, furthermore, been 
presented as a preferable alternative to the adoption of more rigorous substantive 
criminal legislation that would treat offenders not as persons, but as ‗enemies‘ of 
society, always with regard to an effective protection of social security
861
. 
                                                             
852 Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗Interposition in the presentations of Mr. N. Livos and Mr. Al. Kostaras‘  in Greek 
Society of Criminal Law, Organised crime under the criminal law viewpoint. Proceedings of the VII 
Panhellenic convention, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2000, p.196, (in Greek). 
853 Manoledakis, id., p.163. 
854 Livos, id., p.9. 
855 Padapamakis, id., p.950. 
856 Livos, id., 2000, p.56. 
857 Dalakouras, id., p.1026. 
858 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.694. 
859 Livos, ‗The problem of security and security as a problem: The example of Criminal Law‘, in 
Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis I: Democracy-Freedom-Security, Sakkoulas, 2005, p.204, 
(in Greek). 
860 See Pollatou, ‗DNA analysis and new horizons in crime investigation‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, 
p.1179-1183, (in Greek). 
861 Livos, id., 2005, p.202-203. 
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One should note that the desirable protection of personal rights can be achieved 
through the strict observance of the requirements for the authorization of the special 
techniques that are stated in the respective provisions
862
. The terms used in the 
provision must be interpreted narrowly and in favour of the personal liberties
863
.              
In this way the violations of personal rights can be minimized. In any event, the 
legislative introduction of these techniques and their regulation is more preferable and 
less dangerous than their unofficial and uncontrolled use, outside of a legislative 
framework
864
. 
 
4. The rights of the defendant 
The secret character of the special investigative techniques provided for in article 
253A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the non-mentioning of the 
witness‘ identity under art.9 par.4 of statute 2928/2001 have been challenged in view 
of the right of the defendant to effectively defend himself, to know the person 
accusing him, and not to incriminate himself
865
. Therefore, the disclosure of the 
witness‘ name in court following a relevant request by a litigant, although 
compromising the witness‘ protection, was deemed necessary for the safeguarding of 
these rights
866
. It should be noted that this disclosure, previously obligatory, is left to 
the discretion of the court under the new wording of art.9 par.4. Concerns have also 
been raised in relation to the mandatory analysis of the defendant‘s DNA for the 
ascertaining of his guilt, provided for in art.200A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
as academics have maintained that it equals an enforced confession of guilt, 
prohibited under art.14 par.3(7) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
867
. 
 
5. Introduction of expediency concerns 
The Greek criminal law system does not recognise the principle of expediency           
in the confrontation of criminal activities
868
. However, Statute 2928/2001 seems to 
have introduced expediency concerns, especially in art.187B of the Criminal Code
869
 
                                                             
862 Dalakouras, id., pp.1024-1025. 
863 Manoledakis, id., p.161. 
864 Livos, id., 2000, p.59; Dalakouras, id., p.1022. 
865 Dalakouras, id., p.1023. 
866 Zachariadis, id., p.771; Vathiotis, ‗Witness protection under article 9 of Statute 2928/2001‘, Poinika 
Chronika, 2001, p.1053, (in Greek). 
867 Ratified by Statute 2642/1997. See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.697. 
868 Livos, id., 2000, p.58. 
869 Previously 197A (Statute 2928/2001). Renamed as 198 B by art.1 of Statute 3251/2004. 
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entitled ‗Leniency Measures‘. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the article 
determines that the prosecutor/judge should abstain from indicting/imposing a penalty 
on certain categories of persons, if they contribute to the breaking up of a criminal 
organisation. 
The first of these categories refers to members of the criminal organisation. 
Academics have classified this provision as a type of ‗active repentance‘, a mitigating 
circumstance already included in the Criminal Code
870
. Although labelled as 
doctrinally problematic, the provision has been defended as necessary, since the 
cooperation of members of the organisation will usually be the only means for its 
effective confrontation
871
. It has also been noted that members of an organisation can 
often be themselves its victims, living under constant fear and threats
872
. 
However, the remaining two paragraphs of the article have raised more objections. 
The non-indictment of persons prosecuted under the legislation on aliens and 
prostitution in exchange for information concerning organised crime has been 
criticised by academics as ‗morally exposed‘873 and taking advantage of vulnerable 
groups of persons such as illegal immigrants facing deportation
874
. Critics are also 
concerned about the possible encouragement of false denunciations
875
. On the other 
hand, the provision has been viewed positively for enabling trafficked women to 
denounce the trafficking circuit without being in danger of deportation or conviction 
under prostitution laws
876
. 
 
6. Inconsistencies within the criminal law system 
Academics have noted a number of inconsistencies in Statute 2928/2001.                
Such is the case of art.187 par.4 of the Criminal Code, which was introduced with the 
intention to criminalise acts perverting the course of justice and to impose stricter 
penalties on similar acts already provided for in the Criminal Code
877
. It has been 
remarked by critics that, despite its intention, this provision results in some cases in           
                                                             
870 Zachariadis, id., p.773; See also art.44, 79 and 84 of the Criminal Code. 
871 Zachariadis, id., p.774. 
872 Livos, id., 2007, p.86. 
873 Manoledakis, id., p.145. 
874 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.696; Zachariadis, id., p.775. 
875 Zachariadis, id. 
876 Manoledakis, id., p.147. 
877 See Explanatory Report, id., p.1009, (in Greek). 
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a more lenient penalty
878
. Similar is the case with the aggravating circumstances of 
art.187 par.6 of the Criminal Code: the possession of explosives by a member of a 
criminal organisation is punished with a lower penalty under this article than under 
art.272 of the Criminal Code, which would apply to non-members of a criminal 
organisation
879
. It has been proposed that this paradox could be avoided through a 
suitable interpretation and application of the rules of congruence by the prosecutor 
and the judge
880
. 
The other aggravating circumstance of art.187 par.6 has also been criticised as 
superfluous, since the mentioned ‗pursuit of financial or other material benefit‘ is a 
fundamental characteristic of organised crime, and will occur in almost all criminal 
organisations
881
. 
Finally, the new par.2 of art.187 seems to raise similar issues as the corresponding 
par.6 of art.187A referring to terrorism, regarding the criminalisation of participatory 
acts as main offences and the criminalisation of beliefs
882
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
878 For instance, an armed person that threatens a judge in a case concerning organized crime is 
punished with imprisonment for at least one year under art.187 par.2, but would be punished with 
imprisonment for at lest two years under the pre-existing art.167 par.2 of the Criminal Code. See 
Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., p.695. 
879 It is worth noticing that both articles were modified in their present form by Statute 2928/2001.  
880 Manoledakis, id., pp.149-150. 
881 Ibid., p.120. 
882 See page 195 of this thesis. 
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d. The Case Law on organized crime 
 
Although Statute 2928/2001 formally refers to ‗the citizens‘ protection from 
crimes of criminal organisations‘, it has famously been linked to terrorism through its 
application in a number of much-publicized and discussed trials of Greek terrorist 
groups, namely the ‗17 November‘ and ‗ELA‘ (Revolutionary People‘s Struggle) 
terrorist organisations. The impact of the trials has led to the labelling of the Statute as 
a ‗terror-law‘, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The introduction of Statute 
2928/2001 was followed, furthermore, by the adoption of a number of other Statutes 
regulating procedural matters in view of the terrorist trials, and has, thus, led to 
accusations of an ad hoc interference by the legislature in the rendering of Justice
883
. 
The connection between Statute 2928/2001 and anti-terrorism legislation,            
much commented on and criticised by academics, has also been acknowledged by the 
courts. In the ‗17 November‘ judgement, the Court stated that ‗a purpose of profit, 
habitual in the notional structure of criminal organisations, is not required; therefore, 
this article also includes the ‗ideological‘ criminal organisations, an expression of 
which is the ‗terrorist‘ ones‘884. In addition to this, a series of cases concerning 
criminal organisations mention that the provision of art.187 par.1 ‗was initially 
adopted for the protection of society from terrorist organisations, but is applicable to 
all forms of collective criminal activity that targets organised society and legal 
order‘885. However, it should be noted that after the introduction of Statute 3251/2004 
on combating terrorism, the importance of Statute 2928/2001 on terrorism cases has 
been limited to its procedural provisions, which still apply to terrorist activities. 
Apart from the terrorism trials, Statute 2928/2001 has, since its adoption,             
been applied or mentioned by courts in many cases concerning criminal groups and 
organisations. Through this application, the courts have been able to address and 
clarify a number of issues related to the Statute, though not always in a consistent 
manner. A review of the relevant case law highlights the most frequent questions that 
the courts have been called to answer: Firstly, the elements and characteristics of a 
                                                             
883 Margaritis, ‗17 November Trial: The objections were overruled, but the standards of our legal 
culture have been downgraded‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2003, p.302, (in Greek). 
884 Athens Court of Appeal judgements No. 699, 780, 809, 3244/2003 (17 November case), Poinika 
Chronika, 2004, p.1012, (in Greek). 
885 See among others Thessaloniki Council of Appeal, decision No.221/2007, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2008, 
p.1286; Thessaloniki Council of Appeal, decision No. 1093/2008, NOMOS legal database; 
Thessaloniki Council of Appeal, decision No.250/2009, NOMOS legal database, (in Greek). 
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criminal organisation; secondly, the differentiation of the criminal organisation 
(art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code) from the simple criminal group (art.187 par.5 of 
the Criminal Code); and thirdly, issues arising from the application of art.7 of Statute 
2928/2001 concerning the completion of the investigative procedure through an 
irrevocable decree of the Council of Appeal. 
 
1. The Characteristics of a Criminal Organisation 
When applying art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code, introduced by art.1 of Statute 
2928/2001, courts have frequently referred to the elements of a criminal group as they 
can be discerned in the aforementioned provision. Courts mention a number of 
characteristics in a more or less standardised form that has been repeated in most of 
the cases. Courts discern between two groups of characteristics, the objective and 
subjective. According to courts, the objective characteristics contain three elements, 
one temporal, one quantitative, and one qualitative
886
: 
The temporal element is the duration of the activity of the criminal organisation. 
Art.187 par.1 does not provide for a specific duration. It has been accepted by courts 
that the temporal element is satisfied if the organisation is designated to act 
indefinitely or for an extended, if not specifically pre-determined, time period
887
. 
The quantitative element refers to the provision of art.187 par.1 of the criminal 
code for the participation of at least three members in the criminal organisation. 
According to courts, a person is a member in a criminal organisation if he ‗subjects 
his will to the organisation, without the necessity of a personal participation of the 
member in the separate acts of the organisation‘888. However, this participation should 
not be occasional, and nor does the simple support and endorsement of the goals of 
the organisation render one a member
889
. The members should, moreover, have                        
a common goal and feel as part of a united group
890
. 
The qualitative element is the one that has been most analysed by the courts.                      
It refers to the requirement of the provision for a ‗structured‘ group. According to the 
                                                             
886 See Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 30/2005, NOMOS legal database; Aegean Council of 
Appeal, decision No.35/2005, NOMOS legal database, (in Greek). 
887 Athens Council of Appeal, decision No. 1270/2003, Poinikos Logos , 2003, p.1285; Aegean Council 
of Appeal, id. (in Greek). 
888 See Athens Court of Appeal, id.; Thessaloniki Council of Appeal, decision No.93/2006, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2006, p.413, (in Greek). 
889 Athens Court of Appeal, id.; Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No. 221/2007, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2008, p.1286, (in Greek). 
890 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal judgement No.93/2006, id, (in Greek). 
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courts, ‗structured‘ is the organisation that is not formed for the occasional 
perpetration of a crime. However, it is not necessary for the members to have 
determined roles or continuous membership or for the group to have a clear 
hierarchy
891
. Similarly, the decision-making process can vary a lot
892
. Courts have 
also pointed out the ‗in rem‘ basis of organisation, compared to the ‗in personam‘ 
character of the common criminal groups
893
. 
In addition to the above, courts have held that the constitution of or participation 
in a criminal organisation requires something more than a simple agreement for the 
perpetration of certain crimes, since such an interpretation would call for the 
application of art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code in all cases of complicity
894
.                  
On the other hand, the communication among members is not required, as long as 
each member carries out his allotted duties
895
. Nor is the perpetration of the crimes 
mentioned in the provision required; the proof of a serious purpose for their 
perpetration is enough
896
. 
Appeal judgement No.2993/2004 contains some interesting remarks about the 
elements of the criminal organisation. According to the Council, ‗the main interest 
shifts towards the structure of a system of operation of the organisation, usually 
through the establishment of a hierarchical framework, the allocation of duties and 
functions among the members and the co-ordinated activity of the members, which is 
governed by the will of the totality of them towards the realization of its goals, a will 
which is binding for each member, while the participation of all the members in the 
planning of the crimes is not required, provided that each member knows that he 
contributes to the realization of its goals through the carrying out of the duties allotted 
to him‘897. 
The subjective characteristics refer to the intent of the members of the group. 
Courts have noted that members should have the purpose of perpetrating more than 
                                                             
891 Athens Court of Appeal, id.; Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 1152/2005, Poinika Chronica, 
2006, p.550; Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No.93/2006, id, (in Greek). 
892 See for example Athens Court of Appeal, id., where it is mentioned that ‗it is irrelevant if the 
decisions of the group are made in a democratic way or not, according to the principle of plurality or 
unanimity or because of an established relationship of order and obeisance, as long as the decision is 
considered the will of the group‘. 
893 Ibid. 
894 Thrace Council of Appeal decision No.101/2008, Poinika Chronika, 2009, p.658; Thessaloniki 
Council of Appeal decision No. 27/2009, NOMOS legal database, (in Greek). 
895 Ibid.; See also the Supreme Court judgement No. 83/2006 (NOMOS legal database), which states 
that ‗the constitution of such a [criminal] organisation can be attained through other ways of contact 
and communication, and not only through meetings, discussions and direct contacts‘ (in Greek). 
896 Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No. 27/2009, id. (in Greek). 
897 Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 2993/2004, Poinika Chronica, 2005, p.931, (in Greek). 
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one of the crimes mentioned in art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code. This purpose alone 
is enough, and it is not necessary that the group has proceeded to any kind of activity 
or even started planning a crime. Furthermore, this purpose is not required to be the 
sole or primary one of the group
898
. However, the special intent provided for in the 
Statute and referring to the commission of these crimes should exist at the time of the 
constitution or the organisation, since the courts have held that ‗it is not enough that 
the group was initially formed for the perpetration of a specific crime and then 
decided the continuation of its activity for the preservation of its loot‘899. 
 
2. Differentiation between criminal organisation and criminal group (article 187 
paragraphs 1 & 5 of the Criminal Code)
 900
. 
 
Courts have not agreed on a common denominator over which groups are 
classified as ‗criminal organisations‘ prosecuted under art.187 par.1 and which as 
simple ‗criminal groups‘ prosecuted under the more lenient art.187 par.3  Often, the 
criteria of the courts have been limited to those explicitly mentioned in the law,                
an approach that has resulted in a broad interpretation of the notion of the criminal 
organisation, and the prosecution under art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code of many 
groups of limited infrastructure and corruptive power, that posed no great additional 
threat to society
901
.The above mentioned concerns of academics about the definition 
of a ‗criminal organisation‘ in the provision have, thus, often been proven right.              
There are cases, however, in which the courts have adopted a purpose-based 
interpretation. In the Athens Council of Appeal decision No.2993/2004 the prosecutor 
argued that it is the existence of a material and technical infrastructure not available to 
common groups that renders criminal organisation extremely dangerous for society; 
otherwise, the notion of organised crime would eventually encompass all types of 
common groups, a result that was apparently not the purpose of the Legislator
902
. 
Although the prosecutor‘s proposal was not accepted in that case, this argument has 
                                                             
898 Athens Court of Appeal id., p.1013; Athens Council of Appeal decision No.2993/2004, id.; Athens 
Council of Appeal decision No. 1152/2005, id. 
899 Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No.93/2006, id. 
900 Par.5 is referred to in the relevant case law with its old numbering, as par.3 
901 Athens Council of Appeal decision  No.2993/2004, id.; Athens Council of Appeal decision 
No.1152/2005, id.; Aegean Council of Appeal decision No.35/2005, id.; Dodekanisa Council of Appeal 
decision No. 24/2005, NOMOS legal database; Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 3028/2003, 
Poinika Chronika, 2005, p.165; Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No.250/2009, NOMOS legal 
database. 
902 Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 2993/2004, id., pp.935-936. 
224 
 
gained favour with the courts in subsequent decisions
903
. Another interesting purpose-
based interpretation can be found in the Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision 
No.289/2005, which mentions ‗the control over regions or markets, the infiltration of 
economic life, the allocation of labour, the links to public administration, justice, the 
media, and the dominant figures in economic and political life, as well as the 
elimination of state opposition through intimidation and corruption‘904. In limiting the 
range of application of the provision to activities which can better accommodate the 
notion of ‗organised crime‘, these approaches to art.187 par.1 seem to reconcile the 
broad wording of the provision with the purpose of the relevant EU legislation
905
. 
 
3. Article 7 of Statute 2928/2001 
The compatibility of the provisions of art.7 of Statute 2928/2001, pursuant to 
which the investigative procedure for the felonies of art.187 of the Criminal Code is 
completed by an irrevocable decision of the Council of Appeal, with both the Greek 
Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights, has been contested. 
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no question of 
incompatibility, and has refused to grant permission to the accused to appeal against 
the decision of the Council of Appeal. More specifically, the Supreme Court has held 
that the provision: 
 is not contrary to art.6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, since the 
right of the accused to have access to a court is satisfied through his access to the 
Council of Appeal; 
 is not contrary to art.2 of the 7th Additional Protocol of the European Convention 
of Human Rights and art.14 par.5 of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, since they refer to convicting decisions; 
 is not contrary to the constitutional principle of equality in view of the 
prosecutor‘s right, under certain conditions, to appeal against the decision of the 
Council of Appeal, since the prosecutor acts in his role as a public officer and the 
                                                             
903 See for instance Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No.93/2006, id., p.414, which directly 
mentions the prosecutor‘s proposal in decision No. 2993/2004; see also Thessaloniki Council of 
Appeal decision No. 221/2007, id., pp.288-289 
904 Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No.289/2005, NOMOS legal database. 
905 See the Preamble of Council Joint action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998, which makes direct 
reference to organised crime. 
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accused can, in any case, respond, and since the European Committee of Human 
Rights has held so in the similar cases 22324/1993 and 22843/1993
906
. 
Another issue that has been addressed in court is the question of the irrevocability 
of the decision of the Council of Appeal if the accused is released of the accusation 
for the crimes of art.187 of the Criminal Code, and indicted for other crimes in the 
Criminal Code. The Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Council of 
Appeal ceases to be irrevocable, and the accused can appeal against it to the extent it 
indicts him for other crimes, since in such cases the reason for which the provision 
was introduced, namely the quick indictment of the crimes of art.187 of the Criminal 
Code, ceases to exist. The opposite view would surpass the purpose of the Legislator 
and would result in the limitation of the appeal rights of the accused only because of 
his incorrect indictment for the crimes of art.187
907
. 
Finally, the Supreme Court, in its decision in Council No. 4/2005, has held that 
the procedure of art.7 of Statute 2928/2001 is applicable not only for the ‗relevant‘ 
crimes, as mentioned therein, but also for participatory crimes, since the law does not 
differentiate between them and since cases of participation are even more closely 
linked to the main act than simply relevant crimes
908
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
906 See among others Supreme Court in council decisions No: 109/2010, 194/2007, 592/2006, 
766/2006, 177/2005, 654/2005, 464/2003, all in NOMOS legal database. 
907 Supreme Court in council decision No.402/2004, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, pp.46-47; Supreme 
Court in council decision No.565/2009, NOMOS legal database. 
908 Supreme Court in council decision No. 4/2005, NOMOS legal database. 
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e. Final Remarks 
 
As with most European legislation, Greece was late to implement Council Joint 
Action 98/733/JHA
909
. The implementing Statute 2928/2001, however, differs from 
other implementing legislation in that it was adopted in view of not only the Council 
Joint Action, but also the Palermo Convention, a document more extensive and 
detailed than the Joint Action. As a result, Statute 2928/2001 regulates issues that 
were outside of the scope of the Joint Action, or that were addressed in it only briefly. 
It should be noted that Greece incorporated the text of the Palermo Convention into its 
national legislation only on 20 September 2010, and has not implemented on time the 
latest Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 25 October 2008 on organised crime 
either, the deadline having been 11 May 2010. 
Statute 2928/2001 presents the same negative traits as other implementing 
Statutes: vagueness, lack of consideration for the domestic system of Criminal Law, 
and blind copying of the European legislation. The Greek Legislator should focus 
more on the smooth integration of European legislation into the domestic legal order. 
Still, the Statute was an important step towards the confrontation of organised crime 
in Greece and the effective implementation of the relevant European legislation.  
At the same time, the vagueness in the provisions of Statute 2928/2001 has 
resulted in inconsistent court judgements. The lack of an effective definition of 
organised crime in the law has led courts to often adopt a broad interpretation, heavily 
penalising low-level criminal groups that did not in fact present any of the 
characteristics of organised crime. More recent decisions seem to follow a different 
approach, referring to criteria outside the text of the Statute in an attempt to restrict its 
application. An elaboration of these criteria together with an interpretation of the 
Statute based on its purpose, namely the confrontation of serious organised 
criminality, could lead the courts to overcome the drawbacks of the Statute and reduce 
the negative effects of its vague and disproportionate provisions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
909 Pursuant to art. 6 and 7 of the Council Joint Action, the deadline for its implementation was 31st 
December 1999. 
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IV. The Fight Against Money Laundering in the Greek Legal Order 
 
a. The ‘big picture’ in the Greek Legislation in combating money laundering 
 
In contrast to the fields of organised crime and terrorism, money laundering has 
been the object of many legislative initiatives in Greece, but, has not been seen, until 
recently, as an urgent priority
910
. The first regulation concerning money laundering 
was Statute 2145/1993, which added a relevant article in the Criminal Code, namely 
art.394A
911
. The article, however, was short-lived, as in 1995 it was abolished by 
Statute 2331/1995 on the prevention and suppression of money laundering, which was 
adopted in view of the first money laundering Directive (Directive 91/308/EEC), and 
the 1990 version of the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF). As Helen Xanthaki and Constantin Stefanou note, this 
new law was the result of EU pressure for the final compliance of Greece with EC 
legislation in this area and also seemed to reflect the increasing realisation that money 
laundering is an offence that might well affect the Greek legal order; a belief which 
previously did not exist
912
.  
Statute 2331/1995 has been amended numerous times
913
. The most important of 
these amendments was through Statute 3424/2005, which aimed at adapting the Greek 
legislation to Directive 2001/97/EC
914
, to the Council Framework Decision 
2001/500/JHA
915
, and to the special recommendations of FATF on the prevention of 
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism
916
. For the purposes of 
this chapter it is important to note that FATF has played a very significant role and 
has had a great impact on the development of Greek anti-money laundering 
                                                             
910 See Helen Xanthaki and Constantin Stefanou, ‗Greece: Money Laundering‘, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 1999, p.161. 
911 About the former art.392A of the Criminal Code see Vassilakopoulos, ‗Money laundering. Critical 
remarks on the criminal provisions of Statute 2331/1995‘, Poinika Chronika, 1996, pp.1361-1362, (in 
Greek). See also Helen Xanthaki, ibid, p. 162.  
912 See Helen Xanthaki and Constantin Stefanou, ibid, p. 163. 
913 The amending Statutes prior to Statute 3424/2005 were: Statutes 2515/1997, 2479/1997, 2655/1998, 
2656/1998, 2733/1999, 2803/2000, 2928/2001, 3028/2002, and 3148/2003. 
914 Drective 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, and 
adopting certain reviewed Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. 
915 Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime. 
916 See ‗Report on Bill ‗Amendment, completion and replacement of provisions of Statute 2331/1995 
and adaptation of Greek legislation to Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system with the purpose of money laundering and 
other provisions‘ , Poinika Chronika, 2006, p.340, (in Greek). 
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legislation, as Greece has changed its law on money laundering not only in order to 
adapt Greek legislation to the EU Directives, but also in order to adopt certain 
reviewed Recommendations of FATF -the reality is because of the pressure by FATF 
given its negative reports on Greece- and hence to comply with the FATF 
standards
917
.  
Finally, in 2008, Statute 3691/2008 on the prevention and suppression of money 
laundering and financing of terrorism was adopted. This last Statute implemented the 
third Directive on money laundering, Directive 2005/60/EC, and wholly replaced 
Statute 2331/1995, abolishing its provisions
918
. 
While neither Statute 2331/1995 nor its amending Statute 3424/2005 is any longer 
in force, their provisions highlight the development of Greek legislation against 
money laundering and the implementing process of the relevant Directives.                    
For these reasons, the presentation of the present Statute 3691/2008 will contain 
references to the previous Statutes. 
 
 Statute 3691/2008 
Statute 3691/2008 is entitled ‗Prevention and suppression of money laundering 
and financing of terrorism and other provisions‘ and incorporated the third Directive 
on money laundering, Directive 2005/60/EC
919
. The Statute mentions explicitly in 
article 1 that it substitutes the relevant provisions of Statute 2331/1995; therefore, the 
latter Statute ceased to be in force upon the publication of the former, on 5 August 
2008
920
. 
Consisting of 58 articles in total, Statute 3691/2008 is significantly longer than the 
previous anti-money laundering laws. While it contains some important criminal 
provisions, most of its articles refer to the identifying, monitoring and reporting 
obligations of financial institutions and other persons, which take, thus, centre stage in 
the fight against money laundering. In this respect, the Statute seems to be in line with 
the Directives, focusing on the extent of these obligations and on procedural issues, 
while issues of criminal liability are addressed briefly, and mostly in relation to the 
                                                             
917 See for example the ‗Third Mutual Evaluation Report of FATF‘, in June 2007, as well as the ‗7th 
Interim FATF Follow up Report‘ in 19/02/2010 and article 1 of Statute 3424/2005 where a clear 
reference to FATF‘s impact is made.  
918 See art.1 of Statute 3691/2008. 
919 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
920 See Governmental Gazette A‘ no.166 of 5 August 2008. 
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issue of predicate offences. It is characteristic that Statute 3691/2008 is the first anti-
money laundering legislation where the non-criminal provisions appear before the 
criminal ones. 
While Statute 3691/2008 replaced the previous anti-money laundering legislation, 
many of its provisions bear great similarities to the provisions of the previous Statute, 
or are constructed in a similar framework; this is the case especially with the               
non-criminal provisions of the Statute. 
 
Article 2 – ‘Acts constituting money laundering’  
 Art.2 of Statute 3691/2008 defines the acts that can constitute the offence of 
money laundering. The list of criminal acts is, for most of its part, identical to both the 
third Directive and the relevant provision of Statute 2331/1995
921
. It also contains two 
activities not included in the Directive: the use of financial and credit institutions in 
order to make the product of crimes appear legal, and the establishment of or                  
the participation in a group of at least two people that has as a purpose the 
perpetration of one of the offences included in the list
922
. On the other hand,                     
it does not provide explicitly for participatory acts and the attempt to commit a money 
laundering offence. However, these acts are punished under the general provisions of 
the Criminal Code regarding participation and attempt
923
. 
Par.3 refers to the international jurisdiction of the Greek courts, and differs from 
the respective provision of the previous legislation, since it requires the criminal 
activity that took place in another State to be punishable under the legislation of that 
State, a requirement not included in Statute 2331/1995
924
. 
Finally, in par.5, the law mentions for the first time that the ‗knowledge, intent or 
purpose required as an element of the offences mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 may 
be inferred from factual circumstances‘, a provision repeated in all three money 
laundering Directives
925
, but not in the previous Greek legislation. 
 
                                                             
921 See art.2 par.3 of Directive 2005/60/EC. The original art.1 of Statute 2331/1995 did not contain a 
definition of ‗money laundering‘. The definition was introduced by the amending Statute 3424/2005 
and copied almost verbatim the second Directive. See art.1(b) of Statute 2331/1995 and art.1 par.1(C) 
of Council Directive 2001/97/EC. 
922 Art.2 par.2 (d) and (e) of Statute 3691/2008. 
923 See art.1 par.2(d) of Council Directive 2005/60/EC. The previous Statute 2331/1995, as amended by 
Statute 3424/2005, criminalized the participatory acts explicitly, in art.1(b). 
924 See art.2 par.4 of Statute 2331/1995. See also FATF Recommendation 1 (2003 version). 
925 Art.1(5) of Council Directive 2006/60/EC; Art.1 par.1(c) of Council Directive 2001/97/EC; Art.1 of 
Council Directive 91/308/EEC. 
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Article 3 – ‘List of the predicate offences’  
 Art.3 contains the list of activities that constitute a ‗criminal activity‘, that is the 
predicate offences. The list is comprised of two parts, one mentioning specific crimes 
and one general. The specific crimes mentioned are related to terrorism, organised 
crime, drugs, as well as other criminal activities, in accordance with art. 3 (5) of the 
Council Directive 2005/60/EC and FATF Recommendation 1 (2003 version); 
curiously, while fraud is specifically mentioned in art. 3 (5) (d) of the Directive,           
and was also mentioned in the previous Statute 2331/1995
926
, the new Statute 
3691/2008 mentions only fraud committed with a computer. 
The general part of the list adopts a threshold approach, introduced for the first 
time by Statute 3424/2005 amending Statute 2331/1995. Under this threshold 
provision, a predicate offence can be ‗any other offence punishable by deprivation of 
liberty for a minimum of over six months and resulting in a profit‘927.                       
The provision does not include the previous requirement for a profit of at least 15,000 
Euros
928. The provision incorporates art.3 par.5 of the third Directive defining ‗serious 
crimes‘; however, the requirement of profit is not included in the Directive.                 
Also relevant is the FATF Recommendation 1 (2003 version), which calls for a wide 
range of predicate offences and provides for the minimum penalty of six months             
as a necessary element of the threshold approach. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
926
 Art.1(A) of Statute 2331/1995. 
927 Art.3 (r) of Statute 3691/2008. 
928 Art.1 (A) (q) of Statute 2331/1995 as amended by Statute 3424/2005. the 15.000 Euros threshold 
reflected the definition of criminal activities in the second Directive, which included all the offences 
‗which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence of 
imprisonment in accordance with the Criminal law of the Member State‘ (see art.1 par.1(E) of Council 
Directive 2001/97/EC), as well as the interpretative note to FATF Recommendation 4 (1996 version), 
which stated that ‗countries should consider introducing an offence of money laundering based on all 
serious offences and/or on all offences that generate a significant amount of proceeds‘. Under the 
previous Statute, academics had argued that only those offences for which the law mentioned 
specifically the amount of profit when providing for a penalty were included in the second part of the 
definition. See among others Dimitrainas, ‗The expansion (?) of the meaning of the ‗predicate‘ 
criminal activity in the crime of money laundering‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis II: 
Studies on criminal law, criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, 2007, p.245 (in Greek); Pavlou, 
‗Money laundering. From Statute 2331/1995 to Statute 3424/2005: the evolution and expansion of a 
doctrinal and penal deviation‘, Poinika Chronika, 2006, p.347, (in Greek). 
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Articles 4 & 5 – ‘Definitions and Persons assigned the monitoring and reporting 
obligations’ 
Art.4 contains a series of definitions of the terms used in the Statute, again after 
the model of the Directive and the FATF Recommendations
929
. Most notably,                
the article defines the meaning of ‗property‘, as well as of ‗credit institution‘ and 
‗financial organisation‘, to which the obligations of the following articles are 
imposed. All terms are defined broadly, so as to encompass all possible activities. 
Furthermore, art.5 enlists the persons that are assigned the monitoring and reporting 
obligations under the Statute. The list is similar to the one of the respective art.2a           
of Statute 2331/1995
930
 and includes not only financial institutions, but also individual 
professionals, such as notaries, lawyers, and merchants of goods of high value. 
 
Articles 7-44 – ‘Regulating authorities and obligations to financial 
organisations’ 
 These provisions refer to the regulating authorities, and the obligations of 
financial organisations and other reporting persons. A Committee is established,           
with the duty of collection of all information regarding possible money laundering 
activities, investigating and appraising them, to which end it is given extensive 
investigatory authorities. The Committee corresponds to the Committee/Authority of 
article 7 of Statute 2331/1995. 
The obligations of the credit and financial institutions and the other persons 
mentioned in the Statute are presented in a detailed way. The relevant articles present 
the required level of diligence, and provide for the obligation of reporting suspicious 
cases to the authorities, of not communicating the relevant information to the 
customer and of keeping the relevant archives available for a period of time.            
Finally, the Statute makes special reference to the co-operation among authorities and 
the exchange of information and data. Art.31 contains a criminal provision, pursuant 
to which whoever breaks his duty of confidence is punished with imprisonment of at 
least three months and a monetary penalty. 
 
 
 
                                                             
929 Art.3 of Directive 2005/60/EC; FATF Recommendation 5 (2003 version). 
930 Implementing art.2a of Council Directive 91/308/EEC, added by Council Directive 2001/97/EC. 
232 
 
Article 45 – ‘Criminal Provisions’  
Art.45 contains the main criminal provisions of Statute 3691/2008. It should be 
noted that neither the third Council Directive, nor the FATF Recommendations 
impose the adoption of criminal provisions against money laundering; rather, they 
speak of ‗effective, proportionate and dissuasive‘ sanctions of a civil, administrative 
or criminal nature
931
.  
The perpetrator of the crime of money laundering is punished with incarceration 
of up to ten years and a fine amounting from 20.000 to 1.000.000 Euros
932
.                           
It is notable that for the first time the law provides for different penalties, according to 
the severity of the offence. Therefore, the employees of the legal persons under 
obligations pursuant to the Statute, the perpetrators of bribery, and persons 
committing the crime as a profession or repeatedly or in the framework of a criminal 
or terrorist organisation, receive a heavier penalty
933
; on the other hand, if the 
predicate offence is a misdemeanour, a smaller penalty is imposed
934
.                              
In any event, the Statute repeats the provision of Statute 2331/1995 under which the 
penalty imposed for money laundering cannot exceed the penalty that has been 
imposed for the predicate offence
935
. 
Criminal penalties are also provided for the persons under an obligation to report 
suspicious activities that fail to report such activities on purpose or present false 
information
936
. Very interestingly, the Greek Legislator has chosen to treat                  
non-reporting of suspicious transaction as a criminal offence, and thus, imposes 
criminal sanctions. 
The Statute states explicitly that the perpetrator of the criminal activity can be 
indicted for the offence of money laundering, adding the requirement that the two 
offences have been perpetrated by different acts
937
. This provision was first 
introduced in the previous Statute 2331/1995 by Statute 3424/2005, with the 
Legislator deciding thus on the relevant academic debate
938
. It should be noted that 
                                                             
931 Art.39 of Council Directive 2005/60/EC; FATF Recommendation 17 (2003 version). 
932 Art.45 par.1(a) of Statute 3691/2008. The previous Statute 2331/1995 did not provide for a 
monetary penalty. 
933 Art.45 par.1(b) & (c) of Statute 3691/2008. 
934 Art.45 par.1(f) & (i) of Statute 3691/2008. 
935 Art.45 par.1(g) of Statute 3691/2008; Art.2 par.1 of Statute 2331/1995 as amended by art.3 of 
statute 3424/2005. 
936 Art.45 (d) of Statute 3691/2008. 
937 Art.45 par.1(e) of Statute 3691/2008. 
938 Original art.2 of Statute 2331/1005; Art.3 par.1(d) of Statute 3424/2005. 
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neither the Directive nor the FATF Recommendations impose such a provision
939
. 
Another interesting provision is the punishment of the offender if he is closely related 
to the perpetrator of the predicate crime and has not taken part in it with a reduced 
penalty
940
. 
Finally, the Statute states for the first time in relevant legislation that the 
indictment or conviction of the criminal activity is not a prerequisite for the 
indictment or conviction for the crime of money laundering
941
. 
 
Articles 46-48 – ‘Seizure and Confiscation of the property – Freezing of 
accounts’ 
 The seizure and confiscation of the property that constitutes a product of the 
criminal activity, the civil compensation of the State and the freezing of the accounts 
and assets of the accused are regulated in these articles almost identically to the 
relevant articles of Statute 2331/1995. The above provisions correspond to FATF 
Recommendation 3 (2003 version); in the latest FATF report, it is noted that the level 
of compliance with Recommendation 3 is satisfactory, but effectiveness has not been 
proved yet
942
.  
Note should be taken of a couple of important differences from the previous 
legislation: Firstly, art.46 of Statute 3691/2008 mentions that the property that is the 
product not only of the criminal activity, but also of the activities of money 
laundering
943
, is to be confiscated. Secondly, the provision of the previous Statute 
pursuant to which all property of the accused acquired in a five-year period before his 
indictment was presumed to be a product of criminal activity is omitted from Statute 
3691/2008
944
. 
 
 
                                                             
939 Pursuant to FATF Recommendation no.1 (2003 version) the indictment of the predicate offender for 
the crime of money laundering is left in the discretion of each country. See however FATF 7th follow-
up report on Greece of 19 February 2010, p.7 par.17, which seems to expect such an indictment. 
940 Art.45 par.1(f) of Statute 3691/2008. 
941 Art.45 par.2 of Statute 3691/2008. 
942 See FATF 7th follow-up report on Greece of 19 February 2010, p.5 
943 Compare to art.2 par.6 of Statute 2331/1995, which refers to property in relation to a criminal 
activity, that is a predicate offence. 
944 Therefore, the Greek legislator did not adopt this time the propositions of FATF Recommendation 
3, par.3 (2003 version), pursuant to which ‗Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such 
proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which 
require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, 
to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law‘. See art.3 
par.1 of Statute 2331/1005 and art.47 par.1 of Statute 3691/2008. 
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Article 51 – ‘Liability of Legal Persons’  
Art.51 regulates the liability of legal persons. The provision contains a list of 
sanctions, all of them of an administrative nature, since criminal liability of legal 
persons is not accepted in the Greek Criminal Law system. Administrative sanctions 
are mentioned in the FATF Recommendation 3 (2003 version) as an alternative to 
criminal liability; however, there has been pressure from the FATF for the 
introduction of criminal law provisions in relation to legal persons
945
.                          
Art.51 was amended recently by art.9 of Statute 3875/2010, which introduced stricter 
penalties for legal persons, still of an administrative nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
945 See FATF 7th follow-up report on Greece of 19 February 2010, p.8 par.24, where it is stated that ‗it 
seems that the current situation is the result of a legal tradition and policy in Greece, and that there are 
no fundamental or constitutional principles of domestic law prohibiting holding corporations criminally 
liable‘. 
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b. The Academic point of view on money laundering 
 
 
Both Statute 3691/2008 and the previously standing Statute 2331/1995 have been 
the target of harsh criticism: Academics have characterised it as ‗pointedly repressive, 
leading to curtailment of rights and collapse of the guarantees of criminal doctrine‘946, 
‗an ‗anti-code‘ in the Criminal Code‘ resulting in the ‗deviation from a modern 
criminal law‘947. Issues as the legal right that is protected by the provisions,                   
the connection between money laundering and organised crime, the failings of the 
regulatory techniques of the Statutes and their accordance with the Greek Constitution 
and the doctrines of the criminal law system have been much debated and commented 
upon; these debates will be presented, in summary, in the following paragraphs. 
 
1. The legally protected interest  
Since the adoption of the first anti-money laundering Statute, academics have 
proposed a number of legally protected interests that lie at the core of the anti-money 
laundering provisions. The relevant debate, while apparently mostly theoretical,            
can have important implications on many practical questions related to the application 
of the law. 
Such interests that have been proposed as being protected by the provisions are 
the non-obstruction of Justice
948
, the smooth function of the financial system that is 
disrupted by acts of money laundering
949
, the general public interest through the 
connection of money laundering to organized crime
950
, and the legally protected 
interest that is attacked by the predicate offence
951
. The first and second of these 
                                                             
946 Pavlou, ‗(Previous) ‗criminal activity‘: tautology or evolution? Another contribution to the 
doctrinal understanding of Statute 2331/1995 (on money laundering) in the light of recent regulations  
of  Statutes 3424/2005 and 3472/2006‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. 
‗Clean‘ or free society?, Sakkoulas, 2007, p.135, (in Greek). 
947 Pavlou, ‗Persecutory deviations in the application of Statute 2331/1995 on money laundering and 
the required rationalization of its application‘, Poinika Chronika, 2003, p.199, (in Greek). 
948 Dionysopoulou, ‗Money laundering and receiving products of crime. A contribution to the issue of 
the legally protected right of article 2 par.1 of Statute 2331/1995‘, Poinika Chronika, 1999, p.991 (in 
Greek); Katsios, ‗Mundus vult decipi‘. The course of Directive 91/308/EEC on money laundering and 
the non-application of Statute 2331/1995‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2000, p.397, (in Greek). 
949 Nikoloudis, ‗Money Laundering (article 2 of Statute 2331/1995)‘, Poinika Chronika, 2000, p.771, 
(in Greek). 
950 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗Money laundering‘, in Bemmann & Spinellis (eds.), Criminal Law – 
Freedom – Rule of Law. Honorary Volume for G.A. Magkakis, Sakkoulas, 1999, p.389, (in Greek). 
951 Vassilakopoulos, id., 1996, p.1365; Pavlou, id., 2003. pp.193-194; Tzannetis, ‗The confiscation of 
laundered products of criminal activity‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. 
‗Clean‘ or free society?, Sakkoulas, 2007, pp.251-253, (in Greek). 
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propositions have been criticised with the arguments that, firstly, Justice can only be 
obstructed at the point when the offence has reached the courts
952
, and that the 
financial system is not really harmed by money laundering, which, on the contrary, 
reinforces its liquidity
953
. Finally, in view of the persistence of the Legislator in the 
disassociation of money laundering offences from organised crime, even after the 
amendments to Statute 2331/1995 and the introduction of Statute 3691/2008,                     
the third of the above propositions does not seem supportable
954
. 
As a result, the argument most supported by academics, especially in view of the 
recent legislative provisions, seems to be the protection by anti-money laundering 
legislation of the legal right attacked by the previous criminal activity
955
.                       
The adoption of this view, moreover, implies that the law recognises a connection 
between these two activities that should be taken into account in the analysis and 
interpretation of its provisions
956
. 
 
2. The non-correspondence of the text of the Statute to its purpose 
The purpose of Statute 3691/2008 is stated in art.1, as well as in its accompanying 
Explanatory Report, as the prevention and suppression of money laundering, that is of 
legitimisation of revenues from criminal activities
957
. Its provisions, nevertheless,           
do not always seem to be in accordance with this stated purpose, and the Statute has 
even been called ‗pseudepigraph‘958. 
The essence of the crime of money laundering, according to academics, is that 
illegal revenues acquire a ‗legitimate title‘: their illegal source is obscured and 
                                                             
952 Vassilakopoulos, ibid.; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 1999, p.388; Dimitrainas, ‗The perpetrator of 
the crime of money laundering‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. ‗Clean‘ 
or free society?, Sakkoulas , 2007, pp.155-156, (in Greek). 
953 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 1999, p.385. 
954 See the relevant critique in Dimitrainas, id., 2007, pp.160-161. 
955 Dimitrainas, id., 2007, pp.161-162; Pavlou, ‗Statute 3691/2008 on prevention and suppression of 
money laundering and financing of terrorism. The finalization of a historical doctrinal deviation and 
the consolidation of suppressive arbitrariness‘, Poinika Chronika, 2008, p.932, (in Greek). 
956 For a detailed analysis of the different views on the question of the legally protected right, see 
Tsiridis, The new Statute on money laundering (Statute 3691/2008), Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2009, pp.47-
54, and Kamperou-Ntalta, Statute 3691/2008 on money laundering. Interpretative approach of the 
Statute and international criminal framework, Dikaio & Oikonomia, P.N. Sakkoulas, 2009, pp.60-64, 
(in Greek). 
957 Explanatory Report on the Bill ‗Prevention and suppression of money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism‘ , Poinika Chronika, 2008, p.908, (in Greek). 
958 Argyropoulos, ‗The fair penalty as a cultural asset‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, 
Money Laundering. ‗Clean‘ or free society?), Sakkoulas, 2007, p.33 (in Greek); Tsiridis, id., 2009, 
p.65. 
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another, seemingly legal, source appears outwardly
959
. Thus, it has been maintained 
that only acts that can accommodate the above notion of the legitimization of the 
product of previous criminal activities should be prosecuted under anti-money 
laundering legislation
960
. 
However, one should note that  Statute 3691/2008, as well as previous legislation, 
moves in an opposite direction, formulating the crime of money laundering in such a 
way, that it encompasses common acts of receiving and handling stolen goods or even 
neutral ones. Thus, money laundering seems to have ended up as a possible 
accompanying provision to almost all offences of the Criminal Code
961
. This is most 
evident in the provision of art.3(s), which includes in the definition of ‗criminal 
activity‘ all offences punishable with imprisonment over six months962, as well as the 
provision of art.2(d) defining as ‗money laundering‘ the placement and transfer of 
property through financial and credit institutions
963
. 
Another objection towards the content of the anti-money laundering provisions          
is the inclusion of crimes that cannot easily accommodate the notion of profit in the 
list of predicate offences, as is the case with the establishment and participation in         
                                                             
959 Pavlou, id., 2006, p.343; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The crime of money laundering – Problems from 
the application of Statute 2331/1995 up to now‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2002, pp.390-391, (in Greek). 
960 Pavlou, id., 2008, p.927; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The crime of money laundering after Statute 
3424/2005: interpretative remarks‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. 
‗Clean‘ or free society?, Sakkoulas, 2007, pp.170-171, (in Greek); Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 1999, 
p.390; Dimitrainas , ‗Money laundering: views of the case law on special issues of the application of 
Statute 2331/1995 (on the occasion of the Order of Larissa Council of Appeal no.50/2004)‘ , Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2004, p.589, (in Greek); Pavlou, ‗Money laundering‘ (article 2 of Statute 2331/1995), 
especially its delimitation from ‗receiving and handling products of crime‘ (article 394 of the Criminal 
Code)‘, Yperaspisi, 2000, p.644, (in Greek). 
961 Pavlou, id., 2008, p.924; Pavlou, id., 2006, 346; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2007, p.168. 
962 In the previous version of this provision (art.1(a)(ii) of Statute 2331/1995) there was the additional 
requirement of a resulting property of at least 15.000 Euros. Academics had argued that this amount of 
resulting property should be provided for in the article criminalizing the predicate offence, so that the 
crime would be serious enough to be connected to money laundering. See Pavlou, id., 2006, p.347; 
Pavlou, id., 2007, pp.131-132; Dimitrainas, id., in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis II, 2007, 
p.242, (in Greek). On the other hand, while acknowledging the seriousness of the related arguments, 
Simeonidou-Kastanidou had maintained that this interpretation could not have been accommodated by 
the provision and that, in any case, did not preserve its constitutionality. See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, 
id., 2007, pp.177-178. 
963 Academics note that activities included in this definition, as the deposit of money in a bank account 
in the true name of the depositor, are neutral actions that do not provide any kind of legitimate title to 
the property in question, and even facilitates the tracking of suspicious property. See Kaiafa-Gbandi , 
‗Penalization of money laundering: Basic characteristics of Statute 3691/2008 and the limits of the 
rule of law‘, Poinika Chronika, 2008, p.918, (in Greek) ; and Pavlou, id., 2008, p.928; Tsiridis, 
‗Remarks and propositions on the bill concerning the implementation in our legislation of the third 
Council Directive (2005/60/EC) on money laundering and the Directive 2006/70/EC‘, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2008, p.625, (in Greek). 
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a criminal organisation and the terrorist activities
964
. It has been, correctly, argued that 
the offences included in the list should be considered as ‗predicate offences‘ only 
when they result in some kind of property, in a product with a ‗clear financial value‘, 
in an immediate and causative way
965
. 
It has also, correctly, been remarked that the law confuses ‗dirty‘ money, obtained 
through the previous commitment of a crime, with ‗black‘ money, that is the non-
taxed product of any activity, since all offences related to tax evasion and debts to the 
State can be predicate offences under the general provision of art.3(s) of Statute 
3691/2008
966
; this provision connects the Statute even more with everyday offences 
with a small financial product
967
. Finally, in relation to art.2 (e) of Statute 3691/2008 
it has been noted that the establishment of a criminal organisation for the perpetration 
of money laundering offences does not constitute in itself money laundering activity, 
and its inclusion in the definition is illogical
968
. 
 
3. Vagueness and failings in the phrasing of the provisions 
The provision of art.3(s) of Statute 3691/2008 rendering as predicate offences all 
crimes that result in the acquisition of property and are punished by imprisonment for 
at least six months, (as well as the corresponding art.1 (a) (ii) of Statute 2331/1995) 
has been criticized for vagueness in the description of the criminal activity. 
Academics argue that this general description based on the minimum imposed penalty 
does not satisfy the precision of criminal provisions required by rule of law,                      
so that everyone can know beforehand if a certain activity is a crime or not, and thus, 
the constitutionality of the provision is contested
969
. 
Another provision that has been accused of vagueness is the provision of art.13          
of Statute 3691/2008, citing the measures of due diligence that should be followed by 
persons under an obligation to inform the authorities about suspicious transactions.           
                                                             
964 Pavlou, id., 2007, p.128; Dimitrainas, id., in Honorary Volume for I.Manoledakis , 2007, p.244, (in 
Greek). 
965 Pavlou, id., 2007, pp.127-128. 
966 Pavlou, id., 2008, p.926; Pavlou, id., 2006, p.348; Tsiridis, id., 2008, p.626. It should be noted that 
Statute 3472/2006 had introduced art.2(e) in Statute 2331/1995, according to which the product of tax 
evasion and non-payment of debts to the state did not consist a predicate offence; Statute 3691/2008 
did not include a similar provision. 
967 See Tsiridis, id., 2009, p.260. 
968 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2008, p.919. The provision should have been added instead in the definition of a 
criminal organization in art.187 of the Criminal Code. See criticism for this omission in Livos, ‗Money 
laundering‘ and its tracing‘, in Greek Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. ‗Clean‘ or 
free society?, Sakkoulas, 2007, p.377 (in Greek), and Tsiridis, id., 2009, pp.63-64. 
969 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2008, p.920; Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2007, p.179; Dimitrainas, id., in 
Honorary Volume for I.Manoledakis, p.240, (in Greek). 
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It has been, correctly, remarked that the law does not specify the types of information 
that are to be collected, nor the manner in which they should be collected
970
. 
Moreover, the law associates the obligation to inform the authorities and take 
measures of diligence with the perception of the persons under the obligation,            
since they are to judge when there is an increased danger or when a transaction                
is suspicious. While the inclusion of the definitions of ‗suspicious‘ and ‗unnatural‘ 
transactions in the new law is a step forward in comparison with their total absence in 
the previous Statute 2331/1995
971
, the reality is that the definitions are based on 
subjective elements, and thus, the issue of vagueness has not been addressed 
satisfactorily
972
. 
Another point of vagueness in the legislation concerns the relation between the 
predicate offence and the money laundering. On the basis of the dependence of the 
penalty of the money laundering activity on the penalty imposed for the predicate 
offence, academics have argued that money laundering is a ‗post-participatory‘ act973, 
and a corollary of the predicate offence
974
. At the same time, however, it has been 
noted that there is a tendency towards the autonomy of money laundering, most 
evident in the course often followed in the investigation of the crimes, since the 
indications of activities suspicious for money-laundering can eventually lead to 
investigations about the predicate offence
975
. 
Finally, both art.2 par.5 and art.45 par.1 (e) of Statute 3691/2005 have been 
accused of being poor in drafting. The first because the provision that ‗knowledge, 
intent or purpose (…) may be inferred from objective factual circumstances‘, although 
copied almost verbatim from art.1 par.5 of Directive 2005/60/EC, is superfluous as                 
self-evident under the general provisions of criminal law
976
. The second, to the extent 
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 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗Lawyers: Obligations of assistance n the confrontation of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism and criminal liability‘, Poinika Chronika, 2008, p.934, (in 
Greek).  
971 An absence that had raised accusations of unconstitutionality. See Livos, id., 2007, p.363. 
972 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2008, p.936. See also Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗Legal professional 
privilege and money laundering‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis II: Studies on criminal 
law, criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, 2007, pp.660-661, (in Greek). 
973 Livos, id., 2007, p.4. 
974 Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2007, p.187; Dimitrainas, id., in Honorary Volume for I.Manoledakis 
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975 Livos, id., 2007, p.362; Papakyriakou, ‗The criminal legislation on the suppression of money 
laundering as a fundamental axis of a new model of criminal policy‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis 
Manoledakis II: Studies on criminal law, criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, 2007, p.526, (in 
Greek). 
976 Petropoulos, ‗Issues of intent in the crime of money laundering (article 2 par.5 of Statute 
3691/2008)‘, Poinika Chronika, 2008, p.958, (in Greek). 
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that it provides for the liability of the predicate offender for the crime of money 
laundering as well ‗if the elements of the acts of money laundering are different from 
these of the criminal activity‘: given that money laundering is committed through 
separate acts taking place after the predicate offence, these elements will always be 
different
977
. However, it has been noted that under the latter provision acts that 
essentially complete the predicate offence cannot constitute money laundering acts
978
. 
 
4. The principle of proportionality 
The severe penalties introduced by anti-money laundering legislation have raised 
concerns about their proportionality. Academics have often remarked on the relation 
of money laundering to organised crime: the legitimization of the profits of organised 
crime consolidates the power of the latter and its infiltration of society
979
.                           
It is this serious threat to social peace and security that can only justify the penalties 
provided for money laundering offences. Thus, a limiting interpretation of the law, 
excluding all acts not related to organised crime from the definition of money 
laundering, has been proposed as an alternative that respects the principle of 
proportionality
980
. Moreover, it has been maintained that not only the predicate 
offence, but also the money laundering acts must be committed in the framework of    
a criminal organisation
981
. As mentioned above, however, the Legislator‘s repeated 
refusal to include a similar connection in the law seems according to some authors           
to preclude such an interpretation, a view reinforced by the broadness and diversity of 
the predicate offences enlisted in the law
982
. 
The principle of proportionality is further compromised by the omission of the 
requirement of a resulting property of at least 15.000 Euros in the provisions of the 
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 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2008, p.921; Pavlou, id., 2008, p.929. 
978 Dimitrainas, id., 2007, pp.149-150. 
979 Pavlou, id., 2008, p.924; Pavlou, id., 2007, p.120; Dimitrainas, id., 2007, p.159; Simeonidou-
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Criminal Attorneys Association, Money Laundering. ‗Clean‘ or free society?, Sakkoulas, 2007, p.438-
439 (in Greek); Papakyriakou, id., pp.489-490; Dionysopoulou, ‗When does an element of property 
originate in criminal activity? Contribution in the definition of the circle of objects fit to money 
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new Statute 3691/2008. Thus, heavy penalties are imposed without even this 
minimum guarantee of a certain severity of the criminal activity
983
. Another objection 
is related to the aforementioned provision of art.2 par.1 (e) of Statute 3691/2008:             
the article renders a felony punished by incarceration the establishment of a group of 
two people for the perpetration of money laundering offences. Thus, criminal groups 
normally punished by imprisonment (six months to five years), are criminalised with 
incarceration (five to ten years) especially in the case of money laundering.                        
The proportionality of this exceptional provision is, also, dubious
984
. 
Issues of proportionality are also raised by the provisions concerning confiscation. 
More specifically, the obligatory confiscation mentioned in art.46 of Statute 
3691/2008 has been criticised as an obligatory additional penalty, contrary to the 
principle of proportionality of the penalty to the offence, as well as the right to 
property and the principle of culpability
985
. However, according to the contrary 
correct argument, the provision is justified to the extent it refers to the immediate 
product of criminal activity, since the maintenance of such a property by the offender 
cannot be accepted under the rule of law, therefore should not be left to the 
discretionary power of the judge
986
. The absence of a provision regulating the 
confiscation of property that has been acquired by partly illegal and partly legal 
revenues in a proportionate way has been deemed problematic as well
987
. 
Another important issue is the possible criminalisation of the perpetrators of 
money laundering offences with heavier penalties than the perpetrators of predicate 
offences
988
. Art.45 par.1 (g) of Statute 3691/2008 lays the penalty imposed on the 
predicate offence as a limit to the criminalisation of the money laundering activities 
only when the perpetrator of the latter is the predicate offender or a member of his 
family
989
, while the relevant provision of Statute 2331/1995 was applicable to all third 
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persons
990
. It has been maintained that the heavier punishment of money laundering 
can be justified under the principle of proportionality only with the acknowledgement 
that the relevant provisions protect not only the legal rights protected by the 
criminalisation of the predicate offence, but also some further, more general legal 
rights
991
. 
On the other hand, academics have noted some progress concerning the principle 
of proportionality. The omission of any mention to participatory acts has been deemed 
positively, as they are punished in any case under the general provisions of the 
Criminal Code, and their previous punishment with the same penalties as the main 
criminal offence was disproportionate
992
. Another well-received amendment is art.45 
par.1 (f), according to which money laundering activities perpetrated by family 
members of the predicate offender are misdemeanours and not felonies
993
. Moreover, 
a greater diversity of the imposed penalties can be observed
994
, a progress that had 
been regarded by academics as necessary for the observance of proportionality in 
view of the diversity of the previous criminal activities
995
, and that can also reduce the 
instances in which money laundering will attract a heavier penalty than the predicate 
offence. 
 
5. Other doctrinal and constitutional issues 
Art.45 par.1(g) of Statute 3691/2008, as well as its predecessor, art.2 par.1(d) of 
Statute 2331/1995, introducing the dependency of the money laundering penalty on 
the penalty of the predicate offence under certain circumstances, have been the object 
of much criticism by academics. The provisions have been criticized for 
unconstitutionality and for violating all accepted principles that apply to the 
determination of sentence. It has been remarked that the provisions mark ‗a different, 
unknown up to now, criminal law, since every notion of determination of sentence is 
                                                             
990 Art.2 par.1(d) of Statute 2331/1995, introduced by Statute 3424/2005. In its original version, Statute 
2331/1995 included no relevant provision and had been heavily criticized. See Androulakis, ‗Criminal 
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992 Kaiafa-Gbandi, id., 2008, p.919. For a critique to the provision previously standing, see 
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Association, Money Laundering. ‗Clean‘ or free society?, Sakkoulas , 2007, pp.214-215 (in Greek); 
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993 Tsiridis, id., 2008, p.628. 
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broken down; the principle of proportionality traversing this determination is 
downright violated; the legally provided resilience of the threatened penalty in view 
of extenuating circumstances is cancelled; and finally, implicit penalties for                     
in concreto circumstances are introduced‘996. The scope of penalty is, thus, 
determined by the sentence imposed for a different crime by a different judge at a 
different trial, and not by elements intrinsic to the specific money laundering 
activity
997
. It has also been observed that this limitation to the imposed penalty 
depends on the previous conviction of the perpetrator of the criminal activity; if there 
is no conviction, the scope of the penalty remains unlimited
998
. The provisions violate 
furthermore the principle of equality: two identical money laundering acts can be 
punished differently on the basis of the different criminalisation of their predicate 
offences
999
. 
Another issue is related to the liability of the perpetrator of the criminal activity 
for money laundering acts as well, a liability explicitly recognised in art.45 paragraph 
1(e) of Statute 3691/2008 (self-laundering). However, one should note that the 
predicate offender laundering the product of his crimes tries to avoid self-
incrimination, and his acts should remain unpunished under the principle of the non-
criminalisation of self-aiding and abetting
1000
. Under a partly different, but also 
correct view, such a liability is possible only if the perpetrator launders money for a 
criminal organisation, since in this case he is aiding not only himself, but also the 
activities of organised crime, and the demerit of his activities is increased
1001
. It has 
been suggested, furthermore, that self-laundering can be criminalised if the 
prosecution of the offender for the criminal activity is not possible, since in this way 
the impunity of the offender is avoided
1002
. The adoption of the relevant provisions 
has also been criticised for totally ignoring the aforementioned explicit academic 
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objections and for serving utility purposes, as the avowed purpose of the Legislator 
was an increase in the number of convictions for the crime of money laundering
1003
. 
Serious considerations of constitutionality have been raised with regard to the 
Committee of art.7 of Statute 3691/2008 and the previous Authority of art.7 of Statute 
2331/1995. The Committee is authorised to perform a number of actions, such as              
to conduct a preliminary examination, to interrogate witnesses and suspects, to 
conduct investigatory acts, to collect evidence and data, even from court officials,              
to issue its findings etc. Academics note that these actions pertain to the judiciary, and 
not an administrative committee; the relevant provisions violate a number of 
constitutional principles, namely art.96 par.1
1004
 on criminal justice and art.26
1005
 on 
the separation of powers
1006. Furthermore, the Committee‘s power to ask for 
information regarding the prosecution of an offence has been accused of violating the 
principle of the secrecy of criminal preliminary proceedings
1007
, while the provision 
permitting the members of the Committee that had conducted the investigation to be 
examined in the court as witnesses is contrary to art.211 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure
1008
 and the principle of non-prejudice
1009
. On the other hand, one can argue 
that the Committee has in its disposal a specialised technology and organisation that 
can facilitate the investigations and that pose it in a more advantageous position to 
effectively confront money laundering activities than the public prosecutor
1010
. 
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Art.47 of Statute 3691/2008 (and the respective art.3 of Statute 2331/1995)               
has been criticised for disguising the confiscation as ‗compensation‘ and transferring 
criminal cases to civil courts, thus, violating the principle of the legitimate judge 
expressed in the aforementioned art.96 par.1 of the Greek Constitution
1011
.                          
On the other hand, a number of changes in the new provision compared with the 
previous one have been commended by academics: the omission of the provision of 
art.3 par.1 of Statute 2331/1995 that considered all property acquired in the five years 
preceding the commitment of the offence as product of criminal activity
1012
,            
the omission of the indicator of culpability that reversed the principle of innocence of 
the accused
1013
, and the inclusion of the requirement that the property is a product of 
criminal activity
1014
. 
The rest of the provisions regarding confiscation have also been the object of 
criticism. Apart from the question of the proportionality of the obligatory character of 
the imposed confiscation that has been analysed above, issues of constitutionality are 
raised by the provision of art.46 par.1 of Statute 3691/2008 permitting the 
confiscation of the property of third persons that is a product of criminal activity,               
if the person was in knowledge of the criminal activity. It has been noted that the 
provision is unconstitutional, since the assumption of knowledge of the origin of the 
property from the knowledge of the criminal activity violates the principle of 
culpability
1015
. Therefore, knowledge of the origin of the property should also be 
required, in which case the provision appears to be superfluous, as the third person 
would have committed the crime of money laundering him
1016
. Regarding the 
provision of art.46 par.3, pursuant to which confiscation is imposed even if no-one 
was prosecuted or the prosecution was held inadmissible, it has been argued that the 
dissociation of the confiscation from any conviction in relation to the absence of any 
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threat for social order imposed by the property in question leads to the 
unconstitutionality of the provision
1017
. 
As to the imposition of obligations on legal persons and individuals, it has been 
maintained that the relevant provisions cannot easily accommodate the notions of 
professional freedom and secrecy, especially the legal professional privilege
1018
. 
Finally, an argument in favour of the constitutionality of anti-money laundering 
legislation should be mentioned: it has been maintained that the adoption of severe 
and even borderline constitutional provisions is necessary in view of the seriousness 
of the threats posed to society by money laundering activities, which often give the 
impression of regular financial activities that constitute an expression of personal and 
financial freedom
1019
. However, one should note that a detailed law is sufficient in 
order to effective fight money laundering without being necessary to have particular 
constitutional provisions for that purpose. Constitution is the fundamental underlying 
framework of a nation and a State, which regulates more generally both the 
government's power, and the fundamental rights belonging to all people residing 
within its borders. Therefore, particular threats to a democratic society, like money 
laundering or terrorism, can be dealt with efficiently through detailed and 
contemporary laws.  
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c. Review of the Greek case law on money laundering 
 
Courts have addressed many issues raised by academics in relation to money 
laundering legislation, though not always in a constant manner. Relevant judgements 
vary from the analytical, which attempt to interpret the obscure provisions of the 
legislation, to the more superficial, adopting a mostly textual interpretation.                 
Apart from the vagueness of certain provisions, interpretation and application of the 
law is furthermore perplexed by the many amendments, as well as certain legislative 
interventions that moved in the opposite direction from court decisions. 
Since Statute 3691/2008 has not been tested in the courts due to its recent 
adoption, many of the issues addressed in the application of the previously standing 
Statute 2331/1995 in the case law, before and after its amendment by Statute 
3424/2005, remain relevant, given that the provisions of the new legislation bear 
many similarities to their predecessors. The analysis of the case law on Statute 
2331/1995 will be focused on the five main issues that have been addressed by the 
courts: The activities that can constitute a money laundering offence; the previous 
criminal activity and its relationship to money laundering; the connection of money 
laundering to organised crime; the possibility of self-laundering; and the 
constitutionality of certain procedural provisions. 
It should be noted that the proportionality of the provision has not been contested 
or addressed by the courts, although academics have extensively commented on it.             
In addition to that, an overview of the case law leads to the conclusion that                      
anti-money laundering legislation has mostly been applied in relation to small-scale 
criminal activity, that bears little resemblance to organised crime and networks that 
provide legitimate titles for criminal revenues on a big scale. 
 
1. Which acts constitute money laundering activities? 
Focusing on the text of the law, which defines money laundering as, among 
others, the acquisition, possession, transfer, and concealment of property, courts have 
accepted as money laundering a number of acts which, according to academics, 
should be considered as simple acts of receiving stolen property
1020
. The possession of 
money
1021
 or bicycles
1022
 that are the product of a fraud, the purchase of stolen 
                                                             
1020 See Simeonidou-Kastanidou, id., 2007, p.168. 
1021 Council of Appeal of Athens decision No. 2741/2000, reversed by Supreme Court decision in 
council No.372/2002, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2002, p.1013. 
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jewellery
1023
, the purchase of cars
1024
 and of real estate
1025
 with the revenues of the 
previous criminal activity, the deposit of a sum of 10.500 Euros in the bank account 
of a third person
1026
,  have all been held to constitute laundering of money. Case law 
has also accepted in the majority of cases that the simple deposit of the product of 
crime in a bank account in the true name of the depositor equals a ‗concealment‘ of 
this product, thus, the offence of money laundering is committed
1027
. As stated in the 
Supreme Court decision No. 791/2009, ‗the deposit of the money in the bank has as a 
consequence that this money lose their independent status, are mixed with the money 
of the bank and, in this way, their true origin is concealed‘1028. 
However, a number of decisions have adopted a different interpretation, 
underlining the element of legitimization as an essential characteristic of any money 
laundering activity: money and other products of criminal activity should acquire a 
legitimate title through the laundering process. Thus, regarding the deposit of money 
in a bank account, courts have stated that it ‗constitutes an act of concealment, but this 
act on its own does not offer him [the perpetrator] any ‗legal title‘ to his illegal 
revenues, as would be the case if, through a series of bank transactions and the 
interjection of third persons, he managed to give the impression that the illegal money 
were not deposited by him, but have a different origin‘1029. 
While this latter interpretation is supported by both relevant legislation, which 
mentions ‗legitimization of revenues‘ in its title, and by academics, it has not been 
widely accepted by the courts. Characteristically, the recent Supreme Court decision 
No. 991/2009 states that ‗money laundering is nothing more than a distinguished case 
of receiving stolen property that is a felony even if the product proceeds from a 
misdemeanour‘1030 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1022 Athens Council of Appeal decision No.1161/2000, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, p.136. 
1023 Thessaloniki Council of Appeal decision No. 51/2000, Yperaspisi, 2000, p.1037. 
1024 Supreme Court decision No.721/2004, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.900. 
1025 Supreme Court decision No.1231/2004, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.33; Supreme Court decision 
No. 924/2009, NOMOS legal database. 
1026 Supreme Court decision No. 1025/2008, NOMOS legal database. 
1027 Supreme Court decision No. 570/2006, NOMOS legal database; Supreme Court decision No. 
791/2009, NOMOS legal database; Supreme Court decision No. 924/2009, id.; Supreme Court decision 
No.1148/2008, NOMOS legal database; Supreme Court decision No. 1231/2004, id. 
1028 See Supreme Court decision No. 791/2009, id. 
1029 Larissa Council of Appeal decision No. 50/2004, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2004, p.531; Athens Council 
of Misdemeanours decision No. 2593/2006, Poinika Chronika, 2007, p.79. See also Athens Council of 
Misdemeanours decision No.2171/2005, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.1146. 
1030 See Supreme Court decision No.991/2009, NOMOS legal database. 
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2. The relation between money laundering and the predicate offences 
Money laundering legislation requires that the laundered property is the product of 
one of the predicate offences mentioned in the law. Courts are obliged to connect the 
money laundering to a previous criminal activity, but they do not require the existence 
of any convicting decision for the predicate offence. Both the commission of such an 
offence and its perpetrators should ensue clearly from the evidence and not be 
speculative
1031
. A general reference to previous criminal activities and their product             
is not enough; on the contrary, the court should mention the specific acts and 
incidents that constitute one of the predicate offences
1032
. However, there has been       
an unsuccessful attempt to bring about the reversal of this case law by the assistant 
prosecutor of the Supreme Court, who maintained that, the aforementioned view 
‗leads to an impermissible restriction of the provisions that criminalise money 
laundering‘1033. 
It has been held by courts that the relation between the predicate offence and the 
money laundering is that of a main and ensuing act. Money laundering remains, 
however, an offence with autonomous demerit that cannot be absorbed by the 
predicate offence. Courts have based this view on the possible punishment of money 
laundering as a felony even when the predicate offence is a misdemeanour
1034
.        
The Supreme Court held in case No. 1611/2007 that the criminal punishment for the 
main offence does not exclude the punishment of the criminal also for the offence of 
money laundering. In this context, the main offence and the ensuing offence are 
concurrent punishable offences and they do not constitute non punishable following 
acts
1035
. The same approach was followed in the most recent case No. 2035/09 where 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position saying that the main and the ensuing act are 
different offences with different demerits to each of them
1036
. In this framework, and 
very interestingly, the Supreme Court in case No.1379/2008 held that it is possible to 
prosecute for money laundering without prosecuting the predicate offence in cases 
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Dikaiosini, 2004, p.526; Supreme Court decision No. 402/2004, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2005, p.45; 
Supreme Court decision No.721/2004, id.; Supreme Court decision No. 924/2009, id. 
1032 Supreme Court decision No.372/2002, id. 
1033 Supreme Court decision No.1611/2007, unpublished. 
1034 Supreme Court decision No.570/2006, id.; Supreme Court decision No.924/2009, id. 
1035 Supreme Court decision No.1161/2007, Poinika Chronika, 2008, p. 527, in Greek. 
1036 Supreme Court decision No. 2035/2009, Poinika Chronika, 2010, in Greek. 
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where there is evidence of the guilt of the offender for the main crime, showing once 
again the autonomous demerit of money laundering
1037
. 
 
3. Money laundering and organised crime 
The connection of money laundering to organised crime is not mentioned in most 
court decisions. There are, however, a number of decisions where this connection has 
been carefully analysed. The Thrace Council of Appeal decision No.85/2002 accepted 
that laundering should concern the property of a criminal organisation that is the 
product of its illegal activities, and should aim to assist the infiltration of society by 
the organization. Moreover, the Council held that the laundering itself should take 
place inside the organization and according to its rules of operation
1038
.                        
The Council of Appeal
1039
 proceeded to accept the commission of money laundering 
by the accused, who had attempted to drive out of Greece a car stolen in England with 
forged papers, as it held that he was a member of an international multi-member 
organization that traded in stolen automobiles. 
The opposite view was adopted by the Larissa Council of Appeal in decision 
No.50/2004. The Council addressed two issues: if the money laundering should be 
committed by a criminal organisation and if the laundered property should have been 
acquired through the activities of a criminal organization. In connection to the first 
issue, the Council, while accepting that a successful act of money laundering would 
usually require the participation of a criminal organisation, held that such 
participation is not required by the law. As to the second issue, the Council observed 
that the Legislator refrained from including any similar condition in the Statute,                    
and maintained that the addition of such a requirement through judicial interpretation 
would only introduce uncertainty as to the content of the provision and hinder its 
application. According to the Council, the demerit of the acts of money laundering 
lies not in their connection to organised crime, but in their special ‗modus operandi‘, 
that permits the legitimization of illegal revenues
1040
. 
                                                             
1037 Supreme Court decision No.1379/2008, Poinika Chronika, 2009, p. 459, in Greek. 
1038 See Thrace Council of Appeal decision No.85/2002, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2003, p.259. Similar are 
the Alexandroupolis Council of Misdemeanours decision No. 19/1999, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2001, 
p.1245, the Dodekanisa Council of Appeal decision No. 85/2005, NOMOS legal database, and the 
Athens Council of Misdemeanours decision No.2171/2005, id. 
1039 Under the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure, the Council of Appeal is a Committee consisted of 
judges deciding on a series of procedural matters, most importantly about the indictment or non-
indictment of the accused. 
1040 See Larissa Council of Appeal decision No. 50/2004, id. 
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4. The punishment of the perpetrator of the predicate offence for the crime of 
money laundering 
 
Under the original version of Statute 2331/1995, which included no specific 
relevant provision, the majority of the courts had accepted that the perpetrator of the 
predicate offence could not be punished for money laundering as well.                               
It had been characteristically stated that money laundering presupposed ‗the existence 
of the provided criminal activity a third person, other than the perpetrator of the 
money laundering‘ and that ‗in case of concurrence of the two perpetrators the 
offence is not committed‘1041. It had also been maintained that, contrary to what was 
accepted for the main offender, the accessory to the predicate crime could be punished 
as the perpetrator of the money laundering
1042
. 
A number of justifications had been offered for this exception: it was a case of 
unpunishable self-aiding
1043
; this interpretation was arguably consistent with Directive 
91/308/EEC, which required that the launderer had knowledge of the source of the 
laundered property, indicating thus that he was a different person
1044
; finally, that the 
contrary would lead to a prohibited double punishment of the same act
1045
. 
However, this case law was reversed by Supreme Court decision                          
No. 1231/2004
1046
, which held that the law, while not differentiating, should not be 
interpreted restrictively and, thus, self-laundering should be held to be possible.               
As noted by the prosecutor, the opposite view implies that the later action of money 
laundering is absorbed by the former, which is not the case, given that the two 
offences are committed through separate acts, and each one has its own demerit. The 
prosecutor moreover maintained that ‗it is out of the purpose of the Legislator to 
                                                             
1041 Supreme Court decision No.402/2004, id. See similar decisions: Supreme Court decision No. 
721/2004, id.; Supreme Court decision No.351/2003, id.; Supreme Court decision No. 372/2002, id.; 
Larissa Council of Appeal decision No.50/2004, id.; Athens Council of Appeal decision No. 
1571/2003, Poinika Chronika, 2003, p.1007; Athens Council of Appeal decision No.1270/2003, Poiniki 
Dikaiosini, 2003, p.1075; Piraeus Council of Appeal decision No.109/2003, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2003, 
p.515; Athens Council of Misdemeanours decision No. 3648/2003, Poinika Chronika, 2004, p.64. 
1042 See the prosecutor‘s proposal in Supreme Court decision No. 721/2004, id. 
1043 Dodekanisa Council of Appeal decision No. 85/2005, id.; Thrace Council of Appeal No. 85/2002, 
id. 
1044 Nafplio Council of Appeal decision No. 459/2004, Poinika Chronika, 2007, p.73; Larissa Council 
of Appeal decision No.50/2004, id. 
1045 Athens Council of Misdemeanours decision No. 2171/2005, id. 
1046 It is noteworthy that previous case law was reversed in the midst of, and possibly because of, a big 
judicial scandal, when a number of judges were found to have repeatedly accepted bribes. With this 
reversal, the accused judges were prosecuted not only for the predicate offence of passive bribery, but 
also for money laundering, since the deposit of the money they had received in bank accounts was 
considered a case of concealment punishable under Statute 2331/1995. See for instance the Supreme 
Court decisions No. 570/2006 and No.924/2009. 
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introduce a special category of felonies (art.2 of Statute 2331/1995) and then to accept 
the impunity of these felonies because the offender was also the perpetrator of a 
misdemeanour from those mentioned in art.1 of Statute 2331/1995.                                 
Such a supposition constitutes an absurd relaxation in the suppression of serious 
felonies and is unknown to the theoretical rules of the true congruence of crimes‘1047. 
The debate was terminated by the Legislature, which amended Statute 2331/1995 
with Statute 3424/2005, explicitly providing for the criminalisation of self-laundering. 
However, it should be noted that some courts have continued to deny such                       
a possibility when the original provision of Statute 2331/1995 is applicable, 
maintaining that, pursuant to the original provision, the perpetrator of the predicate 
offence could not be held liable for the money laundering activities as well
1048
. 
 
5. The constitutionality of procedural provisions 
The procedural provision of Statute 2331/2005 most addressed by the courts was 
the irrevocability of the decision of the Council of Appeal which rejected the petition 
for withdrawal of the freeze placed on accounts of the accused, pursuant to article 5 of 
the Statute. The Supreme Court held that the above provision did not violate any 
national or international legislation. According to the Supreme Court, the right of the 
accused to access a court was secured, since he was able to address the judicial 
council and submit his arguments; neither the European Convention of Human Rights 
nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliged the Legislator to 
provide the accused with a second instance procedure in all cases
1049
. It should be 
noted that the new Statute 3691/2008 amended the provision in question, granting the 
accused the right to appeal against the rejecting decision of the Council
1050
. 
Related to procedural provisions is the Opinion of the Prosecutor of the Supreme 
Court No. 12/2007, which referred to the rights and obligations of the Authority of 
art.7 of Statute 2331/1995 and was issued in view of the drawing of the findings of 
the Authority by its Chairman alone and not by its total body. 
                                                             
1047 Supreme Court decision No. 1231/2004, id. The same view is adopted in Supreme Court decision 
570/2006, id.; Supreme Court decision No. 1025/2008, id.; Supreme Court decision No. 924/2009, id.; 
Athens Court of Appeal decision No.2944/2008, Archeio Nomologias, 2009, p.634. 
1048 See Athens Council of Appeal decision No.347/2008, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2009, p.36. A similar 
example is the Athens Council of Misdemeanours decision No.2171/2005, which accepts the 
criminalisation of self-laundering on the basis of the previous case law of the Supreme Court, but states 
the objections to it expressed by academics and in older cases. 
1049 Supreme Court decision No. 1988/2005, NOMOS legal database. 
1050 See art.47 par.4 of Statute 3691/2008. 
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The prosecutor of the Supreme Court examined the investigatory duties of the 
Authority. He did not contest their constitutionality, but he noted that the Authority 
operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor, since the contrary would 
violate the constitutional provisions on the separation of powers. He also noted that 
the material collected by the Authority is examined by the prosecutor and the rest of 
the judicial authorities, who are the only authorities responsible for the administration 
of justice under the Constitution. Finally, he held that the Chairman of the Authority 
could not surpass his authorisations according to the law, and issue the findings of the 
Authority on his own. The prosecutor maintained that the Authority, in this instance, 
should act as a body; therefore, the findings of the Chairman could only be regarded 
as a simple conveyance that could be freely examined and valued by the investigatory 
officers
1051
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1051 Opinion of the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court No.12/2007, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2008, p.38. 
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d. Final Remarks 
 
A common characteristic of all three anti-money laundering Statutes is their late 
adoption, after the expiry of the deadline imposed by the implemented Directives and 
after strong international pressure. The first Directive was implemented with a delay 
of two and a half years, the second with a delay of one and a half year, and the third 
with a delay of almost eight months. It is characteristic that Statute 3424/2005 
implementing the second Directive was adopted almost two months after the adoption 
of the third Directive 2005/60/EC. The Greek Legislator has, thus, kept little contact 
with the developments in European legislation, implementing Directives that had 
already been substituted by more recent legislation. 
An overview of the Greek anti-money laundering legislation and the relevant 
debate leads to the conclusion that the Legislator has ignored most of the critical 
remarks of the academics, although he has had the opportunity to address them in the 
subsequent Statutes. Issues of vagueness, proportionality, and constitutionality persist 
through all three anti-money laundering statutes. It has been noted that, fifteen years 
after the adoption of the first Statute 2331/1995, ‗the Greek legal system appears to be 
struggling with very basic elements of the EU and global regime‘1052. However, it 
should be acknowledged that the third Statute3691/2008 is generally in line with both 
the third Directive and the FATF Recommendations; in the most recent FATF 
evaluation report of 19 February 2010 it is noted that ‗the adoption of the new AML 
Law (2008) has resulted in significant progress with regard to Greece‘s compliance 
with the FATF standards‘1053. It is also noteworthy that even if Greece was placed in 
‗enhanced follow up‘ since the Plenary meeting in October 2009, only few months 
ago, on 20 October 2010, Greece was moved back to ‗regular follow up‘ since it has 
made ‗significant progress and has continued to improve its system‘. According to the 
FATF, Greece is now ‗required to fully comply with special Recommendation III 
regarding a comprehensive system of freezing assets of suspected terrorists‘1054. 
Nevertheless, once should not ignore the fact that Greece succeed in this because it 
                                                             
1052 Mitsilegas V., ‗The Impact of the European Union on the Greek Criminal Justice System‘, in L. 
Cheliotis and S. Xenakis (Eds), ‗Crime and punishment in contemporary Greece‘, Peter Lang 
Publishers, Forthcoming.  
1053 See FATF Mutual Evaluation Interim Follow-up Report of 19 February 2010, par.7; in the 
following par.8 it is furthermore stated that ‗Greece has reached a good level of compliance with most 
of the core recommendations‘. 
1054 See FATF/PLEAN 2010 (55) of 30 September 2010. 
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followed the Recommendations by FATF and changed its law accordingly.                     
The FATF, thus, has played a very significant role in the adoption of the Greek anti-
money laundering legislation.  
The application of the anti-money laundering provisions by courts appears to be             
–so some extent- problematic. An overview of the case-law showcases the broad 
application of the relevant legislation which sometimes leads to abuse of the relevant 
legislation, in particular with regard to common criminal activities that fall out of the 
scope of the European legislation and the FATF Recommendations. As has been 
noted
1055
, and this seems to be the reality, Greek judges often use the anti-money 
legislation as the ‗easiest solution‘ for the characterization of a criminal act.                       
Thus, a stricter interpretation of the Statute and a better perception of the nature and 
meaning of money laundering as well as training seminars for the judges in the money 
laundering legislation, should lead Greek courts towards a more meaningful 
interpretation of Statute 3691/2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1055 Interview with X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, 
26/07/10. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
The contact of the Greek legal order with European criminal law has not always 
produced a fortunate outcome. Implementing legislation has usually been met with 
harsh criticism by academics, who have regularly pronounced it vague, 
disproportionate, and unconstitutional. Critics speak of the formation of a new, 
repressive criminal law, which moves further from its liberal roots, and of the triumph 
of expediency over legality and the rule of law
1056
. It is telling that the dilemma 
between ‗security and freedom‘ features prominently in a number of studies on the 
new criminal provisions
1057
. 
On the other hand, the application of the new provisions in the case law has not 
been very encouraging. Apart from a few high profile cases concerning Greek 
terrorist organisations and a trial-fixing ring, legislation about organized crime and 
money laundering has been mostly applied against low-level criminal activities, 
already satisfactorily punished under the Criminal Code. The resulting excessive 
penalization of common offences reinforced the expressed objections. 
Characteristically, given the way the respective legislation is often applied by the 
courts, a member of a group of three persons that commits distinguished frauds,          
who subsequently deposits the ensuing money in a bank account, could face three 
separate sentences of incarceration from five to ten years
1058
. 
The failings of the implementing legislation, however, do not necessarily entail 
respective failings in the implemented legal documents. Indeed, the Council 
Directives and Framework Decisions are specifically targeted against big-scale 
criminals that, due to their high level of organisation, and advanced technical and 
financial means, pose a significant threat to social peace and security. The 
development of international criminal networks in these areas of crime, moreover, 
underlines the necessity of more uniform criminal provisions in Member States and 
closer cooperation, goals that are advanced through the European legislation. 
                                                             
1056 See among others Simeonidou-Kastanidou, ‗The initiatives of the European Union for the 
confrontation of terrorism and of organized crime‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2000, p.195, (in Greek). 
1057 Examples include Manoledakis, ‗Security and Freedom (Interpretation of Statute 2928/2001 on 
organised crime and relevant texts), Sakkoulas, 2002; Manoledakis, ―State security or freedom?‘, in 
Manitakis, Takis (eds.), Terrorism and rights: from state security to law insecurity, Savvalas, 2005, 
pp.23-31, (in Greek); Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗The notion of organised crime in E.U. – The criminal law 
between the citizens‘ security and freedom‘, Poiniki Dikaiosini, 2003, pp.538-552, (in Greek). 
1058 Based on art.386 par.3 of the Criminal Code (fraud), art.187 par.1 of the Criminal Code (criminal 
organization), and art.45 par.1 of Statute 3691/2008 (money laundering). 
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The role, thus, of EU legislation in the effective fight against modern criminal 
networks is, undoubtedly, important. Inevitably, the relevant European provisions are 
broad and sometimes even vague, as they attempt to encompass a range of more or 
less different legal orders. For this reason the national Legislator should, at the stage 
of their implementation, use the discretionary power granted to him so as to adjust 
and reconcile them with his domestic legal order. 
The Greek Legislator did almost nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he often 
repeated the European provision word for word in the implementing law and that 
because of international pressure and because they were overdue. The verbatim 
translation of an EU Directive as a method of transposal into national law tends to be 
a task of doubtful benefit in most cases. In the case of Greece, the result was a 
problematic, often poor implementation, characterised by inconsistencies, vagueness 
and absurdities, that ignored and fragmented the pre-existing structure of the Greek 
criminal law system and its differences from other European systems
1059
. In addition 
to that, it has been noted that many contested provisions were not imposed by 
European legislation, but were introduced by the Greek Legislator alone
1060
. Thus, the 
domestic Legislator seems to be more interested in appearing in conformity with the 
European provisions, than in adopting an effective, high-quality body of 
legislation
1061
.  
The possible poor quality of Greek implementing Statutes, thus, should not reflect 
on the relevant European provisions, nor should it be attributed to them. Community 
law is an important tool towards the effective confrontation of a series of dangerous 
cross-border criminal activities. It is the duty of the Greek Legislator to ensure that, in 
the future, implementation of such law will focus on a substantial rather than a 
superficial approach to its provisions, always in the light of the rest of the domestic 
criminal law system. 
                                                             
1059 Kaiafa-Gbandi gives as an example of uncritical implementation the provision of the last paragraph 
of art.3 of Statute 3691/2008, which renders a predicate offence all crimes punished with imprisonment 
for more than six months. While the above minimum limit is placed by the Directive 2005/60/EC, she 
notes that it was explicitly adopted as an indicator of a serious crime, which is true in most European 
legal orders. However, the Greek Criminal Code imposes on the whole heavier sentences. Therefore, 
the limitation in question should be modified with a view to the requirement of the severity of the 
offence, so as to better accommodate the Greek legal reality. See Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‗Penalization of 
money laundering: Basic characteristics of Statute 3691/2008 and the limits of the rule of law‘, Poinika 
Chronika, 2008, p.920, (in Greek). 
1060 Papakyriakou, ‗The criminal legislation on the suppression of money laundering as a fundamental 
axis of a new model of criminal policy‘, in Honorary Volume for Ioannis Manoledakis II: Studies on 
criminal law, criminology, and history of crime, Sakkoulas, p.517, (in Greek). 
1061 Pavlou, ‗Criminal Law and the ‗Framework Decisions‘ of E.U. Another (dangerous) point of 
entrance of the European criminal law in the Greek one‘, Poinika Chronika, 2004, p.977, (in Greek). 
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Chapter 
5 
                                  Conclusion 
       
‘What has been the impact of EU criminal law on the Greek legal order?’ 
 
European Criminal Law seems to have come of age and to now play the role in the 
European law previously reserved to commercial law, banking, finance law and 
private law. It is undoubtedly a rapidly growing area of Law as well as one of most 
contested areas of EU action, whose impact on national law is already clear and will 
be more significant in years. The development of European Criminal Law is, 
indisputably, very much connected with national sovereignty seriously affecting the 
relationship between the individual and the State as well as fundamental rights which 
must be equally protected while finding a balance between, on the one hand, the 
overriding interests of public security and, on the other hand, the rights of the 
individual. Member States have chosen in a number of fields of common interest to 
transfer the power of criminal law from their national field to the European. However, 
this –in principle- political consensus has, often, been challenged by the national 
Constitutional Courts leading to very significant changes in the national (often 
Constitutional) laws of various Member States, and hence, to a rethinking of national 
sovereignty and territoriality. 
As to the two systems of law-making in the European Union in the field of 
criminal law, namely harmonization and mutual recognition, while the political focus 
has been largely on mutual recognition, European integration in the field of criminal 
law has been progressing, in fact, via the symbiotic relationship between these two 
different systems.  
However, the Treaty of Lisbon suggests that the model of integration in the field 
of criminal law should be seen, firstly, in the light of mutual recognition, rather than 
through substantive harmonization. Even if it is common sense that combating serious 
and international crime needs cooperation between Member States, the latter are more 
reluctant towards the harmonization of criminal law, while instead it seems that 
mutual recognition is less harmful to their national sovereignty, even if it does not 
involve commonly negotiated standards. This happens because mutual recognition 
requires fewer changes to national criminal laws in order to implement Union law, 
and thus, is preferable. This further suggests that the cooperation of Member States in 
the sensitive field of criminal law is based mainly on two key concepts: mutual trust 
and automaticity.  
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On the other hand, it seems that mutual recognition can better serve its purposes 
through a minimum harmonization. It may well be that full harmonization of criminal 
laws is something unrealistic at this stage due to lack of consensus between Member 
States, but, this should not –and in fact, cannot- mean that mutual recognition can 
smoothly operate in the long term only on the basis of mutual trust, without any 
degree of minimum -at least- harmonization. In this light, harmonization should be 
seen, not as an alternative, but as complementary to the mutual recognition principle 
and its purpose to create a common European area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. 
However, both avenues of EU action have created considerable obligations for 
Member States towards implementing the EU acquis in the field of criminal law. 
Greece is a good example in demonstrating that the implementation of EU 
criminal law has not been an easy task. It is not the case, like other European 
countries, having Constitutional conflicts in its domestic legal order while 
implementing the EU criminal law instruments into the Greek jurisdiction.                      
On contrast, apart from the expressed controversial debate that has taken place 
regarding the various EU criminal law instruments and their legality, Greece is the 
case that has showed very slow implementation, most of the times under international 
pressure as the implementation was overdue after the expiry date of implementation, 
and also with a large number of instruments being not, yet, implemented due to 
various reasons. This, however, at least suggests that Greece (at least as far as the 
politicians are concerned), despite the willingness to support the effort for a common 
European judicial area in the field of criminal law, it has practically, rather, showed a 
limited degree of interest to fully comply with the EU requirements and efforts in 
order to combat serious types of crimes. On the other hand, this should also concern 
the European Union itself and its future, as such attitudes without any consequence 
for the Member State that breaches its obligations to fully comply -on time- with                
EU requirements, may jeopardize the efforts of Europe towards the creation of 
European Criminal law and its determination to fight against serious crimes that 
threaten its values and goals.  
This is of greater consideration given the expressed concerns that have arisen in 
respect of the protection of fundamental rights since the European Union has 
introduced instruments that endanger human rights as established in the various 
international and national Human Rights Charters. The case study of Greece has 
proved that the protection of fundamental rights is very much linked to the Greek 
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national sovereignty and, thus, plays a key role in the development of the 
implementation of EU criminal law in Greece. It may well be that in the effort of the 
European Union to create a genuine area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the current 
focus, from the EU perspective, is on ‗Security‘, but from the Greek‘s perspective,           
it seems that the main priority is on ‗Freedom‘. It this context, it is clear that as far as 
Greece is concerned, any instrument or principle which is related to the field of 
criminal law, will have its boundaries in the guarantee that these measures are 
accompanied by the effective protection of human rights. If this is not sufficiently 
guaranteed, then, Greece will raise its serious objections.  
The way that the Greek Legislator has implemented EU requirements has also 
been, most of the times, in the wrong line, often criticized by the European 
Commission, as Greece has chosen to simply copy EU standards without any further 
modification of the national criminal and criminal procedure codes, leading to many 
contradictions to the domestic national criminal law, to excessive criminalization of 
common offences and, sometimes, the judges to a blind alley.  However, one should 
note that in the case of Greece it is, in fact, the majority of Judges (and not the 
politicians) who try to find in these –often- poor quality implementing laws 
explanatory ways in order to adjust EU requirements into the Greek legal order and 
overcome various –even Constitutional- fears and concerns and, thus, to 
accommodate the operation of these EU standards.   
However, one should note that this overcriminalization is due to the uncritical and 
copied implementation of EU law into the Greek legal order, and not because of EU 
law itself. As discussed throughout this thesis, EU law (in particular Framework 
Decisions and post-Lisbon Directives) dictates the objective to be achieved, but leave 
Member States the means through which to best implement  EU law and fully adjust 
EU requirements into the national legal order. However, the Greek implementation of 
substantive criminal law on the one hand and of the European Arrest Warrant on the 
other, suggest that there is a differentiation while implementing them. The case study 
of the EAW has shown that the Legislator and the Judges have taken more care to 
adjust it to the domestic constitutional reality, than in the case of the substantive 
crimes where legislation has been mostly applied to low-level criminal activities, 
already satisfactorily being punished under the Criminal Code. 
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However, despite these obstacles, the reality is that Greece has succeed in 
creating,  in response to EU requirements in the criminal justice field, a legislative and 
operational framework of action in combating serious types of crimes,                      
which previously did not exist to such an extent. The truth is that Greece in the 1970s 
went through a seven year dictatorship where terrorism was thought to be something 
‗foreign‘ being outside of the Greek borders. However, Greece has shifted its 
perception and now has introduced specific offences regarding terrorism.                      
Also, a few years ago there was a perception in Greece that (mainly for political 
reasons) organized crime did not exist in the country in a significant manner, 
minimizing in that way the importance of the demerit of organised crime.               
However, Greece has, now, introduced specific offences that previously did not exist 
in this field. Further, in previous years, Greece was the case that allowed (in fact 
implicitly) laundered money to get in its financial system. Nonetheless, the country 
has also now a detailed framework in order to combat money laundering.                           
Also, it has implemented the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
which is now successfully operating in the Greek jurisdiction. Thus, answering           
the question put forward in the introduction of the thesis, this is, in fact,                        
the added value and the ultimate impact of EU criminal law and policy on the Greek 
criminal justice system, as all the above instruments would not be part of the Greek 
legal order, at least to such an extent, if European Union did not focus its interest in 
the field of criminal law. In other words, all these instruments are the result of EU 
action in criminal matters. Its significance on the Greek jurisdiction is, thus, clear.  
Despite the fact that there is not sufficient and systematic scientific legal research 
on the overall impact of the implementation of the EU criminal law on the Greek legal 
order, the reality is that in almost all the separate studies and publications regarding 
different issues of criminal law, one will now find references to the EU developments 
in the field and its impact on the Greek jurisdiction. This constitutes, undoubtedly, 
evidence of the importance that Greek jurisprudence attaches to EU criminal law, as 
this has happened only in the last few years. On the contrary, in the past, EU criminal 
law seemed to be something ‗foreign‘ and ‗unknown‘, with the Greek law perceived 
to be superior law to the European. This shift is a sign of maturity regarding not only 
the academics, but also the judges and, to some extent, the politicians. 
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Furthermore, the modification in 2001 by the Parliament of article 28 of the Greek 
Constitution which states that the latter is a foundation for the participation of the 
country in the procedures of the European integration proves the importance that the 
Greek Constitutional Legislator has attached to EU law. This is because this new 
provision has made, in practical terms, more operative and effective the 
implementation as well as the interpretation of many EU criminal law standards and 
provisions. All these, however, prove that EU law has modernized and streamlined 
Greek law and has made it international.  
On the other hand, the discussion over the two systems for law making suggests 
that the debate on the harmonization of criminal laws in the EU (both substantive and 
procedural) remains from the Greek point of view a necessary condition to the further 
development of judicial cooperation based on mutual recognition.                       
Indeed, the Greek case suggests that the principle of mutual recognition is not a 
sufficient condition for long term judicial cooperation in the field of criminal law.       
It is thus felt that, from the Greek perspective, at least a minimum level of 
harmonization of laws is also needed in order for this cooperation to operate 
effectively now and in the long term. This will facilitate more efficiently the objective 
set for the Union to become an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and will 
increase the mutual trust between the judicial authorities of Member States which, 
however, already share the same highly demanding concept of the rule of law.  
Undoubtedly, the debate on EU criminal law was primarily focused within a 
constitutional context having as a central question whether the Community had 
competence to adopt criminal law measures or if it was an exclusive competence 
belonging to the Union and the third pillar. Yet, the European Court of Justice gave 
significant answers to these questions by accepting Community competence in order 
to achieve the effectiveness of Community Law and also (perhaps most significantly) 
by applying fundamental criminal law principles (such as the ne bis in idem principle) 
to the Union/Community sphere. Nevertheless, it is felt that the new era introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon will have a substantial impact on the development of EU 
criminal law. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, at least, promises a more 
fertile debate on the development of European Criminal Law without any more 
references to the question ‗who has the competence‘, but rather to ‗what kind of EU 
criminal law Europe needs and wants‘; and this is left to be seen.  
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Annex: (1) 
 
GREECE as the executing the EAW State:  
 
 
 
 
 
Public Prosecutor by  
the Court of Appeal 
   EAW 
CONSENT  
NO  -  YES 
Presidening Judge 
of the Court of 
Appeal 
Judicial Council of 
the Court of Appeal 
Right 
of 
hearing 
Final 
decision 
within 
10 days 
Right to 
appear and 
be heard           
in person 
Final 
decision 
within 60 
after the 
arrest 
Right to appeal to the 
Supreme Court within 
24 h following the 
publication of               
the decision 
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Annex: (2) 
 
 
Grounds for refusal regarded as mandatory in the Council Framework Decision on 
the EAW: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framework Decision                                                 Greek Implementing Law 
 
Article 3 (1) - (amnesty)                                   Article 11 (a) – (amnesty) 
 
 
Article 3 (2) – (final decision)                     Article 11 (b) - (irrevocable decision) 
 
 
Article 3 (3) – (criminal responsibility)      Article 11 (c) - (criminal responsibility) 
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Annex: (3) 
 
 
Grounds for refusal regarded as optional in the Council Framework Decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Framework Decision                                         Greek Implementing Law 
    Article 4 (1)                                                      Article 10 (1) (a) MANDATORY 
 
 
    Article 4 (2)                                                 Article 11 (h)  MANDATORY only 
                                                                                            for Greek nationals 
 
   Article 4 (3)                                                   Article 12 (b), (c) OPTIONAL 
 
 
Article 4 (4)                                                     Article 11 (d)  MANDATORY 
 
   Article 4 (5)                                                       Article 12 (d)  OPTIONAL 
 
 
  Article 4 (6)                                               Article 11 (f)  MANDATORY only for 
                                                                             Greek nationals 
                                                   Article 12 (e)  OPTIONAL for 
                                                                                           domiciled and residents   
 
Article 4 (7)                                                     Article 11 (g) MANDATORY 
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Annex: (4) 
Statistics on the operation of the EAW in Greece 
1062
 
 
A. GREECE as the Issuing the EAW State:  
 
2006: 
 53 EAW were issued, 43 of which were transmitted through Interpol and 47 
through SIS 
 4 of these resulted in the effective surrender 
46%
50%
4%
Interpol
SIS
effective surrender
 
B. GREECE as the Executing the EAW State:  
 79 EAW were received in all the Courts of Appeal of Greece 
 From these: 
 60 persons were arrested 
 45 were effectively surrendered 
 31 consented to the surrender 
 14 did not consent 
 In 12 cases the Greek judicial authorities refused the execution on the 
following reasons: lack of common legal basis (3 cases), revocal of the EAW 
by the issuing State (1 case), statutory limitation cases (1 case), refusal on the 
                                                             
1062 These are the officially provided statistics by the Greek Ministry of Justice.  
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grounds of article 4 par.6 (5 cases) and 7a (1 case) and of article 3 par. 2 (1 
case).  
37%
28%
19%
9%
7%
arrested
effectively surrendered
consented to the surrender
did not consent
refused
 
 
 The requested person is surrendered roughly between 10 and 30 days (if he 
consents) and 20 days to 4 months (if he doesn‘t consent)   
 In 11 cases the Greek judicial authorities executed the EAW with regard to a 
Greek national 
 In 9 cases the Greek judicial authorities requested a guarantee under article 5 
(3) of the Framework Decision  
 In 1 case the Greek judicial authorities requested additional guarantees under 
article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Framework Decision 
 
2008 statistics: 
 
 There is an increase of around 30% of the received EAW 
 The Court of Appeal in Athens has issued 71 EAW 
 The Court of Appeal in Athens has received 77 EAW 
 35 of the received arrest warrants were successfully executed and surrendered 
in the issuing State 
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2009 statistics
1063
: 
 Greece has issued 116 European Arrest Warrants 
 Of these 84 were transmitted via Interpol and 87 via the SIS 
 Of these 19 resulted in the effective surrender of the person sought 
 The Greek judicial authorities has received 216 EAW 
 178 persons have been arrested under a EAW whereas 127 have been 
effectively surrendered  
 Of those surrendered 94 have consented to the surrender whereas 33 did not 
consent  
 In 23 cases the Greek judicial authorities refused the execution of a EAW 
(using as grounds for refusal: art. 11 par. F in eight cases; art. 11 par. D in 
two cases; art. 11 par.H in two cases; art. 10 par.1 a in one case; art.11 par. B 
in seven cases; art. 11 par.G in one case; and art.12 par. a in two cases.)  
 The time between the arrest and the decision on the surrender of the person 
sought is 10 to 30 days in cases of consent, whereas in cases of non consent 
the time is 15 to 120 days 
 In 27 cases the Greek Judicial authorities executed an EAW with regard to a 
national or resident of Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1063 See the ‗Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical operation of the 
European Arrest Warrant‘, Council Doc. 7551/6/10, REV 6, Brussels, 16 November 2010.  
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Annex: (5) 
 
 
List of Persons Interviewed  
 
 
 Mr. Vasilios Skouris - President of the European Court of Justice  
09 January 2010. 
 X official of the Greek Ministry of Justice.                                                                    
28 March 2008. 
 Mr. Chamilothoris Ioannis – Presiding Judge at the Court of Appeal of Athens. 
24 March 2008. 
 Mr. Pantelis – Public Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal of Athens.                           
28 March 2008.  
 Mr. Anagnostopoulos Ilias – Professor of Law at the University of Athens – 
Attorney at Law. 02 May 2008. 
 Mr. Vgontzas – Attorney at Law.                                                                                  
02 May 2008. 
 Ms Olga Tsolka – Assistant Professor at the University of Athens – Attorney 
at Law. 19 September 2008.  
 Mr. Karanikolas Athanasios – Attorney at Law.                                               
28 March 2008. 
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